

1 **How decision-makers' sense and state of power induce**
2 **propensity to take financial risks**

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19 **Ethical approval:** All procedures performed in studies involving human participants were in

20 accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional and/or national research committee

21 and with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical 22

standards. The Ethics Board of the Faculty of Psychology University of Warsaw approved the 23

studies.

24 **Informed consent:** Informed consent was obtained from all individual participants included

25 in the studies.

26 **Data and Original Materials Availability Statement:** The complete datasets can be found
27 at the Open Science Framework (OSF):
28 The original materials for both studies can be found in Supplementary Materials.
29

30 **ABSTRACT**

31 We present two studies ($N_1 = 104$, and $N_2 = 359$) investigating how sense of power (trait) and
32 state of power affect participants' risky financial decisions in the domains of investment and
33 gambling. Moreover, we explored whether a situationally induced state of power moderates the
34 relationship between sense of power (trait) and propensity to take financial risks. The studies
35 demonstrated that the level of sense of power was positively associated with the riskiness of
36 investment portfolios and gambling choices. A similar pattern was observed when a state of
37 power/powerlessness was situationally induced: participants in high-power conditions took
38 greater investment and gambling risks than did those in low-power conditions. Importantly, we
39 found an interaction between trait and state power. For participants in the high-power condition,
40 there was a positive relationship between sense of power and propensity to take financial risks.
41 In contrast, there was no such relationship for those in the low-power condition.

42

43

44 **Keywords:**

45 power, financial risk, investment, gambling

46

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48 **JEL Classification codes:** D1, D19, D14, G4, G40

49 **Introduction**

50 Power is often defined as asymmetric control over valued resources in social relations
51 (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). A number of studies indicate that greater power fosters risk-taking
52 behaviors in various situations, such as negotiations (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Magee et al.,
53 2007), taking a card in a game of blackjack (Galinsky et al., 2003) engaging in unprotected sex
54 (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006), marital infidelity (Lammers et al., 2011), and food consumption
55 (Kim et al., 2018). However, little is known about the way differences in power influence risky
56 personal financial choices, and it is not clear whether people in positions of power and people
57 lacking power differ in terms of their preferred financial risk-levels or whether they invest their
58 money in different ways (e.g., by choosing financial instruments with different levels of risk).
59 The greater propensity of powerful people to take risks has been demonstrated only on the
60 corporate level. Specifically, studies have demonstrated that power held by CEOs is positively
61 related to excessive and unmanaged risk-taking in a firm; for example, misconduct of banks

62 (Altunbaş et al., 2018), the decision to pursue a strategy of specializing in subprime lending,
63 which poses a high risk of default (Lewellyn & Muller-Kahle, 2012), or risk taken by banks
64 (Altunbaş et al., 2020). However, there is a great difference between the way business and
65 personal finances are managed. Thus, results about power wielded by CEOs cannot simply be
66 assumed to be true for investment choices on an individual level. Moreover, the results obtained
67 in other risk-taking domains do not necessarily translate to the financial domain because
68 people's propensity to take risks is not consistent across all decision domains (Hanoch, Johnson,
69 & Wilke, 2006; Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002) and might differ even across different financial
70 domains (Vlaev, Kusev, Stewart, Aldrovandi, & Chater, 2010).

71 Individual variation in one's perceived ability to influence other people is considered an
72 individual difference (trait) variable (Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2012). At the same time, a
73 plethora of research has demonstrated that power is also a psychological state, and that feelings
74 of power or powerlessness can be activated by a number of factors (see Rucker, Galinsky, &
75 Dubois, 2012 for a review). Situational cues to the possession of power create a sense of power,
76 which in turn produces a range of cognitive, behavioral, and physiological consequences (see
77 Galinsky, Rucker, & Magee, 2015 for a further review of the psychology and consequences of
78 power).

79 It is important to note that people can find themselves under the joint influence of both
80 state and trait power. However, such situations are seldom considered in research. Few existing
81 studies have demonstrated that the pattern of interactions between sense of power and power
82 manifested as a state is not straightforward (Chen, Langner, & Mendoza-Denton, 2009; Strelan,
83 Weick, & Vasiljevic, 2014). Thus, little is known about the way such an interaction might
84 influence the making of risky financial decisions. Nevertheless, some assumptions can be made
85 based on research that focuses on the interaction between situationally induced power and other
86 traits. This research indicates that individuals exhibiting power act more in line with their
87 dispositional tendencies than do individuals lacking power (Bargh & Raymond, 1995; Chen et
88 al., 2001; Côté et al., 2011). If this pattern of results were also to occur for situational power
89 and power understood as a trait, people with an experimentally heightened state of power would
90 act in line with their levels of power as a trait, whereas an experimentally induced lack of power
91 would lead a person to make decisions similar to those made by people characterized by lower
92 power (as a trait).

93 The current article focuses on how people’s levels of power influence their risky
94 financial decisions in two domains: investment decisions and gambling. We treat power as an
95 individual difference (trait) characteristic and also experimentally induce power as a state.
96 Moreover, we explore the interaction effect between these two variables on participants’
97 propensity to take financial risks. The results of our two studies demonstrate that power is a
98 significant predictor of risky financial decisions. One’s level of sense of power (trait) is
99 positively related to risk choices in both investment and gambling tasks. A similar pattern was
100 observed when states of power/powerlessness were situationally induced: participants in
101 highpower conditions took greater investment and gambling risks than did those in low-power
102 conditions. Importantly, interactions between trait and state power were observed. For people
103 in the high-power condition, there was a positive relationship between sense of power and
104 propensity to take financial risks. In contrast, there was no such relationship for people in the
105 low-power condition. This suggests that when people find themselves in a position of having
106 little power, their sense of power does not influence their subsequent decisions in the manner
107 that has been demonstrated in previous studies.

108

109 *1.1 Hypotheses and the current studies*

110 Drawing on previous research, we expect individuals exhibiting power to behave in a
111 riskier manner in financial contexts than those with less power, and that this will be the case for
112 both trait and state power. Accordingly, there is evidence that powerful and powerless people
113 differ in their propensity to make risky financial choices, especially considering their
114 differences with respect to rewards and punishments (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002). Moreover,
115 studies indicate that power generally increases the tendency for people to make risky decisions
116 in various life domains (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006) and powerful people tend to be optimistic
117 in their risk assessments (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006), overconfident (Fast et al., 2012), and
118 have the illusion of control over outcomes (Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2009).

119 Finally, based on research demonstrating that powerful individuals act more in line with
120 their dispositional tendencies than individuals who lack power (Bargh & Raymond, 1995; Chen
121 et al., 2001; Côté et al., 2011), we predict that people in a state of power will act in line with
122 their trait power. In this group, we expect that increasing levels of trait power will be related to
123 a greater propensity to take financial risks. Conversely, for the group of participants with an
124 experimentally induced lack of power, we expect that there will not be such a relationship.

125 Specifically, we anticipate that the financial risk preferences of participants in this group will
126 be similar to those of people with lower levels of trait power.

127 The studies were conducted using the online Polish ARIADNA participant panel, which
128 has over 110,000 active adult panel members. E-mail invitations were sent to potential
129 participants, diverse in terms of their age, gender, and level of education. Each email contained
130 a unique link to the study that worked only once and only for the particular panel member.
131 When the participant clicked on the link, they were transferred to ARIADNA's research
132 platform and, after reading the information about the study and giving informed consent, the
133 participant started the study. Participants who took part in the first study were not invited to the
134 second study and were therefore unable to take part in it.

135 Respondents were awarded points for participating that they could later exchange for
136 rewards from a pool of several hundred products offered by the platform running the panel.
137 Additionally, extra points were awarded to participants depending on their choices during
138 gambling tasks. Informed consent was obtained from all participants. The Ethics Board of the
139 University of Warsaw's Faculty of Psychology approved both studies. In both studies,
140 collection of data was not continued after data analysis commenced. We declare that we have
141 reported all implemented experimental conditions and disclosed all measured variables. We
142 have also reported all the studies we have performed on the research question of this paper.

143 **2 Study 1. Sense of power and propensity to take financial risks**

144 *2.1 Study aim*

145 Study 1 aimed to examine whether sense of power is positively related to people's propensity
146 to take two types of financial risk: investment and gambling risks.

147 *2.2 Method*

148 *2.2.1 Participants*

149 A total of 104 Polish working adults (53 female and 51 male; aged 19–64 years, $M = 37.18$
150 years, $SD = 9.49$) took part in the study.¹

151 *2.2.2 Materials and procedure*

152 **Sense of power.** Participants' sense of power was measured using the Generalized Sense of
153 Power Scale (Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2012), on which participants were asked to report
154 their generalized beliefs about the power they have in their relationships with others. The Scale
155 was translated into Polish using the translation/back-translation procedure in accordance with

156 WHO guidelines (Whodas 2.0 Translation Package, n.d). We decided to use 5-point scales
157 because the panelists who took part in the study were used to online studies with 5-point scales,
158 Krosnick and Presser (2010) found very similar effects for 5-point and 7-point scales, and the
159 Generalized Sense of Power Scale has been previously successfully implemented with 5-point
160 scales (also by one of the authors of the scale: van Kleef, Oveis, Homan, van der Löwe, &
161 Keltner, 2015). Participants were asked to rate their agreement with eight statements such as
162 “In my relationships with others I can get others to do what I want” on a scale from 1 (*strongly*
163 *disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). Four items were reverse coded and responses were averaged to
164 create an indicator of each participant’s sense of power ($M = 3.30$, $SD = 0.52$, Cronbach’s alpha
165 $= .767$).

166
167 **Propensity to take financial risks**

168 **Propensity to take gambling risks (the lottery task).** The lottery choice task proposed by Holt
169 and Laury (2002) was used as a measure of participants’ propensity to take gambling risks.
170 Participants were asked to make ten choices between paired lotteries (Lottery A and Lottery B).
171 In each pair, the potential payoffs for Lottery A (PLN 10 = USD 2.5 or PLN 8 = USD 2) were
172 less variable than those for Lottery B (PLN 19.25 = USD 4.8 or PLN 0.5 = USD 0.13). Thus,
173 Lottery B was the risky option. The probability of the high-payoff outcome increased in both
174 lotteries, starting with $p = 0.1$ and ending with $p = 1$. The index of risky gambling choices was

175
176 ¹ To establish appropriate sample sizes, a priori power analysis was conducted using G*Power (Faul et al.,
177 2007). This showed that, given $\alpha = .05$ and 0.80 power, a sample size of 77 participants would be sufficient
178 to detect medium effects ($f^2 = 0.15$) in a regression model with 3 predictor variables. We aimed to exceed
179 this number by at least 30% based on the results of our previous studies (Sekścińska,
180 RudzińskaWojciechowska, & Jaworska, 2021) in which, on average, 33.5% of participants were excluded
181 from analysis because of multiple switching points and and/or choosing dominated options in the lottery task
182 (2002).

183
184 defined as the sum of Lottery B options ($M = 4.45$, $SD = 3.03$). This task was incentivized:
185 participants were informed that a computer would draw one of the 10 chosen lotteries (for each
186 participant individually) at the end of the study, and then throw a virtual 10-sided dice to
187 determine the lottery result. Participants’ incentives were paid according to this outcome as an
188 additional reward for participation (this procedure has previously been successfully used by
189 Sekścińska, Rudzinska-Wojciechowska, & Jaworska, 2021)

190 In this task, rational participants should either have no switching point or only one
191 switching point in their choices between Lotteries A and B. Moreover, in the last choice, the

192 higher outcome of each gamble is drawn with certainty; thus, Lottery A is a dominated option
 193 and should not be chosen by a rational decision maker. Participants with multiple switching
 194 points and participants choosing dominated options were excluded from the analyses (see
 195 Charness, Gneezy, & Imas, 2013). However, we also analyzed the whole dataset (the
 196 description of analyses and related statistics are presented in Supplementary Materials part 1).
 197 Including participants with multiple switching points and who chose the dominated option did
 198 not make a difference to the results.

199 **Propensity to take investment risks** (the investment portfolio task; Sekścińska, Jaworska, &
 200 Rudzinska-Wojciechowska, 2021; Sekścińska, Maison, & Trzcńska, 2016). Propensity to take
 201 investment risks was measured by the percentage of stocks included by participants in a
 202 hypothetical investment portfolio. First, participants read information about the levels of
 203 riskiness and potential profitability of bonds, balanced mutual funds, and stocks. Subsequently,
 204 they were asked to create an investment portfolio by dividing a total of PLN 10,000 (\$2500)
 205 between these three types of investment (balanced mutual funds involved investing 50% in
 206 stocks and 50% in bonds). The following formula, reflecting the percentage of stocks in each
 207 portfolio, was used: $0 \times \text{percentage allocated to bonds} + 0.5 \times \text{percentage allocated to mutual}$
 208 $\text{funds} + 1 \times \text{percentage allocated to stocks}$. This resulted in scores ranging from 0 to 100 ($M =$
 209 $26.37, SD = 4.17$).

210 **Procedure.** In order to control for any undesired order effects, the Generalized Sense of Power
 211 Scale, the investment portfolio task, and the lottery task were presented to the participants in
 212 random order.¹ At the end of the study, all participants were informed about the results of the
 213 lottery.

214 2.3 Results and discussion

215 Descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) and zero-order correlations for the
 216 analyzed variables are presented in Table 1.

217

218 Table 1.

219 Descriptive statistics and Pearson's *r* correlations (Study 1)

<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Zero-order correlations
----------	-----------	-------------------------

¹ One-way ANOVA showed no differences in terms of general sense of power ($F[5,98] = 0.121, p = .99$),
 propensity to take investment risks ($F[5,98] = 0.942, p = .46$), or propensity to take gambling risks ($F[5,98] =$

			2	3	4	5
1. Propensity to take gambling risks	4.36	2.65	.178	.258*	-.025	.016
2. Propensity to take investment risks	49.43 %	24.93 %		.197*	.022	-.059
3. Sense of power	3.30	0.52			-.008	.123
4. Age	37.18	9.49				-.142
5. Sex		M: 51 (49%) F: 53 (51%)				

220 Note: Sex was coded as 1 for female and 0 for male; * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

221

222 2.3.1 Sense of power and propensity to take gambling risks

223 Five participants were excluded from the analyses presented below due to multiple switching
224 points and/or making dominated choices in the lottery task.


225 Analysis of the frequency distribution of propensity to take gambling risks showed the
226 existence of censoring in the data (see Figure 1) and a positively skewed distribution, with 23
227 participants obtaining the minimum (one B choice) score. Accordingly, we employed a
228 leftcensored regression model in which participants' propensity to take gambling risks was
229 regressed on sense of power (with a score of 1 as the lower limit). The tested model exhibited a
230 significantly better fit than a model containing no predictor variables, with sense of power being
231 a significant positive predictor of propensity to take financial risks (Table 2). For each unit
232 increase in sense of power there was a 1.43 (β) point increase in predicted values of propensity
233 to take gambling risks. After introducing demographic variables (age and sex), the model was
234 not significantly better than the one containing no predictor variables, with neither age nor sex
235 being significantly predictive and sense of power remaining as a significant positive predictor
236 ($\beta = 1.45$; Table 2). Similar results were obtained for the whole sample for which data were
237 collected ($N = 104$). Specifically, the model with sense of power as the only predictor was
238 significant, with sense of power being a positive predictor of propensity to take financial risks.
239 Moreover, the model with demographic variables being controlled was not significantly more

² .729, $p = .60$) between participants who completed the research tools in each of the possible orders.

240 predictive than the initial one and showed sense of power as the only and positive significant
 241 predictor. See part 1 of the Supplementary Materials for related statistics.

242

243 Figure 1. Propensity to take financial risks in the lottery task – frequencies (Study 1)



244

245

246 Table 2.

247 Predictors of propensity to take gambling risks (Study 1)

	Step 1	Step 2
Sense of power	1.43 (0.62)*	1.45 (0.62)*
Sex		-0.16 (0.67)
Age		-0.03 (0.04)
Intercept	-0.66 (2.07)	0.40 (2.46)
Observations	99	99
<i>Pseudo R</i> ²	.01	.01
<i>LR</i> χ^2	5.28*	5.93

248 Note: The table presents the β values with standard errors in parentheses. Sex was coded as 1
 249 for female and 0 for male. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

250 2.3.2 Sense of power and propensity to take investment risks

251 The extent to which sense of power can be used to predict propensity to take investment risks
 252 was examined with a hierarchical multiple regression analysis (see Table 2) in which the
 253 riskiness of the created portfolios was the dependent variable. Sense of power was entered as a

254 predictor in the first step, and then the roles of demographic variables (age and sex) were
 255 controlled by entering these variables into the model in the second step of the analysis.

256 The results of the first step showed a significant role of sense of power: more powerful
 257 people were more prone to build riskier investment portfolios. Although significant, the model
 258 for the first step only explained 4% of the variance in portfolio riskiness, $F(1,102) = 4.12$; $p =$
 259 $.045$. After entering sex and age in the second step of the analysis, sense of power was still a
 260 significant predictor ($p = .038$), but neither of the two demographic variables was significantly
 261 predictive and the overall model was not significantly predictive after the second step, $F(3,100)$
 262 $= 1.61$; $p = .192$.

263

264

265

266

267 Table 3.

268 Predictors of propensity to take investment risks (Study 1)

	Step 1	Step 2
Sense of power	9.42* (4.64)	9.91* (4.70)
		-4.13
Sex		(4.94)
		0.03
Age		(0.26)
	18.39	72.90
Intercept	(15.48)	(515.18)
Observations	104 .04	104 .05
R^2		

269 Note: The table presents the B values with standard errors in parentheses. Sex was coded as 1
 270 for female and 0 for male. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

271

272 2.4 *Summary of the results*

273 Study 1 demonstrated that sense of power was positively related to financial risk-taking
274 propensity in both the investment and gambling domains. However, the demographic variables
275 were not predictive of outcomes in either domain when sense of power was controlled.

276 **3 Study 2. The moderating role of power as a state in the relationship between sense of**
277 **power and risky financial decisions.**

278 3.1 *Study aim*

279 Study 2 aimed to explore whether the relationship between participants' sense of power and
280 their propensity to take financial risks is moderated by situationally induced states of power/lack
281 of power.

282
283 3.2 *Method*

284 3.2.1 *Participants*

285 A total of 359 Polish working adults (200 female and 159 male; aged 20–65 years, $M = 38.95$
286 years, $SD = 11.03$) took part in the study. A sensitivity analysis using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder,
287 Lang, & Buchner, 2007) indicated that, given $\alpha = 0.05$ and an assumed power of 0.80, a sample
288 size of 359 participants would be sufficient to detect a small effect ($f^2 = 0.028$) in a regression
289 model with 3 predictor variables.³⁴

290 3.2.2 *Materials and procedure*

291 **Sense of power** was measured as in Study 1 ($M = 3.29$, $SD = 0.62$; Cronbach's alpha = .845).

292

293 **Propensity to take financial risks**

294 **Propensity to take gambling risks** (the lottery task) was measured as in Study 1 ($M = 5.40$,
295 $SD = 2.70$); the procedure that determined participants' incentives was also identical. Mirroring
296 Study 1, participants with multiple switching points and who chose dominated options were
297 excluded from the analyses, but the whole dataset was also analyzed (see Supplementary
298 Materials part 2 for description of the analyses and related statistics). The results showed that

³ To establish appropriate sample sizes, a priori power analysis was conducted using G*Power (Faul et al.,
⁴). This showed that, given $\alpha = .05$ and 0.80 power, a sample size of 318 participants for the study would be
sufficient to detect small to medium effects ($f = 0.175$) in ANOVA. According to Cohen's (1988) guidelines, $f \geq$

299 the inclusion of the participants with multiple switching points and who chose the dominated
300 option did not make a difference to the results.

301 **Propensity to take investment risks** (the investment portfolio task) was measured analogously
302 to Study 1 ($M = 39.36$, $SD = 24.58$).

303 **Power as a state: experimental manipulation.** States of having power or lacking power were
304 induced using scenarios prepared specifically for the study. States of having power were
305 induced by putting participants in a position that allowed them to evaluate and reward other
306 people's work. States of lacking power were induced by putting participants in the position of
307 being the subject of such an evaluation. The effectiveness of the experimental procedure was
308 pretested in a separate pilot study – see Supplementary Materials part 3 for the procedure and
309 results of this study.

310 **State of having power.** At the beginning of the procedure, participants in the powerful
311 state group were informed that panelists belonging to the same research panel had been given a
312 creative task the previous week. The creative task involved participants writing three valid
313 sentences in which they had to use three provided words in such a way that it was difficult to
314 guess which word had been provided. Then, they were asked to evaluate the performance on
315 this task of another panelist (three sentences with three hidden words) and to decide whether to
316 award this panelist with extra points.

317 **State of lacking power.** Simultaneously, participants in the lack of power group were
318 informed that they would be asked to perform a creative task at the end of the study and that
319 another panelist would be asked to evaluate their performance and decide whether to reward
320 them. Participants were informed that the sentences would be used in future studies and that
321 their level of performance on the task would be rewarded with extra points exchangeable for
322 rewards from the pool of several hundred products offered by the platform running the panel.
323 Then the participants were presented with the same three sentences that participants from the
324 powerful group evaluated (ostensibly so that they could understand the task better). At the end
325 of the procedure, these participants were asked to write their own three sentences. The exact

⁵ .1 and $f \geq 0.25$ represent small and medium effect sizes respectively. We assumed a value of $f = 0.175$ as this is the mid-point of the small to medium effect size range. As in Study 1, we took into account possible exclusions based on performance on the lottery task (Holt & Laury, 2002), but based on the results of Study 1, we increased the sample size by 10%. Finally, the required sample was 349. However, ultimately, we conducted regression analysis on the data from Study 2 because ANOVA requires a continuous independent variable to be divided into categories, resulting in a loss of resolution in data.

326 wording of the experimental manipulation can be found in part 4 of the Supplementary
327 Materials.

328 **Procedure.** The study was conducted in two waves. In the first wave, participants completed
329 the Sense of Power Scale. The second wave occurred a few days later. Here, participants were
330 randomly assigned to one of the experimental conditions (either a state of power or lack of
331 power) and subsequently subjected to the experimental manipulation. Participants then
332 completed the investment portfolio and lottery tasks in a rotated order. After this, participants
333 in the lack of power group were asked to perform the creative task. At the end of the data
334 collection phase of the study, all participants were informed about the outcome of the
335 incentivized lottery task and paid according to their performance.

336 *3.3 Results and discussion*

337 The research questions were tested using multiple regression analyses. The sense of power and
338 age variables were mean-centered, and the state of power and sex variables were dummy coded
339 (state of power: 1 – power condition, 0 – lack of power condition; sex: 1 – female, 0 – male).

332 Descriptive statistics for each variable and zero-order correlations between variables are 333
 presented in Table 4 and Table 5.

334

335 Table 4.

336 Descriptive statistics and Pearson's *r* correlations in total sample (Study 2)

	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Zero-order correlations			
			2	3	4	5
1. Sense of power	3.28	0.62	.168**	.227**	.031	<.001
2. Propensity to take gambling risks	5.40	2.70		-.029	-.103	.024
3. Propensity to take investment risks	39.36%	24.08%			-.060	.062
4. Age	38.95	11.03				-.195**
5. Sex	M: 159 (44.3%) F: 200 (55.7%)					

337 **p*<.05, ***p*<.01, ****p*<.001 338 Table 5.

339 Descriptive statistics and Pearson's *r* correlations in experimental groups (Study 2)

	State of power group					State of lacking power group						
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Zero-order correlations				<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Zero-order correlations			
			2	3	4	5			2	3	4	5
1. Sense of power	3.27	0.67	.292**	.344**	-.056	.011	3.29	0.57	-.002	.077	.144	-.014
2. Propensity to take gambling risks	5.78	2.87		-.098	-.196**	.070	5.00	2.46		.007	-.024	-.024
3. Propensity to take investment risks	43.22%	25.13%			-.082	.041	35.26%	22.26%			-.073	.098
4. Age	39.99	11.00				-.129	37.85	10.98				-.263**

5. Sex	M: 84 (45.4%)	M: 75 (43.1%)
	F: 101 (54.6%)	F: 99 (56.9%)

340 * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

340 3.3.1 *The moderating role of power as a state in the relationship between sense of power and*
341 *propensity to take gambling risks*

342 A total of 29 participants were excluded from the analyses due to multiple switching points and
343 having made dominated choices in the lottery task.

344 To analyze the moderating role of power as a state on the relationship between sense of
345 power and propensity to take gambling risks, hierarchical multiple regression analysis was
346 conducted, with sex and age controlled (see Table 6). In the first model, sense of power and
347 state of power variables were introduced as predictors. The obtained model was significant,
348 explained 6% of variance of propensity to take gambling risk, $F(2,327) = 11.052, p < .001$, and
349 showed positive significant roles of both sense of power and state of power. People with a
350 greater sense of power chose more risky options than those with less sense of power. Moreover,
351 people who experienced a state of power also chose more risky options than those who
352 experienced a lack of power. In the second model, all predictor variables, apart from a state of
353 power x sense of power interaction term, were introduced. In this model, positive roles of sense
354 of power and state of power remained significant, but the roles of the two demographic variables
355 were nonsignificant. Overall, the model with sense of power, state of power, sex, and age as
356 predictor variables was significant and explained 7% of variance of propensity to take gambling
357 risks, $F(4,325) = 5.813, p < .001$. In the third model, the sense of power x state of power
358 interaction term was introduced, $F(5,324) = 6.465, p < .001, F_{change}(1,324) = 8.532, p = .004$.
359 In this model, state of power remained significantly predictive, while a significant effect of
360 sense of power was not observed. Additionally, the interaction effect was significant: people
361 with a greater sense of power made more risky choices if they experienced a state of having
362 power, $\beta = 1.22, p < .001$, while there was no difference in the number of risky choices made
363 between people differing in their levels of sense of power when they experienced a lack of
364 power, $\beta = -0.01, p = .967$. Furthermore, the results revealed that participants' risk behavior
365 was significantly different between experimental groups for people with high, $t(354) = 4.00, p$
366 $< .001$, and medium, $t(354) = 2.87, p < .01$, levels of sense of power. However, the difference
367 between experimental groups among people with low levels of sense of power was statistically
368 nonsignificant, $t(354) = 0.02, p = .99^6$.

⁶ The level of sense of power was recoded into three groups based on the distribution of results. The division was made as follows: low level – people in the range below $-1SD$; medium level – people in the range between $-1SD$ and $+1SD$; high level – people in the range above $+1SD$.

369 Similar results related to the role of sense of power and state of power were obtained for
370 the whole sample for which data were collected ($N = 359$). Three analogous models to those
371 conducted for the reduced sample were built. All the models were significant. In the first model,
372 sense of power and state of power had positive roles. In the second model, the significant
373 positive predictive roles of both power-related variables remained significant, age had a positive
374 role, and no significant role of sex was observed. Furthermore, in the third model, where the
375 sense of power by state of power interaction term was introduced, state of power and age
376 remained significantly predictive, and the interaction effect was also significant – see the part 2
377 of the Supplementary Materials for related statistics.
378

379 Table 6.

380 Predictors of propensity to take gambling risks (Study 2)

	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3
Sense of power	0.74*** (0.20)	0.74*** (0.20)	0.01 (0.32)
State of power	0.78** (0.26)	0.81** (0.26)	0.80** (0.26)
Sex		0.12 (0.26)	0.12 (0.26)
Age		0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Sense of power x State of power			1.21** (0.41)
Intercept	2.96 (0.70)	-18.62 (23.77)	-8.58 (23.77)
Observations	330 .06	330 .07	330 .09
R^2			

381 Note: The table presents the *B* values with standard errors in parentheses. Sex was coded as 1
 382 for female and 0 for male. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

383

384 *3.3.2 The moderating role of power as a state in the relationship between sense of power and*
 385 *propensity to take investment risks*

386 In a further hierarchical regression analysis, propensity to take investment risks was regressed
 387 on sense of power, state of power, age, sex, and a sense of power x state of power interaction
 388 term (see Table 6). In Model 1, only sense of power and state of power were introduced as
 389 predictors. The model was significant, $F(2,356) = 15.52$, $p < .001$, and the roles of both
 390 predictors were significant. Participants who experienced a state of having power tended to
 391 build more risky investment portfolios than those who experienced a state of lacking power.
 392 Moreover, sense of power correlated positively with risky investment portfolio choices. Model
 393 2, which included sense of power, state of power, sex and age as predictors, was similar to
 394 Model 1: significant positive main effects of sense of power and state of power were observed.
 395 There were no significant main effects for any of the demographic variables. This model
 396 explained 9% of the variance in portfolio riskiness, $F(4,354) = 8.74$, $p < .001$. After introducing

397 the interaction term in Model 3, sense of power remained significantly predictive, and, while
 398 none of the single predictor variables were significantly predictive, the hypothesized interaction
 399 between sense of power and state of power was observed. This regression model was significant
 400 and explained 10% of the variance in portfolio riskiness, $F(5,353) = 8.17, p < .001$. Among
 401 participants who experienced a state of power, sense of power was positively associated with
 402 the creation of more risky portfolios, $\beta = 1273.31, p < .001$. In contrast, for participants
 403 experiencing a lack of power, there was no relationship between sense of power and riskiness
 404 of portfolios, $\beta = 341.38, p = .267$.

405 Moreover, the results revealed that participants' portfolio riskiness was significantly different
 406 between state of power conditions for people with high – $M_{state\ of\ power} = 49.07, SD_{state\ of\ power} =$
 407 $27.97, M_{state\ of\ lacking\ power} = 35.05, SD_{state\ of\ lacking\ power} = 18.25, t(354) = 4.00, p < .001$ – and
 408 medium – $M_{state\ of\ power} = 41.73, SD_{state\ of\ power} = 20.20, M_{state\ of\ lacking\ power} = 37.30, SD_{state\ of\ lacking}$
 409 $power = 23.88, t(354) = 2.87, p < .01$ – levels of sense of power. Among those participants,
 410 individuals in a state of power made more risky decisions than those in a state of lack of power.
 411 Furthermore, the difference between experimental groups among people with low levels of
 412 sense of power was statistically nonsignificant, $M_{state\ of\ power} = 33.03, SD_{state\ of\ power} = 22.19, M_{state}$
 413 $of\ lacking\ power} = 30.60, SD_{state\ of\ lacking\ power} = 18.25, t(354) = 0.02, p = .99$.⁷

414
 415 Table 7.

416 Predictors of propensity to take investment risks (Study 2)

	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3
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⁷ The level of sense of power was recoded into three groups based on the distribution of results. The division was made as follows: low level – people in the range below –1SD; medium level – people in the range between –1SD and +1SD; high level – people in the range above +1SD.

Sense of power	8.88*** (1.96)	8.97*** (1.96)	3.41 (3.07)
State of power	8.15*** (2.25)	8.56*** (2.45)	8.48*** (2.44)
Sex		2.45 (2.50)	2.52 (2.49)
Age		-0.16 (0.11)	-0.14 (0.11)
Sense of power x State of power	6.04 (6.70)	4.14	9.32* (3.98)
Intercept		(6.82)	-247.83 (225.56)
Observations	359 .08	359 .09	359 .10
R^2			

417 Note: The table presents the *B* values with standard errors in parentheses. Sex was coded 1 for
418 female and 0 for male. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

419 3.4 Summary of the results

420 The results of Study 2 showed that a situationally induced state of power led to participants'
421 having a greater propensity to take investment and gambling risks. Moreover, the results
422 revealed that the role of sense of power depends on the state of power in both financial
423 risktaking domains. Among people in a situation of power, there was a positive relationship
424 between sense of power and propensity to take investment and gambling risks. In contrast, for
425 people in situation in which someone else had power over them, there was no relationship
426 between sense of power and the propensity to take financial risks. Demographic variables were
427 not related to outcomes for either type of financial choice.

428 4 General discussion

429 These studies demonstrated that both sense of power and state of power/powerlessness
430 are significant predictors of risky financial decisions. When a state of power/powerlessness was
431 situationally induced, participants in high-power conditions took greater investment and
432 gambling risks than did those in low-power conditions. Moreover, the role of sense of power in

433 explaining risky financial decisions was significant and positive, apart from in conditions of
434 lack of power. The results of Study 1 demonstrated that sense of power is positively related to
435 personal risky financial choices in both investment and gambling tasks. These results make a
436 further contribution to existing theoretical and empirical research by showing that an elevated
437 sense of power affects personal risky choices in financial domains and offers a conceptual
438 replication of previous findings, showing that individuals with higher levels of power tend to
439 be riskier in their decisions than people with a lower sense of power.

440 The second study examined whether the link between sense of power and propensity to
441 take financial risks could be modified by situationally induced states of high
442 power/powerlessness. For people in the high-power condition, there was a positive relationship
443 between sense of power and propensity to take financial risks. In contrast, there was no such
444 relationship for people in the low-power condition. This suggests that when people find
445 themselves in a position of having little power, their sense of power does not influence their
446 decisions in the manner that has been demonstrated in previous studies. Such results correspond
447 well with the small but growing body of research indicating that a person's chronic traits can
448 interact with situationally activated corresponding states (Haws, Bearden, & Dholakia, 2012;
449 Jain, Desai, & Mao, 2007).

450 The results also indicated that participants with low levels of sense of power (trait) did
451 not differ in their willingness to take risks, regardless of the power condition. Accordingly,
452 having (or lacking) power did not impact participants' risk choices. Moreover, the results
453 revealed that people with medium and high levels of sense of power tended to make more risky
454 financial choices when they were in position of power compared to when they lacked power.
455 This result might be explained by the Active Self (Wheeler et al., 2007). This framework
456 distinguishes chronic self-concept, which refers to those characteristics of the self that reside in
457 one's long-term memory, from active self-concept, which concerns the self-concept information
458 that is currently accessible and used to guide behavior. The latter can shift in response to
459 external inputs, such as priming or decision context (Smeesters, Wheeler, & Kay, 2010).
460 According to the Active Self of Wheeler et al., assimilative behavioral change is increased by
461 individual features enhancing assimilative change in the active self-concept, and is decreased
462 by features that decrease assimilative change in the active self-concept. Moreover, these prime-
463 to-behavior effects are moderated by features that affect usage of the (changed) self-concept in
464 guiding behavior (Wheeler et al., 2007). Accordingly, it is plausible that the observed effect of
465 power manipulation on participants with medium and high levels of sense of power resulted

466 from the presence of trait power in their self-concept. Moreover, it is also plausible that the lack
467 of effect of the power manipulation on participants with low sense of power resulted from the
468 non-presence of trait power in their self-concept. Future research could explore these
469 possibilities.

470

471 *4.1 Limitations and strengths*

472 Despite our studies' interesting findings, there are some limitations. For example, investment
473 choices (unlike gambling choices) were based on participants' declarations of their intentions,
474 rather than observations of real-life behaviors. However, hypothetical scenarios are widely used
475 in research on the propensity to take risks (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) and there is an
476 abundance of evidence that people's responses to hypothetical scenarios predict actual behavior
477 (Johnson & Bickel, 2002; Kühberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, & Perner, 1999). That said, it is
478 worth emphasizing that the second dependent variable – choices in a lottery – was measured
479 using a non-deceptive, incentivized risk-taking task. The results for the two measures were
480 analogous, even though the correlation between them was low ($r = .178$, see Table 1). This
481 shows that similar effects might be demonstrated using hypothetical or self-reported measures
482 and behavioral ones (see also: Locey, Jones, & Rachlin, 2011). Secondly, it provides further
483 indication that risk appetite in the financial domain is, indeed, domain dependent and confirms
484 the need to use fine-grained measures to understand the complexities of financial choices.

485 The present studies have several theoretical implications. For example, the results
486 contribute to our understanding of risky financial decision making by identifying individual
487 differences that can induce participants' propensity to take financial risks. To the best of our
488 knowledge, the role of power (both chronic and situational) in the making of gambling and
489 personal investment choices has not been investigated previously. Notably, the present work is
490 also one of only a few attempts to explore the joint influence of sense of power and situationally
491 induced state of power, and our findings extend the vast literature on power by demonstrating
492 the interplay between these two conceptions of power. **References**

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