Economic growth, corruption and tax evasion
Cerqueti, R and Coppier, R (2011). Economic growth, corruption and tax evasion. Economic Modelling. 28 (1-2), pp. 489-500.
|Authors||Cerqueti, R and Coppier, R|
In this paper, we explore tax revenues in a regime of widespread corruption in a growth model. We develop a Ramsey model of economic growth with a rival but non-excludable public good which is financed by taxes which can be evaded via corrupt tax inspectors. We prove that the relationship between the tax rate and tax collection, in a dynamic framework, is not unique, but is different depending on the relevance of the “shame effect”. We show that in all three cases — “low, middle and high shame” countries, the growth rate increases as the tax rate increases up to a threshold value, after which the growth rate begins to decrease as the tax rate increases. But, for intermediate tax rates, the rate of growth for “low shame” countries is lower than that of “uniform shame” countries which is, in turn, lower than that of “high shame” countries. This happens because the growth rate is more sensitive to variations of t in an honest country rather than in a corrupt country.
|Keywords||Corruption; EvasionTax revenues; Economic growth|
|Journal citation||28 (1-2), pp. 489-500|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI)||doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2010.07.006|
|Online||15 Sep 2010|
|Publication process dates|
|Accepted||30 Jul 2010|
|Deposited||07 Apr 2020|
|Accepted author manuscript|
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