Sequential Elimination in Multi-stage All-pay Auctions
Journal article
Robertson, M. (2024). Sequential Elimination in Multi-stage All-pay Auctions. Economics Letters. 241, p. 111827. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111827
Authors | Robertson, M. |
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Abstract | I study a multi-stage all-pay auction in which the lowest bidder in each stage is eliminated. Elimination continues until only two bidders remain, one of whom wins the auction. I analyse optimal bidding behaviour and the seller’s expected revenue when bidders have independent and private values. In contrast to typical bidding strategies, the optimal bid in each stage is strictly decreasing in the number of bidders. For a fixed number of bidders, however, bids increase as bidders progress through the stages of the auction. Despite independent values, this multi-stage auction yields less expected revenue to the seller than its single-stage counterpart when there are more than three bidders. |
Keywords | All-pay auctions; Elimination stages ; Expected revenue; Bidding strategies |
Year | 2024 |
Journal | Economics Letters |
Journal citation | 241, p. 111827 |
Publisher | Elsevier |
ISSN | 0165-1765 |
1873-7374 | |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111827 |
Web address (URL) | https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176524003112 |
Publication dates | |
29 Jun 2024 | |
Online | 25 Jun 2024 |
Publication process dates | |
Accepted | 20 Jun 2024 |
Deposited | 09 Jul 2024 |
Publisher's version | License File Access Level Open |
Accepted author manuscript | License File Access Level Controlled |
https://openresearch.lsbu.ac.uk/item/979yy
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Publisher's version
Sequential Elimination in Multi-stage All-pay Auctions.pdf | ||
License: CC BY 4.0 | ||
File access level: Open |
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