Why a right to life rules out infanticide: A final reply to Räsänen
Rodger, D and Blackshaw, B (2019). Why a right to life rules out infanticide: A final reply to Räsänen. Bioethics.
|Authors||Rodger, D and Blackshaw, B|
Joona Räsänen has argued that pro-life arguments against the permissibility of infanticide are not persuasive, and fail to show it to be immoral. We responded to Räsänen’s arguments, concluding that his critique of pro-life arguments was misplaced. Räsänen has recently replied in ‘Why pro-life arguments still are not convincing: a reply to my critics’, providing some additional arguments as to why he does not find pro-life arguments against infanticide convincing. Here, we respond briefly to Räsänen’s critique of the substance view, and also to his most important claim: that possession of a right to life by an infant does not rule out the permissibility of infanticide. We demonstrate that this claim has little support, and conclude that Räsänen has not refuted pro-life arguments against infanticide.
|Keywords||Infanticide; Rights; Animalism|
|Publication process dates|
|Deposited||06 Jun 2019|
|Accepted||01 Jun 2019|
|Accepted author manuscript|
CC BY-NC 4.0
Accepted author manuscript
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