A game for exploring political and bureaucratic corruption
Journal article
Cerqueti, R. and Coppier, R. (2016). A game for exploring political and bureaucratic corruption. IMA Journal of Management Mathematics. 29 (2), pp. 151-173. https://doi.org/10.1093/imaman/dpw017
Authors | Cerqueti, R. and Coppier, R. |
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Abstract | This article deals with the relationship between bureaucratic corruption and political corruption from the perspective of the industrial structure of a country. In so doing, we discuss whether political corruption and bureaucratic corruption can coexist. For this purpose, a suitable theoretical game model with imperfect information is constructed and solved.We demonstrate that the size of capital of a specific firm influences the decision of such firm to bribe the bureaucrat or lobby the government. Therefore, political and bureaucratic corruption are substitutes at the level of the firm because they depend on the capital of the firm, but they can coexist at a macro level. Some numerical experiments validate the theoretical model. |
Year | 2016 |
Journal | IMA Journal of Management Mathematics |
Journal citation | 29 (2), pp. 151-173 |
Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) |
ISSN | 1471-678X |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1093/imaman/dpw017 |
Publication dates | |
Online | 03 Oct 2016 |
Publication process dates | |
Accepted | 05 Sep 2016 |
Deposited | 28 Feb 2020 |
Accepted author manuscript | License File Access Level Open |
https://openresearch.lsbu.ac.uk/item/892z0
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Accepted author manuscript
s1-ln2204902295844769-1939656818Hwf-1675753888IdV202808034622049022PDF_HI0001.pdf | ||
License: CC BY 4.0 | ||
File access level: Open |
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