1.

Introduction: A Genealogy of Reconciliation?

Rachel Kerr and Henry Redwood

Reconciliation has become something of a buzzword. It is regularly invoked in discussions about how societies might go about the business of contending with a violent past, presumed to be a key goal of transitional justice processes,[[1]](#endnote-1) and viewed as an ‘absolute necessity’ for societies contending with legacies of violence and atrocity.[[2]](#endnote-2) As such, reconciliation is no longer confined to its original, largely religious, connotations, denoting a relationship between individuals and their God;[[3]](#endnote-3) it has expanded and transformed into a central facet of most, if not all, political transitions and post-conflict peacebuilding programmes. There is now a veritable reconciliation industry, with practitioners and organisations dedicated to ensuring that individuals, states and societies reconcile with one another. At the same time, there have been numerous attempts to offer a definition of reconciliation, which have tended to centre understandings of reconciliation on the (re)building or repair of relationships at various levels within a society – from the individual to the nation.[[4]](#endnote-4) In the political and secular domain, it is often conceived of as a process, with ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ versions,[[5]](#endnote-5) from the mere absence of violent conflict, to a deeper empathy and the engine of political transformation.

Despite this important work, reconciliation, as invoked in debates about peacebuilding, transition and especially justice, remains highly contested in practice as well as in meaning. For some, it is a byword for impunity, understood to be antithesis to justice or a vehicle for a politics of distraction, diverting attention from the inequality and injustice that might have led to conflict in the first place. As a concept, whilst relative consensus exists that reconciliation is primarily about affecting relationships and linked to goals of justice and peace,[[6]](#endnote-6) there is little agreement about what needs to happen to these relationships or indeed, what constitutes justice or peace. As such, debates continue as to whether reconciliation is an outcome or a process, the engine of political transition or a politics of distraction, the antithesis of justice, or the glue that holds the seemingly ‘irreconcilable’ goals of peace and justice together.[[7]](#endnote-7)

This book was originally conceived as a historical exploration of reconciliation, to provide at least part of the answer to the question of what *is* reconciliation and how has it been achieved in the past? However, in developing the book, we soon learned that both questions missed the mark. On one hand, we feared we would run the risk of making too glib a generalisation about what is an essentially complex and contingent process. On the other hand, we came to the realisation that reconciliation is rarely ‘achieved’, and processes of reconciliation rarely confined to the past. Rather, as we will discuss below, by drawing on historical perspectives we sought to uncover how reconciliation had been conceived of by individuals, communities and societies at different historical junctures, what were the politics and practices through which it was enacted, and what were its limitations?

To this end, we commissioned experts in their fields to write about reconciliation in particular historical episodes, deliberately seeking out those not represented in the mainstream transitional justice literature, averting our gaze from the recent past and with it the well-trodden ground of transitional justice interventions carried out in the 1990s and early 2000s. This, we hoped, would open up space to move beyond the limitations of current understandings, allow us to re-evaluate the meaning of reconciliation in very different political, social and cultural contexts, and ask how ideas about reconciliation might emerge at different times, in different places with different modes of understanding. In short, to attempt a *genealogy*.

In adopting a genealogical approach, we begin with a conception of genealogy as set out by Quentin Skinner: ‘When we trace the genealogy of a concept, we uncover the different ways in which it may have been used in earlier times.’[[8]](#endnote-8) Just as Skinner put it to use to uncover the modern state, and David Armitage to uncover civil wars,[[9]](#endnote-9) we attempt a genealogy of another ‘essentially contested concept’, *par excellence*, reconciliation. Rather than refine the concept and in so doing seek to ‘remove all its accreted complexities’, we seek to uncover the different ways it has been used, following Skinner, in order critically to reflect on how it is currently understood.[[10]](#endnote-10) However, where we depart from Skinner is that we do not assume that the meaning of reconciliation can be uncovered as an accumulation of meaning across time, but rather, drawing on Friedrich Nietzche and Michel Foucault, we seek to uncover meanings of reconciliation as they emerged and were understood at different times, without assuming progression in meaning, or even any relationship from one to the other. Following Foucault, we seek to uncover the fractured nature of history, the historical specificity of each particular reconciliatory moment, and see the ‘progression’ of history as filled with chance, contradiction and paradox.[[11]](#endnote-11) We take up Judith Renner’s argument that there is nothing transcendental about the idea of reconciliation, but it is, rather, filled with meaning as it is put into practice in various contexts.[[12]](#endnote-12) Understanding how this has happened across time and space is the focus of this book.

This approach, we argue, offers three clear advantages: 1. It opens up the possibility of alternative, more historically rooted, conceptions of reconciliation beyond its relationship to the newer field of transitional justice;[[13]](#endnote-13) 2. It allows us to take a sort of *longue durée* perspective, to set the periods of political and social upheaval under scrutiny in the context of slower and more residual transformation; and 3. It allows us to adopt a more thoroughly interdisciplinary approach. We discuss these in more detail in the following section.

**Reconciliation in Historical Perspective**

Reconciliation has come to be closely associated with the field of transitional justice as it emerged in the late-1980s and early 1990s, and is often invoked as one of its key goals. In that vein, reconciliation, as part of transitional justice, is tied into the United Nations’ post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding agenda, focused on instilling peace, justice and democracy as ‘mutually reinforcing imperatives.’[[14]](#endnote-14) That agenda is not without its critics. In 2010, Oliver Richmond observed that, in spite of billions of dollars spent and constant revolutions in practice and theory, the success rate of ‘liberal peacebuilding’ was poor.[[15]](#endnote-15) In a similar vein, Elizabeth Porter noted that over a third of societies subjected to liberal peacebuilding initiatives since the Second World War returned to violent conflict.[[16]](#endnote-16) The statistic looks worse if a more developed understanding of peace is introduced to include proxies such as democracy, refugee return and social cohesion. Allan Sens noted that the failure rate can be as high as 88%, and Alex Bellamy found that while UN peace initiatives in the 1990s were relatively successful at preventing the re-emergence of violent conflict, thirteen of the nineteen countries where the UN had intervened retained dictatorships.[[17]](#endnote-17)

In light of these and other critiques, Roland Paris observed that liberal peacebuilding was at somewhat of a crossroads, having gone from ‘exuberance’ in the heady optimism of the early to mid-1990s to its ‘denigration’ by ‘hyper-critical’ scholars who argue that it is fundamentally destructive and illegitimate, and has done more harm than good.[[18]](#endnote-18) These criticisms are reflected in the transitional justice literature, where a new agenda seeks to shifts our gaze from the level of international interventions and even national approaches to the ‘local’,[[19]](#endnote-19) and a call from feminist and post-colonial scholars to interrogate more closely *who* has the right to speak, and dictate the conditions within which ‘peace’ is imagined.[[20]](#endnote-20) There has also been a drive reconceptualise and recalibrate ‘justice’ to mean transformative, not merely transitional, in which, rather than return to the *status quo ante bellum*, societies must undergo radical transformation to eradicate fundamental inequalities that engendered conflict in the first place.[[21]](#endnote-21)

Our goal, like Paris’ in relation to liberal peacebuilding, is not uncritically to applaud reconciliation, and neither is it uncritically to denigrate it as a valuable goal, but rather to make a constructive contribution to understanding how reconciliation, like transitional justice and peacebuilding, operates as a process of highly contingent and imperfect transition, in which, just as there can be no one-size-fits-all solution, our notions of what constitutes success and failure need to be carefully examined.[[22]](#endnote-22)In taking an historical perspective, we sought to decouple the concept from transitional justice and in so doing also to detach it from some of the normative assumptions that underpin transitional justice practice and scholarship. Rather than see it as the engine of political transformation (from authoritarianism to democracy or from war to peace), we consider reconciliation as a political process in and of itself. As Jonathan Evershed argues in Chapter 14, underneath the seeming murkiness of the term, there often lurks very clear understanding of what the political purpose of reconciliation should be in practice: in the specific context of Northern Ireland, reconciliation was presented as a returnto a peaceful state of existence, wherea united community is reproduced around a shared singular identity and a unitary vision of history, and where legalistic notions of ‘closure’ are supposed to ‘draw and line’ under the past, rather than open it up for deliberation.[[23]](#endnote-23) By putting politics back into discussions of reconciliation, we are able better to see who is desiring it, to what ends, and for whom, and what are its outcomes.

In addition to highlighting the political and contingent nature of reconciliation as concept and practice, the volume seeks to diversify understandings of what reconciliation might mean beyond its current usage in transitional justice and peacebuilding theory and practice. In order to do this, we sought to uncover lesser-known attempts at reconciliation that have taken place historically and in different political and social contexts. We ask how recovering these stories might help us reimagine reconciliation, and to understand why initiatives designed to achieve reconciliation so frequently end up reproducing many of the conditions that resulted in the violence in the first place. As has been argued eloquently elsewhere, transitional justice mechanisms, such as courts and truth commissions can do harm as well as good, dividing societies into guilty perpetrators and innocent victims, reifying identity-based divisions within society and neglecting socio-economic structural causes of violence.[[24]](#endnote-24)

This volume takes as its starting point that reconciliation is context specific, and so needs to be understood as a historically contingent and dynamic concept. The particularity, and peculiarity, of the present is examined by juxtaposing it with this past.[[25]](#endnote-25) The problem of how to contend with legacies of violence and atrocity is, after all, not new. Just as making peace predates ‘liberal peacebuilding’, contending with the past predates ‘transitional justice’.[[26]](#endnote-26) With these historical studies of reconciliation (or, indeed, anti-reconciliation), we offer a more eclectic range of views about what reconciliation *is,* and how it can be achieved, demonstrating the peculiarity of the past and the present in the process. We hope that this approach will also have practical utility, to help render peacebuilding and transitional justice interventions more effective and efficient. We seek to contribute to conversations about ‘best practice’ not by supplying a blueprint, but by identifying and drawing out the contingent and complex nature of reconciliation as imagined *within* specific contexts. Whilst we veer away from making universalising assumptions, perhaps one generalisation we can make is that a one-size-fits-all approach to contending with legacies of violence and atrocity that fails to take account of context and contingency, and especially politics, is acknowledged by now to be woefully misguided.[[27]](#endnote-27) Another is that, as will be examined throughout the book, reconciliation has multiple meanings, and is invariably embedded within local power dynamics, traditions, epistemologies and world views. Starting with prefabricated ideas about what reconciliation is and should mean can blind us to this. A key contribution made possible by adopting an historical perspective is to offer an account of how meanings and approaches to reconciliation shift over time *within* a particular setting.

Taking an historical approach offers the possibility of a *longue durée* perspective of reconciliation. Too often there is a sense of impatience; reconciliation must happen immediately after the conflict has come to an end. Focusing on the immediate present conceals how these interventions or the legacies of violence themselves have a lasting impact on society, and, crucially, how historical memory shifts over time as the past works on the present, and the present on the past. This short-termism might not only be inappropriate, but also might end up worsening relationships if transitional justice measures are imposed upon a community before they are ready. Turning to the more distant past allows us to explore how sentiments, memories, and approaches to the past might change over time and with what consequence. We seek to understand and explore how reconciliation as an idea changes over time *within* a particular context, and how the legacies of past violence continue working to shape contemporary politics decades, and even centuries, after provisional peace has been achieved. Painful memories do not simply disappear but continue to define how a society experiences and acts in the present for a considerable time after the original act of violence has come to an ‘end’.

Finally, it is now widely accepted that an interdisciplinary approach is required in order to be able to see and understand complexity and contingency. Whether law, sociology or politics, a range of different approaches are now integrated into the study and practice of transitional justice and peacebuilding.[[28]](#endnote-28) We argue that history has much to offer here also, beyond simply being able to explore instances of (anti-)reconciliation from the past, but bringing to bear a different approach and methodology. In particular, there is a commitment to conduct source-led research and engage in grounded-theory building. The goal of the historian is to understand the past, in as much as is possible, on the terms of those subjects that experienced it. This pushes back against the desire to generalise, or to test hypotheses based on pre-conceived ideas, and instead focus on what makes each episode unique, and what this, in turn, means for how we think about, and pursue, reconciliation.

It is this approach that underpinned the collection of essays in this collection. Throughout, we were less interested in which particular theoretical approach can make sense of an attempt at reconciliation, or can be crafted in order to shape future attempts of reconciliation, and more interested in how reconciliation was conceived of, and how it unfolded in a particular social, political and cultural context. This is not to say that we were opposed to the possibility of common themes emerging between these studies, or of the studies speaking to broader theories of reconciliation. What drove us, though, was finding out what made these interventions unique, which we privilege above what we might extrapolate to make universalising claims. This, when combined with turning to hidden and forgotten instances of (anti-)reconciliation, or revisiting well-trodden ground but with a different lens attached, also helps us to step outside of dominant tropes, re-assess the assumptions that underpin them, and, through the historical perspective, explore how these processes, and the needs of affected societies, change over time and space.

**The Book**

We set authors the task of writing about an episode that they knew well, and to consider those episodes in light of a core set of questions: What does the term 'reconciliation' mean during the events you have studied? How was it pursued? How did it unfold? Which particular harm was seen as needing to be redressed? Which were the key actors driving the process? Was it deemed successful? Why, or why not? On whose/what terms?

The book is organised in four parts: *The Distant Past, The Longue Durée, Alternative Perspectives, and Challenging Conventional Wisdom*. In Part One, *The Distant Past*, historians explore important schisms in global history in order to see how past societies have attempted to overcome divisions within their communities. The temporal and geographical aperture was set very wide, ranging from the amnesty that accompanied the restoration of democracy in Athens in 405 following the overthrow of the brief rule of ‘The Thirty’ installed by Sparta at the end of the Peloponnesian War to the indemnity acts that were intended to draw a line under the English Civil War, via a study of Jesuit peace-making and reconciliation practices in Early-Modern Italy. Robin Osborne’s chapter charts the different ways in which reconciliation was performed and presented at different junctures in Ancient Greece, where reconciliation was a central concern of Greek literature, as well as discussing how it was enacted in ‘the real world’. Osborne notes a key shift after the Thirty Tyrants, from a form of democratic exile of ‘trouble makers’ (ostracism) and forgetfulness to what was more recognisable as an amnesty agreement. This, although perhaps not for the reasons normally associated with amnesties, saw a degree of peace introduced within the Athenian city-state, under which anti-reconciliatory challenges could be safely accommodated. The Athenian amnesty succeeded not because it was punctiliously observed by the whole community, but rather because it provided a framework in which the community could more or less openly explore what did and what did not deserve impunity. In contrast, whilst the Parliamentarians after the English civil war seemingly adopted a similar amnesty policy through the ‘Act of Oblivion’, Imogen Peck shows how this was openly contested and the divisions within society continued. In Medieval Naples, a key centre for European politics, Stephen Cummins’ chapter shows how reconciliation was a means to overcome daily civic strife. In this way, it was a form of everyday reconciliation that in many respects was a pre-cursor to a more recognisable, centralised and legalised judicial system of governance. Whilst each of these chapters shows the importance of historical specificity, there remains an interesting commonality in the use of reconciliation as a way of sustaining the status quo, and how a formal reconciliatory framework might serve either to facilitate safe contestation, as in Athens, or to contain it.

Part Two, *The Longue Durée,* considers concepts and practices of reconciliation over decades and centuries. They capture the fluid nature of reconciliation *within* a specific context, and show how the reverberations of past atrocity or historical schisms continue for considerable time after ‘peace’ is introduced, or even ‘reconciliation’ deemed to have been achieved. Natasha Kuhrt explores the continued legacy of the Soviet Revolution in contemporary Russian politics. This shows the ongoing destabilising nature of these moments of historical rupture, and the limitation through which these can be politically controlled. Kuhrt shows how the Kremlin both denounces the revolution’s legacy (as part of its foreign policy strategy) and enshrines it as a key moment in history (as Russia’s position in global politics today relies on it being seen as the successor to the Soviet Union). Teemu Laulainen explores the twists and turns of Finland’s attempts to come to terms with its civil war (intimately connected to the Soviet Revolution) and how despite the continued peace of one of the world’s most stable countries, civil war fault lines still play a part in contemporary Finish society. Daqing Yang’s chapter shifts us to a different geographical locale, as he explores the question of why the post-war fates of Franco-German and Sino-Japanese relations (the former seen at the time as a catastrophe and the latter seen as a model for all else to follow) ultimately reversed. Yang charts how, contrary to expectations in the early post-war years, when Franco-German reconciliation appeared chimerical, whereas Chinese-Japanise reconciliation a more likely prospect, this situation reversed, so that Franco-German reconciliation is now widely accepted as a classic case of successful reconciliation. Yang explains how this paradox unfolded.

Jelena Subotic turns to the distant past of the Former Yugoslavia (indeed to before the Yugoslav state even existed) to challenge the notion that the Yugoslav project was always doomed to failure. This re-evaluation traces the intellectual idea of Yugoslavia, its implementation and its contestation, and argues that the destruction of the state was not inevitable, nor did it spell the demise of the idea of Yugoslavia. Subotic argues that deliberations about what Yugoslavia was, should or could be involve a form of reconciliatory dialogue in themselves. As such, the chapter offers not only a re-reading of the history of Yugoslavia, but also an alternative and novel conception of reconciliation. Finally, in this section, James Gow and Rana Ibrahem reassess one of the most important moments in North American history, the US Civil War and the period of Reconstruction that followed. They show how contemporary race relations and the continued contestation of confederate memorial sites demonstrate that, while one aspect of reconciliation – between north and south – was relatively successful in ‘healing the nation’, another – between black and white – was not. Combined, these chapters point to the necessity in dealing with the past, but without necessarily restrictively detailing what that intervention might be, and further identify the many iterations that reconciliation politics goes through. Moreover, in spite of all efforts to tame the past, historical memory has an uncanny ability to resist political control.

Part Three offers *Alternative Perspectives* on the ideas of reconciliation as historically constituted, drawing on a range of examples across time and space. George Wilkes begins by challenging the ideas about the role of religion in reconciliation processes by pushing back against claims that religion has any transcendental qualities. Rather, as is true with other aspects of reconciliation, the role of religion has to be understood as a historically constituted activity. Drawing on the examples of discussions around the merits of Truth and Reconciliation processes, and the role of religious actors in them in South Africa and Bosnian and Herzegovina, Wilkes shows how religious practices bend and shape to the socio-political and historical environments within which they are constituted. Anne Kubai’s chapter meanwhile focuses on traditional practices of reconciliation amongst pastoralist communities in East Africa, and not only shows how local practices had kept the peace for decades, if not centuries, but also how interventions that might be seen as emanating from a more state-based approach have undermined these locally-situated practices.

In a very different context, Ben Holmes explores an alternative history of the World War 1 peace settlement, by analysing the practices of the Quaker humanitarian relief charity workers in Germany. This not only shows an important continuity in their actions from their war-time relief work (focused on ‘aliens’ living in Great Britain), but this also shows an imaginative, thoughtful, and (especially for its time) revolutionary approach to reconciliation. However, Holmes’ Chapter also explores both how this type of more grass roots activity becomes embroiled in particular politics, and how more conventional peacebuilding forces come to undermine the potential of these forms of interventions. Finally, in this section, Jonathan Dewar draws on his own work as a practitioner as well as a scholar to show us how the pathway to reconciliation in the context of colonial violence against indigenous and First Nation communities in Canada has been navigated. Dewar explores how the process of reconciliation has played out in and around the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission and in particular in activities involving the arts and arts-based activities, where artists and scholars challenged the very definition of reconciliation so that it was not so much a question of what artistic interventions might or might not do for reconciliation, but rather what these artistic interventions can tell us about what reconciliation might be. Whilst in distinctive ways, then, these chapters contribute to the re-thinking how reconciliation is conceived and pursued, each point to dissonant practices that offer a potentially valuable re-imagining of reconciliation.

Part Four, *Challenging Conventional Wisdom,* returns to some of the more well known, and often considered successful, instances of reconciliation discussed in the transitional justice and reconciliation literatures. It does this to offer a reassessment what reconciliation meant within these contexts, and on whose term’s success was judged. Jonathan Evershed takes aim at reconciliation in the context of Northern Ireland, examining the role of history education during the ‘Decade of Centenaries’ to explore how this formed part of what he terms a neo-liberal agenda that displaced the focus from the drivers of conflict (competing sovereignty claims and the British states’ complicity), onto a mythical idea of the ‘two tribes’ locked into centuries old historical dispute. History education was a ‘technical solution’ to a problem that did not necessarily exist as imagined, and the intervention carries the risk of creating the divisions it claims to address.

Rosa Ana Alija-Fernandez and Olga Martin-Ortega examine claims of Spain’s successful use of amnesty in the aftermath of Franco’s regime. By exploring the consequences of this policy, and the continuity from Franco’s aggressive and divisive ‘reconciliation’ policies after the Spanish Civil War, they point to the negative political consequences for victims of Franco of this settlement. However, in tracing reconciliation across several decades they note how in recent years there has been a push for more victim-centred reconciliatory policies, which have been enabled by regional politics pushing back against the Madrid government. Olga Burkhart-Vetter revisits the claims that Germany represents the ‘gold-standard’ of successful reconciliation by examining its relationship with Greece, particularly around the Distomo massacre. In detailing their consistent failure to address the needs of victims, Burkhardt-Vetter not only questions the perspective of Germany’s successful post-war reconciliation, but also shows how the failure to deal with this legacy has become embroiled with the contemporary Greek debt crisis. Finally, Madoka Futamura’s chapter interrogates reconciliation as a primarily political project. Drawing on the example of Japan, she illustrates how the range of different, and sometimes contradictory, strategic aims associated with attempts to ‘reconcile’ with itself and with its neighbours ultimately doomed such efforts to failure. Combined, these chapters offer a powerful critique of reconciliation, and reveal both the real consequences of its practices but, and importantly, also how it is resisted and revised.

Taken as a whole, the chapters point to a surprising commonality, which suggests that reconciliation often comes to stand in for an attempt to maintain a status quo. Whilst not suggesting that this means there is an *inherent* link between reconciliation and a form of conservative politics, the inability for reconciliation to be about transformative change (at least in these studies) offers pause for further reflection. What emerges from this diverse set of cases is a more radical, and nuanced, understanding of what we understand to be reconciliation, anti-reconciliation and even resistance.

1. Paul Seils, ‘The Place of Reconciliation in Transitional Justice: Conceptions and Misconceptions’, International Center for Transitional Justice, ICTJ Briefing Note, June 2017. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Bloomfield, D, Barnes, T. & Huyse, L. (2003). *Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook*. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 12. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Frayling, N. (2009). Toward the Healing of History: An Explanation of the Relationship between Pardon and Peace. In Quinn, J. R. (ed.). Reconciliation(s): Transitional Justice in Postconflict Societies. Montreal, QC: McGill-Queens University Press. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. Daniel Philpot offered a valuable schema of six different ‘wounds’ that are inflicted by political violence and which, consequently, need addressing in any reconciliation process. Daniel Philpott, *Just and Unjust Peace: An Ethic of Political Reconciliation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 31-47. See also, Daniel Bar-Tal and Gemma H. Bennink, ‘The Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and as a Process’, in Yacov Bar-Siman-Tov (ed), *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*, (Oxford University Press; Oxford: 2004), 11-38; Jennifer Llewellyn and Daniel Philpott (eds). *Restorative Justice, Reconciliation and Peacebuilding.* Edited by. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 14-37. Eric Staub, ‘Reconciliation after genocide, mass killing or intractable conflict: understanding the roots of violence, psychological recovery, and steps toward a general theory’, *Political Psychology* 27:6 (2006), 888; Quinn, J. R. (ed.). Reconciliation(s): Transitional Justice in Postconflict Societies. Montreal, QC: McGill-Queens University Press; Daly, E. & Sarkin, J. (2007). Reconciliation in Divided Societies: Finding Common Ground. Philedelphia, PA: U. Penn. Press. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. Hamber, B. & Kelly, G. (2009). Beyond Coexistence: Towards a Working Definition of Reconciliation. In Quinn, J. R. (ed.). Reconciliation(s): Transitional Justice in Postconflict Societies. Montreal, QC: McGill-Queens University Press. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. Lederach, J. P. (1997). Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. Leebaw, Bronwyn Anne. “The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice.” *Human Rights Quarterly*, vol. 30, no. 1, 2008, pp. 95–118. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/20486698. Accessed 25 May 2020. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Quentin Skinner, ‘A Genealogy of the Modern State’, *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 162, 325–370. 13 May 2009. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. David Armitage, *Civil Wars: A History in Ideas* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017). [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. Skinner, 325. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Michel Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, genealogy, history’, in Bouchard, *Language, Counter-Memory*, and Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, (Cornell University Press., 1977), 139-164. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. Judith Renner, ‘The local roots of the global politics of reconciliation: the articulation of ‘reconciliation’ as an empty universal in South African transition to democracy. *Millennium – Journal of International Studies* 42:2 (2014), 263-287. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. In this way, we seek to do for reconciliation what Brendan Simms and D.J Trim did for humanitarian intervention in their edited collection, that is to sketch out a long-term history of the practice. Simms, B., & Trim, D. (Eds.). (2011). *Humanitarian Intervention: A History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. We were also inspired to cast our gaze in new (old) directions by Kevin Heller and Gerry Simpson (Eds.) (2013), The Hidden Histories of War Crimes Trials.: Oxford University Press. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies,’ UN Doc. S/2004/616 (23 August 2004). [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. Oliver Richmond, ‘A genealogy of peace and conflict theory’, in Oliver Richmond (ed.) *Palgrave advances in peacebuilding: critical developments and approaches* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 14-40. Whilst the definition of liberal peacebuilding often remains more assumed than critically examined, it is often marked by a number of elements, including establishing democracy and the rule of law, transition to free-market economy, security sector reform, and transitional justice measures. International institutions such as the UN or the World Bank are instrumental in dictating the terms upon which transition takes place. The narrow strictures within which this transition is imagined, along with the sense that this is imposed from ‘outside’ has underpinned much of the criticism of both liberal peacebuilding and transitional justice. For discussion, see Chandra Sriram, ‘Liberal Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice: What Place for Socioeconomic Concerns?’, in Dustin Sharp (ed) *Justice and Economic Violence in Transition* (New York: Springer, 2014). [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Elizabeth Porter, *Connecting peace, justice and reconciliation* (London: Lynne Reinner, 2005), 5. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. Alex Bellamy, ‘The institutionalisation of peacebuilding: what role for the UN Peacebuilding Commission’, in, *Palgrave advances in peacebuilding*, 195; Whilst there is no overall statistic that can be offered here, the studies that Sens examines record that anything between 50-88% failure rates. Sens also notes that the statistics are worse when a more developed understanding of peace is included. Allen Sens, ‘from peace-keeping to peace-building: the United Nations and the challenge of intrastate war’, Richard Price and Mark Zacher (eds.), *The United Nations and global security* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 151-152) [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. Roland Paris, ‘Saving Liberal Peacebuilding,’ *Review of International Studies* 30(2) (2010): 337-365. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. Paul Gready and Simon Robins, ‘From transitional to transformative justice: A new agenda for practice’, *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 8:3 (2014), 339-361. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. E.g. Claire Duncanson, *Gender and Peacebuilding* (Cambridge: Polity, 2016); Vivienne Jabri, ‘Peacebuilding, the local and the international: a colonial or a postcolonial rationality?’, *Peacebuilding* 1:1 (2013), 3-16. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. Paul Gready and Simon Robins, ‘From transitional to transformative justice: A new agenda for practice’, *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 8:3 (2014), 339-361. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. For discussion, see Rachel Kerr, Tyrannies of Peace and Justice? Liberal Peacebuilding and the Politics and Pragmatics of Transitional Justice, *International Journal of Transitional Justice*, Volume 11, Issue 1, March 2017, Pages 176–185, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijw022> [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. E.g. Richard Goldstone, ‘Justice as a tool for peace–making: truth commissions and international criminal tribunals’, *Journal of International Law and Politics* 28 (2005), 485–504.; Daniel Bar-Tal and Gemma Bennink, ‘The nature of reconciliation as an outcome and as a process’, in Bar-Siman-Tov (ed.) *From conflict resolution to reconciliation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 12; United Nations (1992) *An agenda for peace*, Secretary-General report.A/47/277 - S/24111; United Nations (1994). *An agenda for development*, Secretary-General report, A/48/935; Martha Minow, ‘Making history or making peace: when prosecutions should give way to truth commissions and peace negotiations’, *Journal of Human Rights* 7:2 (2008), 174-185. For a similar critique see: Andrew Schaap, ‘Reconciliation as Ideology and Politics’, *Constellations Volume* 15:2 (2008), 249-264. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. Ruti Teitel, ‘The universal and the particular in international criminal justice’, *Columbia Human Rights Law Review* 30 (1998), 298; Kristian Brown and Fionnuala Ni Aolain, ‘Through the looking glass: transitional justice futures through the lens of nationalism, feminism and transformative change’, *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 9:1 (2015), 127-149; Denisa Kostovicova and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic, ‘Ethnicity pays: The political economy of post-conflict nationalism in Bosnia-Herzegovina’, in *After civil war* (2014), 195-204 [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. Michel Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, genealogy, history’, in Bouchard, *Language, Counter-Memory*, and Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, (Cornell University Press., 1977), 139-164. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. Indeed, one thing that is notable is that the same critiques of liberal peace have been raised for nearly 20 years now. See. Francis Kofi Abiew and Thomas Keating, ‘Outside agents and the politics of peacebuilding and reconciliation’, *International Journal* 55:1(1999), 80-106. [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. See for example, Roger Duthie and Paul Seils, Justice Mosaics: *How Context Shapes Transitional Justice in Fractured Societies*. International Center for Transitional Justice (New York: ICTJ, 2017). [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. Christine Bell, ‘Transitional justice, interdisciplinary and the state of the “field” or non–field’, *The International Journal of Transitional Justice* 3:1 (2009), 5–27 [↑](#endnote-ref-28)