

## **The Serbs in Western Political and Media Discourse: Othering, Demonisation and Tutelage**

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This chapter examines the portrayal of the Serbs during the key conflicts of Yugoslavia's breakup: Croatia's secession in 1991, the 1992–95 Bosnian war, and the 1999 Kosovo conflict. Although these could all be understood as intra-state civil wars, they rapidly became internationalised through the involvement of outside actors, who also promoted particular interpretations of events. The wider context for the post-Yugoslav conflicts — and for international intervention in them — was the ending of the Cold War. The collapse of this long-established framework raised difficult questions about what 'the West' stood for and who its antagonists might now be. Attempts to make sense of post-Cold War conflicts therefore also involved a concern with the West's self-image, defined through contrast with newly-designated enemies. In the case of the Yugoslav wars, this identification of villains was articulated, both in news reporting and political rhetoric, through two distinct tropes: 'Balkanism' and 'Nazification'.

The initial stages of Yugoslavia's break-up prompted a revival of Balkanism – a view of the region as prone to 'reversion to the tribal, the backward, the primitive, the barbarian' (Todorova 2009: 3). This early 20th-century idea was resuscitated in the early 1990s in the context of fears of a new 'clash of civilisations', as Samuel Huntington put it. In Huntington's (1993: 30) influential argument, the 'Iron Curtain of ideology' was being replaced by the 'Velvet Curtain of culture', and one of the new civilisational 'fault lines' now dividing the world ran 'almost exactly along the line now separating Croatia and Slovenia from the rest of Yugoslavia'. While Balkanist ideas persisted, they were soon overshadowed by and subsumed into the more significant theme of Nazification. This theme came to prominence in coverage of the Bosnian war and dominated the later Kosovo conflict, in both cases casting the Serbs as perpetrators of genocide. In this framing the Serbs were not just Othered as backward, but demonised as evil, in contrast to the good Western Self.

These two ways of framing events are often seen as having been in opposition to each other; certainly in tension, if not 'mutually exclusive frames' (Kent 2006: 9). They implied two quite different understandings of the causes of conflict — as many-sided civil wars based on mutual ethnic hatreds, or as one-sided aggression and genocide — and they logically appeared to promote very different policy responses. While discursive Nazification suggested a moral imperative to intervene, Balkanism seemed to imply an arms-length response from the international community, at most involving peacekeeping operations to separate warring factions. However, the connection between Balkanist explanations and a less interventionist policy stance is not as clear as is often claimed. Although they are different in principle, in practice they were combined as complementary ways of framing the Serbs as the enemy.

Nevertheless, in reporting 'echoes of the Holocaust', the media helped to build a consensus in favour of Western military action – partially realised in Bosnia, and then more fully implemented in NATO's Kosovo campaign. For many journalists, this was a deliberate choice, adopted in order to push for a tougher policy. The BBC's Allan Little, for example, later said he was 'bewildered' by what seemed to be the general consensus about Bosnia:

That the Balkan tribes had been killing each other for centuries and that there was nothing that could be done. It was nobody's fault. It was just, somehow, the nature of the region. It was a lie that Western governments at that time liked. It got the Western world off the hook. When I and others argued that you could not blame all sides equally, the moral implications were that the world should – as it later did – take sides.<sup>1</sup>

'Taking sides', in this context, meant blaming the Serbs as the guilty party. This is what *Washington Post* journalist Mary Battiata had in mind when she claimed that 'There was only one story – a war of aggression....It was very simple'; or what CNN's Christiane Amanpour meant when she argued that 'during the three-and-a-half-year war in Bosnia, there was a clear aggressor and clear victim' (both quoted in Ricchiardi 1996).

This chapter takes a sceptical view of both frameworks as explanations for the wars of Yugoslavia's breakup. Critical accounts indicate how, although domestic economic and political developments created a tendency toward fragmentation, insecurity and the rise of nationalist politics in Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the factor that tipped a volatile situation into outright civil war in Croatia and Bosnia was Western support for secession (for example Chandler 2000, Thomas 2003). German-led backing of Slovenian and Croatian independence in 1991, and then US-led recognition of Bosnia the following year, meant that the leaders of these republics had little incentive to pursue a negotiated settlement with the federal state. Although recognition was presented as a measure to prevent war, as some predicted at the time, the effect was the opposite.<sup>2</sup> As Susan Woodward (1995: 198) puts it, 'Western intervention...provided the irreversible turning point in [the] escalation toward...war'.

In the case of Kosovo, by the end of the 1990s an armed organisation, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), was leading a separatist movement that carried out attacks on the central state authorities, and on Kosovo's Serbian minority and alleged ethnic-Albanian 'collaborators', provoking reprisals from the Yugoslav police and military. As then UK Defence Secretary George Robertson acknowledged at the time, until early 1999 'the KLA were responsible for more deaths in Kosovo than the Yugoslav authorities had been'.<sup>3</sup> Yet Western leaders engineered an escalation of violence, brokering talks that were portrayed as an effort to resolve conflict but which actually presented a provocative 'agreement', with an ultimatum to the Serbs that refusal to sign would trigger bombing. According to then US State Department spokesman James Rubin, the aim was 'to create clarity...as to which side was the cause of the problem...and that meant the Kosovar Albanians agreeing to the package and the Serbs not agreeing to the package' (*Moral Combat: NATO at War*, BBC2, 12 March 2000).

The propaganda battles of the 1990s had lasting effects. The experience of Bosnia and Kosovo was held to affirm a new post-Cold War role for Western military power as upholding humanitarian norms — an idea drawn on in interventions elsewhere, and mythologised in fictional cinematic representations of the Yugoslav conflicts (Harper 2017). The Western propaganda campaign of the 1990s has also continued to affect Serbia itself even after it ceased being an official enemy and sought to 'normalise' its international relationships. The past, or a particular version of it, has been used to exert pressure over Kosovo's still-contested status and other issues; while within Serbia a Western-oriented intellectual elite has internalised many of the negative perceptions of the country, a phenomenon some Serbian critics refer to as 'auto-chauvinism'.

## Othering

Balkanism was a feature of political and media discussion throughout the 1990s, but did not work the same way at all times. The idea that conflict resulted from mutual ethnic hatreds — and the attendant 'moral equalisation' and non-interventionism that some critics have complained of — appeared only sporadically in discussion of the Bosnian war, and even then it had to compete with the more firmly established idea that the Serbs were the main guilty party. Prior to the conflict in Bosnia, the tone had already been set: Balkanism was a prominent theme in coverage of Croatia's secession, specifically framing the Serbs as the Balkan Other. Hence, Balkanist themes could readily be combined with demonisation of the Serbs and support for Western intervention, as we shall see. Let us begin, though, by taking Balkanist explanations on their own terms and recalling the context for their emergence.

Huntington's 'clash of civilisations' thesis was part of a broader effort to make sense of conflict after the end of the Cold War: several writers suggested that culture or ethnicity might be the key to understanding conflict in Yugoslavia and elsewhere. As the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute put it, for example:

The end of the Cold War...removed various restraints exercised over parties to ethnic conflicts....It brought to light old and unresolved animosities between, in particular, Serbs and Croats. The Communist regime had kept these animosities under control through repression.

(SPIRI 1992: 420)

Here, 'ethnic conflict' is seen as an elemental force, inexorably reasserting itself after the temporary freeze of Cold War authoritarianism. This line of thought sometimes also involved the idea that parts of the world were reverting to a pre-modern condition. The *Daily Telegraph's* Defence Editor, military historian John Keegan, for instance wrote that:

The horrors of the war in Yugoslavia, as incomprehensible as they are revolting to the civilised mind, defy explanation in conventional military terms. The pattern of local hatreds they reveal are unfamiliar to anyone but the professional anthropologists who take the warfare of tribal and marginal peoples as their subject of study....Most intelligent newspaper readers...will be struck by the parallels to be drawn with the behaviour of pre-state peoples.

(Keegan 1993: xi)

Similarly, Robert Kaplan (1994) drew on Huntington's ideas but adapted them to describe, not a conflict between civilisations, but a collapse of civilisation itself in 'places where the Western Enlightenment has not penetrated'; places populated by 're-primitivized man' and constantly threatened by 'cultural and racial war'. The Balkans was one such place: having been 'a powder keg for nation-state war at the beginning of the twentieth century', the region might now be 'a powder keg for cultural war at the turn of the twenty-first'.

These ideas tended to assume what they purported to explain: ethnic conflict just happens, and keeps on happening, unless contained or repressed. As Michael Ignatieff (1993: 64) noted at the time, 'we are ending the search for explanation just when it should begin if we assert that local ethnic hatreds were so rooted in history that they were bound to explode into nationalist violence'. Yet to complain of the limited explanatory scope of 'ethnic hatreds' accounts perhaps misses the point. The

aim of most such commentary was to reconceptualise how to project Western, particularly US, power in what had only recently been proclaimed (by President George Bush) the 'New World Order'. Huntington (1993) wrote from the perspective of the now unopposed superpower, considering how it could 'maintain the economic and military power necessary to protect its interests', scanning for where future threats might appear, and hypothesising that 'the paramount axis of world politics will be the relations between "the West and the Rest"'. Similarly, for Kaplan, the point of florid descriptions of a 'coming anarchy' in some parts of the world was to assert the importance of imperial power. As he argued in 1999, for example, 'Only Western imperialism...can now unite the European continent and save the Balkans from chaos' (in Kaplan 2005: xxviii).

Both proponents and critics of 'ethnic' explanations of war tended to start from the premise that the West had to impose order on a dangerous world. Hence Ignatieff, despite dismissing the 'fallacy' of seeing conflict as 'the product of some uniquely Balkan viciousness' (1993: 62), nevertheless took a similar view of the relationship between ethnic conflict and empire:

In crucial zones of the world, once heavily policed by empire — notably the Balkans — populations find themselves without an imperial arbiter to appeal to. Small wonder, then, that, unrestrained by stronger hands, they have set upon each other for that final settling of scores so long deferred by the presence of empire.

(Ignatieff 1993: 41–2)

Discussing Kaplan's ideas, Ignatieff (1998: 98) complains that portraying the world as anarchic discourages the West from intervening: 'If we could see a pattern in the chaos, or a chance of bringing some order here or there, the rationale for intervention and long-term ethical engagement would become plausible again.' Similarly, Mary Kaldor (1999: 147, 124–5) rejects the 'essentialist assumptions about culture' shared by Huntington and Kaplan because they 'cannot envisage alternative forms of authority at a global level'. The differences of opinion were not so much about how best to explain the Yugoslav conflicts as about which explanation would best facilitate the projection of Western power.

The Balkanist frame was used from the outset as a way to depict the war, not as a many-sided ethnic conflict to be avoided, but as the fault of one side, the Serbs, who were different, backward and aggressive. It is worth again recalling the post-Cold War context: Huntington was far from alone in reworking ideological East/West divisions into the new terms of culture and civilisation. Since the big story in eastern Europe for the preceding two years had been the toppling of communist dictatorships, it is not surprising that much reporting 'persisted in inaccurately forcing the Yugoslavian civil war into a black-and-white Cold War framework' (Kavran 1991). The *Los Angeles Times* (8 July 1991), for example, explained the secession of Croatia as 'a battle between hard-line communists and free-market democrats'. Similarly in the British press, the *Independent* (4 July 1991) explained that Serbia was one of the 'last redoubts' of communism and totalitarianism, whereas Slovenia and Croatia, both 'Westernised and prosperous', represented 'democracy'. Indeed, even before the start of the war this perspective had been adopted by Western politicians and diplomats, who misidentified secessionist leaders as anti-communist champions of democracy (Binder and Roberts 1998: 36–7), and their views were already being echoed by the media. As Milica Bakić-Hayden and Robert Hayden (1992: 10–11) note, Western reporters were predisposed to sympathise with 'industrious Roman Catholic Slavs whose culture was shaped by centuries spent

under Austrian rule' in the northern republics of Slovenia and Croatia (*New York Times*, 6 April 1990), and to revile the 'authoritarian traditions of the dominant [Serbian] Orthodox Church [which] have helped fashion intense nationalism but have not fostered participatory democracy' (*Washington Post*, 9 February 1990).

Secessionist leaders also promoted their cause by reimagining the Cold War divide in terms of religious or cultural differences. Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, for example, partly explained the conflict in terms of a broader post-1989 pattern, arguing that 'The struggle here is the same that has been going on in Eastern Europe for the past three years: democracy against communism', but simultaneously maintained that Serbs and Croats were 'not just different peoples but different civilisations' (*European*, 18 August, 1991). As well as seeking to appeal to a Western audience, such rhetorical moves can be understood in terms of what Bakić-Hayden and Hayden (1992: 3–4) call 'nesting Orientalisms': whereas the entire Balkan region might be viewed from the West as 'a cultural and religious "Other" to Europe "proper"', this dynamic is also replicated within the Balkans in 'a tendency for each region to view cultures and religions to the south and east of it as more conservative or primitive'. As they show, from the late 1980s politicians and intellectuals in Croatia and Slovenia were claiming a 'privileged "European" status' while 'condemning others as "balkan" or "byzantine", hence non-European and Other' (1992: 5). Elections in 1990 intensified such rhetoric. The nationalist Croatian Democratic Union saw its electoral victory as presaging 'inclusion in the states of central Europe, the region to which it has always belonged', ending its subordination to an 'asiatic form of government'. Similarly, Slovenian politician Peter Tancig, wrote of the 'incompatibility of two main frames of reference/civilization': a 'humble and diligent western-catholic tradition' in Slovenia and Croatia versus a 'violent and crooked oriental-bizantine [*sic*] heritage, best exemplified by Serbia and Montenegro' (both quoted in Bakić-Hayden and Hayden 1992: 9, 12). Germany's push for recognition of Croatian and Slovenian independence at the end of 1991 effectively gave international approval to the idea that the East-West boundary was now to be located within the former Yugoslavia.

International recognition made this division real. Once the breakaway republics had been recognised as independent states, conflict was defined as an act of inter-state aggression. Yet this made no logical sense: armed resistance to the newly-imposed arrangements was mounted by overwhelmingly local forces, rather than some invading army. Conflict in Croatia, and then in Bosnia, involved not aggression from outside, but rather, embattled Serbian minorities fighting on their own doorstep. Serbs made up over 12% of Croatia's population in 1991,<sup>4</sup> but were not guaranteed rights and protections by the new Croatian state. Rather, their situation deteriorated: Serbs were purged from the public sector, including universities and the police force; employment, property ownership, and residency all became precarious; and the government revived the flag and other national symbols from the Second World War era, when hundreds of thousands of Serbs had been massacred by the Nazi-collaborationist Ustaša regime (MacDonald 2002: 103). Bosnia had an even larger Serbian minority in 1991 (over 31% of the population), and also a substantial Croatian minority (17%). The idea of a unitary Bosnia presupposed the coexistence of Serbs and Croats in a new Bosnian state, despite the mistreatment of Serbs in the new Croatia. Bosnian Serbs balked at again becoming subject to Croat-Muslim rule as they had been under the 1940s Ustaša regime, which included Bosnia and most of present-day Croatia.

Western sympathies in this worsening situation were clear from the start, however: in pushing for recognition, German leaders argued that the cause of conflict was

Serbian aggression (Crawford 1996: 494, 512). Within months, the pattern was repeated in Bosnia, the drive for recognition this time led by the US. Predictably, from the first month of the Bosnian war, April 1992, Western leaders identified the Serbs as the guilty party. The *Independent*, for example, reported that Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic's claim that 'Bosnia is the victim of classic aggression from outside' was 'backed by several foreign governments, including the United States, Germany and Austria' (15 April 1992); that the State Department had 'singled out by name President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia and federal army leaders as the chief culprits behind Bosnia's violence' (16 April); that the European Community and the US 'agree in holding the Serbs responsible for the fighting' (22 April); and that Germany's Foreign Minister had 'described Serbia as "the aggressor" in the Bosnian conflict' (24 April).

The idea that Serbian aggression was the cause of the war was not only widely articulated by several influential sources in the very first month of the conflict. It was also immediately taken up by journalists themselves, who reproduced it in news reports and explicitly endorsed it in editorial columns. Arguing that 'The root of the problem lies in Belgrade', the *Guardian's* editorial position was that Bosnia was an 'innocent multi-racial [*sic*] victim of Serbian malevolence' (13 April 1992). The *Independent* said that the Serbs had 'started the fighting' and suggested that more governments should be 'pressured into recognising that this is now a case of international aggression' (24 April). According to the *Times* (23 April), the 'pattern of Serbian expansionism in Croatia' was now 'being repeated on a potentially far bloodier scale' and the 'Serbian offensive' was 'nothing less than the invasion of an independent country'. In the news pages, the *Independent's* East Europe editor argued that 'Conquest is a national crusade for Belgrade' (17 April); a view reiterated in the *Times* the following day in an article headlined 'Serb crusaders brush aside final warnings' (18 April). The *Guardian's* East Europe correspondent also took up the 'crusade' theme, claiming that 'Serbians view Bosnia as the front line in a new holy war' (16 April).

Statements from reports and editorial columns, taken together with the reported views of official sources, suggest that a dominant consensus was established quickly at the beginning of the war regarding how it was to be understood. As the BBC's Nik Gowing (1994: 55) argues, 'by and large the media took their cue from the regular declarations by Western ministers. The Serbs were the main guilty party'. Yet the media's role was not merely a passive one: journalists also actively contributed to the demonisation of the Serbs — most pointedly by comparing them to the Nazis, committing genocide in Bosnia and later in Kosovo.

## Demonisation

From the early months of the Bosnian war, a powerful theme developed in Western news coverage drawing parallels with the Nazi Holocaust. In July 1992 an American reporter, Roy Gutman, began writing for *Newsday* of 'death camps' run by the Serbs in Bosnia, that were 'like Auschwitz' (Gutman 1993: 34, 36). This sensational story was widely taken up and repeated, with a 6 August 1992 British TV report from one such camp, Trnopolje, billed in the next day's newspapers as revealing 'The Proof' (*Daily Mail*) that a new Holocaust was happening. It was, said the tabloids, 'Belsen 1992' (*Daily Mirror*, *Daily Star*, 7 August 1992). The TV pictures became the subject of a court case in 2000, when the broadcaster sued for libel over an article by Thomas Deichmann questioning the impression the images had created of Nazi-style concentration camps.<sup>5</sup> The magazine that published Deichmann's story was forced to

close, but as Diana Johnstone (2002: 72) remarks, 'anyone who attentively compared the Trnopolje pictures with photographs of Nazi concentration camps could not seriously consider them equivalent'.

The reality was grim but less dramatic. Following international recognition of Bosnia in April, Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims all moved to seize or to defend as much territory as possible, violently expelling populations who might threaten the new arrangements (Johnstone 2002: 70). In the process, for a few months in 1992 all sides established detention centres, where some were killed and many others were treated brutally, but there were no Nazi-style concentration camps. In some early reports, readers could catch a fleeting glimpse of this reality — for example, a 4 August 1992 *Guardian* report quoted Red Cross officials disputing the 'concentration camps' characterisation and emphasising that all three sides were running detention centres. The overall narrative, however, of Serbs committing genocide in Bosnia, became firmly established.

That narrative was promoted by an American Public Relations agency, Ruder Finn, helping the Bosnian government to gain greater international support. Years later, Bernard Kouchner reminded the Bosnian president, Izetbegović, that he had spoken to Western politicians and journalists about 'extermination camps' run by Serbs during the Bosnian war. 'They were horrible places, but people were not systematically exterminated', said Kouchner, 'Did you know that?' Izetbegović admitted that he had indeed known, but offered the excuse that he had sought to 'precipitate bombings' by the West (quoted in Johnstone 2005). One can only wonder when Kouchner knew the claims to be false: at the time, his Médecins Du Monde organisation ran a \$2m advertising campaign, using the British TV pictures, to publicise the camps and push for greater Western intervention (Johnstone 2002: 74). Holes in the camps story appeared quite quickly. By 1993, Gutman's reporting had been criticised as relying on hearsay and speculation (Brock 1993/94), and the *Guardian* journalist who had broken the story in the UK, Maggie O'Kane, acknowledged that the comparison with Nazi concentration camps was misleading (*Free for All*, Channel 4, 24 August 1993). Yet the British TV journalists and the American PR firm garnered industry accolades, and Gutman won a Pulitzer prize for his reporting.

As indicated above, many journalists took sides in Bosnia, seeking to construct a morally black-and-white tale. In Peter Brock's (1993/94: 153) words, 'the media became...co-belligerents' aiming to 'force governments to intervene militarily'. The BBC's Martin Bell (1998: 16) coined the term 'journalism of attachment' for this proselyting style of reporting, arguing that reporters should refuse to 'stand neutrally between good and evil, right and wrong, the victim and the oppressor'. As Hayden (2013: 139) and many others have noted, journalists' effort to fit events into 'a framework defined by the Holocaust...produced systematic distortions', but the advantage of such a frame was that it offered the most powerful way to depict a local civil war as an epic battle of Good versus Evil.

The idea that the Bosnian conflict, or later Kosovo, were comparable to the Holocaust was insulting to the memory of those murdered by the Nazis in the Second World War. It was particularly offensive in the regional context, where the victims of wartime fascism had included many hundreds of thousands of Serbs, massacred in the Croatian state of the 1940s with a ferocity that shocked even its Nazi sponsors (Johnstone 2002: 148). Astonishingly, in April 1993 Croatia's President Tudjman was invited, at the request of the US State Department, to the opening of the Holocaust Museum in Washington — despite the fact that he had written a revisionist history of

the Holocaust (Hayden 2013: 150, 158–9). Serbian representatives were not invited, of course, since they were now seen as perpetrators of genocide. That claim was bolstered by inflated estimates of the numbers killed in the wars of the 1990s. In Bosnia, the claim that more than 250,000 were killed continues to circulate even now,<sup>6</sup> though the 'official' number has been revised downward to just under 105,000 — a figure that includes both civilian and military deaths on all sides of the conflict (Zwierzchowski and Tabeau 2010). In Kosovo, the International Commission on Missing Persons was able to confirm around 7,000 'cases of human remains' by 2017.<sup>7</sup> The final count may rise, since there are still around 1,600 missing persons unaccounted for. Yet these figures are a long way from the US government's claims in 1999 that 100,000 or even 500,000 had been killed by Serbian forces.<sup>8</sup>

Of course, the claim of genocide in Bosnia and Kosovo ultimately depends not on numbers but on intention: the 'intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such', in the words of the 1948 Genocide Convention. Subsequently, a number of individuals were convicted of genocide in relation to the 1995 Srebrenica massacre, including the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić and General Ratko Mladić, in trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Yet right from the first such conviction (of Radislav Krstić in 2001), the ICTY stretched and distorted the meaning of the term genocide, specifically failing properly to establish intent — as legal scholars soon noted (Schabas 2001: 46; Southwick 2005: 188, 191). Critics have continued to question the characterisation of the massacre as genocide (Johnstone 2005; Hayden 2013: 160–7; Szamuely 2020). A major study of the role of military intelligence in Bosnia by Cees Wiebes also suggests strong reasons to doubt this interpretation, again because of context and intention.<sup>9</sup> In 1995 Srebrenica was a designated UN 'safe area' for refugees, but also a military base, where the US allowed clandestine arms supplies to reach the Bosnian Muslim army, enabling it to 'carry out hit and run operations against, often civilian, targets' in nearby Serbian villages (Wiebes 2003: 191). The Bosnian Serbs launched an offensive, aiming to reduce the town's capacity to act as a base for further attacks. Rather than carrying out some planned extermination, they only decided to take the town when they found it was virtually undefended, Bosnian Muslim commanders having already withdrawn (Wiebes 2003: 326–7). The remaining Bosnian Muslim soldiers fled, along with many male civilians. The Bosnian Serbs targeted the military-aged males, killing some in combat, capturing and executing many others, while organising buses to remove women, children and the elderly — an extraordinary choice if their intention was to commit genocide (Schabas 2001: 46).

Wiebes also concluded that President Milošević had no foreknowledge of the Srebrenica massacre, throwing doubt on the ICTY's attempt to prosecute Milošević for genocide. But Wiebes and other authors of the largest and most detailed investigation into Srebrenica were not called to give evidence.<sup>10</sup> Instead, the ICTY took a different tack, linking the Croatian, Bosnian and Kosovo conflicts on the grounds that they demonstrated a pattern: Milošević had pursued an aggressive 'Greater Serbia' policy throughout the 1990s. As John Laughland (2007: 126) explains: 'The allegation was not that Yugoslavia had waged a "dirty war", committing atrocities in the course of what was otherwise a normal civil conflict or counter-insurgency operation, but instead that there was a fully conceived racist and political plan'. Milošević was indicted by the ICTY in May 1999, at the height of the Kosovo war. The indictment was clearly intended to lend a veneer of legal legitimacy to the NATO bombing, but was so obviously politically motivated that it exposed the ICTY's lack of independence. US spokesman James Rubin said that it 'justifies in the clearest possible way what we have been doing these past months' (CNN, 27 May



1999), and Michael Scharf, a lawyer who helped to write the original ICTY statute for the US State Department, later acknowledged that the indictment was understood by Western governments as 'a useful tool in their efforts to demonize the Serbian leader and maintain public support for NATO's bombing campaign' (*Washington Post*, 3 October 1999). A few weeks before the ICTY indictment, the German government revealed the existence of a secret Serbian master-plan for genocide, codenamed 'Operation Horseshoe' (*Times*, 9 April 1999). Yet after the war, this was exposed as a fake concocted by the German intelligence services (*Sunday Times*, 2 April 2000).

Laughland's characterisation of the post-Yugoslav conflicts as a 'dirty war' involving atrocities committed by all sides is closer to what happened, but the claim of one-sided genocide was made to seem credible by a barrage of media stories insisting that violence committed by Serbs was qualitatively different.<sup>11</sup> While all sides in Bosnia engaged in 'ethnic cleansing', for example, their actions were not reported in the same way. In the case of the Serbs, terms such as 'plan', 'objective', 'systematic' and 'strategy' tended to predominate, suggesting the consistent pursuit of a deliberate policy. Sometimes this was made explicit, as when Serbian 'ethnic cleansing' was said to be 'fundamentally different' (*Mail*, 18 April 1993); to be 'the aim...not an incidental by-product of the fighting' (*Times*, 9 November 1995); comparable to 'Hitlerism' (*Guardian*, 15 April 1993) or 'Hitler's Final Solution' (*Independent*, 2 April 1993). The framing of 'ethnic cleansing' by Croats and Muslims, where it was reported at all, tended to use very different language, depicting it as reactive and mutual, 'tit-for-tat' violence. Rather than a conscious strategy, terms such as 'insanity', 'frenzy', 'crazy' and 'epidemic' suggested irrationality or illness (see further Hammond 2007: chapter 3). The first mention of the concept of 'ethnic cleansing' in Western reporting of Yugoslavia was about ethnic-Albanian attempts to drive Serbs out of Kosovo in the early 1980s (Ackerman and Naureckas 2000: 98), but in the 1990s Serbs were almost never said to be the victims of 'ethnic cleansing', even when they clearly were. As Hayden (2013: 315) notes, the expulsion of 250,000 Serbs from Croatia in 1995 and of 100,000 Serbs from Kosovo after 1999 were conducted under 'the rhetorical cover that the victims actually deserved it'.

By the end of the 1990s, crusading journalists' refusal to 'stand neutrally between good and evil, right and wrong, the victim and the oppressor' had become official policy, summed up in Prime Minister Tony Blair's description of NATO bombing as 'a battle between good and evil; between civilisation and barbarity; between democracy and dictatorship' (*Sunday Telegraph*, 4 April 1999). The 'war for values' in Kosovo supposedly demonstrated the enlightened tolerance of Western countries, in contrast to the exclusivist nationalism associated with the Serbs. British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, for example, described the conflict as a battle between 'two Europes competing for the soul of our continent': NATO stood for 'a continent in which the rights of all its citizens are respected, regardless of their ethnic identity', while Yugoslavia represented 'the race ideology that blighted our continent under the fascists' (*Guardian*, 5 May 1999). Similarly, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana spoke of 'a conflict between two visions of Europe': one a 'Europe of nationalism, authoritarianism and xenophobia'; the other 'a Europe of integration, democracy and ethnic pluralism'.<sup>12</sup>

Yet all the Balkanist tropes that had allegedly inhibited intervention in the early 1990s now returned as justification for intervention at the end of the decade. Just before launching the bombing, for example, President Bill Clinton explained the conflict in Kosovo in terms of 'the clash of Slavic civilization with European Muslims and others' and people 'killing each other out of primitive urges'.<sup>13</sup> Such ideas were widely

echoed in the British press. The *Times* wrote of a '1,000 year story written in blood' (29 March 1999), for example, while the *Mail* (25 March) described Kosovo as 'a cauldron of ethnic and religious rivalry' and a 'horrendously complicated tangle of ancient religious and ethnic hatreds'. Writing in the *Sunday Telegraph* (4 April), Simon Winchester remembered visiting Yugoslavia in the 1970s, when he had 'felt there was something intractably wild and backward about the people in these parts'. Of the present, he said: 'Here in the Balkans, although there is a veneer of civilised behaviour, the appearance of prosperity and the suggestion of a future, there is truly only history....Just history, hatred and ruin'.

Hayden (2013: 158) observes that during the Bosnian war, 'one of the Western journalistic clichés...to show that even though they are Muslims, the Bosnian Muslims are like other Europeans, was to make reference to their blue eyes'. Now the same formula was applied to Kosovo Albanians. 'Do Albanians look like Serbs?' asked Marcus Tanner:

No....The Serbs often have black or dark brown hair and are generally darker and more heavily built than Albanians. Their appearance is fairly typical of southern Slavs. By contrast, the Kosovars look Celtic to a British eye. They have curly hair, which is often blonde or rust coloured, and their skin tends to be very pale and covered in freckles. Their eyes are often green or blue and their build is much more slender than that of the Serbs. They have longer heads. It is not surprising that they look so different as they belong to different races that have very rarely intermarried.

(*Independent*, 11 May 1999)

Tanner's bizarre racialised view of the conflict not only invited sympathy for those who looked familiar, but also implied hostility to those who allegedly did not. Others took a similar line. In the 26 March 1999 edition of the *Telegraph*, for example, one writer opined that 'it has been all the more painful to witness the suffering of the people of Kosovo because they look and live so much like us', while another said that "'Serb" is a synonym for "barbarian"'. The *Sun*'s 14 April editorial drew out the logic, declaring that '[Milošević's] animals' were 'an affront to humanity' and should be 'shot like wild dogs'.

As this indicates, it was not only leaders who were demonised, but the Serbian people. In the *New Statesman* (31 May 1999), for example, Steve Crawshaw asked 'why have so many millions of Serbs become liars on a grand scale or gone mad, or both?' Assigning collective guilt was usually done via the theme of Nazification. In the *New Republic* (10 May), Stacy Sullivan described the Serbs as 'Milosevic's Willing Executioners', insisting on 'the culpability of Serbs as a whole'. Similarly, in the *New York Times* (9 May), Blaine Harden outlined 'What it would take to cleanse Serbia' of its 'national psychosis'. Envisaging a scenario of 'unconditional surrender' after which 'the political, social and economic fabric of Serbia would be remade under outside supervision', Harden suggested that 'a Japan- or Germany-style occupation' might be the only way to 'stamp out the disease' of 'extreme Serb nationalism'. In the same vein, the BBC's Jeremy Paxman suggested a programme of 'thoroughgoing imposed de-Nazification' for post-war Serbia (*Newsnight*, 29 April).

## Tutelage

Serbia is no longer an official enemy of the West, but it is still not free from Western interference. As other former communist states have done, Serbia now aims to join

the European Union (EU), having been formally accepted as a candidate for membership in 2012. And as in other countries, the accession process provides a framework for intrusion into Serbia's internal affairs by powerful EU institutions, undermining its national sovereignty. As a former enemy country, however, the demands imposed by the EU take on a special character and have a deforming effect on Serbia's domestic politics.

EU enlargement involves 'shaping a new symbolic geography of the continent' (Petrović 2013: 110) which places Serbia in the 'Western Balkans' — to the bemusement of anyone wondering where the northern, southern and eastern Balkans might be (Vukasović 2018: 9). Predrag Svilar (2010: 508–9) traces how this formerly marginal term became commonplace after a 2003 summit that agreed an agenda for the region's eventual EU integration. It is a temporary political construct masquerading as a geographical description: countries will cease to be located in the Western Balkans when they join the EU (Svilar 2010: 514).<sup>14</sup> Repositioning various states and territories as 'on the verge of becoming "Europe"', the new terminology was perhaps intended as a way to help the process of integration, avoiding the negative connotations of Balkanism (Svilar 2010: 514). Yet the change in vocabulary only reproduces the power relationship in a new form, confirming 'the "civilizational" supremacy of the West' (Svilar 2010: 516). As Dejana Vukasović (2018: 10) puts it, 'Europeanisation produces Balkanisation' as the region strives to "prove" its Europeanness' by demonstrating 'satisfactory conduct'. As this implies, the ostensibly helpful accession process is actually coercive. The EU requires governments in a 'periphery that has to be supervised and administered' to submit to 'colonial relations' (Petrović 2013: 113). Serbia and other states are objects of disciplinary surveillance, while the EU 'gathers "facts" via annual reports, defines and monitors situations and problems in the countries of the Western Balkans, and authorises "appropriate" policies' (Vukasović 2020: 147–8).

As Tanja Petrović observes, the normative, reality-defining power exercised by the EU and other Western governments also has a temporal dimension. Joining EU-style modernity means breaking with a '*reactionary past*' of '*instability, chaos, nationalism and disease*', and opting for '*the future, progress, stability, and health*' (Petrović 2013: 120, original emphasis). In this spirit, European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker argued that the 'tragic' Western Balkans region 'needs a European perspective. Otherwise the old demons of the past will reawaken' (in Vukasović 2018: 9). Signing up to a future of EU membership entails estrangement from one's national history and culture, since the endorsement of 'Western standards, institutions and values' also means 'retroactively "strengthening" the "truthfulness" of Balkanist discourse' as it was used in the past (Svilar 2010: 514–15).

The implicit invitation to 'become self-stigmatized' (Svilar 2010: 517) is answered by what Zoran Ćirjaković (2018) calls 'auto-chauvinism'. This is the outlook of a liberal, Western-oriented intellectual elite; a 'Missionary Intelligentsia'<sup>15</sup> in sections of the media, academia and NGOs, who blame Serbia's problems on the country's allegedly primitive outlook. This liberal milieu traces its roots to the opposition to Milošević in the early 1990s — a self-styled 'Other' or 'Civil' Serbia that rejected nationalism and war — comprised of a modern, urban elite anxious to distance itself from rural backwardness (Jansen 2005). As Marek Mikuš (2013: 5, 34) suggests, this perspective rests on an 'essentialist idea of an unchanging Serbian "premodern political culture"', held to have frustrated all attempts at modernisation since the nineteenth century, to which the only solution is 'self-colonisation' to import Western norms.

Like other post-communist countries after 1989, the future for Serbia was assumed to be Western capitalist democracy in the form of the EU, and as in other countries, the promotion of globalist, cosmopolitan values has provoked divisions over 'culture wars' issues of identity and lifestyle (Furedi 2018). However, there are some factors that are significantly different in Serbia's case. The post-communist 'transition' was not just delayed but retarded by a decade of war and economic sanctions, and while the whole of the 'Western Balkans' is by definition not-quite-European, only Serbia is the West's recent enemy. Serbia has been expected, in effect, to accept its demonised status, as established in the skewed narrative compiled by the Western media and institutionalised in the ICTY; to accept the fiction that only Serbia was to blame for conflict in the 1990s; and to swallow the falsehood that while other groups fought defensive wars of liberation, the Serbs committed genocide.

This last has proven to be an issue that the West simply cannot let go, because it is a perennial source of moral authority. In 2015, for example, the British government proposed a UN resolution condemning denial that the Srebrenica massacre was genocide. The resolution was vetoed by Russia as 'confrontational and politically motivated' (*Guardian*, 8 July 2015), but a similar resolution was passed by the European Parliament, denouncing 'any denial, relativisation or misinterpretation of the genocide'.<sup>16</sup> In 2020 the EU admonished Serbia for having 'repeatedly and publicly challenged the judgments' of the ICTY, and for failing to penalise members of parliament who had denied that genocide was committed at Srebrenica.<sup>17</sup> Western institutions such as the EU and ICTY claim to be promoting reconciliation, but seek to silence or delegitimise any views that contradict their own, even to the extent of instructing the Serbian authorities to police the opinions of elected representatives. Yet when domestic commentators do echo Western views on these issues, they encounter the problem that many people in Serbia know the West's narrative of the 1990s to be false. This disconnect leads them to conclude that 'the overwhelming majority' of their fellow citizens are 'at best ignorant...and at worst complicit in defending the indefensible, just as they did when Slobodan Milošević was president'.<sup>18</sup> This is perhaps the most pernicious effect of EU involvement in countries' domestic politics: by inviting political and 'civil society' actors to adopt its own values and outlook, it encourages the growth of disconnected elites who are 'democratic' only by virtue of being approved as such by Western institutions and donors rather than through accountability to voters.

One would hardly guess from the catastrophising 'Other Serbia' discourse and the hectoring tone of EU directives, but Serbian politics has been strategically oriented to the EU for more than two decades. As Slobodan Antonić (2012: 71) observes, 'between 2000 and 2008, all media and almost all commentators and analysts were believers in euroenthusiasm'. Under the 'For a European Serbia' coalition that came to power in 2008 (with the slogan that there was 'no alternative'), official enthusiasm then became even more intense: Serbia began unilaterally implementing the Interim Agreement with the EU; war-crimes suspects were extradited to the ICTY (including Karadžić in 2008 and Mladić 2011); and by 2012 over 800 laws and protocols had been introduced or amended in order to harmonise with EU law (Mikuš 2013: 6–7). Yet over the same period, popular support fell away and Eurosceptic voices were increasingly heard in the media and academia (Antonić 2012: 68). By the time Serbia's accession negotiations began in 2014, only 36% of citizens were in favour — 'the lowest support for European integration recorded in a candidate country' (Belloni and Brunazzo 2017: 30).

If the achievements of 'Europeanisation' were disappointing this was not, as civil society critics saw it, because of the underlying problem of a 'primitive' national

mentality, but because circumstantial factors meant that EU realities were starkly revealed. 2008 was a singularly unpropitious moment to launch a campaign for EU membership, for two obvious reasons. Firstly, the EU was engulfed by the global financial crash, followed in 2009 by the Eurozone debt crisis. Expectations that EU integration would deliver economic prosperity were overturned by the ensuing instability and austerity. Moreover, as Roberto Belloni and Marco Brunazzo (2017: 25) note, the crisis also revealed the 'chasm between institutions and citizens', especially in Serbia's near neighbour, Greece, where a punishing austerity programme was imposed against the democratic wishes of voters. Secondly, also in 2008, the EU's recognition of Kosovo's independence created an extra obstacle. Today the EU insists on 'a fully comprehensive and legally binding agreement between Serbia and Kosovo' in order that both can eventually become EU members.<sup>19</sup> In effect, Serbia is required to give up part of its national territory and abandon citizens living in areas of Kosovo where it still has some control, and to do so not through any democratic process but simply on the say-so of the EU. Anyone expecting the 'road to Europe' to be a way to foster a vigorous democratic culture in Serbia or other former communist states has misunderstood the nature of the EU. It is fundamentally shaped by the globalist perspective of neoliberal thought, which seeks to institutionalise a system of 'double government' whereby the legally-enshrined rule of capital is separated and shielded from the democratic politics of sovereign states (Slobodian 2018). The 'rules-based order' of the EU always trumps the democratic nation state. As Juncker told Greece in 2015, 'there can be no democratic choice against the European treaties'.<sup>20</sup>

The other global exporter of democracy, the USA, offers no alternative. Weeks after coming to office in January 2021, President Joe Biden also instructed Serbia to reach 'a comprehensive normalization agreement with Kosovo centered on mutual recognition'.<sup>21</sup> Biden has long held virulently anti-Serb views, bordering on outright racism (Binder and Roberts 1998: 34, 43). He was a passionate advocate of military action against the Serbs in Bosnia, and called for 'a Japanese-German style occupation' of Serbia after the Kosovo conflict.<sup>22</sup> Yet previous US governments have also thought nothing of interfering in Serbia's internal affairs. In 1999, having bombed the country for 78 days, the US then poured millions of dollars into influencing Serbia's elections. Working both directly (through the CIA, the State Department and USAID), and indirectly (through organisations such as the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute), the US spent more than \$40m training and supplying the opposition, particularly the 'Otpor' student movement.<sup>23</sup> There was genuine domestic opposition to Milošević, of course, and most of the Otpor activists were simply idealistic young people wanting a better future, but as one former member later reflected, the 'impact of Otpor's unraveling for Serbia's youth has been profound'.<sup>24</sup> The effect of discovering that the whole thing had been payrolled by the US was to disillusion and depoliticise a generation. It is probably misleading to see this as an unfortunate but unintended side-effect, though, since that would be to assume that the goal really had been to support democracy in Serbia. More likely, the true intention was simply to project US power and effect regime change.

## Conclusion

The events discussed in this chapter demonstrate the importance of the media in contemporary conflict. In the West, it tends to be assumed that 'our' media are citadels of journalistic integrity reporting the truth, while 'theirs' are propaganda factories manufacturing lies. On that basis, in 1999 NATO bombed Serbian

broadcasting transmitters and destroyed the main television building in central Belgrade (killing civilians), justifying it on the basis that the media were part of the military machine. Yet NATO governments also set up a 'Ring around Serbia' of radio stations broadcasting Voice of America and Radio Free Europe — a scheme that continued after the war as part of the effort to unseat the country's government, alongside funding opposition media within the country. If that is not a propaganda operation, then nothing is.

A distinctive feature of the Yugoslav wars was how many 'attached' Western journalists sought to play a key role, hoping that their partisan reporting might influence policy-makers. Yet the relationship between journalism and government in wartime is better understood as a symbiotic one, in which journalists and powerful institutions jointly define reality and confirm each other's mutually-reinforcing narratives. From their editorial adoption of the views of official sources at the start of the Croatian and Bosnian conflicts, though to their post-war testimony at the ICTY, journalists have been willing participants in constructing a self-confirming loop, whereby reporters take their lead from officials, those same officials cite media reports as evidence, and journalists then draw confirmation of the rightness of their reporting from the authority of those institutional sources. It is a near-perfect propaganda system, though it only works so long as nobody punctures the bubble.

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<sup>1</sup> Allan Little, The West did not do enough, *BBC*, 29 June 2001, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/world/from\\_our\\_own\\_correspondent/newsid\\_1413000/1413764.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/world/from_our_own_correspondent/newsid_1413000/1413764.stm).

<sup>2</sup> In December 1991, for example, UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar urged Germany not to recognise Croatian independence, warning that 'a drastic struggle for territory could break out' as a result (Boutros-Ghali 1999: 37).

<sup>3</sup> House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, 24 March 1999, <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmdfence/39/9032403.htm>. Robertson was appointed Secretary General of NATO a few months after the bombing ended.

<sup>4</sup> The 1991 census data here are from Woodward (1995: 33). The situation after the war remained bleak: by 2011 Serbs constituted less than 5% of the population, and continued to face violence and discrimination (Sokolić 2017).

<sup>5</sup> Deichmann's original article is reproduced at: [www.whatreallyhappened.com/RANCHO/LIE/BOSNIA\\_PHOTO/bosnia.html](http://www.whatreallyhappened.com/RANCHO/LIE/BOSNIA_PHOTO/bosnia.html).

<sup>6</sup> See for example the online *Britannica* encyclopaedia: [www.britannica.com/event/Dayton-Accords](http://www.britannica.com/event/Dayton-Accords).

<sup>7</sup> Missing Persons from the Kosovo Conflict and its Aftermath: A Stocktaking, [www.icmp.int/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Kosovo-stocktaking-ENG.pdf](http://www.icmp.int/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Kosovo-stocktaking-ENG.pdf).

<sup>8</sup> James Rubin, State Department Regular Briefing, Federal News Service, 19 April 1999; State Department Fact Sheet: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo, 22 April 1999.

<sup>9</sup> Wiebes's study was part of a larger report by the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, available at [www.niod.nl/en/srebrenica-report/report](http://www.niod.nl/en/srebrenica-report/report).

<sup>10</sup> Wiebes was told that prosecutors saw him and his colleagues as 'too "nuanced"' because they were 'not seeing things in black and white' (BBC Radio 5 Live, 9 October 2004).

<sup>11</sup> As Laughland (2007: 131) remarks, the prosecution's arguments on this point appeared to be 'little more than a rehash in court of opinions gleaned from the television', particularly a 1995 BBC documentary, *The Death of Yugoslavia*, which was repeatedly screened in court.

<sup>12</sup> NATO as a Community of Values, 2 June 1999, [www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s990602a.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s990602a.htm).

<sup>13</sup> Remarks at the Legislative Convention of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, 23 March 1999, [www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-1999-book1/html/PPP-1999-book1-doc-pg427.htm](http://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-1999-book1/html/PPP-1999-book1-doc-pg427.htm). Clinton readily combined this Balkanist frame with Nazification, describing Bosnia as having been 'a genocide in the heart of Europe' and asking rhetorically 'What if someone had listened to Winston Churchill and stood up to Adolph Hitler earlier?'

<sup>14</sup> The Western Balkans comprised seven countries, according to the EU: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia. The number was reduced to six when Croatia joined the EU in 2013. See, for example: [https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/western-balkans/index\\_en.htm](https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/western-balkans/index_en.htm).

<sup>15</sup> Slobodan Antonić, Misionarska Inteligencija u Današnjoj Srbiji (The Missionary Intelligentsia in Today's Serbia), *Vreme*, 5 February 2003.

<sup>16</sup> The European Parliament resolution is at: [www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2015-0276\\_EN.html](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2015-0276_EN.html).

<sup>17</sup> European Commission, *Serbia 2020 Report*, [www.stat.gov.rs/media/5500/izvestaj-ek-o-napretku-srbije-za-2020-godinu.pdf](http://www.stat.gov.rs/media/5500/izvestaj-ek-o-napretku-srbije-za-2020-godinu.pdf), p24–5.

<sup>18</sup> Miloš Ćirić, Serbia Must Face Up to Its Responsibility for Srebrenica, *Balkan Transitional Justice*, 11 July 2020, <https://balkaninsight.com/2020/07/11/serbia-must-face-up-to-its-responsibility-for-srebrenica/>.

<sup>19</sup> European Commission, *Serbia 2020 Report*, [www.stat.gov.rs/media/5500/izvestaj-ek-o-napretku-srbije-za-2020-godinu.pdf](http://www.stat.gov.rs/media/5500/izvestaj-ek-o-napretku-srbije-za-2020-godinu.pdf), p66.

<sup>20</sup> Gavin Hewitt, Greece: The dangerous game, *BBC*, 1 February 2015, [www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-31082656](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-31082656).

<sup>21</sup> Biden's 5 February 2021 letter is available at: [www.predsednik.rs/docs/2021/02/07/1612682312235-bajden-cestitka.pdf](http://www.predsednik.rs/docs/2021/02/07/1612682312235-bajden-cestitka.pdf).

<sup>22</sup> Biden summarised his Bosnia record during a Congressional debate on 13 December 1995: [www.youtube.com/watch?v=MZs8Qj8QuRc](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MZs8Qj8QuRc). His Kosovo comment is from NBC's *Meet the Press*, 9 May 1999, excerpted at: [www.youtube.com/watch?v=hYXf2G6Ng7M](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hYXf2G6Ng7M).

<sup>23</sup> See: Michael Dobbs, US Advice Guided Milosevic Opposition, *Washington Post*, 11 December 2000, [www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2000/12/11/us-advice-guided-milosevic-opposition/ba9e87e5-bdca-45dc-8aad-da6571e89448/](http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2000/12/11/us-advice-guided-milosevic-opposition/ba9e87e5-bdca-45dc-8aad-da6571e89448/); and Nicholas Thompson, This Ain't Your Momma's CIA, *Washington Monthly*, March 2001, archived at <https://web.archive.org/web/20070109084028/http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0103.thompson.html>.

<sup>24</sup> Mladen Joksic and Marlene Spoerri, From Resistance to Revolution and Back Again, *Carnegie Council*, 18 February 2011, [www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles\\_papers\\_reports/0087](http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles_papers_reports/0087).