Corruptibility and tax evasion
Journal article
Cerqueti, R. and Coppier, R. (2015). Corruptibility and tax evasion. European Journal of Law and Economics. 39 (2), pp. 355-373. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-013-9406-z
Authors | Cerqueti, R. and Coppier, R. |
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Abstract | Reduction of fiscal evasion may be pursued by introducing incentive schemes for tax inspectors. The aim of this paper is to explain the role of such bonuses in an economic environment with corruption, i.e. in a world where entrepreneurs and tax inspectors are open to bribery. In detail, we analyze the role of a public incentive scheme, where the tax inspector’s bargaining strength is endogenous with respect to an incentive mechanism: indeed the knowledge that even if an entrepreneur does not agree to pay the bribe, s/he can report tax evasion and be partly rewarded for this, increases the tax inspector’s bargaining strength. This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in European Journal of Law and Economics. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10657-013-9406-z |
Year | 2015 |
Journal | European Journal of Law and Economics |
Journal citation | 39 (2), pp. 355-373 |
Publisher | Springer |
ISSN | 0929-1261 |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-013-9406-z |
Web address (URL) | https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10657-013-9406-z |
Publication dates | |
Apr 2015 | |
Online | 05 Jul 2013 |
Publication process dates | |
Accepted | 13 Jun 2013 |
Deposited | 09 Mar 2020 |
Accepted author manuscript | License File Access Level Open |
https://openresearch.lsbu.ac.uk/item/8936w
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