London South Bank University
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Emotional Culture?

An Investigation into the Emotional Coverage of Televised Leader Debates in Newspapers and Twitter

by

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Abstract

This thesis studies how emotions are used in and around TV debates by politicians during debates, by newspaper journalists in their coverage of debates and by Twitter users following debates and reacting to their coverage. Although emotions have been the focus of many studies recently, the literature that combines emotions with politics, journalism and social media remains limited. To fill this gap in knowledge, my research involves two case studies: the 2010 British election, where TV debates were held for the first time, and the 2012 American election, where debates are a long-standing tradition. For this purpose, my research is guided by the following research question: how far did political candidates, print media and Twitter users use emotions and emotional references in the 2010 British and 2012 American televised leader debates and their coverage?

To answer this research question, I carried out a content analysis of the three British and four American debate transcripts; a framing analysis of 104 articles from the *New York Post* and 223 articles from *The New York Times* as well as 93 articles from *The Sun* and 238 articles from *The Guardian*; and, finally, a content analysis of a sample of American (30 000 tweets) and British tweets (3 000 tweets) posted during the debates period.

These analyses reveal two key findings. Firstly, the manipulation of different forms of emotionality by politicians (e.g. to convince voters, defend themselves, criticise others) during the debates failed as Twitter users mainly displayed negative emotions in relation to politicians' emotions. Secondly, journalists' attempt at manipulating different forms of emotionality (e.g. to praise their favourite candidate or discredit another) failed too as Twitter users mainly expressed negative emotions regarding the coverage of the debates. Thus, it appears that emotions are not a means for politicians and journalists to interact with Twitter users as the manipulation of emotions by politicians and journalists failed to convince most Twitter users.

Publications

Parts of this thesis have been published as follows:

- Kimmich, M. (2015). The uninvited guests of TV debates: emotions, candidates' families and friends. *Media, Communication and Cultural Studies Association (MeCCSA) Three-D newsletter*, Issue 24. Available at: http://www.meccsa.org.uk/news/three-d-issue-24-the-uninvited-guests-of-tv-debates-emotions-candidates-families-and-friends/.
- Kimmich, M. (2016). Emotional communication in TV election debates. Conference paper, *24th IPSA World Congress of Political Science*, Poznań, Poland. Available at: http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_49092.pdf.
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Finally, a journal paper is currently under preparation.

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"I've learned that people will forget what you said, people will forget what you did, but people will never forget how you made them feel."
Maya Angelou

There are over 90 000 words in this thesis. A dictionary in itself. However, today I cannot seem to find the right words to describe the adventure that this PhD has been. Challenging would certainly come close. Hard, isolating, stressful. But also rewarding, enlightening and fascinating. An adventure I have come to love and take much pride in.

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Introduction

I. Background

From Lyndon Johnson's "Daisy Ad" depicting a little girl pulling the petals off a flower with a nuclear bomb going off in the background in 1964 to President Obama tweeting a picture of his wife and himself as his first reaction to his re-election in 2012, politicians have been using emotional bridges to reach out to potential voters and maintain support, particularly during electoral campaigns, for a long time (Hoggett and Thompson, 2012). However, more than a political tool and a journalistic angle, emotions have gained greater importance in academic research and every arena of society, such as politics, journalism and social media.

It is, however, not the presence of emotions that is new but rather the fact that emotions are now more visible, explicit and prominent in society (Richards, 2007; Turner, 2009; Beckett, 2015). This rise in visible emotionality coincides with the "emotionalisation of society" that has been taking place for the last few decades (Rieff, 1966; Lasch, 1979, 1984; Hume, 1998; Furedi, 2003; Illouz, 2007; Richards and Brown, 2002; Richards, 2007; Lilleker, 2006; Lilleker and Temple, 2013). The emotionalisation of society has progressively given more space to emotions but also to the expressivity, management and personal reflection linked to emotions in everyday life culture, institutions (whether at a state or organisational level) and communications in the public sphere, what Richards (2007) calls the "therapeutic". More specifically, Richards and Brown (2002, p.99) link the emotionalisation of society to profound changes in popular and political culture:

> The emotionalisation hypothesis proposes that we are living through a period in which the historic splits between the public and private and between reason and passion are being reconfigured, and to some extent dissolved, as a consequence of a transformation in the relationship of affective life to public culture. In short we are witnessing a profound emotionalisation of social life, led by, and in, the domain of popular culture but reaching out, like popular culture itself, into commercial culture (into business organisations as well as marketing), into political culture and into personal life.

The emotionalisation of society is also linked to social and media events, such as the death and subsequent funeral of Lady Diana in 1997, the Dunblane tragedy in 1996 and the Louise Woodward case in 1997 (Hume, 1998). These events have put so-called "televictims" in the spotlight, the most prominent of all being Princess Diana (Hume, 1998). These televictims, mostly women, share common characteristics: they have suffered from personal, social or medical conditions and are taking over the news agenda. For example, the funeral of Lady Diana received more media coverage than the whole of the Second World War or Kennedy's assassination (Hume, 1998). These televictims have also risen as former collective institutions such as churches and trade unions, which used to cement society, declined (Hume, 1998). The media are thus offering to the public the possibility to be part of something and to be emotionally connected with others, allowing citizens' emotions to be manipulated not only by the media but also by politicians.

Although a public sphere in which emotions are neglected is almost unimaginable nineteen years after Diana's death, there is no consensus on how to approach this emotionalisation of society. Some scholars see the benefits of visible emotions in society and acknowledge that emotions can help improve people's lives at school, work or in relationships for example. Along those lines, Goleman (1995) developed the concept of emotional intelligence, Orbach (2001) that of emotional literacy, Thomson (1998) that of emotional capital and Hardt (1999) that of affective labour. The thought that the emotionalisation of society is beneficial to society is also shared by Richards (2007) who believes that emotions are a means for politicians to reconnect with people who have become highly sceptical of political matters. However, other scholars see the emotionalisation of society as potentially destructive, stressful and traumatic. This is the case of Lasch (1979, 1984) who believes that the world has to end because it is characterised by a culture of competitive individualism and the pursuit of a selfish and narcissistic happiness. Lasch's work can be linked to other scholars who place one emotion, fear, at the heart of society and all its problems (Furedi, 2005; Farrell, 1998; Luckhurst, 1997; Rees, 2013). In addition to researching fear, other scholars link the emotionalisation of society to the notion of trauma, which results from different professional, political and cultural discourses that question the place of the self (Rees, 2013; Luckhurst, 1997). As trauma is what cannot be tackled by the mind, it therefore remains within the self, directing its actions and behaviours in sometimes dangerous ways (Luckhurst, 1997).

It now seems vital to shed more light on emotions themselves. To start with, it is necessary to mention that there is no single or generalisable theory of affect but rather a plurality of concepts and theories relating to affect. Summarising these theories and concepts would be impossible as there is no overarching line that connects affects and all of its variations and understandings. Far from dating the beginning of affect theory, which can be traced back to Aristotle questioning reason and emotion (Escobar, 2011), two essays published in 1995 seem to correlate with the increasing wave of interest in the humanities regarding affect theory: *Shame in the cybernetic fold* (Kosofsky Sedgwick and Frank, 1995) following the work on the psychobiology of different affects by Tomkins (1962) and *The autonomy of affect* (Massumi, 1995) highlighting the importance of qualifying affect and its complex relationships with the body and mind, feeding back into the work of Spinoza (1985) and Deleuze (1986, 1990, 1994). These two visions have differences but also similarities. For Seigworth and Gregg (2010, p.6), both theories can be described as "a certain inside-out/outside-in difference in directionality: affect as the prime 'interest' motivator that comes to put the drive in bodily drives (Tomkins); affect as an entire, vital and modulating field of myriad becomings between human and nonhuman (Deleuze)". For Thompson and Biddle (2013), both visions see affect as a transformative force, which goes beyond, although being intimately linked to, conscious processes such as feelings and emotion. However, these theories differentiate affect, feeling and emotion from one another (Thompson and Biddle, 2013).

Building on this key literature, many authors have developed their own understanding of affect and emotion in different fields such as sciences (Westen, 2007), neurosciences and psychology (Marcus, 1988, 2002, 2003; Marcus et al., 2000; Marcus and MacKuen, 1993; Marcus and Rahn, 1990), body studies (Blackman, 2008, 2010), feminism (Gould, 2010; Staiger et al., 2010), sociology and politics (Richards, 1994, 2004, 2007, 2009; Richards and Brown, 2002) and more. The understandings and definitions of emotion therefore vary according to the field of study considered. For example, from a psychological point of view, affect and emotion are related to consciousness and bodily experiences: while affect is more embodied, unformed and less conscious, emotion is more conscious and anchored in language and meaning (Lupton, 2012). Sociologists reject, or complement, this approach by stating that emotions are daily understandings of affects, which are socially and culturally constructed (Hoggett and Thompson, 2012). Furthermore, emotions tend to be specific and observable - one can see the effects of anger or joy on bodies for example - whereas feeling is understood as the conscious aspect of one or several emotions experienced in mind and body (6 et al., 2007).

To illustrate the implications of emotions in different fields and disciplines, I now turn to the movement of the "affective turn". The affective turn in the humanities and social sciences, which developed from 2001 onwards, can be seen as a symptom of, or an attempt to grasp, the plurality surrounding studies about emotions. This movement has understood emotions as being at the centre of people's lives with more studies focusing on emotions than ever before such as in continental philosophy, psychoanalysis, mainstream psychology, neurosciences, human sciences especially sociology as well as gender studies, history and psychology as pointed out by Hoggett and Thompson (2012) and Staiger et al. (2010). Beyond the relationship between emotion and society, the affective turn also aimed at showing the complexity of studying emotions that cannot be wholly reduced to biology nor captured by language or psychology (Cromby, 2012). The affective turn consists of attempts to engage with emotional matters at a social rather than natural science level in order to highlight the intrinsic relationship between emotion and society (Cromby, 2012). The affective turn goes beyond discussions on emotion and aims at redefining society and citizens, what Clough (2007) calls “theorizing the social”. The affective turn invites a pluridisciplinary approach both in theory and method exploring the changing and intertwined spheres of politics, economics and culture. The movement highlighted that humans, who are both rational and emotional, are pushed by their emotions, which are essential for their everyday thinking process (Gould, 2010).

However, the concept of affective turn itself is hard to grasp. Regarding the complexity and plurality of emotions, the terms “affective turn” are misleading. Indeed, affect and emotion can be differentiated and even distinguished as two different forms, sometimes overlapping while not mutually exclusive. So if the concept itself is blurry, how can conclusions and generalisations be drawn? My aim is not to investigate studies of the affective turn but rather to show that the growing number of studies in relation to emotions lays a solid ground for my research to examine the emotional field further, particularly in fields more usually associated with rational discourse and argument, such as journalism and politics. Whether a consequence or cause of the plurality and turmoil surrounding emotions, the affective turn nonetheless illustrates that emotions are crucial parts of life and more specifically of politics and journalism, both of which my research investigates.

Since emotions operate at different levels (cultural, biological, sociological and many more), the definition selected by each researcher varies (Turner, 2009). For example, the arousal of body systems will prevail for a study exploring neurological aspects of emotions, whereas ideologies and vocabulary will dominate research focusing on cultural emotions (Turner, 2009). Without compromising on analytical rigour, I am therefore interested in finding a definition of emotions that can be applied to politics, journalism and social media. As such, I agree with Engelken-Jorge et al. (2011, p.11) who state that:

> As political scientists and sociologists, it is not emotions per se that we need to define. Rather, what we are interested in is in reaching a definition of emotion that is useful for political analysis. This means that we may be interested in more parsimonious concepts, which should be, however, complex enough for rigorous analytical work, though not more complex than strictly necessary. This is not to prejudge the potential interest of any of the aforementioned aspects claimed to be constitutive of emotions. Rather, we are suggesting that, in this context, we should only consider those elements of emotions relevant to political analysis.

Throughout this thesis, I have applied the political analysis approach taken by Engelken-Jorge et al. (2011) to two other spheres, namely news media and social media analysis. As such, I conceive emotion as an umbrella term including feelings and their specific thoughts, with their own psychological, cultural and biological states and tendencies to act (Bollow, 2004). More specifically, I follow the framework of emotions as understood by Richards and Brown (2002) who claim that the concept of emotionalisation is not linked to any specific psychological theory of affect, but rather to a broad range of mental states, which can generically be termed affects, feelings, moods, passions, or sentiments. Although I do not have preconceived emotions in mind and intend to follow my data in an inductive way, I do not limit my research to emotions such as anger or love but also include other attitudes or behaviours that can elicit an emotion such as references to family, friends or anecdotes. I also take a closer look at humour, which, although not an emotion itself, is closely related to emotions. As Freud (1927, p.2) puts it: "There is no doubt that the essence of humour is that one spares oneself the affects to which the situation would naturally give rise and dismisses the possibility of such expressions of emotion with a jest." Therefore, this umbrella approach to emotions includes more emotions and emotional attitudes than previous studies (Brader, 2005; Tiedens, 2001; Marcus et al., 2000).

This thesis analyses the emotionalisation of society through specific fields that are politics, journalism and social media. Before discussing this in more detail, it is important to mention some of the political, journalistic and social media contexts relevant to this thesis. Political leader-based communication has been undergoing a so-called "Americanisation", in a turn towards "infotainment" that entails a greater focus on candidates, celebrity and the media rather than policies and issues (Corner and Pels, 2003). Thus, politics is now more associated with art than science, with a show based on style, emotion and the cult of personality (Corner and Pels, 2003). It is in this changing political environment that emotions appear to have come to the forefront of politics (Hoggett and Thompson, 2012). For example, British Labour Party politician Ed Miliband asked academics in 2014, such as Professor of Developmental Psychology Simon Baron-Cohen, for help in understanding "the politics of empathy" and related emotions (Baggini, 2014).

Journalism has been challenged in many ways: poor financial health, decrease in mainstream audience share, and loss of credibility, autonomy and professional authority, among others (Peters and Broersma, 2013). At the core of these challenges lies the questioning of journalistic objectivity. In a study focusing on the management of emotion by British journalists, Richards and Rees (2011) reveal that the notion of objectivity is a source of confusion and inattention for journalists who assimilate objectivity to impartiality, neutrality, accuracy, fairness, honesty, commitment to truth, depersonalisation or balance. For some, such as Tuchman (1972) or Schudson (2001), contemporary journalism confines objectivity to a set of rituals aimed at protecting journalists from editorial and legal repercussions, and does not present the truth. For Coward (2009, 2013), the concept of objectivity itself is philosophically flawed: objectivity requires a total separation between a writer and the world he is living in, between a writer and his emotions, and between a writer and his beliefs. However, such a separation is not possible: journalists make such judgment calls every day when they choose their interviewees, quotes and story structure. Furthermore, objectivity, balance, accuracy and facticity are not synonymous with such a separation and invisibility (Coward, 2009, 2013). While for some objectivity does not exist (Coward, 2009, 2013; Schudson, 2001), for others it could reinvent itself through transparency (Cushion, 2012; Wallace, 2013; Coward, 2009, 2013; Beckett, 2015). For Beckett (2015), objectivity can only be an "aspiration" as journalists are humans trying to make sense of the world by selecting specific stories and specific aspects contained in each story. Beckett (2015) sees transparency as the new objectivity - a form of journalism that mixes emotions and facts, in a transparent and non-contradictory way, what the author calls "networked journalism". For Beckett (2015), three factors are currently pushing journalists towards an increased use of emotions. Firstly, emotions can help journalists face an intense economic situation as the competition is fierce regarding both readerships and advertising revenues. Secondly, emotions attract more readers and enable an increase in the sharing of journalistic content. Lastly, the author stresses that journalists need to understand how people react to news content, especially in an emotional sense. Along those lines, Wahl-Jorgensen (2016, p.133) states that "the clashing and fundamentally incompatible epistemologies of conventional 'objective' journalism and 'emotional' audience content now sit alongside each other, rather than the former being privileged by the hierarchies of news content." In addition to these challenges, journalism is also affected by new media (social media, blogs, forums), which are sometimes characterised as the "fifth estate" (Dutton, 2007). Rather than a dichotomy between old and new media, however, Chadwick (2013) suggests that a "hybrid media system" has emerged, combining, according to its needs, traditional news reporting and social media tools. Furthermore, journalism is increasingly subjective and emotional as shown by the rise of confessional journalism, characterised by people "speaking personally" through opinion pieces, articles based on first-person real-life experiences, magazines speaking on intimate terms with their readers, along with confessional columns and blogs (Coward, 2009, 2013).

Although linked to traditional media (television, print media and radio), social media have a particular relation to emotions. In some cases such as in the 2008

American elections or following Michael Jackson's death in 2009, social media have given a more emotional and personal view of events and have therefore steered coverage in a specific way (Newman, 2009). Along those lines, Wahl-Jorgensen (2016) argues that social media are new places where emotional expression can be elicited and encouraged. She adds that this emotional encouragement can impact political discussion and action. Wahl-Jorgensen (2016) also argues that there is a current push towards positive emotions caused by the tremendous potential to monetise and commercialise positivity and emotional labour. For Pariser (2011), this strong desire for positive emotions only creates a certain "bland positivity". Beyond this commercial aspect, positive emotions on social media also have widespread consequences such as the creation of only positive and likeable content (Eckles, 2010; Pariser, 2011). Thus, social media, although encouraging the sharing of emotions, also represent platforms where emotions can be manipulated as explored throughout this thesis.

Emotions and either politics, journalism or social media have been the focus of studies in the past. For example, Brader (2005) studies politicians' appeal to the public's emotions in TV ads and other electoral events, specifically looking at enthusiasm and fear, Tiedens (2001) focuses on the expression of anger and sadness regarding different politicians and Marcus et al. (2000) investigate enthusiasm and anxiety in relation to political judgement. Similarly, researchers have focused on emotions and journalism by highlighting subjective and emotional forms of journalism (Coward, 2009, 2013), the emotional experience of involvement for journalists (Peters, 2011) or emotional and subjective journalistic narratives linked to an increasing use of user-generated content (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2016). Lastly, some researchers have linked social media to emotions by describing the "architecture of social networks" (Papacharissi, 2009) or how emotions relate to digital technologies (Serrano-Puche, 2015). However, while many studies have researched this increase of visible emotions in society especially in politics, journalism or social media, no research on the intersection of emotions, politics, journalism and social media has been found to date.

To fill part of this gap in knowledge, my research investigates the emotionalisation of society by analysing how emotions are used in, and around, live televised debates by politicians during debates, by newspaper journalists in their coverage of debates and by Twitter users following debates and reacting to their coverage. For this purpose, my thesis relies on two specific case studies: the 2010 British election, where TV debates of this kind were held for the first time in the UK, and the 2012 American election, where debates have been a long-standing tradition since the 1960s. Indeed, regarding their growing popularity and multifaceted aspects, TV debates can be considered as a microcosm of politics and news media, especially in the UK and US. Furthermore, TV debates have become cornerstones of election campaigns in many countries such as Canada, France, Germany, Australia, the Netherlands, and most recently the United Kingdom (Cushion, 2012). TV debates have impacted politics but also the journalistic coverage of political campaigns (Cushion, 2012) and have become some of the most tweeted events in the history of Twitter (Sharp, 2012a,b). Moreover, TV debates are also intrinsically linked to emotions (Newton et al., 1987).

Aided by two case studies, this thesis challenges the "emotional governance" theory formulated by Richards (2007). Emotional governance is a complex approach relying on mass media communications that aims at emotionally touching the public (Richards, 2007). Richards (2007) argues that emotional governance is the solution to overcome the challenges faced by politics and democracy, namely citizens' lack of interest in these two spheres. Richards emphasises that ideology and politics are now enmeshed with candidates' personalities, emotionality and psychological considerations. These theoretical claims are challenged by the empirical findings developed in this thesis. More particularly, the analysis of TV debates as well as their news and social media coverage reveals that an emotional governance may not be the solution to overcome deficits in politics and, I would add, in journalism. This thesis is therefore interested in analysing what emotions, and in what proportions, were used by the different actors considered in this thesis, namely politicians, journalists and Twitter users. This thesis also investigates how these emotions were used, whether emotions were authentic, manipulated or used for specific purposes in relation to the British and American debates.

II. Aims & objectives

In order to examine how journalism, politics and social media interact with each other under the impetus of emotions in televised debates, my research is guided by the following research question: how far did political candidates, print media and Twitter users use emotions and emotional references in the 2010 British and 2012 American televised leader debates and their coverage? This question is answered in three stages. Firstly, this thesis analyses what emotions and emotional references candidates used in the 2010 British and 2012 American televised debates and in what proportions. For this purpose, a content analysis of the four 2012 American and three 2010 British debate transcripts was performed. Secondly, this thesis investigates how *The Guardian, The Sun, The New York Times* and the *New York Post* framed emotions and emotional references to construct their reporting of the debates. To that end, a framing analysis of 658 newspaper articles was carried out. Lastly, this thesis explores how Twitter users reacted to the emotions used by politicians and journalists during the 2012 American and 2010 British TV debates. With this in mind, 33 000 tweets were analysed using a content analysis.

For this purpose, my thesis has the following aims:

- Enhancing the fundamental understanding of the role of emotions in the public sphere through the reporting of televised leader debates and bridging several disciplines such as politics, journalism and social media
- Further developing research in emotions, journalism, politics and social media, especially across different media platforms, namely television, Internet and print media
- Improving the knowledge about the reporting of political debates in newspapers and on Twitter in two democracies, the United Kingdom and United States

The following objectives will help meet these aims:

- Developing my understanding of emotions derived from the existing literature, my research question and aims in order to analyse debate transcripts, newspaper articles and Twitter feeds
- Analysing how far political candidates used emotions during TV debates in the UK and US
- Analysing how far *The Guardian, The Sun, The New York Times* and *New York Post* used emotions to construct their reporting of the debates
- Analysing how Twitter users reacted to the debates and their coverage

III. Overview of thesis

This thesis will begin by discussing past literature researching the intersection of emotions and journalism, politics and social media. The first section of Chapter 1 will explore the phenomenon of the emotionalisation of society and related emotional theories such as emotional intelligence, capital, literacy, affective capital but also traumaculture, culture of fear and risk. The second section will examine the interactions of emotions and politics by discussing the emotionalisation and personalisation of politics paying particular attention to the concept of therapeutic culture. Section two will also discuss characteristics of live televised debates, which are the case studies that my thesis relies on. The third section will investigate the connections between emotions and journalism by discussing the numerous crises affecting contemporary journalism and its norms and practices. The example of an emotional and subjective form of journalism, confessional journalism, will also be developed. Finally, Section four will tackle social media and their relation to emotions, politics and journalism.

Chapter 2 will be devoted to my methodology, data sets and analysis. Chapter 2 will therefore start by stating the research question and subsidiary research questions guiding this thesis. Following on from this, the first section will consider the research methods selected, namely content and framing analysis. Section two will provide justifications regarding why I selected the data sets that are part of my thesis. Building on this, the third section will describe how I acquired my data sets. Finally, Section four will detail the methodology applied to each of my data set.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 correspond to the results extracted from my analyses. Chapter 3 will analyse what emotions and emotional references were used by candidates in the 2010 British and 2012 American televised debates and in what proportions. This analysis will examine how emotions were used in each debate, by each candidate and in relation to each topic. Building on this first analysis, Chapter 4 will analyse how highbrow (*The New York Times*, *The Guardian* and its Sunday sister *The Observer*) and tabloid (the *New York Post*, *The Sun* and its Sunday sister at the time, the *News of the World*) newspapers in the UK and US framed emotions and emotional references to construct their reporting of the debates. Chapter 5 will analyse how Twitter users reacted to the emotions used by politicians and journalists during the 2012 American and 2010 British TV debates. Chapter 5 will also explore what emotions Twitter users displayed during the debates.

Finally, Chapter 6 will present the conclusions drawn from this thesis. While the first section will summarise my thesis, the second section will single out the novel contributions to knowledge derived from my thesis. Section three will detail the results extracted from each of my analytical chapters. Lastly, the fourth section will point out the recommendations for future work inspired by this thesis.

Chapter 1

Literature review

In my research, I explore the intersection of emotions, politics, journalism and social media by studying a concrete example: televised leader debates. With this in mind, this literature review follows the historical path that has been traced by emotions in society, politics, journalism and social media. The first section focuses on the characteristics of the emotionalisation of society, which has benefits and limits in its everyday application. Secondly, I investigate the emotionalisation and personalisation of politics along with some of the key characteristics of TV debates. Then, I explore the impact the emotionalisation of journalism has had through several phenomena such as loss of objectivity, global crisis and confessional writing. The fourth section tackles social media and their, sometimes stormy, relation to emotions, politics, and journalism.

I. Emotions & society

Princess Diana & the emotionalisation of society

Princess Diana's death on 31st August 1997 not only caused the instantaneous gathering of large masses in front of Buckingham Palace, but also an incessant wave of information on all the media platforms available at the time. A large majority of the media considered Diana's death as more important than other events such as famine, war, the moon landing or the fall of a government in contemporary society. During this national grief, more coverage was devoted to the Princess than to the Second World War or Kennedy's assassination (Hume, 1998). This global event, as well as others such as the 1996 Dunblane tragedy and the Louise Woodward case in the early months of 1997, highlighted what had already been taking place in society for a few years, namely the emotionalisation of society (Hume, 1998; Richards, 2007; Lilleker, 2006; Lilleker and Temple, 2013). Consequently, so-called *televictims*, of whom Princess Diana is the Queen, have emerged (Hume, 1998). These televictims can be defined as people, mostly women, who are suffering from personal, social or medical conditions and are dictating the news agenda. For Hume (1998), these televictims have spread to hard news and are threatening standards of reporting and the quality of public debate. The author links this phenomenon to the decline of former collective institutions such as churches and trade unions, which used to cement society. Regarding Diana's death, single individuals not only shared common grief but also a kind of emotional connection going beyond the death of the Princess. By default, the press has become the glue that brings people together, making them more likely to have their emotions manipulated by the media. Hume (1998) goes as far as to say that the coverage of Diana's death and funeral have set the emotionally correct tone of British media that are now craving for televictims and emotionalism. For the author, this emotional correctness corresponds to journalists displaying the appropriate emotional message in their reporting, which can be more important than telling the story itself. If journalists are unable to display this correct emotional tone, they may appear heartless (Calcutt and Hammond, 2011).

Nineteen years have passed since Diana's death and a public sphere in which emotions are neglected is almost unimaginable today. From the fear of wartime to changes in behaviours towards women, homosexuals or even environmental issues and to the current state of fear individuals are living in, emotions have become more visible, explicit and prominent in society (Richards, 2007; Turner, 2009; Beckett, 2015). For example, during the Gulf War, fighter pilots declared that they were scared, which would have been inconceivable during the Second World

War as it was thought that one could not perform well when afraid (Wouters, 2002; Bennett, 2003). These events and societal changes acknowledge that emotions, more than a political tool and journalistic angle, have gained in importance in society over the years, which justifies the examination of emotions in my research.

Emotional intelligence, literacy, capital & affective labour

Many concepts have emerged as a consequence of the emotionalisation of society. Indeed, concepts such as emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1995), emotional literacy (Orbach, 2001), emotional capital (Thomson, 1998), and affective labour (Hardt, 1999) all acknowledge the importance of emotions in society and link emotions with different arenas of life such as business, work, and relationships, among others. The first, and probably most well-known, of these concepts is the one of emotional intelligence developed by Goleman (1995). Emotional intelligence is composed of self-control, zeal, persistence and the ability to motivate oneself as well as the ability to control impulses, delay gratification, regulate one's moods, empathise and hope. For Goleman (1995), a high emotional intelligence can be more valuable than a high intelligence quotient. Indeed, individuals with a high IQ do not necessarily get better jobs, better salaries or even better lives than people with a high emotional quotient. Displaying the appropriate emotions in a given situation therefore lies at the heart of this concept, which echoes the emotional appropriateness developed by Hume (1998). Not only do the media have to adopt an emotionally correct tone, but so must people if they are to make the most of their lives in an emotional society. As for journalism, Fröhlich (2005) argues that the association of emotional intelligence and peace journalism helps journalists overcome traumatising work, while also helping the public understand how media work affects journalists, physically and emotionally. As such, emotions have an effect on actions, attitudes and achievements.

Orbach (2001) builds on Goleman's theory by defining the concept of emotional literacy. To manage and understand emotions, emotional literacy involves three phases: registering that something can touch people in a specific way, recognising what this emotion is, and querying whether other, more complex, emotions come into play. In accordance with Goleman (1995), Orbach (2001) argues that without these three steps, individuals do not have a sufficient emotional repertoire to fully experience life. This concept is particularly relevant for my research as, when combined with politics, emotional literacy can increase political literacy by linking issues and emotions when these need to be linked, and by separating these when they have become too enmeshed. In this sense, emotional literacy can strengthen political expression and political engagement.

Applying this knowledge to the field of business, Thomson (1998) argues that companies should increasingly develop their emotional capital. For Thomson, emotional capital is composed of the, sometimes hidden, resources relating to feelings, beliefs, perceptions and values that should be exploited in addition to intellectual capital such as time, money, training and databases, among others. Although lacking an in-depth analysis of the concept of emotional capital, this study claims that emotions have a legitimate place alongside knowledge and intellectual property within successful organisations in the long-term. Furthermore, emotions are an asset in every company's hands: they can increase productivity, employees' engagement with the company and develop new ideas among others.

Along those lines, Hardt (1999) anchors affective labour in the current capitalist economy driven by the reign of services and affects. Even if it is corporeal and affective, affective labour belongs to immaterial labour as its products are imperceptible and include well-being, satisfaction, passion, excitement and connectedness, among others. Affective labour therefore helps produce immaterial goods such as communication, knowledge or service. Hardt (1999) goes further by saying that, even though some sectors, such as nursing and entertaining, welcome affective labour more than others all labouring processes involve some degree of affective labour. All in all, concepts mixing emotions and areas of society such as the workplace, relationships or even businesses and capitalism, have emerged following the emotionalisation of society. These theories aim at helping people and companies understand, manage, and use their ever more important emotions to their best advantage.

Limitations of the emotionalisation of society

Some scholars argue that the emotionalisation of society can also be destructive, stressful and traumatic. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Lasch (1979, 1984) described the American, and even global, malaise triggered by crises in every domain. Capitalism, liberalism, but also politics, economics, psychology, and natural sciences, among others, all seem to have lost answers and cannot make sense of the world anymore in Lasch's eyes. According to the author, humans cannot control their destiny anymore and face the future without hope. It is only by ending one civilisation that another one, able to overcome these crises, will be able to rise. For that purpose, the current human life characterised by a culture of competitive individualism and the pursuit of a selfish and narcissistic happiness has to end.

Lasch's views on the end of what he thinks is the current American society can be linked to studies concerning the culture of fear (Furedi, 2005; Farrell, 1998; Luckhurst, 1997; Rees, 2013), which place fear at the heart of society and all its problems. The ever growing number of studies about the culture of fear indicates that fear is not only used in its most plain meaning, namely as a reaction to a specific danger, but also as a way of interpreting and making sense of life. Fear arises from everything and within everyone: individuals and societies fear diseases, gods, nuclear wars, age and death, among others (Furedi, 2005). Furedi (2005) argues that the current culture of fear is characterised by the belief that mankind is threatened by powerful and destructive forces. As such, what is at stake is not so much human survival, but the survival of faith in mankind itself (Furedi, 2005). From this perspective, people themselves are the problem: for Furedi, it is not hope that is driving 21st century citizens, but fear. The development of the culture of fear is particularly relevant for my research since part of this fear is put forward by the media and promoted by politicians and lobbyists.

Following on from studies relating to fear and threat, many scholars have investigated a related theory, the trauma society. Although trauma is derived from the ancient Greek noun for "wound", its meaning is made clearer with the use of a verb meaning "to pierce into" (Rees, 2013). Simply put, trauma is a physical damage made to the body therefore piercing into how people think and feel. A traumatic event involves either the exposure to actual or threatened death, injury or violation of the physical integrity of a person, or the assimilation and identification of such a situation as it happens when witnessing or hearing a threatening situation for example (Rees, 2013). Luckhurst (2003) argues that a new type of subjectivity arose in the 1990s organised around the concept of trauma. In Luckhurst's words this *Traumaculture* results from different professional, political and cultural discourses that questioned the place of the self. Trauma and the self are intertwined as, by definition, trauma is what cannot be tackled by the mind and therefore remains within the self, directing its actions and behaviours in sometimes dangerous ways. For Farrell (1998), the "post-traumatic" echoes previous events and is caused by cumulative stresses. It attests to a shock in people's lives, values, trust, and sense of purpose and states that, ultimately, everyone can die. The author also argues that the emotionalisation of society, the culture of fear and trauma have all been a blow to people who were used to a constantly improving and progressing world. In relation to journalism, Rees (2013) adds that trauma is news and is everywhere: on TV, in newspapers, on the Internet. Trauma can be depicted through riots, shootings, armed conflicts, natural disasters, house fires, traffic accidents, or other violent situations that are the focus of public attention. Although the media are often accused of overplaying the trauma and emotion cards, Rees stresses that these stories need to be told, as adequate trauma reporting can lead to more accountability and awareness of issues that can determine the quality of people's lives.

The notions of end of civilization, culture of fear and traumaculture are intrinsically linked to that of risk. When feeling threatened, people evaluate potential risks that could allow them to escape from a dangerous situation. For Lupton (2012), risk and emotions are intertwined in a conscious and non-conscious relationship. She goes further by saying that such a relationship involves different emotions such as apprehension, fear, anger, anxiety, sadness, guilt, disgust and terror along with more positive emotions of elation and excitement.

I now investigate how the emotionalisation of society has impacted one of my fields of study, namely politics.

II. Emotions & politics

Emotionalisation of politics

My research investigates the emotionalisation of society through the study of specific fields that are journalism, politics and social media. Since my research does not wonder whether emotions are the enemies of reason, I depart from the centuries-long debates regarding emotion versus reason in politics to rather focus on the emotionalisation of the field. The emotionalisation of politics refers to the increasing preoccupation of emotion in political communication. According to Lilleker (2006) politicians must express emotions in reaction to a public demand for this relationship to be qualified as emotional. Richards (2004) considers four elements as essential for an emotionalisation of political communication, or in his words "political discourse", to take place. Firstly, politics has be openly and continuously relevant for citizens' everyday lives, at a local or national level. Secondly, political communication should prove to voters that politicians are human beings capable of feeling just like their audience. This second point echoes the concept of "emotional appropriateness of leaders" developed by Bucy (2000). Bucy (2000) argues that for leaders' reactions to be considered "appropriate", they must not only be in accordance with their message, but also with the emotional tone of the context of the message. Bucy (2000) develops the example of the Lewinsky-gate scandal in the United States. After denying his affair with Monica Lewinsky, former President Clinton appeared calm and relaxed on TV, which fuelled the controversy even more. It is only when he appeared angry, ashamed and sorry that the affair happened that his reaction was deemed appropriate regarding the situation. Thirdly, Richards (2004) argues that politicians should directly tackle sensitive and controversial topics such as the public's hopes, fears and concerns, and not hide behind carefully prepared elocutions. Finally, for the emotional relationship between emotion, public and politics to be maximised, politics should be attuned with the public's everyday emotional language. Lilleker (2006) and Richards (2004) both think that political communication should focus more on the humanity of politicians so that citizens can identify with their leaders. According to Lilleker (2006), this does not correspond to an emotional striptease but rather to a certain quality in the relationship between voters and political parties.

The emotionalisation of politics also works through the use of humour. Political humour can be used by politicians but also by journalists, artists and people in general to criticise politics and politicians in political or non-political settings (Tsakona and Popa, 2011). More specifically, having a sense of humour can help politicians to bond with citizens by making jokes, often at their own expense, or delivering comic lines, which aim at discrediting or criticising opponents, promoting themselves, all while still appearing polite and positive (Richardson et al., 2012; Tsakona and Popa, 2011). The use of humour can, however, go beyond jokes and help politicians to express emotions in different, more negative ways. In the words of Richardson et al. (2012, p. 149): "However articulated, comic mediations of politics are marked as strongly affective, working from, and upon, emotional patterns concerning politics and politicians." Humour can also be used by journalists and politicians to persuade, and engage with, audiences as well as develop their public persona (Markiewicz, 1974; Delaney, 2015; Richardson et al., 2012; Tsakona and Popa, 2011). Richardson et al. (2012) indicate, thanks to analyses based on interviews with voters, that respondents were more receptive of political messages when they contained humour of some sort. Thus, humour was not only pleasant for respondents but also helped them to engage with political matters, which they would otherwise dismiss (Richardson et al., 2012). Overall, humour in politics can take many forms and mainly aims at connecting with, and convincing, the public, while allowing politicians to avoid rudeness.

Personalisation and intimacy in politics

Before discussing the emotionalisation of politics in more detail, it is vital to provide some context regarding the personalisation of, and intimacy in, politics, which are intrinsically linked to emotional forms of politics. The personalisation of politics corresponds to individual politicians and individual issues gaining more importance than political parties and collective identities (Karvonen, 2009; Kinder, 1994; van Zoonen, 2004; Corner and Pels, 2003; Van Aelst et al., 2012). In the words of Manin (1997, p.219):

> [P]eople vote differently from one election to another, depending on the particular persons competing for their vote. Voters tend increasingly to vote for a person and no longer for a party or a platform. This phenomenon marks a departure from what was considered normal voting behavior under representative democracy, creating an impression of a crisis in representation... Although the growing importance of personal factors can also be seen in the relationship between each representative and his constituency, it is most perceptible at the national level, in the relationship between the executive and the electorate. Analysts have long observed that there is a tendency towards the personalization of power in democratic countries.

Emphasis is put on individual politicians and issues, which can trigger changes in electoral systems and campaigns, the building of political preferences, or in the way politics is depicted to the public by the news media. The personalisation of politics also has limitations as it can become pervasive and impact political processes and issues by focusing on the performance of individual politicians (Karvonen, 2009; van Zoonen, 2004). Here it is also worth mentioning that the personalisation of politics does not so much describe a rise of the personal but, rather, of the personal filling a gap left by declining formal politics. Indeed, as the popular legitimacy of political institutions (including the media) has declined, political leaders have been making their appeals in different, arguably in personal, emotional and individual terms, which has been leaving space for "outsider" candidates (from Ross Perot to Donald Trump) to emerge. In other words, the greater prominence of emotion may not be a solution to the problem but rather a symptom of it.

Stanyer (2013) distinguishes between the personalisation of politics, that is to say the increasing visibility placed on individual politicians rather than political parties and institutions, and the “intimization” of politics, which deals with the growing focus on the personal lives of politicians (e.g. their sex lives, marital problems, family lives, tastes in music, clothes or movies) in advanced industrial democracies. For Stanyer (2013), this rise in intimate information already affects the kind of information, mainly personal and emotional, that citizens receive. Stanyer (2013) adds that not only are politicians’ private lives no longer private but these now public matters are also disseminated in an accelerated form.

The personalisation and intimisation of politics can be linked to four other processes. One of these processes corresponds to the individualisation of social life according to which people increasingly see themselves as individuals and not as part of collectivities (Bauman, 2001). Furthermore, the personalisation and intimisation of politics are linked to economic and technological modernisation, which have redefined social structures and led to an increased scepticism towards traditional political and social organisations (Swanson and Mancini, 1996). Because citizens cannot identify with traditional political ideologies, they turn themselves to specific politicians and advocate specific political issues instead. In addition to these social, economic and technological changes, the news media have been playing a role in this increasingly personal and intimate form of politics by focusing on human and candidate-centred aspects of politics, predominantly on the characteristics of individual politicians rather than substantive issues (Cushion, 2012; Haßler et al., 2014; Peters, 2011), especially on television but also increasingly on social media, which offer platforms where feelings and intimate relationships can be shared (Karvonen, 2009; Coward, 2009, 2013). Lastly, the personalisation and intimisation of politics are linked to the rise of entertainment in politics (van Zoonen, 2004), which is now more associated with art than science, with a show based on style, emotion and the cult of personality (Corner and Pels, 2003). “Celebrity politicians” are now providing people with the shortcuts needed to make political decisions and make sense of politics (van Zoonen, 2004). This context of changes and the rise of entertaining news contribute to create an increase in intimacy with politicians sharing emotional and intimate information such as family-related information, personal tastes or feelings with journalists and voters (Engelken-Jorge et al., 2011). Van Aelst et al. (2012), Stanyer (2013) and Karvonen (2009) all, however, warn that further research needs to be carried out in order to empirically identify personalisation and intimisation trends in advanced industrial democracies. By identifying what emotions and references to family, friends and anecdotes politicians used in the 2012 US and 2010 UK TV debates, my thesis contributes to research on personaliation and intimisation in politics.

Therapeutic culture

Richards and Brown (2002) explore the "therapeutic culture hypothesis" according to which most contemporary societies have become increasingly therapeutic. According to the authors, the therapeutic culture is not only characterised by feelings and their expression, but also by their management and personal reflection. Building upon this concept, Richards (2004) adds that people now seek different types of emotionalised experience from politics. As Lilleker (2006, p.15) says, "politicians try to create a personality for themselves, to be more than just a grey man in a grey suit". Richards (2004, 2009) states that the relationship between people and politics has changed and is now comparable to a mode of consumption, while also being anchored in an "emotional public sphere" in which emotions are directly involved in the political life of a nation. For Richards (2004), this change triggered an "emotional deficit" - a lack of careful and continuous focus on the emotional needs of the public - which is linked to a "democratic deficit" - a growing lack of interest and distaste in politics. To answer these emotional and democratic gaps, Richards (2007) develops the concept of "emotional governance", which is an intentional and complex approach relying on mass media communications that aims at emotionally touching the public. For Richards (2007), the governed public is at the centre of society and politics, thus changes in politics have to come from the governed themselves. If the governed express a need for a more emotionalised society, as Richards thinks is the case, then governments should be more emotional in their leadership. Richards' work follows from Rieff's *Triumph of the Therapeutic* (1966) in which the author expresses his interest in social change. For Rieff (1966), each culture is therapeutic and functions around a set of moralising demands. For the author, the 1960s saw a period of coexistence between the end of one culture, assimilated to faith and Christianity, and the beginning of another, relating to the early ages of the therapeutic. Although Rieff focuses on the therapeutic, this notion has little in common with the therapeutic described by Furedi (2003) or Richards (2007). Rieff (1966) himself seems to struggle to define his take on therapeutic culture as no clear link with people's emotionality and the management of their emotions were mentioned.

The "emotional governance" theory formulated by Richards (2007) is central to this thesis as the three results chapters presented herein in turn challenge the idea that emotions can help politicians overcome the democratic and emotional gaps present in contemporary societies. Through the analysis of emotions used by the different actors involved in the 2012 American and 2010 British live televised debates (politicians, journalists and Twitter users), this thesis posits that an emotional governance may not be the solution to overcome deficits in politics and, I would add, in journalism. Seeking to test Richards' theoretical claims using data and empirical analyses, this thesis analyses what emotions, and in what proportions, were used by politicians, journalists and Twitter users but also how these emotions were used, whether they were authentic, manipulated or used for specific purposes in relation to the American and British debates.

Other studies have also questioned the work of Richards (2004, 2007, 2009) and the idea that the therapeutic can benefit politics and society at large. Challenging the hypothesis that the therapeutic can help people be more in touch with their emotions, Furedi (2003) and Rose (1999) argue that it has triggered a radical redefinition of personhood inciting people to feel vulnerable, powerless and ill. Maisano (2014) adds that the therapeutic is an individualistic process based on the self and self only. Furedi (2003, p.21) further claims that the therapeutic imposes a new conformity on people through the management of their emotions:

> the therapeutic imperative is not so much towards the realization of self-fulfillment as the promotion of self-limitation. It posits the self in distinctly fragile and feeble form and insists that the management of life requires the continuous intervention of therapeutic expertise. The elevated concern with the self is underpinned by anxiety and apprehension, rather than a positive vision realizing the human potential. Therapeutic culture has helped construct a diminished sense of self that characteristically suffers from an emotional deficit and possesses a permanent consciousness of vulnerability. Its main legacy so far is the cultivation of a unique sense of vulnerability.

Regarding politics, Furedi (2003) states that although politicians have always been emotional, they have mostly kept their private lives private. However, today, politicians' emotionality is regarded as a matter of public concern. Consequently, Furedi argues that politics is no longer about what politicians stand for but rather about how they feel, a situation emphasised by journalists who give full attention to politicians' emotionality. Others scholars (Mouffe, 2002; Corner and Pels, 2003) agree that the emotionalisation of politics has blurred the boundaries between public and private. Mouffe (2002, p.1) goes as far as to say that it is "not the end of history but the end of politics". Obsolete political systems are now governed by morality and emotions that impose a distinction between right and wrong, rather than left and right. All in all, while some scholars perceive the emotionalisation of politics as beneficial and as a motivation for political engagement, others see it as harmful and destructive.

Analysing TV debates

In order to study the emotionalisation of journalism and politics, I decided to focus on live televised debates in the US and UK. Indeed, regarding their growing popularity and multifaceted aspects, TV debates can be considered as a microcosm of politics and news media, especially in the United Kingdom where televised debates were introduced in 2010 and in the United States where TV debates have settled in the political landscape and in voters' expectations since the 1960s. Debates have become cornerstones of election campaigns in many countries and, since the first leader debate in 1960 in the United States, many democracies have adopted this special event such as Canada, France, Germany, Australia, the Netherlands, and most recently the United Kingdom (Cushion, 2012). The performance of candidates in televised debates has impacted the nature of election coverage such as the pre-coverage of, and reaction to, the debates (Cushion, 2012). Moreover, TV debates are also intrinsically linked to emotions (Newton et al., 1987). The analysis of TV debates has therefore allowed me to analyse emotions at different levels (politicians, journalists and Twitter users).

I selected the United States and United Kingdom as case studies for different reasons. In the American case, debates have become one of the cornerstones of US politics and have an international influence as they are reported on in the rest of the world. In the British case, the first set of debates was introduced during the 2010 general election thus TV debates are still relatively novel. Furthermore, the United Kingdom and United States are both influential democracies, therefore political, social and journalistic patterns developed in these countries can interest anyone concerned with political communication more generally. Finally, I selected the 2010 campaign in the UK and 2012 campaign in the US for their groundbreaking nature in the fields of political communication, journalism and society: among other reasons, both campaigns organised in debates, used emotions, social media and Internet-related techniques.

Beyond these similarities, some context regarding the political regimes and electoral systems in the United States and United Kingdom has to be provided. The United States of America is a federal republic where powers are shared by three branches: the executive (the President and his cabinet), the legislative (the US Congress composed of the Senate and the House of Representatives) and the judiciary (the Supreme Court, lower federal courts), which together ensure a system of checks and balances preventing any individual or group from becoming too powerful and guaranteeing that the Constitution is respected (USA.gov, 2017). Historically, two parties have been dominating the American political landscape: the Democratic Party and the Republican Party. However, there are also smaller parties such as the Libertarian Party, the Green Party or the Constitution Party. As far as elections are concerned, the President and Vice President are indirectly elected by the Electoral College. Citizens vote in each state for electors who pledged to vote for a party's candidate. The candidates who receives an absolute majority of electoral votes from the states are elected President and Vice President and sworn in by Congress in January.

As far as the 2012 American election is concerned, at least five other elements came into play. Firstly, political communications shifted from fewer whistlestop tours, TV spots and traditional media appearances to more emphasis on social media, the Internet and blogs (p2012.org, 2012). Secondly, the United States has become an increasingly polarised nation divided between those voting "blue" and those voting "red" (p2012.org, 2012). Thirdly, the slow recovery of the economy and the dark prospects of financial threats such as the fiscal cliff impacted the 2012 campaign (p2012.org, 2012). Changing demographics such as the rise of Hispanics or the recalculation of seats attributed to each state were also elements that candidates needed to take into account (p2012.org, 2012). Finally, the results of the 2010 mid-term elections, which saw the Republicans win but not deliver many of their campaign promises, hurt the Romney-Ryan ticket (p2012.org, 2012).

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is a unitary state with devolved governments operating within a parliamentary democracy, which is itself placed under a constitutional monarchy (Gov.UK, 2017). Power is divided between the head of the state, Queen Elizabeth II, whose role is now mainly ceremonial, and the head of government, the Prime Minister. The democracy is also divided in three and rests on the executive (the British government following the consent of the monarch but also the devolved governments of Scotland and Wales and the Northern Ireland Executive), the legislative (the Parliament composed of the House of Commons and the House of Lords as well as the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh and Northern Ireland assemblies) and the judiciary (the Supreme Court and other courts). The British political landscape is a multi-party system dominated by the Labour Party and the Conservative Party. Before general elections, the Parliament has to be dissolved. Citizens then vote for candidates, generally members of political parties, in each constituency. Each constituency elects one Member of Parliament using the first past the post system. The party that wins an overall parliamentary majority following the general elections forms the government. In the case that no party has an outright majority, a coalition with one or more other parties is necessary to enable a majority representation in parliament.

At least five elements have to be considered when analysing the 2010 British election. Firstly, the first live televised debates were held between the leaders of the three main parties (Labour, the Conservative and the Liberal Democrats), which changed the nature of the campaign and triggered interest from the public (Electoral Reform Society, 2010). Secondly, like for the 2012 American campaign, communications in the 2010 British election focused on the Internet, blogs and social media rather than on traditional media and rallies (Chadwick, 2010, 2013). The 2010 election also took place in a climate of reforms as changes in the electoral system for the House of Commons were promised by Labour (Electoral Reform Society, 2010). This climate of reforms was echoed by a climate of crisis with the 2009 MPs expenses scandal and the slow recovery of the economy.

Characteristics of TV debates

Debates have many key advantages; they are financially incorruptible, they are based solely on the performance delivered by candidates, they are educational, they hold politicians accountable for their policies and ideas, they offer a means to compare candidates on key issues during relatively long events and, although prepared, they may offer some moments of spontaneity through unplanned questions and comments (Schroeder, 2008; Djerf-Pierre et al., 2014; Benoit and Currie, 2001; Boulton and Roberts, 2011). However, they also have limitations; they are over-planned and calculated, they make central issues seem simplistic and polarised, they are based on the physical image of candidates rather than on their competence, they are centred on gaffes, they can destroy politicians, and they put forth wrong and inadequate qualifications (Hall Jamieson and Birdsell, 1988; Wring et al., 2011; Coleman et al., 2011; Gaber, 2011). I argue that, although debates are meticulously calculated, they still offer the chance for careful voters to get a big picture of candidates' positions and personalities and are therefore useful to democracy and politics.

Televised debates are multifaceted events that have different functions and touch upon a wide array of television, media and emotional characteristics. Televised debates are a type of political communication; they present a dual strategy which, while highlighting the differences between candidates, also stresses their qualities (McKinney et al., 2004). Although contested, two messages are put across during TV debates; firstly, debate viewing increases people's knowledge of candidates' positions on certain issues and secondly, it affects voters' perceptions of candidates' image or personality (McKinney et al., 2004). However, whether voters focus more on the competence or character of the candidates is still widely disputed. It has been reported that the most important criterion for people straight after the debates was described as being the candidate's competence, whereas in the following weeks, memories of what had actually been said in the debates tended to fade (Sheckels and Cohen Bell, 2004). Only the candidates' behaviour, mistakes and catch phrases were remembered. Debates can also offer points of comparison between candidates and their personalities so undecided voters can hone their choice (Cap and Okulska, 2013; Coleman, 2011; Hall Jamieson and Birdsell, 1988). Schroeder (2008), who researched presidential debates in the United States in an exhaustive way, states that a candidate can deliver a lacklustre performance and still win over voters if voters feel empathy or sympathy for that candidate (Schroeder, 2008). Leaning on interviews with former presidents and campaign aides, he adds that debates tackle the question of who is ready to become president, in terms of competence and character. For Schroeder (2008), this is not a technical question but a deep emotional one. Similarly, the introduction of live TV debates in the UK impacted political campaigns and voters. According to a study carried out by Bailey (2011), 10 per cent of the people polled said they changed their votes because of the debates. The debates also had an impact on younger generations as there was a 7 per cent increase in 18-24 year-olds turnout (Coleman et al., 2011). Finally, the debates stoked political dialogue again as 87 per cent of people polled and 92 per cent of young voters said that they had talked about the debates with others (Bailey, 2011). Coleman (2011) concludes by saying that the debates are a learning process for viewers as they get familiar with candidates' qualities and opinions, and national issues. All in all, I agree with Schroeder (2008) who states that it is virtually impossible to measure the impact of debates as they cannot be isolated from other stages of the campaign and journalistic coverage.

TV debates in the UK and US also are a specific TV genre with its own characteristics (Neale, 2001). For example, the characters are clearly identified as the leaders of the main political parties of a country. The settings are the TV studios in which the candidates are performing following a traditional set of rules such as strict timing and discussions of key issues. The candidates' narrative and style are also specific to this TV genre as personal and political attacks are rarely as intense as in televised debates. Cap and Okulska (2013) underline that TV debates are a hybrid genre that blends political interviews, which are rather conversational and spontaneous, and speeches, which are rather oratorical and rhetorical. The appellation "debate" is misleading: there is little direct interaction between the candidates and the public, and between the candidates themselves (Cap and Okulska, 2013). Indeed, the format, content, and questions are determined in advance by the campaign teams, broadcasters and other organising committees, thus very little is left uncontrolled (Schroeder, 2008). This specific TV genre is also intrinsically emotional as much of today's factual content is concerned with spectacle, style, emotion and personality (Hill, 2007; Street, 2003; Corner and Pels, 2003).

TV debates are also a type of media event insofar that they are public ceremonies broadcast live (Dayan and Katz, 1992). Presidential debates, along with sports events, gladiatorial fights and wars, are categorised as contests, which often create tensions while spreading feelings of justice and fairness among voters and supporters (Katz and Liebes, 2010; Schroeder, 2008; Coleman, 2011). Televised debates can be seen as media drama events insofar that they allow candidates to display emotions ranging from love to tragedy. All of these features add to the dramatic side of debates, which have been described as unmissable events shared by a whole nation in the United States (Hellweg et al., 1992). In addition to being media events, TV debates are also media spectacles, which are media constructions taking audiences out of their ordinary routine (Kellner, 2009). Spectacles are characterised by an aesthetic, dramatic and competitive dimension, such as in the Olympics or Oscars (Kellner, 2009).

Another central aspect of communication emerges during debates: language. Both in the United Kingdom and United States, language plays a crucial role in political communication, even more so in TV debates where sentences are dissected and analysed. Fairclough (2000) argues that language intervenes at different levels; as part of the action (genre), as representing the action (discourse) and as part of the performance (style). Language can also be used to persuade voters as part of a political communication strategy. This persuasion can take two forms: scrutiny of message content ("central route") or aspects ("peripheral route") such as emotional appeals (Cap and Okulska, 2013). It is this second route that I intend to explore in my research, specifically at the intersection of journalism, politics and social media. Thus, televised debates' characteristics are many and diverse: they are a type of political communication, have an uncertain impact on the public, are a TV genre of their own, focus on language and image, and are a media event and spectacle, all of which are anchored in a deep emotional context.

TV debates & the media

While debates have a relative impact on voters, they can affect media content. The first debate in American history between Kennedy and Nixon received almost no newspaper coverage: nothing in the *Times*, four short paragraphs on page 22 of the *New York Times*, three network newscast mentions, one story in the *Los Angeles Times* and the *Boston Globe* where Kennedy and Nixon came from, and in papers in Chicago where the event took place (Schroeder, 2008). However, in the years following the event, journalists covered the debates in an almost "messianic" way (Schroeder, 2008). The pre-debate reporting involves speculation, expectations, potential tactics, comparisons with previous debates, and more. The coverage of the debates focuses on gaffes and slips, while the press reaches its peak after the debates with a wave of opinion pieces, commentaries and a summary of the highlights of the debates (Schroeder, 2008). Furthermore, TV debates count among the most watched programmes ever broadcast (Hellweg et al., 1992). Katz and Feldman (1977) and Alexander and Margolis (1980) complement each other by respectively saying that 80 per cent of American viewers watched one debate in 1960, whereas they were 90 per cent in 1970 therefore reaching 60 to 100 million viewers. The third and final televised debate of the 2012 US election between Obama and Romney drew approximately 60 million people and was broadcast on 11 networks (Nielsen, 2012). To compare, the 2014 edition of the Super Bowl drew 115.5 million viewers (Nielsen, 2012) and the 2014 Academy Awards Ceremony drew 43.7 million viewers (Levin, 2014). Similarly, the first TV debates in the UK attracted a large audience of 9.4 million viewers with a peak at 10.3 million (37 per cent of the total TV audience) on ITV News, the second drew 4 million viewers on Sky news, and the final one counted 8.6 million viewers on the BBC (Coleman, 2011). Despite these large audience shares, the British debates gathered less audience than *Britain's got talent*, *Eastenders* and *Dr Who*, all shown in the same week (Coleman, 2011).

For Chadwick (2010, 2013), the debates transformed the traditional news cycle in a 24-hour political news cycle. For the author, the new political information cycle is composed of assemblages of personnel, practices, genres and temporalities in which online media work alongside traditional media. Furthermore, the traditional news cycle - the time in between two issues of a newspaper or broadcast bulletin devoted to gathering and preparing new content - has been transformed in a 24-hour news cycle where news, of varying degrees of quality, is produced non-stop. According to the author, the political information cycle is composed of four stages. Firstly, candidates and their teams discuss possible points of contention in order to control, as much as possible, every second of the live events. Secondly, real time is managed through instant reaction polls and devices, small panels of citizens using sentiment dials, instant graph used during debates, voters' opinions on social media, and live blogs written by journalists during the events. Thirdly, journalists' opinions and commentaries, along with opinion polls and traditional interviews with representatives of each party take place straight after the debates. Finally, more care and details are devoted to post-debate analysis in the hours following the debates. For the author, the new political information cycle is massively represented by journalistic elites, bloggers, PR people and politically active citizens. Chadwick (2010, p.40) concludes by saying that the debates show that "competition and conflict, but also interdependence among broadcasters, the press and digital media actors [...] are now growing forces in the mediation of political life." Although revolutionary in some aspects - significant changes in political communication, political reporting and social media coverage - the first British debates gathered as much praise as criticism, and their future is still unknown. Revolutionary or not, televised debates have been demanded by voters, broadcasters and some politicians for a long time in Britain and therefore deserve more academic attention.

Parallel to this hyper-mediatisation, presidential debates in the United States and United Kingdom are also a big hit on social media, especially on Twitter. The first debate opposing Obama to Romney in the 2012 campaign was, with 10.3 million tweets, the most tweeted-about event in US politics (Sharp, 2012a). Similarly, the final debate gathered 6.5 million tweets (Sharp, 2012b), giving the 2012 debates a traditional but also extensive online coverage. However, while some called the 2010 election the "first British television general election" (Boulton and Roberts, 2011), others (Wring et al., 2011; Newman, 2009, 2010) stated that traditional media remained very strong during this election. For example, the telegraph or the phone were both considered revolutionary when they were created, even though they are now either rarely used or anchored in the communication landscape.

This section has explored the emotionalisation of politics, through different theories such as that of therapeutic culture. I also explored several characteristics of TV debates and their relations to news and social media. The emotionalisation of politics is not an isolated phenomenon as emotions have also been more visible in other fields particularly relevant to my research such as journalism that I am now turning to.

III. Emotions & journalism

Journalism in a climate of crisis

Before discussing emotional forms of journalism, contemporary journalism has to be linked to a climate of crisis. Changes in news consumption, high levels of distrust in journalism, the rise of infotainment, and more, have triggered a new kind of journalism more centred on emotions and feelings. Many scholars noticed that there has been a change in news consumption. Peters and Broersma (2013) argue that a journalism *à la carte* has been developed by news that can be consumed anyhow, any time, anywhere. News consumers are now able to pick from an individual issue or broadcast whatever they like and consider interesting or fun, like a consumer in a supermarket. There is now an enormous array of media forms available to the public that some see as an "information blitz" (Cushion, 2012). Jones (2006) underlines that this relatively new trend sees people, especially the younger generation, shift from traditional media, such as broadcast news or print journalism, to entertainment media and the Internet. Along those lines, Chadwick (2013) stresses that a *Hybrid Media System* has emerged, combining, according to its needs, traditional news reporting and social media aids. These changes in news consumption are accompanied by an overall bad financial health, a decrease of mainstream audiences and by an erosion of professional authority, credibility and autonomy. This shift in the media consumption pattern also explains why my research focuses on "older media" with a newspaper analysis as well as "newer media" with a Twitter analysis.

The changes in news consumption are accompanied by a distrust in journalism. For Fallows (1997), the media are becoming increasingly hard to trust and keep framing public life and politics as a spectacle entertaining, more so than informing, citizens. For Fallows, this may trigger the end of journalism in the long-term as citizens may only pay attention to the media if they consider there is something they should know. Fallows goes as far as to say that, to break this vicious circle, the news media should go back to its very essence: the quest of information and truth for the public. Along those lines, journalism has suffered from the Leveson inquiry, which has highlighted some of the most unethical and controversial practices in British journalism (Fowler-Watt and Allan, 2013; Laville, 2013). For Cappella and Hall Jamieson (1997), the distrust that the media have been experiencing is more structural. The authors declare that "The public now tends to see the media as part of the problem, not part of the solution." (p.227). This distrust is linked to levels of cynicism regarding the belief that institutions only care about their own interests and not about those of their constituents and that the media are sensationalist, lurid and strategic. Cappella and Hall Jamieson believe that this cynicism has affected all institutions of society, including journalism. For Peters and Broersma (2013), this distrust in journalism not only has deep consequences for the journalistic field, but also for democracy and citizens who are left uninformed and only aware of gossip. Fowler-Watt and Allan (2013, p.ii) go as far as to say that journalists went from being "watchdogs" to "lapdogs" questioning the defining nature of the media as a guardian of the freedom of speech, plurality and democracy.

Some scholars also indicate that the type of news covered by journalists is part of the problem. Davies (2009) argues that "flat earth news" - a story seems true and is widely accepted as such so much that it becomes an aberration to say the contrary, even though the story is actually false, distorted and used as propaganda - has now become rampant in the press. These flat earth news pieces are anchored in the rise of churnalism: journalists stay all day behind their desks and churn stories out instead of "going out there" developing contacts and gathering facts. For Davies it is not the fault of journalists if they are using more emotions and sensationalism in their stories, but rather that of financial pressures. Jukes (2013) concludes by saying that the combination of a technological revolution, new and still unknown business rules, along with global recession have created a "perfect storm" in the media. The consequences have been multiple: cost cutting and consolidation in ownership, reduction of the plurality of news available, and a more homogenised news agenda where news packaging is ever more prominent, among others.

In addition to these flat news, the coverage of political news has witnessed the emergence of infotainment, media and political spectacles. For Corner and Pels (2003), modern politics has gathered entertainment and politics in a so-called "infotainment" characterised by political leadership and media celebrity. Politics is now more associated with art than science, with a show based on style, emotion and the cult of personality. In her book *Entertaining the Citizen*, van Zoonen (2004) wonders if politics and entertainment are compatible. She argues that citizens are entitled to be entertained, but not within the political sphere, which suffers from a lack of substantial coverage and leaves citizens partially, or wrongly, informed. Along with Street (2003), she stresses the increasing use of the "soap opera" metaphor used by journalists when referring to public and private matters such as sexual and financial abuse, political conflict, the art of spin and politicians' incompetence. van Zoonen (2004) stresses that citizens can be entertained by politics, especially by the trivial phenomena of personalisation and dramatisation, however, this linkage should also make people think about what citizenship entails. For Maurer and Pfetsch (2014), infotainment and political spectacles are anchored in a media logic that relies on commercial imperatives, which often lead to a dumbing down of political coverage that therefore focuses on rather simple issues, trivial aspects of politics, negativity, strategy, conflict and entertainment, among others. The restyling of politics towards more entertainment triggered a restyling of factuality on TV (Hill, 2007). Television is now offering a mix of fact and fiction with an acute focus on emotions that have become a trademark for many factual programmes, whose aims are to observe or put people in emotionally difficult situations. Kellner (2009) goes further by saying that political events and information are now increasingly processed under the form of media and political spectacle. Pushed by competition with 24/7 cable news, Internet and social media, talk radio and the desire to earn more and more, corporate media create spectacles by finding sensational angles to their stories in order to attract more audience shares, as often as possible, until another spectacle surfaces (Kellner, 2009). Lilleker and Temple (2013) summarise the main criticisms politics and corporate media are facing today. For the authors, political journalism and communication are biased, dumbed down, most interested in the personalities and process of politics, over-reliant on official sources and increasingly offering subjective commentary rather than information.

Evolution of journalistic norms & practices

In addition to these crises, the journalistic norm of objectivity has also been put into question. To understand how a possible emotionalisation of journalism has progressively settled in the media landscape, it is vital to acknowledge that objectivity has not always been the norm as shown by the history of political journalism both in the UK and US. In the UK, political journalism did not exist before the middle of the 19th century as the use of the press as a provider of information and political analyses was not distinguishable from politics itself (Neveu, 2002). Although he may be too absolute in his approach, Chalaby (1998) coins the term "publicists" to qualify these early journalists and "public discourse" to refer to the pre-journalistic era such as British middle-class newspapers published during the first half of the 19th century or "unstampeds" illegally published in the 1830s in London as a reaction to the stamp duty. These publicists were political actors who, while waiting to be elected, wrote to mobilise and partake in politics (Neveu, 2002; Chalaby, 1998). Publicists remained the only form of journalism until the mid-19th century when it became restricted to the partisan press, which gradually weakened during the 20th century (Neveu, 2002; Chalaby, 1998).

It is only when journalism emerged as a profession that objectivity became the norm (Chalaby, 1998). This recognition was driven by many social (rise of literacy, constitution of readership), political (guarantee of the freedom of the press), technical (networks of railways) and economic (entrepreneurs investing in the press) advances (Neveu, 2002; Chalaby, 1998). These changes made the population of journalists grow and saw the creation of specialised journalists among which appeared political journalists. From there, political journalism was characterised by objectivity (Tuchman, 1972), independence and political interviews (Chalaby, 1998).

Along those lines, Schudson (1978) links the birth of objectivity to the creation of America's first newswire service, the *Associated Press* in 1848, and the invention of the telegraph in the 1840s. To increase the speed of news transmission and reach as many readers of different opinions as possible, the *Associated Press* made its reporting objective. Schudson (1978) continues by saying that, although *The New York Times* tried to make its reporting more based on objective information rather than sensational stories, the barrier between facts and values remained blurry throughout the 20th century. The *status quo* changed after the first World War when journalists lost faith in the democratic market society they were living in (Schudson, 1978). Journalists then realised that the facts they held as true could in fact be manipulated and thus could not be trusted any more. As a consequence, new subjective reporting genres such as the political column emerged and more and more journalists relied on rules and procedures to write their articles. Back then, objectivity meant that "a person's statements about the world can be trusted if they are submitted to established rules deemed legitimate by a professional community." (Schudson, 1978, p.7).

Loyal to the objectivity principle, political journalism continued its evolution, and since the 1960s, it has been evolving in growing critical expertise in the UK and US. The reign of critical expertise has been triggered by the professionalisation of political communication through the rise of PR officers, spin-doctors and ready-to-publish news (Chalaby, 1998). The phenomenon of "PR-isation" can be explained as the professional state where PR people are inserting selected and unsourced material in journalists' work (Moloney et al., 2013). Since the 1980s, the number of PR people increased progressively overtaking the number of journalists in Britain (Davies, 2009). Although PR is inevitable, the scrutinising role of journalism is essential and the current major concern is whether the contemporary news media in the United Kingdom and United States can ensure an effective scrutiny. Critical expertise is also linked to the growing importance of broadcast journalism, which holds a special place in the political field, especially with live news (Neveu, 2002). Critical expertise is also a direct consequence of the better training of journalists who are able to deepen subjects and express the public's opinion through polls (Neveu, 2002).

The creation of private networks, growing advertising and the weakening of governments' control of TV and radio also triggered a greater competition for audiences and therefore a shift towards interpretative journalism (Neveu, 2002). Journalists critically analyse political events based on facts and data aiming at convincing readers (Neveu, 2002). However, distortion of this expertise can lead to political commitment and to the race for greater audience shares. Neveu (2002) wonders whether the limits of critical expertise and the crisis political journalism is facing will lead to a fourth generation of political journalism. Overall and as shown by Neveu (2002) and Chalaby (1998), objectivity was only recently introduced in journalistic practice, which shows that other ways of reporting facts may be possible thus leaving the future of objectivity unsure.

Objectivity is, or was, at the heart of journalistic practices and values. But what is objectivity, and what is its future? There is no straightforward answer as it relies on different concepts of what objectivity is and how it should be articulated. In a study focusing on the management of emotion by British journalists, Richards and Rees (2011) revealed that the very notion of objectivity is a source of confusion and inattention for journalists who assimilate objectivity to impartiality, neutrality, accuracy, fairness, honesty, commitment to truth, depersonalisation or balance. Many scholars have questioned the notion of objectivity. While for some, objectivity is a myth and ideal, a set of rituals aiming at protecting journalists from editorial and legal repercussions, and does not present the truth (Tuchman, 1972; Schudson, 2001), for others it is like a "regime" that changes over time and adapts itself (Hackett and Zhao, 1998). For Coward (2009, 2013), the concept of objectivity itself is philosophically flawed: objectivity requires a total separation between a writer and the world he is living in, between a writer and his emotions, and between a writer and his beliefs. However, such a separation is not possible: journalists make such judgment calls every day when they choose their interviewees, quotes and story structure. Furthermore, objectivity, balance, accuracy and facticity are not synonymous with such a separation and invisibility (Coward, 2009, 2013). Along those lines, Schudson (1978) does not understand why, although journalism is not fit for objectivity (mainly due to financial and market pressures), objectivity has to remain a core tenet of the profession. Indeed, for Schudson (1978, p.3):

> Objectivity is a peculiar demand to make of institutions, which as business corporations, are dedicated first of all to economic survival. It is a peculiar demand to make of institutions which often, by tradition or explicit credo, are political organs. It is a peculiar demand to make of editors and reporters who have none of the professional apparatus which, for doctors or lawyers or scientists, is supposed to guarantee objectivity.

Parallel to this classic dichotomy emerged a third option, that of transparency (Cushion, 2012; Wallace, 2013; Coward, 2009, 2013; Beckett, 2015). For Beckett (2015), objectivity can only be an "aspiration" as journalists are humans trying to make sense of the world by selecting specific stories and specific aspects contained in each story. Beckett (2015) sees transparency as the new objectivity - one that mixes emotions and facts, in a transparent and non-contradictory way, what the author calls "networked journalism". For the author, three factors are currently pushing journalists towards using more emotions. Firstly, emotions can help journalists exist in an intense economic situation as the competition is fierce both regarding readerships and advertising revenues. Secondly, emotions attract more readers and allow journalistic content to be shared more. Lastly, the author also stresses that journalists need to understand how people react to news content, especially so emotionally. Along those lines, Wahl-Jorgensen (2016, p.133) states that "the clashing and fundamentally incompatible epistemologies of conventional 'objective' journalism and 'emotional' audience content now sit alongside each other, rather than the former being privileged by the hierarchies of news content."

A different type of journalism, confessional journalism

Transparency, subjectivity and emotions can all be illustrated by the example of a different type of journalism, namely confessional journalism. Coward (2009, 2013) argues that contemporary journalism is full of people "speaking personally" through opinion pieces, first-person real-life experiences articles, magazines speaking on intimate terms with their readers, along with confessional columns - the author herself held a column about her mother's dementia for two years in *The Saturday Guardian* - and blogs. There is a current need for journalists to express themselves and for readers to be understood emotionally. Since the 1980s, commentary has skyrocketed and is now spreading to sections other than the designated comment one so much that the boundaries between news and views are today blurry (Coward, 2009, 2013). Although confessional writing can put unpopular stories such as cancer check-ups on the news agenda, it also raises many ethical issues such as authenticity of facts that can rarely be verifiable, manipulation of relatives and friends to get a story, self-exposure or digital narcissism especially on blogs, the sometimes absent consent of people involved in stories, emotional "striptease" or voyeurism.

Despite these ethical issues, many reasons can explain the success of confessional writing in journalism. Confessional writing is accompanied by a growing interest in the personalities and views of journalists. This phenomenon is not only restricted to tabloids, but also to "quality" newspapers such as *the Independent, The Times* and *The Guardian.* Indeed, Wahl-Jorgensen (2013c) showed that most of Pulitzer prize winning stories, mostly published in prestigious and elitist newspapers, were subjective. For Wahl-Jorgensen (2013a,b,c), in addition to Tuchman's (1972) strategic ritual of objectivity, there is a strategic ritual of emotionality according to which journalists construct their stories sentimentally after gathering facts from their sources. Schultz (2007) highlights another, sometimes emotional, ritual that she calls "gut feeling". The author explains that this gut feeling partly explains how journalists and editors choose news stories in a self-evident and self-explaining way. Peters (2011) goes further by saying that this emotionality has always been present in 20th century journalism; what is new is the diversity in emotional styles, the acceptability of journalistic involvement, and the attempts to involve the audience with news.

Confessional journalism is also a digital movement, highly influenced by social networks and social media, as it is widespread on the Internet, especially on blogs. For example, the online newspaper *The Huffington Post* has a strong personal voice and offers opinion stories and lifestyle blogs. Coward (2009, 2013) also argues that other social, technological and cultural factors explain the shift towards interpretation. The arrival of television forced print publications to change their approach in order to remain relevant against television's ability to break news and entertain viewers. Newspapers then gave something to their readers that television could not, namely interpretation.

Confessional journalism also emerged from changes in journalism itself. Although not writing subjectively, the "New Journalism" movement that emerged in the 1960s in the United States looked for new ways to challenge objective and traditional journalism by pushing for the integration of more personal material in the press. For that purpose, they used fiction writing techniques and stylistic devices such as conversations, participant observation and precise descriptions, among others.

Furthermore, journalism is a mirror of society and, as society allowed itself to become more emotional in the 1990s (Richards, 2007; Hume, 1998) as developed in Section I, journalism became more emotional too. This emotionality can be seen as a consequence or cause of the growing number of women, considered more subjective and emotional, entering journalism. Women journalists brought previously ignored and often personal subjects, especially relevant to women themselves, into the journalistic agenda. Although emotionality and subjectivity in journalism have been said to undermine democracy, political knowledge and trigger a "dumbing down" of the press, Coward advocates this type of writing that interests the public and that is more in phase with the current emotional society.

This section has highlighted that the emotionalisation of society has also reached journalism, which, through different elements such as many crises, loss of objectivity, confessional writing and rituals of emotionality, among others, has also become more emotional. The next section investigates social media, their links with emotions and their impact on journalism and politics.

IV. Emotions & social media

Defining social media

They may sound straightforward, but social media and social networks are difficult terms to define. They can both refer to an activity, a software, a tool and a platform (Newman, 2009; Hermida, 2010, 2012). Social media and networks can generally be qualified as "digital multiway channels of communication among people and between people and information resources and which are personalized, scalable, rapid and convenient." (Katz et al., 2013, p.12). Social media also refer to user-generated content, freedom of expression, and individual as well as collective action and empowerment (Katz et al., 2013). In addition to being relatively new tools and platforms, social media also form new journalistic and political communication genres (Cap and Okulska, 2013). For example, re-elected President Obama used social media in both of his presidential campaigns to tailor messages and videos to specific audiences, which gave a more humanised version of himself (Cap and Okulska, 2013). On a different note, Murthy (2013) and Papacharissi (2009) underline that there is a difference between social networks, in which users create a public or semi-public profile within an umbrella organisation and choose their connections such as Facebook, MySpace or LinkedIn, and social media, which are more concerned with publications of ordinary people and the fostering of friendship between users. In my research, I explore Twitter, which is classified as a micro-blogging website of short messages making it more social and open than ordinary blogs - more egocentric too - but it is also accessible for large audiences and goes beyond an individual's network.

Characteristics of Twitter

As my research includes an analysis of Twitter feeds, it is vital to understand some of Twitter's key particularities. Originally used to discuss live events, particularly media events, Twitter also has a social function that enables its users to post messages of 140 characters (Shamma et al., 2009; Murthy, 2013). Twitter can be used to express opinions, discuss subjects, for speed dating, personal diary, news consumption and job hunting, among others. Concretely, a Twitter user can "follow" another person and therefore see this person's postings on his or her timeline. This timeline therefore gathers all the tweets of the persons followed including the user's own tweets, presented in reverse chronological order. Apart from following other users, Twitter users can also directly interact with each other. This is made possible through the adding of "@" in front of someone's name, which means that someone is either addressing a new tweet or responding to an existing one. Explicit tags describing posts are also rampant on Twitter. To classify all posting concerning one specific subject, users use the prefix "#", in order to tag an event or fact. It is this hashtag function that is particularly relevant for my research. Indeed, hashtags concentrate all the postings relating to the same subject making an event easily researchable and ready to be analysed. Furthermore, the mention and tag functions of Twitter make it an easy-to-use system that enables its users to communicate with anyone, even world leaders and celebrities. In a way, Twitter can be compared to television: there is a limited amount of information available so viewers, just as Twitter users, can stay tuned or switch channels (Shamma et al., 2009; Murthy, 2013). In this sense, Twitter is not a passive process, but rather an active one where users are both consumers (tweets) and producers (retweets) (Shamma et al., 2009; Murthy, 2013). Although Twitter can shed light and awareness on social movements and natural disasters for example, its openness also raises ethical issues, especially ones relating to privacy as anyone can tweet and be tweeted (Shamma et al., 2009; Murthy, 2013). Thus, Twitter has many features and uses, however, it is also open to incivility and bullying.

Beyond defining what Twitter is, it is important to mention what Twitter affords users, such as journalists, politicians and the public, the possibility to do. Studying the affordances of social media in organisations, Treem and Leonardi (2012) identify four different affordances: visibility, editoriability, persistence and association, which offer organisations flexibility in their communication processes and impact the organisational communication processes of an organisation. Along those lines, Bucher and Helmond (2017) explore the impact that changes in social media affordances, namely Twitter, have on the public. In November 2015, Twitter changed its "favourite" button displayed with a star to a "like" button displayed with a heart, which caused distress, disbelief and disappointment in Twitter users and staff at the headquarters of Twitter itself. In this example, Bucher and Helmond (2017) show that it is not the symbol of the button that matters but rather what it means and how it allows users to mediate and communicate with others and with content, which also shows the importance and attachment that social media users have towards these affordances. In the case of journalism and politics, Twitter affords its users, such as politicians and journalists, the possibility to communicate in a direct and humanised way (by following other users and not simply liking people and inanimate objects such as on Facebook for example) with potential voters and/ or news consumers and to receive feedback and responses, among other examples (Cap and Okulska, 2013).

Social media & emotions

I now argue that emotions have a special place among social media and networks, especially on Twitter. In some cases such as following Michael Jackson's death or the 2008 American elections, social media have given a more emotional and personal view of events and facts than traditional news media and have therefore steered coverage in a specific way (Newman, 2009). Wahl-Jorgensen (2016) argues that social media correspond to new places where emotional expression can be elicited, and even encouraged. The author adds that this emotional encouragement can have a crucial impact on possible political discussion and action, while also impacting journalism practice through the increasing number of emotional user-generated content material shared by the public (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2014, 2016). In agreement with Wahl-Jorgensen (2016, 2014) and Newman (2009), I have incorporated the study of both traditional and new media in my research in order to see whether emotions used by candidates and journalists during leader debates echo on Twitter.

Wahl-Jorgensen (2016), who builds on the work of Papacharissi (2009) and her concept of “architecture of social networks”, discusses the “emotional architecture” of social media when referring to emotions and public places. Increasingly, much thought is given, by social media leaders such as Facebook, to adjust the emotional architecture of social media to positive emotions. Wahl-Jorgensen (2016) argues that this push towards positive emotions has been caused by the tremendous potential to monetise and commercialise such positivity and emotional labour. Indeed, social media’s survival depends on this positivity, as negative emotions could lead to negative content, which would be harmful for both users and social media sites. This is one of the reasons why Facebook is opposed to the introduction of a “dislike” button, which could be harmful and negative. This strong desire for positive emotions only creates a certain “bland positivity”, which can create a “friendly world syndrome” that only stresses positive and likeable content such as nice pictures or funny stories, and tends to ignore important ones such as coverage of famine, chaos or torture (Pariser, 2011). Thus, it can be said that the emotions present on social media are being shaped by commercial and practical considerations, and are pushed towards more positivity that can, in turn, create depression or undermine non-popular topics.

In addition to emotions, humour (e.g. jokes, irony or sarcasm) has a special place on social media, whether used by journalists (Lasorsa et al., 2012; Holton and Lewis, 2011), politicians (Katz et al., 2013), marketers (Whiting and Williams, 2013) or organisations at a national and international level (Rasmussen, 2017), among others. Humour, and subsequent entertainment, are some of the main reasons why users visit social media platforms alongside social interaction, information seeking or pass time, among others (Whiting and Williams, 2013). Moreover, a shared sense of humour helps users connect with each other on social media, which is a significant aspect of online communication (Holton and Lewis, 2011). Furthermore, the public, especially younger generations, favour entertaining sources of information, especially when they contain humour of some sort

(Feldman, 2007). Lastly, humour takes a visual form on social media through the use of humorous hoaxes, hacks, Internet memes or Emoticons (Davison, 2012; Coleman, 2012). These tools enable the transmission of positive and negative content and emotions, which themselves create a spectacle (Davison, 2012). Thus, the use of humour on social media is many and diverse and helps to connect users with each other using text but also visual tools such as Internet memes.

Social media & journalism

Social media are often said to have affected some deep-rooted journalistic norms and practices (Newman, 2009, 2010; Thorsen, 2013; Murthy, 2013). Murthy (2013) and Newman (2009) highlight three of the major ways in which social media have changed journalistic habits. Firstly, social media have accentuated the opinion of journalists who tend to disclose more about themselves and their views on specific issues, therefore threatening objectivity and shifting mass media to personal media. Secondly, social media have forced journalists to be more transparent and accountable for their stories by patrolling and checking facts and figures. Finally, social media have also helped journalists get feedback, answers, new sources and material as it was the case for the 2008 Mumbai bomb blasts, the 2011 phone-hacking scandal, the political movements of the Arab Spring and the 2009 crash of US Airways flight 1549. The latter gave Twitter a serious status of news breaker, making it a good ally for journalists. For Murthy (2013), journalism is now at a crossroads: on the one hand, the great impact of social media on journalism could see the rise of citizen journalists, especially Twitter-based citizen journalists. On the other hand, social media could simply become a new way for journalists to crowdsource stories and involve new actors in the story writing process. The author concludes that the boundaries between citizen and professional journalism have been blurred with regards to the increasing number of contributions of non-journalists to blogs, social media, but also printed newspapers.

Furthermore, a “fifth estate” composed of social media users and Internet-savvy citizens has already emerged and has bypassed the boundaries of existing institutions (Dutton, 2007). For Newman (2009, 2010), social media have triggered six main changes in relation to journalism: there has been an increased participation between social media users and journalists thanks to easy-to-use Internet tools, more efficient smartphones and better connectivity; social media and user-generated content are transforming breaking news; journalists are interacting with social media on a personal and professional basis; far from replacing journalism, social media allow journalists to get more sources and material; social media fit in a competitive market where news outlets' budgets are tight; and social media can attract people to traditional news content via links and articles. For all these reasons, Newman (2009, 2010) argues that social media can only have a positive impact on journalistic practice. Sparrow (2010) agrees with Newman by saying that social media and micro-blogging can enhance journalism with their immediacy, and the space they offer in comparison with newspapers' fixed columns, however, for Symes (2011) social media represent the "death of journalism" since it "is merely just repeating all that's wrong with 24 hour rolling news" and can be assimilated to a "media circus" characterised by the reign of chaos. Thorsen (2013) concludes by saying that there are obvious opportunities for live blogging and what he calls "social media curation" such as immediacy, transparency, interaction and crowdsourcing, among others. However, this curation is accompanied by many challenges and ethical considerations that journalists will have to face, or are already facing. These challenges and issues include keeping high standards of verification, especially with an abundance of online material, attributing each piece of material to the right event and time, ensuring that sources are not exploited, and finding a balance that would allow sources and audiences to interact (Thorsen, 2013; Fowler-Watt and Allan, 2013). In summary, although opinions regarding the benefits and limitations of social media in a journalistic context vary greatly, it can be said that social media have been affecting journalistic practice deeply.

Social media & politics

Social media have not only transformed journalism, but also politics. While social media are valuable political tools for some (Newman, 2009, 2010), they are seen as counter-productive techniques for others (Katz et al., 2013). The introduction of social media into political life partly came from politicians as was the case for re-elected President Obama who often repeated that social media should be used to draw people to politics and provide citizens with a way to engage with the democratic process (Katz et al., 2013). Katz et al. (2013) argue that social media really cemented their place in the political landscape with the 2008 and, even more so, with the 2012 Obama campaigns. The authors even called Obama the "social media president" in reference to his behaviour towards social media during the campaign but also after his inaugurations. He is not the first to have used social media, but probably the first to have used these media so intensely. In his speeches, Obama often mentions the three following themes: populism, active citizenship in government, and digital communication technology as a way to help people and government interact (Katz et al., 2013). And these are precisely the three themes that made Obama an Internet superstar: he had 3 million Facebook friends, 845 000 on MySpace, 123 000 followers on Twitter, his name was mentioned in more than 500 million blog posts, his YouTube videos received 14.5 million hours of playing time, he had his own "virtual campaign" in the cyberworld called "Second Life", his email list contained 13 million addresses, he had his own iPhone app, and much more (Katz et al., 2013; Mount, 2014). Ultimately, he raised $745 million in his presidential campaign, including an unprecedented half a billion dollars online (Mount, 2014). Many commentators, including Al Gore, declared that Obama could not have been elected without the Internet (Katz et al., 2013). Obama was supported by online citizens, called "netizens", but also by Internet and social media leaders such as Google's chief executive Eric Schmidt, and Facebook cofounder Chris Hughes (Katz et al., 2013).

Although Twitter and other new online technologies are valuable tools in modern campaigning - they help gathering input from the public, pushing information to the public, and co-determining policy with the public - Katz et al. (2013) state that a future where social media would take the lead in politics is difficult to imagine. The authors argue that social media would be expensive to implement in everyday politics, and even counterproductive or ineffective in some cases. For example, two social media initiatives pushed by the Obama Administration, the

Citizens Briefing Book and the *White House Online Town Hall*, did not manage to stimulate meaningful citizen participation. These projects were looking for ways to help the Administration get more support for its policies and projects, to counter criticisms, and to give a positive image of the President (Katz et al., 2013).

What was started by the Obama team has spread to other democracies, especially the United Kingdom where parties spent time studying social media techniques in the United States. British political parties even hired some of Obama's former campaign advisers to quickly implement their social media and digital strategies (Newman, 2010; Mount, 2014). Even though British politicians have integrated social media in their everyday lives, Mount (2014) argues that there is still a long way to go for them in order to use these modern tools as effectively as their American counterparts, especially Obama. Although Newman (2010) argues that the impact of social media is hard to measure as it is composed of a series of small personal actions, he states that social media transformed the British way of campaigning. The author underlines that, together with televised debates, politicians hoped that social media would increase their ability to directly interact with the public, without having to go through conventional media. This desire for more interactivity was pushed forward by politicians, but also by traditional news organisations, which wanted to build more direct and personal relationships with their audience by creating sentiment trackers such as ITV's experiment with a superimposed graph called “the worm” that indicated live approval ratings of participants in the 2010 British debates (Newman, 2010; Thorsen, 2013). These sentiment analyses have become increasingly popular in political and media events and play an important role in electoral campaigns (Chadwick, 2010). Sentiment analyses of online text allow researchers to analyse online communication by automatically measuring emotions (Thelwall et al., 2011). More specifically, sentiment analyses rely on algorithms, which automatically identify sentiment in text whether these algorithms correspond to specific objects and the polarity of the sentiment expressed (positive, negative, neutral) about these objects or to an overall polarity regarding a specific text (Thelwall et al., 2011). Sentiment analyses therefore offer new perspectives such as the possibility to analyse large amounts of data in real time thus creating liveness around an event and improving television viewers' experiences by providing information and attractive visualisation of results (Chadwick, 2010; Bruns and Stieglitz, 2013). Although sentiment analysis offers the possibility to analyse large amounts of data in a quasi-instantaneous way, it remains an automated computer search, which can include terms that are not needed in a specific analysis or, on the contrary, exclude terms that would have been needed. It is therefore not suited for the aims of my research as I focus on historical Twitter data and look at the emotions used following the 2010 British and 2012 American debates and their news coverage, which require the inductive analysis of emotions in the acquired data sets. Although opinions differ regarding the benefits of social media in the realm of politics, social media seem to have secured their place in the political landscape at least for the years to come. But are social media a (r)evolution?

On the one hand, social media have allowed ordinary people to break news, produce media content, publicly voice their opinions, and directly interact with opinion leaders. Social media thus present many advances such as interactivity, free source of material, users' participation in the news process, readily available material for breaking news, alternative to mainstream media, unmediated way of communication for businesses and politicians, and more transparency in the corporate media (Newman, 2009, 2010). Murthy (2013) underlines the globalised and digital interdependence created by one social media patform, Twitter, which enables users to be connected in a sort of "global village" (McLuhan, 1962). McLuhan (1962) studied the print phase of language in an "electric era" that has now given way to a digital one. McLuhan (1962, p.30) argues that the process of "new electronic interdependence recreates the world in the image of a global village." In Murthy's view, Twitter could speed the spreading of this global village in terms of connectedness, but also awareness of other members of the village. This is in accordance with the findings of Papacharissi (2009) who states that electronic media have the ability to suppress, or reorganise, the boundaries between public and private, both in relation to the content published on these sites and to the geography of social life of users who are living in an open space.

On the other hand, Twitter is not as revolutionary as one might initially think. Many scholars have underlined that social media, especially Twitter, are the next step of a long series of historical evolutions in the sphere of public short messaging services (Shamma et al., 2009; Murthy, 2013). Scholars (Newman, 2009; Murthy, 2013) argue that social media have the same values as older devices, the same potential to facilitate communication, the only difference is that social media are new and popular tools. Indeed, just like other inventions that seemed revolutionary at the time, such as the telegraph, telephone, radio and television, Twitter has not created long-distance communication, but has rather facilitated transformations in online and social behaviours (Murthy, 2013). Furthermore, social media such as Twitter raise issues relating to reliability, trust, truth and accuracy, the difficulty of processing the high numbers of user-generated data received, and to the financial costs (launching new websites, training journalists, and hiring social media staff), among others (Newman, 2009, 2010). More than issues in the field of journalism, Twitter could transform society as a whole: are we becoming more and more concise? Are we less and less able to concentrate and focus on serious topics? Are we witnessing a "me culture" centred on the individual? In short, "are we saying more with less, or overall just less?" (Murthy, 2013, p.ix). These questions will probably be answered over time. All in all, although Twitter seems revolutionary regarding many aspects, it actually follows a pattern of technological evolution that gathers advantages as well as disadvantages.

In this literature review, I presented spheres such as society, politics, journalism and social media. Although highly different, these spheres are all interconnected by one plural and complex element: emotion. After having transformed society and led to the development of an emotional culture, emotions have reached fields traditionally associated with reason and logic such as politics and journalism. New and sometimes stormy relationships have been created between emotions and these fields. In the digital era we are living in, emotions have continued their expansion and reached users' fingertips via social media sites.

Chapter 2

Methodology

In order to highlight how emotions were used by politicians, journalists and Twitter users, this chapter considers my research methodology and data sets. For this purpose, I am working with the following research question: how far did political candidates, print media and Twitter users use emotions and emotional references in the 2010 British and 2012 American televised leader debates and their coverage? Several subsidiary questions derive from my research question:

- What emotions and emotional references did candidates use in the 2010 British and 2012 American televised debates? In what proportions did they use emotions and emotional references?
- How did *The Guardian, The Sun, The New York Times* and the *New York Post* frame emotions and emotional references to construct their reporting of the debates?
- How did Twitter users react to the emotions used by politicians and journalists during the 2012 American and 2010 British TV debates? What emotions did Twitter users display during the debates?

This chapter considers the limitations and benefits of my research methods (I), explains my data selection procedure (II), details how the data was acquired (III) and describes how I applied these methods to my data sets (IV).

I. Consideration of research methods

The use of emotions by politicians, journalists and Twitter users as part of my research has been analysed using a content and framing analysis. I now consider the advantages and limitations of the research methods that were applied to my data sets.

Content analysis

Krippendorff (1989, p.403) sees content analysis as “one of the most important research techniques in the social sciences” and it has often been described as “A research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication” (Berelson, 1952, p.18). The aim of content analysis is to capture, quantify and analyse large body of media messages (Berelson, 1952; Krippendorff, 1989). This research method presents both advantages and some limitations. Indeed, content analysis allows the analysis of large volume of media content over, sometimes, extended periods of time as it is the case with longitudinal studies (Bauer, 2000; Krippendorff, 1989). Furthermore, content analysis is a relatively cheap research method that does not involve interviews with participants. It can therefore be useful as a starting point for other studies (Krippendorff, 1989) as it is the case with mine since I have used content analysis to explore what emotions politicians used during the debates, a foundation, which I have built on throughout my whole thesis. If well prepared, Bauer (2000) also finds “beauty” in the coding process of content analysis, which is detailed, complex and allows interesting results to be identified. To be transparent, Bauer (2000) claims that researchers have to provide their coding frame, which can take the form of a booklet including everything related to the coding procedure. I have followed Bauer’s advice as I have included a dictionary of each theme in Appendix A corresponding to the analysis of debate transcripts.

However, content analysis also presents some limitations. Firstly, content analysis is limited to a quantitative description of what the text contains (Bauer, 2000; Krippendorff, 1989). Researchers therefore need to develop data in relation to an overarching theory or further study. Furthermore, separating units of analysis can skew interpretation as researchers will make judgements according to these bits of texts and not the overall text or corpus (Bauer, 2000; Krippendorff, 1989). Content analysis also has a tendency to focus on frequency possibly ignoring what is rare or absent (Bauer, 2000). Content analysis also poses the question of reliability: "No content analysis expects perfect reliability where human judgement is involved, and so the question of an acceptable level of reliability arises. [...] Furthermore, reliability may differ across codes, some being more ambiguous than others." (Bauer, 2000, p.144).

To address these limitations, I have developed my own understanding of content analysis. Indeed, my research goes beyond simply counting elements by providing and unpacking meaning as well as context. In addition to counting elements, I have also taken notes regarding the ideas, issues and themes, which have allowed me to contextualise my data sets. I further modified content analysis by adding non-mutually exclusive codes. Indeed, coding the most dominant topic and/ or emotion for each paragraph or tweet would have been too broad-brush as it would have ignored references that may be frequent but rarely prominent enough to be counted as a main topic, and would have relied on the researcher accurately deciding what the main topic is. This method allowed for a fine-grained analysis and is particularly well suited for my debate transcripts and Twitter analyses as I explore what emotions were used during the debates and on Twitter as well as how many times these emotions were used. Section IV will detail how I applied this methodology to my data sets.

As there are many new data science techniques such as virtual ethnography, network analysis and conversational analysis (see for example Ackland (2013), Price et al. (2013) or Hine (2015)), among other examples, further justification regarding why my research relied on a more traditional method, content analysis, needs to be provided. Indeed, the aim of my Twitter analysis was not to analyse "big data" devoid of meaning and context or to rely on automated computer searches, which would have included terms that are not needed or, on the contrary, excluded terms that would have been needed. In particular, emotions cannot be pre-coded using pre-definable keywords or emotion-words, which computer searches would have required, as phrases, metaphors or adjectives (see Appendix A for examples) can only be coded by reading and manually analysing data. Similarly, my research aim was not to explore how journalists produced news online in the context of new technologies (see Paterson et al. (2016)) but rather to highlight how Twitter users reacted to the 2012 US and 2010 UK debates, the candidates who took part in these debates, the coverage of these debates and the use of social media during these debates. I therefore needed to count emotional and non-emotional elements as well as provide examples, which made content analysis the most appropriate method. Furthermore, the aim of this thesis is to analyse the emotional interaction of politicians, journalists and Twitter users in the context of the 2012 US and 2010 UK live political debates. As such, my thesis is not a study of social media *per se* even though it gives a valuable insight into social media behaviour, especially when it comes to emotions and political and media events.

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Framing analysis

Framing analysis presents limitations and advantages. Indeed, several problems arise from the many definitions and uses of framing analysis. Firstly, researchers have imposed, and given different names to, their frames (Iyengar's "episodic" and "thematic frames" in 1991, De Vreese and colleagues' "issue-specific" and "generic" frames in 2001, among others), which makes frames and subsequent results hard to compare (Vliegenthart and van Zoonen, 2011; Vliegenthart, 2012; Cappella and Hall Jamieson, 1997; Scheufele, 1999). Secondly, the method designs used to identify frames are also many and diverse, and are orientated by each specific piece of research, rather than connected to a bigger whole (De Vreese, 2002). Consequently, different methodologies have engendered different results (Cappella and Hall Jamieson, 1997). Reese (2007) further argues that some studies, although using the term "framing", do not actually carry out a framing analysis. For the author, a study has to prove that discourse is anchored in a more structured and organised context for it to be called framing. The author also claims that framing cannot rely on descriptions only as some researchers may include long quotes providing no overarching argument or interpretation to their study. For Van Gorp (2007, p.60), the wide array of frames perspectives and diversity of research methods to study frames have led to this methodology being a *passe-partout* without clear unity or framework. Alternatively, Norris et al. (2003) warn of the uncertainty and unknown surrounding framing as they wonder why specific frames are put forward and what impact they may have on the public. Lastly, identifying and checking frames involves time-consuming interpretive work.

However, I believe that these methodological disagreements are outweighed by the advantages offered by framing analysis. Firstly, framing analysis appears to be more suited for news media research than quantitative methods as framing remains close to the text, while avoiding skewed interpretation and selective use of evidence (Vliegenthart, 2012; Gitlin, 1980). While Vliegenthart (2012) underlines the systematic analysis of media content across time and space with large samples of coverage, the thorough description of frames and the better understanding of media studies that these tools provide, Gitlin (1980) stresses that framing, in relation to cultural and media studies, is more flexible, exhaustive and complex than quantitative studies. Along those lines, Hammond (2007) claims that the qualitative aspect of framing analysis offers greater subtlety than traditional content analysis, even though this advantage can sometimes be lost as coherent wholes may be split into countable "bits". Secondly, framing also possesses a strong bridging function. As Reese (2007) argues, framing can bridge areas that were not related before such as, in my case, journalism, social media, emotions and politics. For Reese, framing is an insightful process, which allows more interpretation, grasps the process of meaning-making and stresses relationships within discourse. Thirdly, framing analysis is particularly suited to study emotions as shown by the work of Gross and Brewer (2007) who investigate how the news framing of policy debates could shape the public's emotions. Lastly, framing as a research method has increased in popularity over the past decade. Using this methodology is therefore being attuned with the research interests of the moment, being able to compare potential results, taking part in the collective enthusiasm about framing and further contributing to the theoretical and practical considerations of framing analysis (Weaver, 2007). Therefore, although it needs more theoretical and practical unity, framing analysis has the ability to tie different fields together, such as journalism, politics and social media, and is becoming increasingly popular as a research method. Section IV will detail how I applied this methodology to my data sets.

II. Data selection procedure

This section explains why my research focuses on newspaper coverage and Twitter feeds. As my research analyses TV debates, the analysis of the corresponding transcripts is a vital requirement. Before providing these justifications, it is worth mentioning that each medium afforded this research project as well as viewers, readers and social media users with different possibilities. Television, via debate transcripts, afforded me the opportunity to analyse what, and how, topics were discussed in the debates, in what proportions and using what emotions. TV debates enable viewers to learn more about candidates' policy ideas and personalities, see how they behave under pressure or make up their minds and discuss the debates with friends, colleagues or family. The press, via newspaper articles, allowed me to analyse how journalists reported on the debates by investigating what topics and emotions were favoured or, on the contrary, undermined during the debates period. The newspaper coverage of the debates provide readers with a summary of the debates if they did not watch them, opinions of pundits, discussion points and the ability to make up one's mind. Lastly, social media, via tweets, afforded me the possibility to analyse how Twitter users reacted to the debates, candidates, the coverage of the debates and the use of social media during the debates, in what proportions and using what emotions. Twitter enables users to share opinions, emotions and content (e.g. links, pictures, videos), start discussions with others (by mentioning others in posts or private messaging others) as well as follow the debates (by following other users, liking content) online. Regarding social media, it is worth mentioning that these platforms contain limited demographics in terms of gender, age, ethnicity and income levels, among others. Indeed, one of the main aspects of Twitter is its non-hierarchical structure where all users can tweet and be tweeted. I believe that three main reasons explain why I did not integrate users' personal information in my samples. Firstly, this type of information (e.g. gender, age, income levels, ethnicity) was not available in my data, which is not a survey but a collection of tweets relating to the 2012 US and 2010 UK debates. Secondly, the Twitter analysis presented in Chapter 5 is not a study of social media *per se* but rather investigates how Twitter users reacted to the debates and their coverage. Finally, my research seeks to guarantee the anonymity of the tweets contained in my sample and therefore agrees with Bruns and Burgess (2012, p.806-807) who state that

> Given obvious ethical concerns with highlighting activities of individual users, the goal here is not to engage in detailed profiling of individuals, but to establish the overall community structure.

It is the overall emotional structure of Twitter users in relation to the US and UK debates that my research focuses on. Furthermore, my Twitter data enabled me the possibility to distinguish between public and private tweets and between types of users (experts, journalists, politicians, PR people and private users). Thus, the combination of these various media forms produce a rich set of interrelated affordances helpful when analysing how politicians, journalists and Twitter users interacted across platforms and media during the 2012 US and 2010 UK elections under the impetus of emotions.

Newspaper coverage

Two of the main aims of newspapers are to inform readers and make sense of the world. Although the accuracy of the coverage of news events, especially political debates, is widely disputable (Benoit and Currie, 2001), studying the news coverage of presidential debates remains an important and meaningful task. Particularly, analysing the newspaper coverage of post-debate analysis is important as it can have as much of an impact as the debates themselves (Hwang et al., 2007). Indeed, post-debate coverage can "influence understanding, perceptions, and judgments in response to political debates by reshaping an individual's encoded experience of the event through the process of reflection." (Hwang et al., 2007, p.41). This is also supported by Benoit and Currie (2001) who argue that, if many watch televised debates, many more do not and rely on news coverage to shape their opinions of the debates and ongoing election campaign. Furthermore, those who watch the debates can be influenced by the subsequent news coverage of these events. Analysing the coverage, and especially newspaper coverage, of TV debates is therefore important and deserves further scholarly attention.

More specifically, I chose *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* for their national and international influence on different news agendas impacting the government, businesses but also professional and academic circles across the United States and Europe, their strong Internet presence, their serious coverage of international affairs, their gatekeeping habits and news selection processes along with the important literature comparing their respective coverage (Toledo Bastos, 2014; Gitlin, 1980; Hopple, 1982; Bantimaroudis and Ban, 2001). In addition to highbrow newspapers, I decided to analyse tabloid newspapers for each of my case study in order to analyse media frames across different types of newspapers. Although not comparable in terms of circulation figures - 2 091 484 copies distributed in 2014 for *The Sun* (Newsworks, 2014) and 500 521 in 2013 for the *New York Post* (Lulofs, 2013) - I chose the *New York Post* and *The Sun* for several reasons. Firstly, both newspapers are fully owned by *News Corp*, which is an American multinational mass media company. This ensures that there will be no variation in ownership influence and that the newspapers will be culturally comparable. Secondly, both offered political coverage of the debates in varying degrees. I further selected *The Observer* and the *News of the World*, respectively the Sunday papers of *The Guardian* and *The Sun*, at the time of the 2010 British TV debates, in order to even the coverage of the American and British newspapers.

Twitter feeds

In addition to newspaper coverage, I also analysed Twitter feeds relating to the 2012 American and 2010 British televised debates. Indeed, as the digitalisation of journalism continues to grow, it seems essential to investigate both traditional news and social media to get an accurate view of the coverage of specific events and to better understand news flow and structural interdependencies among officials, journalists and social media users (Bruns and Burgess, 2011a). Moreover, Twitter is also particularly insightful for my other fields of interest, namely politics and emotions. In the case of politics, Twitter can blur the boundaries between information, news and entertainment (Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveira, 2012) and therefore offer new insights into the evolution of digital politics. Beyond this role, Twitter and politics now go hand in hand through increased political discussions during events such as national elections, uprisings and other social mobilisations, among others (Bruns and Burgess, 2011b). Moreover, tweets are also particularly relevant for emotions studies. In their study of the Egyptian uprisings and news story-telling, Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveira (2012, p.277) claim that "Tweets blended emotion with opinion, and drama with fact, reflecting deeply subjective accounts and interpretations of events, as they unfolded." Although the authors do not mention what and how emotions were used, they underline that a so-called "affective news streams" occurs on Twitter. This affective news streams is a mixture of humour, opinion expression and emotions. On a different note, analyses of social media are still in the making although they are rapidly growing in popularity (Bruns and Burgess, 2011a). New approaches, methods, procedures for data collection and analysis are therefore needed (Bruns and Liang, 2012; Burgess and Bruns, 2012b; Bruns and Burgess, 2011a), especially in the fields of media and politics that I am exploring. In summary, Twitter data is significant for many reasons: it gives a better understanding of the digitalisation of politics and journalism, blends news information with personal opinions and emotions, and allows for interdisciplinary research.

In order to study the Twitter feeds relating to the American and British televised debates, I focused on keywords and hashtags. First of all, it can be said that acquiring a sample that is as comprehensive and representative as possible is a real challenge when studying social media. One way of capturing such a sample is to focus on relevant topical hashtags (Bruns and Liang, 2012; Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveira, 2012; D'heer and Verdegem, 2014). By analysing topical hashtags, researchers are ensured that they have captured the most visible tweets about one specific event or issue as it is the essence of hashtags to give visibility to tweets (Bruns and Liang, 2012; Bruns and Burgess, 2011b; D'heer and Verdegem, 2014). Moreover, hashtags are often created and/ or widely supported by the mainstream media, which can display specific hashtags on TV or media websites therefore making them highly visible to the public (D'heer and Verdegem, 2014). For all these reasons, hashtags are now widely adapted to many scenarios ranging from emergency relief to reactions to television programmes and political discussions (Bruns and Burgess, 2011b). Furthermore, hashtags are also particularly relevant for the study of emotions as they invite the use of affective language as indicated by Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveira (2012). However helpful hashtags are, they cannot guarantee that all tweets relating to one event are captured as some users may not know of official or non-official hashtags (Bruns and Liang, 2012; Bruns, 2012; D'heer and Verdegem, 2014).

More specifically, I selected specific keywords and hashtags relating to the British and American debates. Firstly, it can be said that there were many hashtags in use for both the British and American campaigns. In the British case, hashtags ranged from official or semi-official ones such as #ukelection, #ge2010, #ge10 to humorous ones such as #nickcleggsfault (Politics11, 2010). However, only the official hashtag for the debates, #leadersdebate, was considered relevant as the others were too general and would have captured data not related to the debates. As for the American debates and to be consistent with the British debates, I decided to focus on the official hashtag for the debates, namely #debates (Kanalley, 2012). Secondly, and in order to further justify and verify the relevance of the selected hashtags, I searched tweets related to the debates in the viewer Topsy, which allowed Internet users to search for any tweet posted since 2006[1]. By doing this, I realised that I needed to expand my hashtag search to popular keywords such as "prime ministerial debates", "TV debates", "televised debates", and "debates" for the British debates, and "presidential debates", "TV debates" and "televised debates" for the American ones. In summary, hashtags represent a reliable and representative way to get data, they highlight emotions, and they can be complemented by additional keywords.

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[1] The website Topsy was taken down in 2015 and can no longer be accessed today.

III. Acquiring the data

After considering my research methods and justifying my data selection procedure, I now turn to data acquisition. A few justifications such as the selected timeframes, downloading procedures, issues encountered and ethical considerations also need to be detailed.

Debate transcripts

I electronically acquired the transcripts of the three 2010 British debates[2] and four 2012 American debates[3]. In the American case, the vice presidential debate was also analysed as it follows the same axis of political communication as presidential debates therefore sharing the same arguments, examples and even emotions. For example, in the vice presidential debate (11/09/12), Romney and his running mate Ryan had very similar answers on the issue of Iran's potential nuclear weapon. Ryan declared:

> Let's look at this from the view of the ayatollahs. What do they see? They see this administration trying to water down sanctions in Congress for over two years. They're moving faster toward a nuclear weapon. They're *spinning the centrifuges* faster.

Similarly, in the third debate, Romney used almost the same line:

> All of these things suggested, I think, to the Iranian mullahs that, hey, you know, we can keep on pushing along here, we can keep talks going on, we're just going to keep on *spinning centrifuges.*

On the emotional side, Romney and Ryan also shared the same personal stories and feeling of empathy. In the vice presidential debate, Ryan said:

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[2] There were three 90-minute debates that ran without a break: 15 April on domestic affairs, 22 April on foreign affairs and 29 April on economic affairs. Candidates did not know questions in advance.

[3] There were four 90-minute debates that ran without a break: 3 October on domestic affairs, 11 October on domestic and foreign affairs (vice presidential debate), 16 October on questions from an audience (townhall format) and 22 October on foreign policy. Candidates did not know questions in advance.

> He talks about Detroit. Mitt Romney's a *car guy.* They keep misquoting him, but let me tell you about the Mitt Romney I know. [...]

A personal story told again by Romney in the third debate:

> I'm a son of Detroit. I was born in Detroit. My dad was head of a *car company. I like American cars.* And I would do nothing to hurt the U.S. auto industry.

Thus, because presidential and vice-presidential candidates had similar political and emotional strategies, I investigated the only vice presidential debate along with the three presidential ones in my analysis.

Newspaper articles

Data was collected one week before the first debate and one week after the last debate for both the United Kingdom and United States. In other words, I downloaded the British newspaper articles from 8th April 2010 to 6th May 2010, and the American ones from 26th September 2012 to 29th October 2012. Previews, expectations and speculations were found one week before the start of the debates. Similarly, one week after the last televised debate, comments and hypotheses on who won the debates and who is likely to win the election were found. The selected timeframe for pre and post-debate coverage is in accordance with previous studies (Chadwick, 2010; Coleman et al., 2011). In a second phase, newspaper articles were downloaded from the database LexisNexis. To further tailor my research, I performed several Boolean searches with different keywords, and the two most adequate searches - the ones offering the most results - were selected. In the case of the United States, I selected the following search: "debate AND presidential OR us OR America OR election". In the case of Britain, the following one was used: "debate AND general election OR uk OR britain OR prime minister". Only the articles with specific buzzwords (presidential debate, leader party debates, election, Romney, Obama, Cameron, Clegg, Brown, America, TV, Britain, and the like) were kept for further consideration. In the case of the United States, LexisNexis retrieved 667 articles for *The New York Times* and 166 for the *New York*

Post. After reading the headlines, first paragraphs and deleting doubles, I downloaded and analysed 223 and 104 articles respectively. For the United Kingdom, LexisNexis retrieved 555 articles for *The Guardian*, 208 for *The Observer*, 184 for *The Sun* and 49 for the *News of the World.* After following the same procedure as for the American newspapers, I downloaded and analysed 191 articles from *The Guardian*, 47 from *The Observer*, 77 from *The Sun*, and 16 from the *News of the World.* After reflection, I decided not to focus on specific geographic location so I did not download the Scottish, Ulster or other special editions. Moreover, I did not download letters to the editor as they are a specific genre different from the content written by professional journalists (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2014).

Tweets

Twitter data was collected one day before the first debate through to one day after the last debate in each case study, that is from 14th April 2010 to 30th April 2010 for the UK debates and from 2nd October 2012 to 23rd October 2012 for the US debates. This timeframe therefore includes the whole duration of the debate periods in each case study. However, the pre and post-coverage period have been contained to one day since tweets are mostly event-driven (Murthy, 2013). This has also been confirmed by the fact that almost no tweets were found on the viewer Topsy before and after these dates. Secondly, the Twitter data had to be downloaded. There are three ways of getting data from Twitter through so-called API (Application Programming Interface). Researchers and companies can get data through Twitter's Search API (data that already exists, but limited to 3 200 tweets regardless of the query of the data), Twitter's streaming API (real-time data, also limited to 3 200 tweets) or Twitter's Firehose (Vis, 2013; Bruns and Liang, 2012; Bruns, 2012). Although not free, the Twitter Firehose contains all of the Twitter feeds and therefore represents a reliable way of getting as much data as possible during and after the debates (Vis, 2013). All parameters considered, I downloaded my data from Twitter's official data reseller called Gnip, which has access to the Twitter Firehose. After trying different keywords and timeframes, I downloaded two data sets: tweets relating to the American debates (300 000 tweets) and to the British debates (30 000 tweets).

In order to make my study transparent and repeatable, it is essential to discuss the many difficulties I encountered when gathering Twitter data. Indeed, options are tremendously limited when it comes to historical[4] data. In 2011, Twitter considerably restricted access to its data, giving access only to third-party resellers. Some free platforms, such as Twapperkeeper or Topsy therefore closed, and limited choice remained. I contacted several researchers to ask for data relating to the debates; however they no longer possessed the required data or their data was not a good match for my aims and objectives. I also used viewers such as Topsy or Twitter itself; however the data these websites contain can only be viewed and not downloaded. I also contacted the Library of Congress in the United States, which, through a partnership with the reseller Gnip, has been collecting all tweets posted since the creation of Twitter in 2006. However, due to the tremendous amount of data that it represents, this service of the Library is not currently accessible and will not be for many years to come. The only option left was therefore to resort to third-party resellers such as Gnip and Datasift. Despite the cost, I finally downloaded my data from Gnip, which allowed me to process several quotes with different keywords, timeframes and filters. Finally, Twitter's fast-changing policies have also slowed down, or stopped, studies on social media. This represents a considerable blow to a field that more than ever needs practical, theoretical and methodological studies to expand itself. Thus, downloading historical data from Twitter is a challenge in itself regarding the complexity of the process, the jargon one has to face and Twitter's fast-changing policies.

Ethical considerations

I now discuss ethical considerations related to my study. Indeed, Twitter, and social media in general, have redefined issues surrounding ethics in academic research (Miah, 2012). Looking at the current privacy policy of Twitter sheds some light on the ethical debate surrounding tweets. Twitter privacy policy (2013) states that users "consent to the collection, transfer, manipulation, storage, disclosure and other uses of [their] information" therefore authorising "Twitter to use [this] information in the United States and any other country where Twitter operates."

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[4] Data, which is more than three weeks old.

Some of this information, such as name and username can even be seen publicly by non-Twitter users. Twitter justifies this openness by saying that upon creating an account, users specifically ask Twitter to make their information public. If users do not wish to have their information disseminated online they can tighten their privacy setting or permanently delete their account. Furthermore, Twitter (2013) positions itself as a service provider explicitly stating that by creating an account, users should be aware that Twitter may share this information to third party resellers such as Gnip, which I used to download my data. In summary, Twitter explicitly warns users of its privacy policy whose acceptance is directly linked to the creation of an account.

Although the privacy policy of Twitter is explicit, potential ethical issues should still be considered. For this purpose, Zimmer (2010) analysed 244 studies, themselves examining Twitter data, between July 2010 and October 2011 across many disciplines such as sociology, sports sciences or communication sciences, as well as across different data collection procedures and methodologies. Zimmer came to the conclusion that 93 per cent of these studies did not discuss ethics in their papers. Only 3 per cent of the analysed journal papers discussed ethical considerations such as the anonymity of tweets. Zimmer's findings are in accordance with many research papers that display Twitter usernames without creating pseudonyms to maintain anonymity. For example, Bruns and Burgess use journalists' and politicians' tweets to support their argument in several articles without giving pseudonyms to the authors of these public tweets (Bruns, 2012; Bruns and Burgess, 2011a,b; Burgess and Bruns, 2012a). However, Bruns and Burgess (2012) argue that using Twitter usernames of so-called "individual users" is not ethical as no informed consent was obtained. The authors also point out that the aim of their research is not to profile individuals but rather to highlight the overall structure of a specific community as I have done with my research and discussions around emotions and televised debates. This is in accordance with Zimmer (2010) and Nunan and Yenicioglu (2013) who state that although individuals are aware that their tweets will be published and spread online, they do not expect researchers and marketers to use them in their research or business activities.

In the specific case of my research, I understand "public tweets" as tweets posted by journalists and politicians involved in the 2012 American and 2010 British leader debates. Indeed, Bruns and Burgess (2012) consider as ethical to further analyse professional tweets such as tweets by journalists or politicians. Similarly, other studies related to my fields of interest take the stand to use public figures' tweets without rendering them anonymous. For example, Vis (2013) uses real Twitter usernames in his paper on Twitter's role as a"breaking news" tool. Along those lines, Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveira (2012) display journalists' usernames without considering ethics in their paper on the affective news coverage relating to Egyptian uprisings. Mostly relevant for my research, Shamma et al. (2009) refer to journalists' and politicians' usernames in their study about the usage of Twitter during the 2008 American presidential debates. In relation to politics, journalism and Twitter, Newman (2009, 2010) discusses ethics for journalists who are personally and professionally engaging with Twitter, but does not consider ethical issues that may arise from his data sets, although he uses journalists' and politicians' usernames.

To further broaden the debate, Priego (2014) argues that the ethics deriving from the public use of Twitter data depends on the selected field of study. For example, it seems ethical to protect Twitter users when tackling mental health issues. However, these specific fields should not impact other fields of research that do not require the mental or physical protection of users such as, in my case, journalism and politics, which mainly use public figures' tweets. Furthermore, Priego points out that, "Publicly published data is public evidence and it should be subject to public research - Facebook is not Twitter, and Twitter research is not hacking into private mobile phone messages or emails." Priego also advocates for the full transparency of the use of publicly accessible data in order to make studies repeatable and valid. I have therefore tried to be as transparent as possible in my research in order to ensure that individual tweets are made anonymous and that, as stated before, only tweets by journalists or politicians are used without pseudonyms. Thus, in addition to the distinction between individual and public accounts, there is also a difference between highly sensitive fields of study such as mental health, and everyday public discussions such as the ones following televised leader debates as I have studied.

To conclude, I did not display names or usernames of private individuals who should not be forced to be publicly named in a study they did not consent to. However, this anonymity seems inappropriate for public figures who take part in public debate regarding public affairs, such as journalists and politicians, and who seek to gain as much public coverage as possible, especially in public debates on politics and journalism. Thus, I followed the ethical thinking of previous literature on Twitter research (Bruns, 2012; Bruns and Burgess, 2011a,b; Burgess and Bruns, 2012a; Bruns and Burgess, 2012; Vis, 2013; Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveira, 2012; Shamma et al., 2009; Newman, 2009, 2010; Nunan and Yenicioglu, 2013). In line with common practice in this field, I displayed journalists' and politicians' actual usernames, while anonymising individual (privately intended) tweets. My ethics review was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of London South Bank University in August 2014.

IV. Applying content and framing analysis

I now detail how I performed each of my analyses starting with the debate transcripts, followed by the newspaper articles and the Twitter feeds.

Content analysis of debate transcripts

Chapter 3 aimed at identifying what emotions were used during the debates, in what proportions and what topics were discussed during the debates. For these purposes, I counted emotional (paragraphs containing emotions, humour, references to family, friends or anecdotes) and non-emotional elements (paragraphs not containing any emotions, humour, references to family, friends or anecdotes) and provided examples to illustrate these numbers making content analysis the most suitable method for this chapter. As far as my coding process is concerned, each reference was coded in one, or more, particular sub-topics belonging to one, or more, non-mutually exclusive topics. More precisely, I coded metaphors, keywords, catchphrases and terms referring to specific topics in the text analysis software NVivo (Robinson, 2000, 2002; Robinson et al., 2010; Hammond, 2007; Bishop, 2006; Kellow and Steeves, 1998). To decide whether such elements had to be coded in a particular emotional code, I had a closer look at the type of words used (e.g. adjectives, pronouns, verbs) and constantly referred the coding and analysis to the definitions provided in Appendix A. To help me in this coding process, I also watched all the debates to check whether the emotions that appear to be displayed in the transcripts really are on display (e.g. body language, audience, candidates and moderator reactions). With this catalogue of terms and phrases, I established the final form of each topic (topic name, definition and related vocabulary) therefore developing a dictionary for each topic, which was highly relevant for the other stages of my methodology design (see Appendix A).

I did not carry out this analysis with pre-defined themes in mind but rather followed an inductive approach that aimed at capturing all topics present in the 2010 British and 2012 American leader debates. This approach was composed of non-mutually exclusive categories, which allowed for a more fine-grained analysis and showed what emotions and topics were part of the debates. Coding the most dominant topic for each paragraph would have been too broad-brush as it would have ignored references that may be frequent but rarely prominent enough to be counted as a main topic, and would have actively relied on the researcher accurately deciding what the main topic is. My coding process is therefore highly consistent as the same procedure was applied to all paragraphs but also detailed as each reference was coded in one or more sub-topics. Furthermore, my research possesses a high level of reliability and validity that other approaches, such as computer-based search that would exclude terms that are needed and include others that are not, cannot offer.

From the debate transcripts, I focused on paragraphs as a whole as reading the transcripts revealed that candidates gathered all their argumentation in this form. In this regard, Bollow (2004, p.228) argues that televised debates are “organised exchanges of arguments, of entire sub-monologues, well-rehearsed in advance and delivered sometimes even without regard to the question". Single words or sentences would therefore not have provided a meaningful unit size as the main context of each occurrence would have been left out. Conversely, candidates' whole answers, sometimes developed over several paragraphs, were considered too broad as they include too much data sometimes not related to the same topics.

Framing analysis of newspaper articles

Chapter 4 did not aim at counting elements and providing examples as this procedure would not have indicated how journalists constructed their reporting of the debates. Indeed, Chapter 4 investigated six broad categories: issues, candidates, emotions, personal relationships and stories, criticisms and recommendations (see Appendix B for more information). All of these categories contain emotions in tone and content and needed to be analysed for a picture of the emotional framing of the debates to be drawn. To identify how emotions were framed by American journalists in the print media, I investigated the coverage of the debates by analysing 223 articles (e.g. editorials, opinion pieces by journalists and guest writers, news stories) from *The New York Times* (abbreviated NYT) and 104 articles from the *New York Post* (abbreviated NYP) one week before the first American 2012 TV debate and one week after the last one. The number of articles spread across the American debates period is shown in Table 2.1. Similarly, I investigated the coverage of the British debates by analysing 238 articles (all editorials, opinion pieces by journalists and guest writers, news stories) from *The Guardian* and its Sunday sister *The Observer* as well as 93 articles from *The Sun* and its Sunday sister at the time, the *News of the World* one week before the first British 2010 TV debate and one week after the last one. In this case study, results for newspapers and their Sunday sisters were handled together: every time that *The Guardian* is mentioned, it also includes *The Observer* and, similarly, every time that *The Sun* is discussed, it also includes the *News of the World*, unless stated otherwise. The number of articles spread across the British debates period is shown in Table 2.2.

TABLE 2.1: Number of articles about the 2012 American TV debates

	Pre-debate coverage (27 Sep.-2 Oct.)	First debate (3-10 Oct.)	VP debate (11-15 Oct.)	Second debate (16-21 Oct.)	Third debate (22-24 Oct.)	Post-debate coverage (25 Oct.-1 Nov.)	Total
The New York Times	18	55	34	48	37	31	223
New York Post	5	38	13	17	21	10	104
Total	23	93	47	65	58	41	327

Table 2.2: Number of articles about the 2010 British TV debates

	Pre-debate coverage (11-14 April)	First debate (15-21 April)	Second debate (22-28 April)	Third debate (29 April-1 May)	Post-debate coverage (2-6 May)	Total
The Guardian, *The Observer*	12	79	72	39	36	238
The Sun, *News of the World*	2	38	24	13	16	93
Total	14	117	96	52	52	331

This analysis aimed at answering the following questions:

- What issues were discussed? How much coverage did each issue get? Did newspapers cover the same issues, and in the same proportions, as candidates in the debates?
- How were candidates depicted (e.g. policies, party politics, emotions)?
- Were emotions used? By whom? Which ones?
- Were there references to personal stories and relationships?
- What criticisms were voiced? How did journalists perceive emotions?
- Did journalists make recommendations?

From these research questions and overall aims of my thesis, I created six categories: *Issues*, *Candidates*, *Emotions*, *Personal Relationships and Stories*, *Criticisms*, and *Recommendations*. In order to highlight the emotional framing of newspaper coverage during the debates, I went through all 658 newspaper articles contained in my case studies line-by-line. After reading each paragraph, I coded answers to all these questions (words, sentences, paragraphs but also keywords and metaphors) into non-mutually exclusive nodes (issues, candidates, emotions, personal relationships and stories, criticisms, and recommendations) and sub-nodes, which were inductively created, in NVivo. More specifically, I focused on the type of words used (e.g. adjectives, pronouns, verbs) referring to the definitions and dictionary of terms and emotions created from Chapter 3 and available in Appendix A in order to code elements in a particular emotional code. The selected unit of analysis was the paragraph as each journalistic paragraph presents one argument.

Although this procedure may seem unsystematic and researcher-orientated, it is reliable as I followed critical steps such as reading articles entirely thus developing a sense for their overall tone and emphasis - for a similar procedure see Robinson (2000, 2002), Robinson et al. (2010), Hammond (2007) and Bishop (2006). More reliability was also added by the software NVivo as it systematically counted and organised each reference coded (Robinson, 2000, 2002; Robinson et al., 2010). Finally, my research method was also tested as I carried out a pilot analysis on

10 per cent of articles of each newspaper selected (28 articles for *The New York Times*, 13 for the *New York Post*, 22 for *The Guardian*, 5 for *The Observer*, 9 for *The Sun* and 2 for the *News of the World*). As the results of my pilot analysis provided early answers to the questions formulated above, I decided to apply the same procedure to the whole data set of articles. This pilot analysis has been integrated into my overall framing analysis.

Content analysis of Twitter feeds

Chapter 5 aimed at analysing how Twitter users reacted to the emotions used by politicians and journalists as well as identifying what emotions users displayed on Twitter. As the aim of this chapter was to count emotional and non-emotional elements as well as to provide examples to illustrate these numbers, content analysis was judged the most suitable method for this analysis. For these purposes, I manually coded a sample of 10 per cent of each data set (30 000 tweets for the American debates and 3 000 for the British ones), which is consistent with previous studies analysing such a large amount of tweets (Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveira, 2012). Each tweet contains the text of the tweet, any hashtag or keywords used, the date and time as well the username and name of the Twitter user. Although names are part of spreadsheets, only those of public figures such as politicians and journalists are displayed in my results as agreed in my ethics review.

Although my research seeks to overcome limitations as much as possible, the task of analysing 330 000 tweets, as part of a doctoral research project that includes other analyses, would have been impossible. Thus, I analysed two samples of tweets that, although manually coded, are likely to still contain noise (tweets unrelated to the debates for example). Despite this limitation, I believe that the combination of qualitative interpretive work and quantitative data adds to the validity and reliability of my analysis. To extract my samples from my data sets, I used simple random sampling. Since simple random sampling randomly chooses elements in the total population of data, it gives each element, in my case each tweet, the same probability of being selected and therefore avoids all possible influence of researchers over their data. More specifically, I used a random integer generator, which provided me with a list of random numbers. I then only selected tweets having this number (as numbered in my Excel files) as part of my samples. I thereby obtained two samples of tweets: the American one composed of 30 000 tweets and the British one composed of 3 000 tweets.

Once the data were prepared, I applied a content analysis to my samples in order to examine how Twitter users reacted to the emotions and emotionality used by politicians and journalists. More specifically, I read over each tweet several times in order to identify each of the following categories and took notes regarding the language used, focus of each tweet and other elements that could help answer my research question:

- What type of tweet is it? (original tweet, retweet, mention or reply, containing a hashtag)
- What type of Twitter user is it? (individual users, politicians, journalists, experts or PR people)
- Is any hyperlink part of the tweet? (news website, political website, expert website, image, video, broken link, other websites)
- What emotions and emotional attitudes are contained in tweets? (emotions, humour, references to family, friends and anecdotes)
- What context is the tweet referring to? (e.g. debates in general, a particular candidate, topic or issue)

Similarly to the analyses in Chapters 3 and 4, I relied on the type of words used (e.g. adjectives, pronouns, verbs) as well as on the definitions and dictionary of terms and emotions created from Chapter 3 and available in Appendix A in order to code elements in a particular emotional code. I tested the reliability and validity of my methodology by carrying out a pilot analysis of 1 per cent of British tweets (300 tweets in total). I used the same sampling methodology as for my sample analysis, which guaranteed that the tweets were selected in a rigorous and unbiased way. As the results from this preliminary analysis addressed all the questions listed above, it showed that the methodology used was appropriate and could be applied to the two samples of British and American tweets. The pilot analysis was not integrated in my final analysis since the random sampling generator could have created doubles.

Chapter 3

Emotions & politics: analysis of TV debate transcripts

Although politicians “routinely” appeal to the public’s emotions in TV ads and other electoral events (Brader, 2005), the use of emotions in TV debates has rarely been studied in broad terms. Indeed, Brader (2005) looked at enthusiasm and fear, Tiedens (2001) focused on anger and sadness, Marcus et al. (2000) investigated enthusiasm and anxiety and many more focused on specific emotions. But what about inductively studying the emotions used by candidates in TV debates? This chapter not only outlines the different topics discussed during the debates, it also explores emotions as well as emotional references used during the debates. This chapter therefore answers my first subsidiary research question, namely: what emotions and emotional references did candidates use in the 2010 British and 2012 American televised debates? In what proportions did they use emotions and emotional references? Thus, I will examine how emotions were used in each debate, by each candidate and in relation to each topic for my two case studies (I). Following on from this, I will draw some conclusions from these results (II).

This chapter shows that political candidates both in the US and UK manipulated emotions and emotionality, especially in the first US and UK debates. In the

American case, all candidates mainly used empathy, anger, pride, happiness, frustration, anxiety, disappointment, fear, hope and love as well as references to family, friends, anecdotes and humour. Results were more candidate-specific in the UK where Cameron used mixed emotions (care, empathy, gratefulness, love, anger and shame), Brown mainly negative emotions (anxiety, apology, fear, hate and shame) and Clegg less risky emotions (disappointment, pride). All British candidates also used references to family, friends, anecdotes and humour. These emotions were predominantly used when discussing the economy, wars and conflicts, health and social care, education and training as well as America and American values in the American debates and when discussing the economy, education and training, health and social care, wars and conflicts, police and national security as well as change and alternative in the British debates.

I. Findings

In this section, I am presenting the results extracted from my content analysis focusing on emotions and emotional references in the American and British debate transcripts.

A. Emotions across debates

In the American case, Table 3.1 indicates that, although emotions vary in numbers across debates, more emotions were coded for the first debate (33.8 per cent of all references coded) than for the second one (23.6 per cent), the third debate (21.6 per cent) and the vice presidential debate (20.9 per cent). The five most coded elements across the American debates include empathy (35.5 of all references coded), humour (17.2 per cent), anger (12.8 per cent), pride (9.8 per cent) and happiness (5.4 per cent). In order to interpret results throughout this thesis, I use a negative and positive valence approach. Although criticised for its one-dimensional view of emotions (Verhulst and Lizotte, 2011), this categorisation is suited for my research as I analyse whether candidates used emotions, which ones and in what proportions. I therefore argue that candidates grouped emotions in precise communication strategies composed of positive, negative or mixed emotions. This is in accordance with previous studies that also divided political emotions into positive or negative emotions (Hoggett and Thompson, 2012; Furedi, 2003; Bucy, 2000; Goodwin et al., 2001).

Table 3.1 indicates that American candidates largely used positive emotions (e.g. empathy gathers one third of all emotional references) during the debates. Interestingly, candidates also used negative emotions such as anger (12.8 per cent of all references coded), anxiety (2.4 per cent), apology (3 per cent), disappointment (2.7 per cent), fear (0.7 per cent) and frustration (0.7 per cent). With the exception of anger, the common feature among all these emotions is their low number of references (between 0.7 to 3 per cent of references, against 2.7 to 35.5 per cent of references for positive ones). Although positive emotions outnumber negatives ones, there are no specific patterns showing that positive and negative emotions are more used in one debate than another. On the contrary, all emotions are used with varying degrees across all debates.

Table 3.2 indicates that the first British debate was also the most emotional with 39.2 per cent of all references coded followed by the second (33.5 per cent) and third (27.3) debates. Although different emotions were used across all three debates, a pattern of emotions distinctively standing out for a particular debate could not be identified. Overall, three groups of mixed emotions emerged from my results. Firstly, two types of emotions, empathy and anger, can be singled out as 24.5 and 17.1 per cent of references were respectively coded for these emotions. Examples of empathy and anger are therefore numerous across the British debates. For example in the first debate, Clegg used empathy to tell voters that he understands concerns about crime:

> I think that's what Jacqueline is talking about, this desperate, hopeless feeling. It keeps happening over and over again.

Table 3.1: Percentage of emotions and humour across the 2012 American TV debates

	First debate	**VP debate**	**Second debate**	**Third debate**	**Total**
Anger	0.7	4.4	3	4.7	12.8
Anxiety	1.7	0	0.3	0.3	2.4
Apology	1.4	1	0	0.7	3
Care	0	1.4	1	0.3	2.7
Disappointment	0	0	2.4	0.3	2.7
Empathy	14.2	6.4	10.5	4.4	35.5
Fear	0	0	0	0.7	0.7
Frustration	0.3	0.3	0	0	0.7
Happiness	1.4	0	1.4	2.7	5.4
Hope	0.3	0	1	1.4	2.7
Humour	7.8	4.7	2.4	2.4	17.2
Love	2	0.7	0.7	1	4.4
Pride	4.1	2	1	2.7	9.8
Total	33.8	20.9	23.6	21.6	100

Brown also used a personal story in the first debate to show people that he was aware of crime-related issues:

> I met a young man in London the other day. His flat had been burgled five times, and one of them, would you believe it, Jacqueline, was when he was away at his father's funeral. He said to me "Why can't this stop?" Unless we do something different, not the same old remedies [...] I don't think this stuff will make the difference that they say it will.

Still in the first debate, Clegg expressed his anger at the ineffectiveness of the judicial system:

> I think what makes me so angry is that again, it's like the immigration debate: so much tough talk from different governments of different parties for so long has turned our prisons into overcrowded colleges of crime. Do you know that young men going into prison now on short-term prison sentences now come out, and nine out of ten of them reoffend, so we are reproducing more crime than actually cutting it.

Clegg was angry at Cameron and Brown's reaction following the MPs expenses scandal. He said in the first debate:

> I have to say to both David Cameron and Gordon Brown, what bothers me is that I hear the words, they sound great. But, you know, it's not just what you say, it's what you do. Why is it that when I put forward, Liberal Democrats put forward, a law which would have given all of you and everyone watching now the right to sack their MP if their MP is corrupt, the Labour MPs voted against it, the Conservative MPs didn't even bother to vote. Why is it when we supported a deal to clean up the really murky business of party funding, which has affected all parties, you blocked it, you blocked it.

The second group of emotions is composed of three emotions (fear, pride and hope) and humour, all comprised between 11 to 7.3 per cent of references coded. Fear is the most coded emotion of this second group and can be illustrated by the following example where Brown used fear to highlight the dangers linked to Cameron's policies in the first debate:

> I will be honest with you, you cannot afford to take money out of the economy now because you will put jobs at risk, businesses at risk, and you put the whole recovery at risk. [...] If you take that money out now, I fear for what could happen, and we do not want to have a double-dip recession in this country. Take 6 billion out and it is the equivalent of taking out thousands of jobs in this economy today and

> making a lot of jobs that are safe at the moment unsafe. I would not recommend that at all.

TABLE 3.2: Percentage of emotions and humour across the 2010 British TV debates

	First debate	**Second debate**	**Third debate**	**Total**
Anger	5.7	7.3	4.1	17.1
Anxiety	0.8	1.2	0	2
Apology	0.8	1.2	0.8	2.9
Care	0.4	0	0	0.4
Disappointment	1.6	1.6	1.2	4.5
Empathy	7.8	7.8	9	24.5
Fear	2.9	3.7	4.5	11
Gratefulness	1.6	0	1.2	2.9
Happiness	0.8	1.2	1.2	3.3
Hate	0	0	0.4	0.4
Hope	3.7	2	1.6	7.3
Humour	4.5	3.3	1.2	9
Love	3.3	0.8	1.2	5.3
Pride	4.9	2.4	0.8	8.2
Shame	0.4	0.8	0	1.2
Total	39.2	33.5	27.3	100

Finally, all other emotions that is to say the majority of them (9 in total), gathered 5.3 per cent, or less, of references. Love is the most coded emotion of this last group. Thus, these British results indicate that candidates Brown, Clegg and Cameron used three groups of mixed emotions ranging from positive to negative ones across all three debates.

B. Emotions across candidates

Table 3.3 shows what emotions American candidates used and in what proportions. Firstly, it can be said that more emotions were coded for candidate Romney (with 45.3 per cent of all references coded) than for President Obama (33.1 per cent). As VP candidates Biden and Ryan only took part in one debate against three for presidential candidates, an expected low number of references was coded for vice presidential candidates. More specifically, more emotions were coded for Biden than for Ryan (14.5 per cent of references for Biden and 7.1 per cent for Ryan). From Table 3.3, it can also be seen that both Republicans and Democrats used mixed emotions during the debates. The Democrat emotional mix is composed of the most references to anger (4.4 per cent of references coded for Biden, 5.4 per cent for Obama), frustration (0.3 per cent of references coded for both Biden and Obama), happiness (3 per cent of references coded for Obama) and humour (6.4 per cent of references coded for Obama and 3.4 per cent for Biden).

The Republican emotional mix is composed of different types of emotions, namely negative ones such as anxiety (1.7 per cent of references coded for Romney), apology (1.4 per cent of references coded for Romney), disappointment (2.7 per cent of references coded for Romney), fear (0.7 per cent of references coded for Romney) but also positive ones such as empathy (17.6 per cent of references coded for Romney), hope and love (each having 2.4 per cent of references coded for Romney) and pride (5.1 per cent of references coded for Romney). Empathy, the most coded emotion across all candidates, was therefore more used by Republicans (17.6 per cent of references coded for Romney) than by Democrats (11.5 per cent for Obama).

Table 3.4 reveals that, in Britain, the most emotional candidate was David Cameron with a total of 35.5 per cent of references coded, followed by Gordon Brown (33.1 per cent) and Nick Clegg (31.4 per cent). Although some emotions were almost equally spread between the three British candidates (7.3 per cent of references to anger were coded for both Cameron and Clegg), others were candidate-specific. Brown used the maximum references for five negative emotions: anxiety (1.2 per cent of references), apology (1.6 per cent), fear (10.2 per cent), hate (0.4 per cent) and shame (0.8 per cent). Indeed, at many points in the debates, Brown expressed his concerns over his opponents' policies. For example in the first debate, Brown worried about Cameron's plans for education cuts:

> What I'd be very worried about is if in this difficult and straitened time, we were to cut our budgets for education at this point in time. I think that would put our children at risk for the future, and it's very important that we continue to invest in the education of every child in this country.

Table 3.3: Percentage of emotions and humour across candidates Biden, Obama, Romney and Ryan

	Biden	**Obama**	**Romney**	**Ryan**	**Total**
Anger	4.4	5.4	2.7	0.3	12.8
Anxiety	0	0.7	1.7	0	2.4
Apology	0	0.7	1.4	1	3
Care	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	2.7
Disappointment	0	0	2.7	0	2.7
Empathy	4.1	11.5	17.6	2.4	35.5
Fear	0	0	0.7	0	0.7
Frustration	0.3	0.3	0	0	0.7
Happiness	0	3	2.4	0	5.4
Hope	0	0.3	2.4	0	2.7
Humour	3.4	6.4	5.7	1.7	17.2
Love	0.7	1.4	2.4	0	4.4
Pride	1	2.7	5.1	1	9.8
Total	14.5	33.1	45.3	7.1	100

This fear was mainly directed at the Conservative leader David Cameron. Indeed in the last debate, Brown ended almost all of his answers with "it's the same old

Conservative party". For instance in the first debate, Brown warned voters of the risks of austerity at this moment in time:

> Now, pull out the money [...] and you'll have less growth, you'll have less jobs, and you'll have less businesses. That's the fear. We've got to take an overall responsibility for the whole economy.

Moreover, Brown tried to make Clegg his ally by repeating many times throughout the debates that he agreed with Clegg or that Clegg should agree with him. Clegg and Cameron noticed Brown's major use of anxiety and fear as Cameron said in the second debate:

> Well, I don't know about you, but I thought all that sounded slightly desperate and an attempt to frighten people, instead of doing what I think we need to do in our country, which is to take and make a clean break from the last 13 years.

The maximum number for two positive emotions (1.6 per cent for happiness and 2.9 per cent for hope) was also coded for Brown.

Regarding the Liberal Democrats, the maximum references to disappointment (2 per cent of all references), humour (4.1 per cent) and pride (4.5 per cent) were coded for Nick Clegg. I argue that Clegg used less "risky" emotions as he used disappointment over shame or anger (mainly in relation to the MPs expenses scandal) for example. According to Lupton (2012), some emotions are more associated with risk than others. Fear, apprehension, terror, anger, anxiety, guilt, sadness and disgust as well as more positive emotions such as excitement and elation are "risky" emotions as they require a strong lexicon and commitment from candidates. By systematically answering each question by agreeing with the questioner ("of course you're right", "it's true", "I agree with"), Clegg further gave the impression that he did not want to position himself very clearly on topics or emotions. Clegg even broke the rules when he asked confirmation to a questioner during the first debate ("Joel, I'm not allowed to ask you questions, that's against the rules, but just nod if - good!"). This attitude is also reflected in Clegg's language, which was more tentative than his opponents'. For example, he systematically said "savings" instead of the term "cuts", which his opponents commonly used.

TABLE 3.4: Percentage of emotions and humour across candidates Brown, Cameron and Clegg

	Brown	**Cameron**	**Clegg**	**Total**
Anger	2.4	7.3	7.3	17.1
Anxiety	1.2	0.8	0	2
Apology	1.6	0.8	0.4	2.9
Care	0	0.4	0	0.4
Disappointment	0.8	1.6	2	4.5
Empathy	6.1	10.2	8.2	24.5
Fear	10.2	0.8	0	11
Gratefulness	0.8	2	0	2.9
Happiness	1.6	0.8	0.8	3.3
Hate	0.4	0	0	0.4
Hope	2.9	2	2.4	7.3
Humour	2.4	2.4	4.1	9
Love	0	3.7	1.6	5.3
Pride	1.6	2	4.5	8.2
Shame	0.8	0.4	0	1.2
Total	33.1	35.5	31.4	100

In contrast, the Conservative leader David Cameron used a majority of positive emotions such as care (0.4 per cent of all references), empathy (10.2 per cent), gratefulness (2 per cent) and love (3.7 per cent). For example, Cameron closed the second debate by saying:

> you've heard a lot of differences on values, how the family comes first for me, how we need to do more to help those who actually do the right thing and want their Government behind them.

Cameron reinforced this family image by telling many personal stories about himself, his family or people he met, all of which consolidate a feeling of closeness between Cameron and the public. For instance, in the first debate, Cameron mentioned his son and the love he has for the NHS:

> What it did for my family and for my son, I will never forget. I went from hospital to hospital, A&Es in the middle of the night, sleeping in different wards in different places. The dedication, and the vocation and the love you get from people who work in the NHS just, I think, makes me incredibly proud of this country, so thank you for all that you've done.

To offset this potentially vulnerable image, Cameron also put forward his leadership skills and strength with negative emotions, and did not hesitate to show anger or shame when appropriate such as for the expenses scandal when he declared in the first debate:

> The expenses saga brought great shame on parliament. I'm extremely sorry for everything that happened. Your politicians, frankly all of us, let you down.

He also fiercely attacked other candidates as he did with Gordon Brown in the third debate:

> You're quite entitled to speak out, but the Prime Minister ought to get his facts right, and as so often, he gets his facts wrong. We all remember when he told us the defence budget went up every year, when in fact it didn't. It didn't go up every year when he was sending troops to war. [...] But for Gordon Brown to say that actually the changes we're making would hit low income families is simply not true. As I say, last week in these debates he tried to frighten people, saying the Conservatives would take away benefits, when we will keep the

> winter fuel allowance, we will keep the cold winter payments. He's trying again to frighten people, and actually he should be ashamed of what he's doing.

Thus, in Britain the majority of emotions were candidate-specific; Brown dominated negative emotions (anxiety, apology, shame, fear, hate), Clegg preferred *passe-partout* types of emotions (disappointment and pride) as well as humour, while Cameron positioned himself as a family man (care, love, empathy and gratefulness) who spoke against other candidates and scandals (anger). These figures also indicate that Cameron was the most emotional candidate, followed by Brown and Clegg.

The study of empathy is interesting for both case studies at different levels. My results show that there is a clear link between empathy and American and British candidates referring to their families, friends or anecdotes. Indeed, candidates tried to be empathic by telling viewers about their own experiences either personal or through people they have met. This creates a sense of closeness between candidates - who are, directly or not, sharing their emotions and emotional memories - and the public who have the impression to have gone through the same. In this regard, British candidate Nick Clegg declared "I'm like anybody else" in the first British debate. Empathy was mostly created through personal stories or "I've met/ I was/ I have" stories told by candidates. For example in the first American debate, Romney talked about job insecurity through the many people he met:

> This is obviously a very tender topic. I've had the occasion over the last couple of years of meeting people across the country. I was in Dayton, Ohio, and a woman grabbed my arm and she said, "I've been out of work since May. Can you help me?"

Similarly in the first British debate, Gordon Brown showed his empathy regarding immigration issues:

> You know, I've heard the concerns around the country. I've been listening to people. I know people feel there are pressures because of

> immigration. That's why we want to control and manage immigration.

All candidates also used specific vocabulary when trying to be empathic. In both cases, the economic term "household" was commonly replaced by "families" with a focus on families with children, especially sick children ("autistic kid", "more money for the kids"). Many adjectives and verbs qualified this specific vocabulary further; as such families were often mentioned as "suffering", "crushed", "burdened", "struggling", "hurt", among many other examples. Similarly, the military term "attack" was almost always replaced by "massacre", "tragedy" or even "terrible tragedy" when referring to the killing of three Americans during the 2012 Benghazi Embassy attack. British candidates also showed the spectrum of the empathy vocabulary when discussing the numerous cases of sex abuse in the Catholic Church ("immeasurable scars", "terrible suffering", "immense feelings of anguish", "extremely torn apart"). Thus, empathy played a key role in the American and British debates as it created, through the use of emotional language and references to family, friends and anecdotes, a connexion with the public.

All candidates also used many references to their families, friends and anecdotes to show that they were close to voters. This approach is particularly visible for Obama and Biden. Firstly, vice presidential candidate Joe Biden systematically called allies, in particular Israel ("with regard to Bibi, who's been my friend 39 years"), his opponent Paul Ryan ("my friend talks about fissile material") and other politicians ("Why does my friend cut out the tuition tax credit for them?") his "friends". In addition to friendship, Biden also used informal language ("fellas", "folks", "malarkey", "bunch of stuff"), which gives the impression that he was close to people. Secondly, it seems that Obama used emotions as well as references to family, friends and anecdotes as emotional examples for every situation. For example, President Obama opened the first debate with a reference to his wedding anniversary:

> There are a lot of points I want to make tonight, but the most important one is that 20 years ago I became the luckiest man on Earth

> because Michelle Obama agreed to marry me. And so I just want to wish, Sweetie, you happy anniversary and let you know that a year from now we will not be celebrating it in front of 40 million people.

To which candidate Romney jokingly answered:

> And congratulations to you, Mr. President, on your anniversary. I'm sure this was the most romantic place you could imagine, here with me.

Furthermore, when Obama could not use his personal life to illustrate issues and events, he used that of someone else through the telling of anecdotes of people he met. For example, he used the example of a woman in met in North Carolina to show that he knew what impact the troubled economy had on voters (first debate):

> You know, four years ago, we were going through a major crisis. And yet my faith and confidence in the American future is undiminished. And the reason is because of its people, because of the woman I met in North Carolina who decided at 55 to go back to school because she wanted to inspire her daughter and now has a job from that new training that she's gotten; because a company in Minnesota who was willing to give up salaries and perks for their executives to make sure that they didn't lay off workers during a recession.

My results indicate that Obama was not the only one to refer to his family, friends or anecdotes. Indeed, all candidates presented themselves as husbands (e.g. "my wife", "Ann", "sweetie", "the first lady"), family men (e.g. "my kids", "my boy", "family", "my mom and dad"), proud citizens (e.g. "in an awe", "honor", "pride") and as leaders who can feel and understand the issues affecting people (e.g. "I understand concerns", "I feel"), among many other examples. These examples indicate that candidates used specific stories according to their own biographies in order to show their skills such as leadership, their "likeable" potential and ability to defend their case to voters during TV debates.

In addition to empathy, the study of hope is also particularly revealing, especially in the American case. According to Civettini (2011), hope not only has an impact on political behaviour, it also motivates citizens to be more active in political and civic life (e.g. to vote, volunteer or organise). For the author, Obama has been embodying hope since 2004 when he first honed his communication strategy during the Democratic National Convention and has been dominating this emotion ever since. However, my results give a different picture of hope. Firstly, with only 2.7 per cent of all references coded, hope was one of the least coded emotions of the American debates. Secondly, with 0.3 per cent of references coded for Obama and 2.4 per cent for Romney (0 for both Biden and Ryan), it appears that Obama did not use this emotion the most. Thus, although Obama may have used hope more through the 2008 and 2012 campaigns generally, it is candidate Romney who used hope the most during the 2012 TV debates and who used the most references to emotions altogether. Thus, Romney, whose strategy was to trigger fear and anxiety regarding Obama's presidency, also used hope to show voters that Republicans were hopeful about the future. I therefore argue that recent studies (Escobar, 2011; Civettini, 2011) on Obama's emotional power do not take the whole picture into consideration as they only focus on one candidate (Obama) and not on his opponents. Gould (2011) provides an explanation regarding the decrease of hope elicited by Obama. She claims that hope may have made citizens more passive and more reliant on their president who was going to bring about change. For Gould, it may be that after the election, people have judged Obama on his actions and policies rather than on his emotions, especially that of hope. Thus, although Obama is probably the one who tailored the hope message in the most effective way and for the longest period of time, it is candidate Romney who showed the most hope during the 2012 debates.

Many consequences emerged from the numerous emotional references identified in the American and British debates. Indeed, American and British candidates felt that too many emotions and emotional references were used during the debates, which were then lacking policy discussions. They therefore expressed many negative emotions, especially anger, at this emotional "overdose" that was taking place during the debates. For example in the American vice presidential debate, Biden angrily said to Ryan:

> Stop talking about how you care about people. Show me something. Show me a policy. Show me a policy where you take responsibility.

Similarly, in the first British debate, after Cameron said how proud he was of the NHS, Clegg answered:

> Of course, the easy thing is to say how much we all love and depend and rely on the NHS. The difficult question, which I think is the one you're addressing, is, how do we protect the NHS which we all rely on, maternity services, A&E departments, GP services and so on, when money is tight?

More specifically, so-called "emotional battles" also took place during the American and British debates. For example, during the American vice presidential debate, Biden and Ryan fought at an emotional level to find out who was the most empathic. Ryan started by telling the story of how Romney met the Nixon family:

> They keep misquoting him, but let me tell you about the Mitt Romney I know. This is a guy who I was talking to a family in Northborough, Massachusetts the other day, Sheryl and Mark Nixon. Their kids were hit in a car crash, four of them. Two of them, Rob and Reed, were paralyzed. The Romneys didn't know them. They went to the same church; they never met before. Mitt asked if he could come over on Christmas. He brought his boys, his wife, and gifts. Later on, he said, "I know you're struggling, Mark. Don't worry about their college. I'll pay for it." When Mark told me this story [...] he said it wasn't the help, the cash help. It's that he gave his time, and he has consistently. This is a man who gave 30 percent of his income to charity, more than

> the two of us combined. Mitt Romney's a good man. He cares about 100 percent of Americans in this country.

To which Biden immediately answered:

> Look, I don't doubt his personal generosity. And I understand what it's like. When I was a little younger than the congressman, my wife was in an accident, killed my daughter and my wife and my two sons survived. I have sat in the homes of many people who've gone through what I got through [...].

These examples indicate that emotions and emotional references can be crucial tools for candidates to connect with the audience but they can also be a weakness if over-used.

My results also suggest that American and British candidates manipulated emotions to their advantage. Indeed as candidates were well-trained before the debates, the emotions displayed were not necessarily authentic but may have been manipulated for many reasons: display positive emotions to show optimism, use anger to pressure an opponent or even use empathy to create solidarity (Bollow, 2004). For example in the American case, VP candidate Ryan accused Biden at many points during the vice presidential debate of using fear (e.g. by criticising and undermining Republican policies) to deter people from voting for the Romney-Ryan ticket. Ryan even described Biden's attitude by saying that the Democratic strategy was to "paint your opponent as somebody you should run from". However, I did not code fear once for Biden in that debate, which shows that it was in fact Ryan who was manipulating fear. Nonetheless, using emotions is not only part of candidates' strategies as they are sometimes urged to do so by third-parties. Although I did not code moderators' questions, I find one of the last questions of the vice presidential debate particularly revealing in this regard. Indeed, the moderator, Martha Raddatz, strongly urged Biden and Ryan to speak in emotional terms when answering a question about faith. She said: "And please, this is such an emotional issue for so many people in this country, please talk personally about this, if you could" therefore almost forcing candidates to deliver an emotional answer to this question. Similarly, British candidate Gordon Brown used fear in many instances when talking about Conservative policies even though Cameron only used fear twice across all debates. By painting someone who is a risk for the economy, Brown found counter-arguments and deflected the spotlight from his own mandate to his opponent's risky ideas. The three British leaders occasionally fought to be the best parent, the proudest citizen or the most ashamed of the expenses scandal. For example, in the first debate, British candidates consecutively expressed their shame, anger or disappointment regarding the expenses scandal. Nick Clegg started by saying:

> I don't think that any politician deserves your trust - and you talked about credibility - deserves any credibility until everybody has come clean about what has gone wrong. [...] you know, there are still people who haven't taken full responsibility for some of the biggest abuses in the system. There are MPs who flipped one property to the next, buying property, paid by you, the taxpayer, and then they would do the properties up, paid for by you, and pocket the difference in personal profit. They got away scot-free.

To which Brown answered:

> I was shocked and I was sickened by what I saw. I'd been brought up to believe by my parents that you act honestly, and you act fairly and you act responsibly. And just as the bankers were irresponsible, so too were members of parliament. Nobody should be standing for election at this election who is guilty of the offences we've seen in MPs.

Finally, Cameron answered:

> Helen, I'm not surprised you talk about it in your pub, because it was just a horrendous episode. As Nick says, it isn't fully finished and

> sorted out yet. I know how angry people are in this country. They pay their taxes and they don't pay their taxes for MPs to abuse the system. I know how angry I was when I heard about the moats and the duck houses and the rest of it. I was determined to do my bit to clean it up, to get my MPs to apologise, to get them to pay back money, all of which they did before the official reviews started to happen.

All in all, two main aspects of these results complement previous answers to my first research question. Firstly, Cameron in Britain and Romney in the United States were the most emotional candidates. However, in the United States, Republicans and Democrats used mixed emotions, whereas in Britain, Cameron frequently used mixed emotions, Brown mainly negative emotions and Clegg less risky ones. Secondly, my results also showed the presence of an emotional malaise, which had an impact on the overall tone of the American and British debates. As well as analysing the presence of emotions in the debates, my research therefore highlights that emotions have an impact on the tone of the debates before, potentially, having an impact on the newspaper and Twitter coverage of the debates, as will be explored in other chapters.

C. Emotions across topics

Before discussing what emotions were used in relation to what topics, it seems vital to explore what topics and sub-topics were discussed during the debates in the first place. This sub-section investigates whether some topics were more dominant than others, having a particular interest for the dominance, or not, of *personal relationships and stories.* This content analysis also investigates what features of these dominant topics were the most coded. A dictionary of all of the topics identified in this analysis can be found in Appendix A. For more clarity, the name of each topic was systematically written in italics.

Most coded topics

My content analysis highlighted that some topics were more coded than others and allowed me to compare the percentage of references coded for emotional and non-emotional content. In the American case, Figure 3.1 indicates that topics discussed during the debates can be grouped in four clusters. The first cluster gathers the two most dominant topics, namely *economy and finance* (with 32 per cent of all references coded) and *wars and conflicts* (with 26.1 per cent of all references coded). These two topics dominated the American debates as they represent more than half of all references coded, which means that more than half of the debates were centred around questions of economy and military conflicts. The most coded of the two, *economy and finance*, almost represents a third of all references coded.



Figure 3.1: Most coded topics across the 2012 American debates

A second cluster of middle-ground topics gathered more than six per cent of all references coded: *health and social care* (with 7.5 per cent of all references coded), *Democrat* (6.8 per cent), *Republican* (6.3 per cent) and *education and training* (6 per cent). It is therefore interesting to observe that party politics was discussed almost as many times as domestic issues such as health or education, and even more discussed than other topics such as ecology, immigration or gun control. Moreover, almost as many references were coded for the *Democrat* and *Republican* topics, which means that Obama attacked and talked to Romney as much as Romney questioned and blamed Obama. This shows that each candidate saw in the other a serious opponent and that neither of them was willing to give the other more ground.

A third cluster of topics also stands out in these debates as they gathered around three per cent of all references. These topics include *America and American values* (with 3.5 per cent of references coded), *ecology and green energy* (3.4 per cent) and *personal relationships and stories* (3.3 per cent). The *personal relationships and stories* topic includes all references to content discussed in an emotional way such as when candidates told viewers personal stories or mentioned their families and friends. Interestingly, *personal relationships and stories* gathered more total references than both domestic and foreign issues such as gun control, gender equality and abortion issues. Altogether, this emotional topic amounts to 3.3 per cent of all references coded. Although this percentage seems low, it is important to remember that this percentage only covers emotional topics discussed during the debates. More emotions were expressed in relation to each debate, candidate and topic in tone, as suggested by previous sub-sections. Therefore, more topics, although not containing any references to personal stories, families and friends, were infused with candidates' emotions. Thus, emotions had an impact on the tone of the debates as well as on their content.

Finally, a last cluster of background topics, gathering about one per cent of all references coded, was also present in these debates. Indeed, although these topics were referred to in a minor way, the *immigration* (with 1.3 per cent of references), *former presidents and politicians* (1.2 per cent), *gun control* (1.1 per cent), *gender issues* (1.1 per cent) and *pro-life and abortion* (0.3 per cent) topics were also part of the 2012 American debates. These topics were mentioned by candidates, rather than discussed, in specific questions but did not elicit much debate between them.

Similarly, in the British case, Figure 3.2 indicates that four clusters of topics emerged from my results. Firstly, the *economy and finance* topic dominated all the others with 30.3 per cent of references coded that is to say almost a third of all references coded. Thus, my results show that most of the content of the debates was devoted to economic issues, which have been at the heart of the economic crisis since it hit the world in 2008.



Figure 3.2: Most coded topics across the 2010 British debates

Although almost 22 points separate the economy topic and the second most coded one (*immigration*), candidates still discussed topics of varying importance; so-called middle-ground topics (*immigration*, *wars and conflicts*, *education and training*, *Conservative* and *health and social care*). These five middle-ground topics represent between 8.6 to 7 per cent of all references coded. Interestingly, all of these middle-ground topics were contained within a 1.6 point range therefore being almost equally discussed during the debates.

The same trend can be observed with the next group of topics that represent between 5.4 to 3.5 per cent of all references (*Labour*, *Liberal Democrat*, *personal relationships and stories*, *EU and Euro-scepticism*, *expenses scandal*, *police and national security*, and *change and alternative*). Two interesting points emerge from this group, which includes most of the topics. Firstly, these results are revealing when it comes to party politics. Indeed, with 7.1 per cent of references, the *Conservative* topic does not cluster with any other, which can be explained by the fact that David Cameron was the main target of Gordon Brown and Nick Clegg who both attacked and asked many questions to the Conservative leader. The surprise guest of these first British debates, the *Liberal Democrat* topic was coded less than the two main parties, whose candidates have debated more with each other than with Nick Clegg. Cameron was therefore seen as the biggest threat for the other leaders who kept mentioning and attacking him. Secondly, with 3.8 per cent of references, the *personal relationships and stories* topic was more coded than domestic or foreign policy issues such as Europe, the expenses scandal, the police or ecology. Although only gathering 3.8 per cent of all references coded, personal relationships and stories have to be added to the emotions already used in candidates' tone and analysed in previous sub-sections. Indeed, my results show that emotions not only shaped the tone of the debates but personal relationships and stories also influenced what was discussed during the debates. Two background topics (*ecology and green energy* and *religion*) were also referred to. However, with only 2.4 and 1.1 per cent of references coded respectively, these two topics did not spark much debate but rather consensus between all candidates.

All in all, four clusters of topics of varying dominance were identified in the 2012 US and 2010 UK debates. In America, two topics (economy and wars) dominated middle-ground topics (e.g. health care issues, education and party politics) but also minor topics (such as gun control and gender issues). British candidates, despite also using middle-ground and background topics, mainly discussed economic and financial issues during the British debates. The dominance of the *personal relationships and stories* topic was underlined in both countries as it was more prominent than other national issues, even more so when added to the emotions used by candidates in tone. These results therefore have implications for the rest of my research as it will be interesting to study whether newspaper articles and tweets reflected on these dominant topics or rather focused on personal relationships and stories or minor topics.

Most coded sub-topics

As I coded each paragraph in different sub-topics, my content analysis also allows me to describe in more detail what sub-topics were the most used by candidates. Figure 3.3 indicates that some features of the most dominant topics were indeed more prominent in the 2012 American TV debates. The two most coded topics (with the highest percentage of sub-topics coded) are the *economy and finance* and *wars and conflicts* topics with six and eight sub-topics ranked in the 25 most coded sub-topics. The sub-topics economy, taxes, employment, companies, investments and banks (*economy and finance* topic) dominated the American debates as they were coded more than any other sub-topics. In particular, the economy sub-topic accumulated 17.6 per cent of all references, which is almost one-fifth of all references coded. Indeed, more than seven points separate this sub-topic from the second most coded one (war issues with 10.1 per cent of all references coded). Although gathering fewer references, the *wars and conflicts* topic still has eight of its sub-topics (war issues, belligerents, agreements and allies, soldiers and staff, equipment and weapons, terrorism, Benghazi attack and war casualties) ranked among the 25 most coded sub-topics. The *personal relationships and stories* topic was also significantly used with all of its three sub-topics (family, friendship and personal stories) being ranked in the 25 most coded sub-topics. These results therefore indicate that personal relationships and stories, in addition to emotions themselves, were decisive elements not only in the tone of the debates but also regarding the content of the debates, overtaking both domestic and foreign issues such as war casualties, financial crisis or even immigration issues. The four other topics (*health and social care*, *education and training*, *ecology and green energy*, and *America and American values*) all have two sub-topics ranked in the 25 most coded sub-topics with health care system gathering systematically more than the others (with 5.7 per cent of all references coded against less than 3.3 per cent for the others).

Figure 3.4 displays the rest of the sub-topics coded across the American debates. All sub-topics in Figure 3.4 gather one per cent, or less, of all references coded and therefore represent minor sub-topics. As well as politically controversial topics such as immigration, gender issues or gun control, other sub-topics are nonetheless revealing. For example, the most coded sub-topics for the economy and finance topic were the most optimistic ones (e.g. investments, economy, trade) and the rather pessimistic ones, such as financial crisis, bank crisis and slow economic recovery, were barely discussed. Similarly, candidates emphasised the health care system and patients rather than doctors' issues and specific diseases. Thus, my results indicate that when discussing a particular topic, candidates preferred more optimistic and positive angles of these topics rather than realistic or negative ones.



Figure 3.3: Most coded sub-topics across the 2012 American debates

As far as the British case study is concerned, Figure 3.5 shows that some features of specific topics were also more referred to than others. Indeed, the most coded sub-topics are economy, taxes, and jobs and employment (with 14.4, 5.6 and 4.9 per cent of all references coded respectively), all belonging to the *economy and finance* topic. Furthermore, almost all of the economy and finance sub-topics were active parts of the debates as seven out of nine of them are coded among the 25 most coded sub-topics. On a different note, two of the *personal relationships and stories* sub-topics are ranked among the 25 most coded sub-topics. With 2.7 and 1.6 per cent of all references coded, personal stories and references to family outnumber discussions about the expenses scandal, the global financial crisis or terrorism. Candidates therefore preferred talking about their families or telling viewers personal stories rather than mentioning their friends as this sub-topic only gathers 0.2 per cent of all references.



Figure 3.4: Continued - Most coded sub-topics across the 2012 American debates

British Candidates gave the whole picture of the immigration situation by talking about issues, potential solutions and migrants with relatively similar number of references coded (4 per cent of all references for immigration issues, 3.3 per cent for immigration solutions and 3 per cent for migrants). Similarly, both sub-topics of *alternative and change* (old politics and alternative) were used by candidates. A relatively complete view of the *wars and conflicts* topic was also given as almost all sub-topics represented that topic (four out of seven). In addition to these dominant sub-topics, candidates also referred to one or two sub-topics of various topics such as Europe and the EU for *EU and Euro-scepticism*, reforms and scandal for *expenses scandal*, policing and police forces as well as crimes and criminals for *police and national security* and schools and education for *education and training*. Apart from the top four sub-topics (economy, taxes, jobs and employment, and immigration issues), all the other sub-topics were referred to almost equally as they are all within a 4 point range.



Figure 3.5: Most coded sub-topics across the 2010 British debates

Figure 3.6 displays the other sub-topics used by candidates in the British debates. All of these sub-topics are below 1.6 per cent of all references and were therefore minor subjects of discussion. However, the analysis of these figures reveals that, while candidates decided to focus on some elements of a topic, they neglected several features of others. For example, Europe and EU is the only sub-topic of *Europe and Euro-scepticism* that was coded among the 25 most coded sub-topics. The two other sub-topics focusing on pro and anti-Europe arguments gather only 0.9 and 0.6 per cent of references respectively. These results show that discussions concerning Europe were mainly centred around Europe as a union and not so much on the controversial "in or out" debate. Similarly, only the sub-topics reforms and scandal were coded among the 25 most coded sub-topics, which indicates that candidates preferred talking about actions and consequences following the expenses scandal rather than about MPs' responsibilities (only 0.6 per cent of all references were coded for trust issues and 0.1 per cent for formal apologies). The same goes with the *ecology and green energy* topic; candidates favoured sub-topics such as climate change and energy of the future rather than concrete facts and actions such as pollution and international agreements.



FIGURE 3.6: Continued - Most coded sub-topics across British debates (April 2010)

All in all, this sub-section highlighted that candidates favoured some topics (e.g. *economy and finance*, *wars and conflicts*, *health and social care*, *education and training* in the American case; *economy and finance*, *wars and conflicts*, *personal relationships and stories* in the British case) as well as particular features of these topics (e.g. economy, trade, investments, personal stories, family and friendship in the American case; economy, taxes, war issues, family, personal stories in the British one), most of which were rather optimistic and positive. This sub-section therefore confirms previous sub-sections by stating that personal relationships and stories were indeed among the most ranked sub-topics across the debates therefore not only affecting the tone of the debates but also their content. These two layers of topics have only rarely been reported in the literature as many authors focused on overarching topics. My results also have implications for the rest of my research and beg the following question: did American and British journalists and Twitter users follow this dual logic or develop their own?

Emotions and topics

After showing what topics and sub-topics were the most coded, I now study the percentage of emotions in relation to these topics. The *Republican*, *Democrat* and *pro-life and abortion* topics in the American case as well as the *Conservative*, *Labour* and *Liberal Democrat* topics in Britain are not part of this analysis as they did not contain emotional references. Consequently, it is interesting to notice that no emotions were used in relation to party politics in both American and British debates. Understanding why these topics were deprived of emotions goes beyond the scope of my research, which aims at identifying and analysing emotions and emotional references across debate transcripts. Further research should therefore use interviews with senior politicians or political aides to deepen this subject.

As far as the American debates are concerned, Table 3.5 indicates that only 0.9 per cent of emotional references were coded for the *former presidents and politicians* and *gender issues* topics, while the maximum of 38 per cent of emotional references was coded for the *economy and finance* topic. The *gender issues*, *gun control*, *immigration*, *former politicians* and *ecology and green energy* topics were only marginally discussed in emotional terms as they gather less than 4.3 per cent of emotional references. However, at least 9.6 per cent of emotional references to emotions were coded for the five remaining topics, one of these accumulating 38 per cent of references (*economy and finance* topic). The *economy and finance*, *wars and conflicts*, *health and social care*, *America and American values* and *education and training* topics were therefore the most discussed in emotional terms. Table 3.5 also indicates that empathy (45.2 per cent of references coded across all topics), pride (12.3 per cent), anger (10.2 per cent) and humour (9.3 per cent) were the most coded emotions regarding topics discussed during the debates. These emotions were mostly used in conjunction with *economy and finance*, *wars and conflicts*, *health and social care*, *education and training* and *America and American values.* The *wars and conflicts* topic contains minor references to humour as well as diverse emotions such as anxiety, care, apology, happiness and hope. Thus, only five topics (*economy and finance*, *wars and conflicts*, *health and social care*, *education*

Table 3.5: Percentage of emotions and humour across American topics. The names of topics have been shortened, a full list can be found in Appendix A; Abbreviations: Disap. for Disappointment and Frust. for Frustration.

	Ecology	**Economy**	**Education**	**Former pol.**	**Gender**	**Guns**	**Health**	**Immigration**	**USA**	**Wars**	**Total**
Anger	0.6	4.2	0.3	0	0	0	0.6	0.3	0.3	3.9	10.2
Anxiety	0	1.2	0	0	0.3	0	0.9	0	0	0.3	2.7
Apology	0	0.6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.6	1.2	2.4
Care	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.5	0.6	2.1
Disap.	0.6	1.8	0.6	0	0	0	0.6	0.3	0	0.3	4.2
Empathy	2.1	19.8	4.2	0.3	0.3	0.9	7.2	0.6	2.7	7.2	45.2
Fear	0	0.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.3	0.6	1.2
Frust.	0	0.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.3	0	0.6
Happy	0	1.2	0.3	0	0	0	0.9	0	0	1.2	3.6
Hope	0	0.3	0.3	0	0	0.3	0.3	0	0.6	0.9	2.7
Humour	0.3	3.9	0.6	0.3	0	0	1.5	0	0.6	2.1	9.3
Love	0.3	1.5	0.9	0	0	0	0	0	0.3	0.6	3.6
Pride	0.3	3.0	3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.6	0	2.4	2.1	12.3
Total	4.2	38	10.2	0.9	0.9	1.5	12.6	1.2	9.6	21	100

and training, and *American and American values*) have been emotionally skewed mainly towards empathy, pride, anger and humour.

In the British case study, Table 3.6 indicates that all remaining topics contained emotional references with varying degrees; the lowest number of references was coded for the *religion* topic (1.8 per cent of references) and the maximum for the *economy and finance* topic (34.2 per cent of references). Less than 5.5 per cent of references were coded for five topics (*religion*, *ecology and green energy*, *Europe and EU-scepticism*, *expenses scandal and consequences*, and *immigration*), which were therefore only marginally discussed in emotional terms as they only counted occasional references to emotions. These occasional uses of emotions therefore do not reveal the presence of an overarching emotional topic. On the contrary, the most emotional references were coded for six topics (*economy and finance*, *education and training*, *health and social care*, *wars and conflicts*, *police and national security*, and *change and alternative*) gathering at least 7.3 per cent of references coded. As for the American debates, the British debates were discussed in terms of specific topics and specific features of these topics. Indeed, five emotions, in addition to humour (7.7 per cent of references), were put forward in the *personal relationships and stories* topic; empathy (with 24 per cent of references coded), anger (15.7 per cent), fear (12.2 per cent), hope (9.2 per cent) and pride (8.8 per cent).

All in all, emotions, and specific features of these emotions, were indeed used in conjunction with specific topics. From the results presented in this sub-section, it appears that five main topics were the most discussed in emotional terms in the American debates: *economy and finance*, *wars and conflicts*, *health and social care*, *education and training*, and *America and American values*. Furthermore, these five topics were skewed towards particular emotions (empathy, pride, anger) and humour. Similarly, in the British debates, issues were not only skewed towards six main topics (*economy and finance*, *education and training*, *health and social care*, *wars and conflicts*, *police and national security*, and *change and alternative*), they were also emotionally skewed towards empathy, anger, fear, hope, pride and humour.

Table 3.6: Percentage of emotions and humour across British topics. The names of topics have been shortened, a full list can be found in Appendix A; Abbreviations: Disap. for Disappointment and Grate. for Gratefulness.

	Change	**Ecology**	**Economy**	**Education**	**Europe**	**Expenses**	**Health**	**Immigration**	**Police**	**Religion**	**Wars**	**Total**
Anger	1.4	0.4	5.7	1	1.2	1.8	2	0.2	1.2	0	1	15.7
Anxiety	0.2	0	0.4	0.4	0	0	0	0.2	0	0	0.2	1.4
Apology	0.2	0.2	1	0	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	2.9
Care	0	0	0	0.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.2
Disap.	0.6	0.2	1.4	0.2	0.4	0.8	0.2	0	0	0.2	0.2	4.1
Empathy	2	0	9	2	1	0.8	4.9	1.6	1.6	0.4	0.8	24
Fear	0.4	0.4	4.9	1.6	1	0	1.2	0.2	1.4	0	1.2	12.2
Grate.	0.2	0	1.2	0.6	0	0	0.6	0	0.4	0	0.4	3.3
Happy	0	0.2	0.8	0.4	0.2	0	0	0	0	0.2	0.2	2
Hate	0	0	0.2	0.2	0.2	0	0	0.2	0	0	0	0.8
Hope	1.2	0.2	2.4	1	0.4	0.8	1.4	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.4	9.2
Humour	0.6	0.6	2.6	1.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.4	1.4	0	0.2	7.7
Love	0.2	0	2.2	0.2	0.4	0	1.8	0.4	0	0	0.6	5.7
Pride	0.8	0.8	2	0	0.4	0.2	1	0.6	0.4	0.2	2.6	8.8
Shame	0.2	0	0.6	0.2	0	0.6	0.2	0	0.2	0	0	2
Total	7.9	2.9	34.2	9	5.5	5.5	13.8	4.3	7.3	1.8	7.9	100

II. Conclusions

This chapter aimed at analysing what emotions and emotional references candidates used in the 2010 British and 2012 American televised debates. As such, it lays the foundation for my two next results chapters investigating what emotions journalists and Twitter users displayed in their articles and posts, respectively, and how they reacted to politicians using emotions during the debates. I believe that the results presented in this chapter have to be understood through the lens of the emotionalisation of society, which has not created emotions but rather made them more visible, explicit and prominent in society (Richards, 2007; Turner, 2009; Beckett, 2015). The emotionalisation of society has progressively given more space to emotions and emotional expressivity but also to the management of, and process of personal reflection linked to, said emotions in every aspect of society for the last few decades (Rieff, 1966; Hume, 1998; Furedi, 2003; Richards, 2007; Richards and Brown, 2002; Lilleker, 2006; Lilleker and Temple, 2013). More particularly, the results presented in this chapter are in agreement with parts of the claims of Richards (2004) who states that politicians now use more emotions and emotionality in their appearances to engage the public at an emotional level. Indeed, the results of my research indicate that the 2012 American and 2010 British debates were conducted in emotional terms. This chapter therefore answers my first subsidiary research question, which asked whether debates were emotional, in what proportions and composed of what emotions.

My results revealed that American and British candidates, especially Romney and Cameron who were the most emotional candidates of the debates, not only manipulated emotions but also humour and references to their families, friends and anecdotes in order to fit their arguments, policies or defence tactics. This manipulation of emotions had a repercussion on the overall tone of the debates, which became emotionally heavy at times. American candidates particularly emphasised empathy, anger, pride, happiness, frustration, anxiety, disappointment, fear, hope and love. Regarding British candidates, Cameron focused on mixed emotions (especially care, empathy, gratefulness, love, anger and shame), whereas Brown predominantly put forward negative emotions (especially anxiety, apology, fear, hate and shame) and Clegg less risky ones (especially disappointment, humour and pride).

My results also indicated that American and British candidates manipulated the content of the debates by favouring certain topics, but also certain elements of these topics (e.g. economy, jobs and employment, taxes, and for *economy and finance*), all of which were rather optimistic and positive. The prominence of the *personal relationships and stories* topic was proven in both case studies as this topic was coded more than domestic and foreign issues. In the American case study, five topics (*economy and finance*, *wars and conflicts*, *health and social care*, *education and training*, and *America and American values*) were particularly infused with humour and emotions such as empathy, pride and anger. Similarly, in the British case study, six topics (*economy and finance*, *education and training*, *health and social care*, *wars and conflicts*, *police and national security*, and *change and alternative*) were steered towards empathy, anger, fear, hope and humour. Thus, candidates in the 2012 American and 2010 British debates manipulated emotions and emotionality both in their tone and in the content of the debates. How journalists and Twitter users reacted to the manipulation of emotions and emotionality by politicians in the context of the American and British debates will be developed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.

Chapter 4

Emotions & journalism: analysis of newspaper articles

While studies have recently focused on emotions (Serrano-Puche, 2015; Hoggett and Thompson, 2012; Engelken-Jorge et al., 2011), the accuracy of the coverage of TV debates (Benoit and Currie, 2001; Deacon and Wring, 2011) or the emotional experience of involvement for journalists (Peters, 2011), no study to date has inductively explored emotions before, during and after each TV debate both in the UK and US as I intend to do. This chapter therefore aims at filling this gap by carrying out a framing analysis of the 2012 American election debates in *The New York Times*, as an example of a quality newspaper (also called "highbrow newspaper"), and the *New York Post*, as an example of a tabloid newspaper and of the 2010 British election debates in *The Guardian* and its Sunday sister *The Observer*, as examples of quality newspapers, and *The Sun* and its Sunday sister at the time the *News of the World*, as examples of tabloid newspapers. This chapter answers the following question: how did the selected newspapers frame emotions and emotional references to construct their reporting of the debates? This chapter details the American and British results (I) as well as a discussion (II) and the conclusions (III) drawn from these results.

This chapter argues that, although politicians tried to manipulate emotions and emotionality during the debates as indicated in the previous chapter, this use failed as journalists reacted mainly negatively to the emotions put forth by candidates. More specifically, the use of emotions and emotionality was only welcomed for Cameron in *The Sun*, for Clegg in *The Guardian*, for Obama in *The New York Times* and for Romney in the *New York Post*. The manipulation of emotions backfired for the candidates that were not supported by specific newspapers. Moreover, journalists too manipulated emotions and emotionality through the range of issues covered in their articles, the respective portrayal of all candidates, the emotions and emotionality conveyed in articles and the criticisms voiced in each article.

I. Findings

I now turn to the results extracted from the framing analysis applied to the newspaper coverage of the 2012 American and 2010 British debates.

A. Issues

Analysing what issues were discussed in each article allows my research to see the range of issues covered during the debates, compare these with topics discussed by candidates and study how emotions and issues interacted. As far as the American coverage is concerned, issues were identified in almost all articles (89.4 and 97.8 per cent for the *New York Post* and *The New York Times*, respectively). The articles that did not contain issues were mostly very short and covered facts, such as when and where the debates took place. There is, however, a difference in the number of references coded for each newspaper. Indeed, issues represented 25.6 per cent of all the coverage of *The New York Times*, while they represented 13.2 per cent of the whole coverage of the *New York Post*. This difference is most likely due to the data set size itself as *The New York Times* published 119 more articles than the *New York Post* therefore covering more issues and raising the number of references coded. However, this difference is also due to the type of newspaper itself. Indeed, from these results it can be seen that tabloid and highbrow newspapers differed in focus: *The New York Times* primarily focused on candidates (43.5 per cent of the whole coverage), issues (25.6 per cent) and emotions (18.2 per cent), whereas the *New York Post* was centred on candidates (55.4 per cent), emotions (22.3 per cent) and issues (13.2 per cent).

Articles were further classified according to the issues they raised. Although I identified many issues for *The New York Times* and *New York Post*, articles could be grouped in more general categories. Both newspapers focused on:

- TV Debates
- Governor Romney and his Team
- President Obama and his Team
- Campaigning and Election Race
- Wars and Conflicts
- Economy and Finance
- Ignored Issues
- Abortion
- Candidates' Families
- Women and the Election

In addition to these, *The New York Times* also focused on Health Care, Education, Relationships with China, Social Media, Energy, Former Politicians, Gender Issues and Justice. *The New York Post* also focused on Voters. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the number of references coded for each issue.

Despite differences in proportion, the *New York Post* and *The New York Times* framed their coverage around the same issues: *TV debates* (24.5 per cent for the NYT, 9.6 per cent for the NYP), *Romney and his Team* (13.5 per cent for the NYT, 22 per cent for the NYP), *Obama and his Team* (12.3 per cent for the NYT, 40.7 per cent for the NYP), *Campaigning and Election Race* (11.5 per cent for the NYT, 16.3 per cent for the NYP) and *Wars and Conflicts* (8.3 per cent for the NYT, 3.9 per cent for the NYP). With the exception of *Wars and Conflicts*, these issues are all "meta-issues" and deal with the conduct and significance of the debates themselves, rather than with substantive issues. These five categories represented 70 per cent of issues in the NYT and 92.5 per cent of issues in the NYP. All other sub-categories were below 7 and 20 references for the NYT and NYP, respectively. Although the NYT covered more issues than the NYP, both newspapers gave less attention to specific issues such as *Women and the Election*, *Candidates' Families*, *Ignored Issues* and *Abortion*.



Figure 4.1: Issues identified in *The New York Times*

Similarly, issues in the British press were mentioned in almost every article of *The Guardian* (88.7 per cent) and of *The Sun* (77.4 per cent). Articles that did not contain issues were often very brief and focused on factual information such as the date, location or broadcast channel of the debates. Both newspapers covered issues in the same proportions: issues represented 15.3 per cent of the whole coverage of the *The Guardian* and 14 per cent of the coverage of *The Sun*. Furthermore, both newspapers framed their coverage according to similar categories: candidates (52.9 per cent of the coverage of *The Guardian*, 52 per cent of that of *The Sun*), emotions (23 per cent for *The Guardian* and 26.2 per cent for *The Sun*), issues (15.3 per cent for *The Guardian* and 14 per cent for *The Sun*) and criticisms (4.5 per cent for *The Guardian* and 4.1 per cent for *The Sun*), among others. All issues were grouped into sub-categories to facilitate their analysis. Both newspapers focused on the following issues:

- Campaigning and Election Race
- TV Debates
- Clegg and his Team
- Brown and his Team
- Cameron and his Team
- Economy
- Social Media
- Immigration
- Candidates' Families
- Wars and Conflicts



Figure 4.2: Issues identified in the *New York Post*

However, *The Guardian* also focused on Voters, Ignored Issues and Religion, while *The Sun* emphasised Crime, Education and Health Care.

As indicated by Figures 4.3 and 4.4, *The Guardian* and *The Sun* framed their coverage around the same issues: *Campaigning and Election Race* (28.5 per cent for *The Guardian*, 9.3 per cent for *The Sun*) and *TV Debates* (23.1 per cent for *The Guardian*, 19.5 per cent for *The Sun*). These issues were followed by party politics with *Team Clegg* (10.8 per cent for *The Guardian*, 17.8 per cent for *The Sun*), *Team Brown* (9.3 per cent for *The Guardian*, 12 per cent for *The Sun*) and *Team Cameron* (9.1 per cent for *The Guardian*, 16.4 per cent for *The Sun*).



Figure 4.3: Issues identified in *The Guardian*

Overall, the issues that received the most attention by both British newspapers exclusively related to style, PR and election race issues. These "meta-issues" (issues about the debates and their process, not about policy substance) represented 80.8 per cent of all issues coded for *The Guardian* and 75 per cent for *The Sun*. All other issues were below 6 and 10.5 per cent for *The Guardian* and *The Sun*, respectively, thus also giving less attention to other issues such as *Social Media*, *Immigration*, *Candidates' Families* and *Wars and Conflicts*.



FIGURE 4.4: Issues identified in *The Sun*

Issues that received the most attention

As candidates will be discussed in the following sub-section, I now explore what other issues received the most attention in the press. Concerning the American case study, the NYT was overall pro-debates (25.2 per cent of references coded) as one of its editorials showed: “Thursday night’s vice-presidential debate was one of the best and meatiest political conversations in many years” (NYT, editorial, 12 October). This enthusiasm was accompanied by discussions on technical issues (e.g. moderators, audience rates, split-screens, rules, fact-checking or figures and statistics, 56.1 per cent of references coded). Despite this pro-debate coverage, there was nonetheless a significant negative assessment of the debates (18.7 per cent of references coded) as exemplified by Peter Baker:

> After three debates and four and a half hours of nationally televised exchanges, Americans have learned that President Obama has a smaller pension than his opponent and Mitt Romney wants to get Big Bird’s beak out of the federal trough, that Joseph R. Biden Jr. likes to smile

> and Paul D. Ryan drinks lots of water. (NYT, Peter Baker, 18 October)

While the pre-coverage of the debates was revealing (many expectations were discussed before the debates, 41 per cent of references), the post-coverage was very short and almost immediately shifted to the intense campaign that followed the debates until Election Day (6.3 per cent of references for the post-debate period and 52.7 per cent for the rest of the campaign). Unlike the NYT, the NYP was much more straightforward. There was almost no discussion of technical issues (8.2 per cent of references), expectations (16.3 per cent of references) and no reference at all for the post-debate period. The tabloid's view on the debates was split: 40.8 per cent of positive aspects of the debates were coded against 34.7 per cent of negative ones. While Michael Goodwin denounced the debates as being purely about "political point scoring" (NYP, 23 October), S.A Miller stated that the "stakes for the big debate couldn't be higher" (NYP, 2 October).

Campaigning and Election Race is the last common issue discussed by both American newspapers. This category raised a lot of consensus as both newspapers reported on the same sub-issues: polls (44.1 per cent of references coded for the NYT, 55.4 per cent for the NYP), battleground states (38 and 24.1 per cent), adverts (10.9 and 6 per cent) and other events such as official dinners or natural disasters (6.1 and 6 per cent). In addition to those, the NYT also focused on the price of the campaign (0.9 per cent) and the NYP highlighted early voting (8.4 per cent).

With 8.3 and 6.9 per cent of references coded respectively, the NYT also devoted many of its articles to *Wars and Conflicts* and *Economy.* While many journalists described "this presidential cycle" as being "all about the economy" (NYT, Adam Davidson, 28 October), others emphasised the need for more "economic sacrifices" from both politicians and voters (NYT, Frank Bruni, 30 September). Concerning *Wars and Conflicts*, the coverage split into two groups. On the one hand, issues were linked to specific conflicts such as the war in Afghanistan, uprisings of the Arab Spring, Iran's nuclear threat, the Consulate attack in Benghazi and the threat of Al Qaeda. On the other, issues dealt with more general questions such as the future of American power or the best candidate for foreign policy.

Similar issues were given the most attention in British newspapers. Indeed, *TV Debates* were one of the main issues discussed by both British newspapers. Overall, *The Guardian* was mainly sceptical towards the debates judging them too controlled, unfair and based on a show (21.8 per cent of references). For Marina Hyde, “It was like watching the live abortion of democracy” (*The Guardian*, 23 April). She added that “Even before the party leaders have finished debating, legions of spinners and spinners’ lackeys materialise to explain exactly why everything you thought you saw and heard was wrong”. However, journalists of *The Guardian* also found the debates insightful and useful (11.3 per cent). Along those lines, *The Observer* underlined the historical aspect of TV debates that were held for the first time in Britain (45.8 per cent):

> Overall, the debates are a hugely positive addition to the repertoire of British politics. They have attracted mass audiences without luring the candidates into tawdry populism. The exchanges have been lively, but not aggressive. Substantial policies have been aired with sophisticated arguments. These prime-time hustings have been a credit to our democracy. (*The Observer*, editorial, 24 April)

The Guardian also focused on technical aspects such as body language analysis (2.9 per cent), debate viewing parties (1.1 per cent), debate preparation and expectations (17.1 per cent). Although articles were considerably shorter during the pre-debate coverage, *The Guardian* advocated their importance:

> Expectations shape reactions, which is why Britain’s first televised leaders’ debate will be judged not just in terms of how the three men involved in it performed, but what was predicted before they began speaking. (*The Guardian*, editorial, 16 April)

Journalists of *The Sun* did not focus on technical aspects but rather voiced their opinion on these new media and political events. Indeed, journalists were mainly against the debates considering them as a "massive disappointment" (64.8 per cent of references). In Ian Hyland's words, the debates featured a "host in an ill-fitting suit shouting and waving his arms around" and "was roughly 87 minutes too long" (18 April). Many positive references to the debates as historic, insightful and re-engaging were also coded (35.2 per cent). Fraser Nelson even labelled the first debate as a "game-changer" (18 April). Overall, both newspapers voiced their opinion, mainly negative, towards the first British TV debates.

Campaigning and Election Race was the only other issue covered by both British newspapers. This category was more or less covered in the same way by both papers that focused on election race (15.1 per cent of references for *The Guardian*, 50 for *The Sun*), tactical voting and undecided voters (51.9 per cent for *The Guardian* and 50 for *The Sun*). *The Guardian* further explored candidates' donations (6.3 per cent), bets surrounding the election (13.1 per cent) and the evolution of British politics (13.6 per cent).

Other issues

I now turn to issues mentioned only in passing. In the American case, twelve issues received significantly less attention in the NYT: *Women and the Election* (4.2 per cent of references coded), *Health Care* (3.1 per cent), *Education* (2.9 per cent), *Relationships with China* (2.6 per cent), *Candidates' Families* (2.4 per cent), *Social Media* (1.7 per cent), *Energy* (1.7 per cent), *Ignored Issues* (1.5 per cent), *Ex-politicians* (1.1 per cent), *Abortion* (1.1 per cent), *Gender issues* (19) and issues related to the *Justice* system (0.1 per cent). Similarly, seven issues did not get much attention in the NYP: *Wars and Conflicts* (3.9 per cent), *Voters* (2.8 per cent), *Women and the Election* (1.8 per cent), *Abortion* (1 per cent), *Ignored Issues* (1 per cent), *Candidates' Families* (0.8 per cent) and *Economy* (0.2 per cent). All of these issues only have up to three sub-issues coded, which shows that, firstly, these issues were barely discussed and, secondly, that this was done in a superficial way. In other words, only specific aspects of issues were referred to in newspapers. For example, the NYT favoured discussions on affordable education, investments in research and education standards for the *Education* category and the future of health care for the *Health Care* category. The NYP highlighted the Benghazi attack, Obama's foreign policy legacy and the fate of the Navy in the *Wars and Conflicts* category and opened discussions on whether rape is intended or not by God in the *Abortion* category.

Similarly, in Britain, *The Guardian* mentioned the *Economy* (5.9 per cent of references coded), *Voters* (3.8 per cent), *Social Media* (3.3 per cent), *Immigration* (3 per cent), *Candidates' Families* (1.1 per cent), *Ignored Issues* (0.9 per cent), *Wars and Conflicts* (0.9 per cent) and *Religion* (0.2 per cent). *The Sun* briefly talked about the *Economy* (10.3 per cent), *Immigration* (4.7 per cent), *Candidates' Families* (3.9 per cent), *Crime* (1.9 per cent), *Wars and Conflicts* (1.9 per cent), *Education* (1.4 per cent), *Social Media* (0.6 per cent) and *Health Care* (0.5 per cent). Furthermore, only one aspect of each of these was discussed in *The Sun* and up to three in *The Guardian*. Therefore, it appears that these topics were approached superficially. For example, *The Sun* focused on the issues surrounding the NHS for the *Health Care* category and on the increasing number of crimes committed for the *Crime* category. *The Guardian* stressed racial issues and immigration issues for the *Immigration* category and the future of British defence for the *Wars and Conflicts* category.

American and British newspapers, both highbrows and tabloids, reported on *Candidates' Families* as the main topic of articles with different angles. In the American press, the NYT focused on wives defending their husbands (NYT, Bee-Shyuan Chang, 14 October) and Tagg Romney following the footsteps of his dad (NYT, Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Ashley Parker, 27 October), while the NYP wrote about Obama wishing a happy anniversary to his wife (NYP, Andrea Peyser, 25 October). Similarly, in Britain, *The Guardian* focused on candidates' wives being at the forefront of the election fighting the "war of the wives" or the "battle of the spouses" (Carole Cadwalladr, 12 April), while *The Sun* stressed the increasingly important role played by families in the campaign. As explained in previous chapters, I consider references to families as emotional. It is therefore revealing to see that emotional references were not only used by politicians to articulate specific roles and policies but they were also discussed, however superficially, by both tabloid and highbrow newspapers.

These results are thus revealing as they show that the issues that received the least attention in both the American and British coverage of the debates almost exclusively focused on substance (ideas and policy proposals). Conversely, issues that were covered the most extensively (except *Wars and Conflicts* and *Economy*) all focused on either candidates, election race or the debates themselves. All newspapers therefore chose to focus on meta-issues, while almost ignoring substantive issues. This superficiality begs the question of how accurate the coverage of the debates was. My results are in line with previous studies that found that the focus of newspapers was on the process rather than substance of politics (Deacon and Wring, 2011) with a clear interest in attacks and defences (Benoit and Currie, 2001). However, my research goes further than these studies as it identified emotions as well as personal relationships and stories as being part of this process.

Debates: who said what?

I now compare issues covered by journalists in their articles with issues discussed by candidates during the debates. As indicated by the previous chapter, *Economy and Finance* and *Wars and Conflicts* were the most coded topics in the American debates. These topics were followed by *Health and Social Care*, *Democrats*, *Republicans*, *Education and Training*, *America and American Values*, *Ecology and Green Energy* and *Personal Relationships and Stories.* Finally, the least coded topics were *Immigration*, *Former Presidents*, *Gun Control*, *Gender Issues* and *Abortion.*

The same results were identified in the British case study. Indeed, from my previous chapter, I established that *Economy and Finance* dominated the British debates followed by *Immigration*, *Wars and Conflicts*, *Education and Training*, *the Conservative Team* and *Health Care.* The least coded topics were *the Labour Team*, *the Liberal Democrat Team*, *Personal Relationships and Stories*, *EU and EU-scepticism*, *Expenses Scandal*, *Police and National Security* and *Change and Alternative.*

All of these topics (with the exception of *Economy and Finance*, *Wars and Conflicts* and topics focusing on candidates), although covering substantive issues, received little attention from the press. Although journalists focused on substance less than candidates, journalists were surprised by the fact that candidates deliberately ignored some topics. For example, the fact that candidates ignored gun control issues irritated American journalists (NYT journalist Gail Collins wonders: "Why wasn't there a gun control moment before now?", 20 October) who expressed anger, frustration and disappointment. However, the issue of gun control (coded in the *Ignored Issues* category) was reported only marginally by journalists (less than 1.5 per cent of references were coded for gun control in the NYT and less than 1 per cent in the NYP). These results therefore indicate that candidates, probably because they were asked direct questions by moderators and the audience, focused more on substance than journalists who preferred writing about TV debates or polls.

Moreover, my previous chapter showed that candidates used two-layered topics in the American and British debates. In both case studies, these specific aspects of topics were shown to be mostly optimistic and positive in order to spark optimism and positivity in voters in return. However, even if my newspaper analysis shows that American and British journalists too preferred some aspects of specific issues (e.g. affordable education and research for *Education*), they did not aim for positivity or optimism. Overall, my results show that there were major differences not only in what candidates and journalists talked about in the debates and newspaper articles, but also in how they did so.

B. Candidates

Exploring the descriptions of each candidate helps to understand how Romney and Obama in the US and Brown, Cameron and Clegg in the UK, were depicted by the press and see whether these descriptions were emotional. Moreover, these descriptions provide more information about the bias of each newspaper, which, in turn, may have affected how emotions were framed. This category was the most coded of my framing analysis for both my American (43.5 and 55.4 per cent of the coverage was devoted to candidates in *The New York Times* and *New York Post*, respectively) and British case studies (52.9 and 52 per cent of coverage devoted to candidates in *The Guardian* and *The Sun*, respectively).

To make my results clearer, I categorised descriptions into positive and negative ones. Descriptions that did not fit these categories were handled separately. Categories were content-dependent: "aggressive" was coded positively when candidates were portrayed as active and motivated but references were coded into "offensive" when candidates were seen as rude or offensive. Because Obama and Biden, on the one hand, and Romney and Ryan, on the other, were described the same way, I coded all descriptions in one category for the Democrats and in another for the Republicans. Indeed, newspapers showed their partisanship for both presidential and vice-presidential candidates or against both of them. Results are now discussed for each newspaper separately.

The New York Times

Concerning Romney, the picture was rather blurred as 48.1 per cent of descriptions were positive and 51.9 per cent were negative. Table 4.1 shows the percentage of positive and negative descriptions of Romney and Ryan in *The New York Times.* Romney was described predominantly as a manipulator and liar (31.3 per cent of all negative descriptions) having bad policies and ideas (11.8 per cent) that could be dangerous for both domestic and foreign policies (8.1 and 6.3 per cent respectively) mainly due to the fact that Romney had no experience in the job (5.5 per cent). Consequently, he was often described as losing (9.2 per cent). To a lesser extent, Romney was also described as incompetent (4.1 per cent), too rich (3.7 per cent) consequently not close to normal people (3.6 per cent) and deeply flawed (3 per cent). These negative descriptions were balanced by almost the same number of positive ones. Therefore, Romney was also depicted as being aggressive (26.9 per cent), pro-active (13.2 per cent), a good debater (8.5 per cent) and more moderate than other Republicans (7.2 per cent). Romney was also given vital qualities to govern such as leadership skills (3.2 per cent), confidence (2.8 per cent), bipartisanship skills (1.4 per cent) and determination (1.9 per cent), among others. Thus, Romney was described as the winner of the election in 11.4 per cent of cases. On a more personal note, Romney was described as a good man (0.7 per cent) who cares about his family (2.3 per cent).

Table 4.1: Percentage of negative and positive descriptions of Romney and Ryan in *The New York Times*

Negative descriptions	Positive descriptions
Manipulator, liar (31.3)	Aggressive (26.9)
Bad policies and ideas (11.8)	Pro-active, energetic (13.2)
Losing (9.2)	Victorious (11.4)
Dangerous for the economy (8.1)	Good debater (8.5)
Dangerous for foreign policy (6.3)	Moderate (7.2)
Novice (5.5)	Represents change (3.9)
Weak, incompetent (4.1)	Business man (3.8)
Mistakes and gaffes (3.8)	Presidential, leader (3.2)
Rich, too close to the wealthy (3.7)	Close to normal people (2.9)
Not close to normal people (3.6)	Distinguished language (2.9)
Flaws, disadvantages (3)	Confident (2.8)
Against women's rights (1.9)	Cool, fresh, calm (2.8)
Defensive (1.4)	Family man (2.3)
Impatient (1)	Determined (1.9)
Pro-military (1)	Optimistic (1.6)
Suffering from Romnesia (1)	Bipartisan (1.4)
Fails to put ideas into practice (0.9)	Ambitious (1.1)
Not eco-friendly (0.9)	Religious (0.8)
Too conservative (0.8)	Good man (0.7)
Racist (0.5)	Charismatic (0.3)
	Persuasive (0.3)
	Attractive (0.1)

For example:

> Mr. Romney is shown roughhousing with his sons when they were youngsters, encouraging his wife and following the public service footsteps of his father, George W. Romney, the former governor of Michigan. In one scene, Mr. Romney begins talking about his wife, gushing, “Ahh, she’s gorgeous.” Russ Schriefer, the senior strategist charged with making the film, said he got that footage by showing Mr. Romney a picture of Ann as a teenager and asking him to reflect. (NYT, Ashley Parker, 7 October)

The difference in appraisal was clearer for Obama who was described positively in 56.9 per cent of references and negatively in 43.1 per cent of references. Table 4.2 shows the percentage of negative and positive descriptions of Obama and Biden in *The New York Times*. Obama was mainly portrayed as being aggressive (34.4 per cent), pro-active (15.3 per cent), determined (6.7 per cent) and good for the economy (10.3 per cent). As for Romney, journalists recognised vital presidential qualities in Obama: leadership skills (2.9 per cent), efficiency (2.5 per cent) as well as an organised (1.9 per cent), peaceful (1.7 per cent) and calm (1.6 per cent) personality. Furthermore, journalists described Obama winning (12.8 per cent) much more than Obama losing (7.9 per cent), unlike Romney. However, the President was also described negatively. He was seen as failing in the first debate (21.9 per cent), a manipulator (12.6 per cent), responsible for the bad state of the economy (11.5 per cent), weak and incompetent (10.7 per cent) and as someone who did not keep his promises (8 per cent). This mixed view of Obama is reflected in the following paragraph:

> You can defend President Obama’s jobs record - recovery from a severe financial crisis is always difficult, and especially so when the opposition party does its best to block every policy initiative you propose. And things have definitely improved over the past year. Still, unemployment remains high after all these years, and a candidate with a real plan to

> make things better could make a strong case for his election. (NYT, Paul Krugman, 19 October)

Table 4.2: Percentage of negative and positive descriptions of Obama and Biden in *The New York Times*

Negative descriptions	Positive descriptions
Failed in the first debate (21.9)	Aggressive (34.3)
Manipulator, liar (12.6)	Pro-active and energetic (15.3)
Responsible for bad economy (11.5)	Victorious (12.8)
Weak and incompetent (10.7)	Good to the economy (10.3)
Did not keep his promises (8)	Determined (6.7)
Losing (7.9)	Good debate performance (3.8)
Defensive (4.6)	Commander-in-chief, leader (2.9)
Arrogant, too confident (4.3)	Efficient (2.5)
Failed foreign policy (3.6)	Methodological (1.9)
Passive (3.5)	Anti-war, anti-conflict (1.7)
Fails to put his ideas into practice (2.5)	Cool, calm (1.6)
Squandered advantages (2.5)	Eco-friendly (1.3)
Too ambitious (2)	Close to normal people (1.1)
Mistakes and gaffes (1.7)	Strong (1.1)
Pro-Black only (1.1)	Popular (0.8)
Not close to people (0.6)	Attractive (0.7)
Not eco-friendly (0.5)	Optimistic (0.5)
Stubborn (0.3)	Self-made man (0.5)
Not religious enough (0.2)	Trustworthy and honest (0.2)
	Competitive (0.1)

Thus, although *The New York Times* was balanced, the newspaper showed its support for Obama in subtle ways. Firstly, the newspaper used mitigation to undermine Obama's mistakes ("Mr Obama did not say that... just that...", NYT, Elisabeth Bumiller, 24 October). Secondly, the newspaper did not give much importance to Romney being right. For example, Elisabeth Bumiller (NYT, 24 October) underlined that Romney was indeed right when saying that the Navy is smaller. However, for the journalist, Romney was comparing the actual Navy with the war-time Navy, two situations that cannot and should not be compared.

Obama was also described as being attacked and/or discredited, a category that was not coded for Romney. The fact that Obama was described as a victim who needs to be defended further suggests that the NYT was indeed protecting its candidate. Finally, the NYT also found excuses for Obama to explain his failure in the first debate:

> Like other presidents, Mr. Obama's debate preparations were hindered by his day job, his practice sessions often canceled or truncated because of events, advisers said. One session took place just after he addressed a service for the four Americans slain in Libya, leaving him distracted. [...] Mr. Obama does not like debates to begin with, aides have long said, viewing them as media-driven gamesmanship. (NYT, Peter Baker and Trip Gabriel, 4 October)

New York Post

The *New York Post* was again much more straightforward than the NYT. As for Obama, only 14.4 per cent of descriptions were positive against an overwhelming 85.6 per cent of negative descriptions. Table 4.3 indicates the percentage of negative and positive references for Obama and Biden. The NYP depicted Obama through a single negative lens: he was judged offensive (15.4 per cent), weak and emotional (14.4 per cent), a manipulator (12.3 per cent) and associated with failure (15.6 per cent). Journalists also discredited Obama through nicknames ("O", "Bam") and physical attacks. This negativity was translated by specific terms used to describe Obama throughout the whole data set: "non-issue" attack, "Democrats seized on what Obama-friendly media gleefully labeled Romney's blunder", "trying to spin your candidate's debate performance as a great victory", "overwhelmingly rejecting the suggestion that Obama offered" or "not a pretty sight". Negative language was further used to describe Obama's first debate performance: "debacle", "poor and listless", "bad", "can't debate", "Obama picked himself off the mat yesterday after getting battered by Mitt Romney" or "worst debate performance ever". The NYP marginally described Obama positively. However, these positive descriptions were unempathic and down-beat: pro-active, presidential, determined, experienced and good rhetoric are all predictable descriptions of a presidential candidate. Thus, Obama was systematically described in a negative way, whether he performed well or not.

This bias against, and negative framing of, Obama can also be found through unconventional journalistic practices. Firstly, the NYP drew conclusions from guesses and assumptions. For example, to make the point that Obama does not like people, Michael Goodwin said that Obama "reportedly watched the Super Bowl alone" (24 October). In the journalist's mind, watching the Super Bowl alone showed that Obama does not like people. However, by doing that Goodwin ignored other options (e.g. Obama may have wanted to focus on the game without distractions, he may have needed to work on something else at the same time). Secondly, NYP journalists almost exclusively framed Obama as losing by using mitigation:

> So, yes, the race is still too close to call, and events can still reshape it. But what we're seeing now is how things have to look if Obama is going to lose. (NYP, J.T. Young, 22 October)

Other journalists presented polls in a specific way in order to undermine Obama's lead. The focus was therefore on the gap closing between the two candidates and not on Obama leading: "Obama leads among women 51-45 in the polls, but last week, he led by 11 points" (Geoff Earle and S.A. Miller, 23 October); Romney "has narrowed the gap against President Obama to a single point in the critical state of Ohio, with the President clinging to a one-point lead" (Michael Gartland, 23 October). Finally, Obama's efforts were useless as Romney would ultimately win. In Goodwin's words: "So Obama's victory, if that is how it is seen, might have little meaning where it matters most." (23 October). To win, Romney can count on voters who will vote for him "for sure" as they "won't change their minds", unlike Obama's voters (S.A. Miller, 23 October). This losing framing, and victory framing for Romney, gave the impression that, in the end, it was Obama who was struggling and losing, not Romney.

TABLE 4.3: Percentage of negative and positive descriptions of Obama and Biden in the *New York Post*

Negative descriptions	Positive descriptions
Offensive (15.4)	Victorious (45.3)
Weak, too emotional (14.4)	Pro-active (34.9)
Manipulator, liar (12.3)	Presidential, leader (6.4)
Losing (12.2)	Determined (5.2)
Failed in the first debate (10)	Experienced (2.9)
Failed economy policy (5.6)	Strong (1.7)
Did not keep his promises (5.2)	Family man (1.2)
Mean, mocking, rude (4.3)	Pro-women's rights (1.2)
Failed foreign policy (4)	Good rhetoric (1.2)
Flawed (3.5)	
Desperate (2.2)	
Arrogant, pretentious (2.2)	
Anti-military (1.7)	
Ignorant (1.2)	
Not a people person (1.2)	
Mistakes and gaffes (1.1)	
Defensive (1)	
Addicted to power (0.8)	
Pro-black only (0.8)	
Against women's rights (0.7)	
Unpopular (0.4)	

The reverse happened for Romney: only 20.4 per cent of descriptions coded were negative against 79.6 per cent of positive ones. Table 4.4 indicates the percentage of negative and positive references for Romney and Ryan. Romney was framed as being positively aggressive (15.9 per cent), a good debater (15.2 per cent), proactive (10.8 per cent), presidential (4.7 per cent), knowledgeable (2.5 per cent), an experienced business man (1.7 per cent) and having good foreign policy ideas (1.6 per cent). Journalists also attributed great personal traits to Romney: he was framed as smart (7 per cent), strong (5.4 per cent), determined (2.8 per cent), confident (1.7 per cent), gracious and kind (0.6 per cent) and a family man (0.4 per cent), among others. The language used to describe Romney was hyperbolic: people were “overwhelmingly” supporting Romney, women were “flocking” to him, Romney was making “strenuous efforts” to hire more women, there was a “substantive debate over Romney’s position on genuine women’s issues” or Romney took a “substantive stance on wasteful government spending”.

There were also many positive references concerning Romney’s debate performance: “triumph”, “perfect”, “brilliant”, “clear-cut victory”, “flawless”, “scored big in the first debate”, “spectacular”, “superb” or “most commanding presidential debate performance”. Just as Obama’s emotions were seen as weaknesses (14.7 per cent of references depicted Obama as too weak because of his emotions), Romney was praised for being a family man. It therefore seems that journalists of the NYP were juggling with emotions to show their support for a candidate or their dislike for another. Negative descriptions of the Republican challenger only represented 20.4 per cent of all descriptions of Romney. Once again, this negativity can be questioned: rich (8.5 per cent), a novice (7.4 per cent), too polite (7.4 per cent) and defensive (1.1 per cent), among others, are all traits that do not depict Romney in wholly a bad way. The NYP also described Romney as being attacked and discredited by Obama, other politicians or the media. For example, the NYP defended the Republican challenger who was accused of wanting to kill the Public Broadcasting Service by privatising it and of not taking the issue of women in politics more seriously (editorial, 17 October). For the tabloid, these accusations came from a desperate Obama who needed help (“You need all the help you can get [...] especially when the CNN polls showed Romney outscoring President Obama”, editorial, 17 October).

TABLE 4.4: Percentage of negative and positive descriptions of Romney and Ryan in the *New York Post*

Negative descriptions	Positive descriptions
Losing (40.9)	Victorious (18.2)
Manipulator (10.2)	Aggressive (15.9)
Bad policies and ideas (10.2)	Good debater (15.2)
Rich (8.5)	Pro-active (10.8)
Novice (7.4)	Smart (7.0)
Too polite (7.4)	Strong, reliable (5.4)
Mistakes and gaffes (6.3)	Presidential, leader (4.7)
Weak, incompetent (4.5)	Determined (2.8)
Against women's rights (3.4)	Knowledgeable (2.5)
Defensive (1.1)	Pro-women's rights (1.9)
	Protector of America (1.7)
	Business man (1.7)
	Represents change (1.7)
	Confident (1.7)
	Good for foreign policy (1.6)
	Popular (1.3)
	Moderate and prudent (1.2)
	Optimistic (0.9)
	Bi-partisan (0.7)
	Pro-life (0.7)
	Gracious and kind (0.6)
	Pro-military (0.6)
	Family man (0.4)
	Peaceful (0.4)
	Mormon (0.3)

The NYP also showed its emotional partisanship during the 2012 debates. Indeed, Romney was associated with enthusiasm, admiration and pride, whereas Obama was linked to anger, frustration and disappointment. For example, the NYP editorial following the second debate contained many emotions (17 October). Firstly, there were many references to anger at moderator Candy Crowley for not being objective (she was accused of helping Obama and interrupting Romney) and for having her facts “flat-out wrong”. Secondly, there were feelings of hate at Obama for being an opportunist (“the man is an empty suit with empty policies hidden behind voluminous rhetoric”). Finally, the NYP admired Romney for having “won on substance and held his own”.

Pride was also identified in a specific example. Andrea Peyser mocked *The New York Times* as its candidate, Obama, did not win the first debate (8 October). The NYP therefore declared itself winner of the newspaper election competition by declaring that “the editors of the New York Times are crying in their aged Scotch” before adding “Obama lost the showdown. Romney won. Live with it.” (NYP editorial, 17 October). This competition between newspapers triggered specific emotions: anger when Romney was attacked as well as pride and enthusiasm when support was growing for Romney. The fact that there was a competition between *The New York Times* and *New York Post* further justifies my choice of newspapers for this analysis. All in all, the NYP was pro-Romney not only in its opinions, but also in its emotions. The tabloid and highbrow newspapers therefore had the same goals (support their candidate) but used different means to reach these (the NYP was more direct in its endorsement, whereas the NYT was more subtle and inquisitive).

The Guardian and The Observer

The Guardian and *The Observer*’s pre-debate coverage focused on Brown and Cameron, the two potential prime ministers. Clegg was not yet as popular, although Patrick Wintour already expected him to win the first debate “because he is new and unknown” (15 April). Descriptions of Brown and Cameron follow the same pattern as they were mainly described negatively (64 per cent of descriptions were negative for Brown and 61.6 per cent for Cameron). Table 4.5 indicates that Brown was mainly framed as offensive (18.4 per cent), a manipulator (13.4 per cent) and as a bad prime minister (9.9 per cent) making many mistakes and gaffes (9.9 per cent). Brown was therefore framed as losing the election in most cases (28.7 per cent). Journalists also attacked Brown's physical traits to undermine his stature and power. While Peter Collett mentioned Brown's "unusual habit of dropping his lower jaw when he is speaking" (*The Guardian*, 15 April), Simon Hoggart talked about Brown's "ghastly grin, as if the nodding dog in a car was channeling the Joker" (*The Guardian*, 23 April). Furthermore, Brown was also seen as too robotic, technocratic and lacking emotions. Simon Hoggart was disappointed by Brown's inability "to turn his message into human terms" (*The Guardian*, 6 May). Although Brown was framed as a bad PM, half as many positive references were also mentioned. Brown, mainly thanks to his mandate as a prime minister, was seen as experienced and respected on the international scene (16.4 per cent), pro-active (11.3 per cent), confident (10.3 per cent), good for the economy and other substantive issues (18.4 per cent). Brown was also seen victorious in many cases (12.7 per cent) as the British voting system favours not the number of votes but the number of seats won. On the emotional side, journalists viewed Brown as a caring family man (3.9 per cent) and passionate politician (5.5 per cent). Other journalists showed admiration for Brown's experience, determination and ability to handle the economy ("he looked to me like the clear winner of the debate", "Brown, the man who 'saved the world financial system"', "he is not going down without a fight", *The Guardian* Jacob Weisberg, 30 April). Thus, Brown was also described as being attacked and discredited by other politicians and the media. Many journalists pitied the PM and were angry at other journalists for attacking him:

> Did anyone else feel that Brown had been handed the third-place rosette before he even took to the podium? That, even before Brown screwed up with Gillian Duffy, everything he said and did, was to an accompaniment of abuse, insults and gloating - with Brown, the equivalent of a bull, determinedly trying to keep on its feet, despite a baying media crowd, and a back full of pollsters' spears. A 'Get Gordon' bloodlust, which, in the end, was so obvious as to be foolish.

> After all, attack a guy often enough (for everything, for nothing) and it just may backfire and ignite the sympathy vote. (*The Observer*, editorial, 1 May)

Brown was thus framed negatively by journalists of *The Guardian* who also felt sympathetic for a politician who was over-attacked and devoted his life to British politics.

Table 4.5: Percentage of negative and positive descriptions of Brown in *The Guardian* and *The Observer*

Negative descriptions	Positive descriptions
Losing (28.7)	Experienced, respected (16.4)
Offensive (18.4)	Victorious (12.7)
Manipulative (13.4)	Pro-active (11.3)
Bad Prime Minister (9.9)	Confident and determined (10.3)
Mistakes and gaffes (9.9)	Good to the economy (9.4)
Wrong in ideas and policies (3.8)	Good for substantive questions (9)
Peculiar physical traits (2.9)	Strong, solid (6.2)
Desperate (2.5)	Passionate (5.5)
Robotic, lack of emotions (4.3)	Heroic achievements (4.3)
Boring and depressing (2.1)	Family man (3.9)
Defensive (3.4)	Good man (3.7)
Too close to the USA (0.3)	Pro-reform (2.7)
Pro-nuclear weapon (0.2)	Good rhetoric (1.6)
Rich (0.1)	Close to minorities (1.4)
	Pro-women's rights (0.8)
	Pro-Europe (0.4)
	Religious (0.2)

Like Brown, Cameron was mainly framed negatively with 61.6 per cent of negative descriptions coded against 38.4 per cent of positive ones as indicated by Table 4.6. Cameron was seen as a manipulator (27.1 per cent) having wrong ideas and policies (14.1 per cent) and being too rich to be close to voters (9.4 er cent). Thus, Cameron was seen as losing the election in most cases (20.2 per cent).

TABLE 4.6: Percentage of negative and positive descriptions of Cameron in *The Guardian* and *The Observer*

Negative descriptions	Positive descriptions
Manipulator (27.1)	Aggressive (29.2)
Losing (20.2)	Victorious (15.7)
Wrong ideas and policies (14.1)	Pro-active (11.4)
Rich (9.4)	Representing change (8.8)
Defensive (3.9)	Experienced, leader (7.9)
Anti-European (3.8)	Determined and confident (6.9)
Anti-reform (3.1)	Family man (6.3)
Contradictory (2.5)	Caring, close to people (5.4)
Too conservative (2.2)	Calm (2)
Depends on a coalition (2.1)	Charming (1.8)
Passive (2.1)	Optimistic (1.3)
Not ready to be PM (1.9)	Pragmatist (0.9)
Not very popular (1.9)	Simple, understandable language (0.9)
Too confident (1.2)	Strong (0.7)
Missionless (1.1)	Polite (0.5)
Simplistic (1)	Punctual (0.2)
Anti-gay (0.7)	
Uncool (0.6)	
Against women's rights (0.4)	
Pro-nuclear weapon (0.2)	
Half-religious (0.1)	

The Guardian journalists even went on an anti-Cameron crusade:

> I will assume, dear Guardian reader, that like me you have two prime purposes. One is to prevent Cameron walking into Downing Street on

> 7 May. Equal first is to secure electoral reform so that we are never again presented with such a disgraceful voting choice. (*The Guardian*, Polly Toynbee, 25 April)

Half as many positive references were also coded depicting Cameron as aggressive (29.2 per cent), pro-active (11.4 per cent), representing change (8.8 per cent) and victorious (15.7 per cent). Cameron was depicted more than other candidates as a family man (6.3 per cent), which is in accordance with Chapter 3. Indeed, I previously established that Cameron referred to his family the most during the debates and that family was a clear axis of communication during his campaign. Thus Cameron, although described positively on some occasions, was more often framed negatively and seen as the main challenger in this election.

Clegg broke this circle of negativity by being framed positively in 70.5 per cent of references (against 29.5 per cent of negative ones), as indicated by Table 4.7. The Lib Dem leader was seen as doing well thanks to the debates (17.9 per cent), a saviour representing change (16.5 per cent), aggressive (10.9 per cent), very popular with the Cleggmania around (6.1 per cent) and thus victorious in most scenarios (10.5 per cent). Novelist Fay Weldon illustrated these positive descriptions by presenting Clegg as a saviour "looking rather more, to the 10 million who watch, like a living person than a politician" (*The Guardian*, 20 April). In Weldon's eyes, Clegg was honest, hopeful, educated, multi-cultural, good looking and his own man. On a personal note, Clegg was seen as a passionate (1.6 per cent) family man (2.5 per cent). Aida Edemariam and Patrick Wintour wrote an article about Clegg's policies but mainly about his life, family and values (*The Guardian*, 30 April). The journalists showed their admiration for this normal and empathic family man:

> His parents are a different matter: his father 'leaves lengthy voicemail messages on the phone every day, with his latest tips from the top. They're sometimes so lengthy that I literally don't have time to listen to them. They all sort of start with, 'Son, it's your father here.' It's

> amazing - you're on an election campaign and your parents still think they can tell you what to do.' His voice is fond.

Table 4.7: Percentage of negative and positive descriptions of Clegg in *The Guardian* and *The Observer*

Negative descriptions	Positive descriptions
Not ready to be PM (15.3)	Doing well thanks to the debates (17.9)
Manipulator (14.6)	Saviour, change (16.5)
Losing (15.8)	Aggressive (10.9)
Pressured (12.8)	Victorious (10.5)
Defensive (10.5)	Very popular (6.1)
Controversial (10.1)	Pro-reform (4.3)
Needs coalition partners (8.9)	Confident and determined (4)
Wrong ideas and policies (8.9)	Cool, fresh, young (3.4)
Out of touch with reality (2.3)	Honest (3.4)
Rich (0.7)	Pro-active (3.1)
	Family man (2.5)
	Multi-cultural (2.5)
	Good for substantive questions (2.4)
	Smart (2.2)
	Normal, close to people (1.9)
	Pro-Europe (1.9)
	Strong (1.8)
	Passionate (1.6)
	Anti-American (0.9)
	Leader (0.9)
	Bipartisan (0.8)
	Not religious (0.5)

This endorsement was confirmed by the fact that Clegg was also described as being unfairly attacked and discredited against by his opponents and the media.

For example, the editorial of *The Guardian* following the second debate declared that "The unhappiest line of the evening [...] was Mr Brown's insulting charge that Nick Clegg is 'anti-American'. He isn't, and opposing Iraq was not a sin" (23 April). Alan Travis also defended Clegg who was attacked over his immigration policies (*The Guardian*, 25 April). The journalist was angry at, and criticised, the other parties in order to make Clegg seem like the best option. Thus, it seems like *The Guardian* showed its partisanship in two ways: by praising one candidate in particular or criticising everyone else.

Although marginal, negative descriptions were also coded. However, these did not depict a bad image of Clegg. Indeed, the young leader was seen as not ready (15.3 per cent), pressured (12.8 per cent), defensive (10.5 per cent) or controversial (10.1 per cent of references coded for some of his controversial policy ideas such as shorter prison sentences or an amnesty for illegal migrants, among others). For example, some journalists such as Robert Booth and Alan Travis (20 April), leaned on expert studies to portray Clegg as wrong in his tax, poverty and economic policies. For others, it did not matter whether Clegg won the first debate as he was doomed to lose the election anyway: "Clegg might have performed [but] that was irrelevant given that the current electoral system would never see the Lib Dem leader made prime minister", "The choice of this election is between Brown and Cameron" (*The Guardian*, Nicholas Watt and Allegra Stratton, 16 April).

The Sun and News of the World

Table 4.8 indicates that 85.4 per cent of negative descriptions were coded for Brown in *The Sun* that depicted him as a bad PM (30.3 per cent), a manipulator (17 per cent), making many mistakes and gaffes (9.8 per cent) and thus losing the election in most cases (24 per cent). Journalists of *The Sun* and *News of the World* even felt like Brown had to lose the election, there was no other possibility regarding Labour's chaotic legacy. Using example after example, one of *The Sun*'s editorials showed that Brown was the cause of all of Britain's problems (6 May):

> The NHS is not safe with Labour. Nick Clegg would break it up. But the Tories will defend the NHS - and force hospitals to clean up.

> Labour have failed on Europe. They promised a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. They lied. (*The Sun*, editorial, 6 May)

TABLE 4.8: Percentage of negative and positive descriptions of Brown in *The Sun* and *News of the World*

Negative descriptions	Positive descriptions
Bad PM (30.3)	Pro-active (30.4)
Losing (24)	Victorious (26.8)
Manipulator (17)	Confident and determined (22.3)
Mistakes and gaffes (9.8)	Experienced (13.4)
Offensive, rude (6.7)	Decent man (6.3)
Desperate (5.2)	Family man (0.9)
Negative (2.4)	
Defensive (2.3)	
Peculiar physical traits (0.8)	
Socially awkward (0.8)	
Untrustworthy (0.8)	

Like *The Guardian*, *The Sun* also criticised Brown's physical traits (0.8 per cent). In the words of comedian Frankie Boyle, Brown "gave a strained smile that made his face look like a great white shark having its prostate examined" (30 April). Brown was also described as being negative (2.4 per cent) having nothing to offer but "negative attacks on the other parties" (Graeme Wilson and Kevin Schofield, 30 April) and "debt, tax, unemployment and scare stories" (*The Sun*, editorial, 30 April). This negativity was translated by the use of specific adjectives such as "rattled Gordon", "sinking Labour", "bad-tempered PM", "tired-looking", "desperate Mr Brown", "uninspiring performance" or "Prime Sinister". *The Sun* also showed its partisanship by writing specific words in capital letters. For example, "Labour can STILL win" suggests the danger and fear at Labour not winning the popular vote but winning the most seats anyway. Positive descriptions were almost insignificant in Brown's case as they only represented 14.6 per cent of all descriptions. Besides this huge difference in figures, journalists also attributed qualities to Brown (pro-active, experienced, decent man, among others) that all prime ministerial candidate would have in the running-up of an election.

As shown in Table 4.9, I coded a majority of negative descriptions for Clegg (64.7 per cent). The Lib Dem leader was viewed as a dangerous manipulator (47.6 per cent), a novice (9.8 per cent) who cannot explain his policies (6.2 per cent) and is doomed to lose (16.9 per cent). The tabloid also went further by calling Clegg stupid in 3 per cent of references, weak in 1.6 per cent of references and arrogant in 1.1 per cent of references. The adjectives used to describe Clegg further show that *The Sun* framed the Lib Dem leader negatively: “evasive”, “empty vessel”, “lightweight”, “dangerous”, “utopian view” or “faltering performance”. Apart from specific vocabulary, the tabloid used other tactics to be anti-Clegg. For example, rhetorical sentences standing as paragraphs on their own were used: “Still think Nick Clegg can rescue the ailing country?” (Jane Moore, 21 April). Furthermore, inverted commas to undermine Clegg’s achievements were also used: “the day after his ‘victory’ at the first leaders’ debates” (Jane Moore, 21 April). Other journalists followed that lead by undermining Clegg’s victory in the first debate (“But it’s not so much him winning the debate as the others losing it. Every time Cameron and Brown argued, the winner was Clegg”, Frank Luntz, 17 April) or stressing other elements (Clegg undoubtedly won the first debate but Cameron was voted best potential PM in many polls, which is much more important).

Half as many positive references depicted Clegg as pro-active (13.4 per cent), cool and fresh (7.1 per cent), very popular (5 per cent) and aggressive (6.3 per cent). These descriptions did not improve Clegg’s image as they were just a list of facts that could be attributed to any candidate. For example, although only a few articles contained references to Clegg winning the election, many actually depicted him as victorious (54.2 per cent) as he was said to have won the debates and an unprecedented number of seats for the Lib Dems. Moreover, references were coded for Clegg being unfairly attacked and discredited, which shows that not all journalists followed the editorial stance. For example, Donald MacLeod (24 April) defended Clegg who was massively attacked by pro-Cameron media (including *The Sun*!). With humour, the journalist showed that Clegg was seen as being responsible for everything and anything: "NICK CLEGG ATE MY HAMSTER!", "NICK NICKS NAZI GOLD TO FUND AL-QAEDA!" or "NICK CLEGG HAD SEX WITH THE MEMORY OF DIANA" (24 April).

TABLE 4.9: Percentage of negative and positive descriptions of Clegg in *The Sun* and *News of the World*

Negative descriptions	Positive descriptions
Manipulator and dangerous (47.6)	Victorious (54.2)
Losing (16.9)	Pro-active (13.4)
Novice (9.8)	Cool, fresh (7.1)
Not representing change (6.4)	Aggressive (6.3)
Cannot explain his policies (6.2)	Representing change (5.5)
Too close to Brussels (3.7)	Confident and determined (5)
Stupid (3)	Very popular, Cleggmania (5)
Rich (2.3)	Honest (3.4)
Weak (1.6)	
Defensive (1.4)	
Arrogant (1.1)	

Cameron was overwhelmingly framed positively (87 per cent) as shown by Table 4.10. The Conservative leader was described as being pro-active (17.2 per cent), a saviour who will bring change (14.8 per cent), aggressive (12.1 per cent), confident and determined (8.3 per cent) and thus victorious in most cases (16 per cent). This victory was attributed to Cameron in sometimes unconventional ways. For example, Graeme Wilson declared Cameron the winner after analysing who stuttered the most, who was smiling the most or who was the most serious (1 May). These categories have nothing to do with substance and show that *The Sun* wanted to declare Cameron the winner at all costs. This was confirmed by former political editor of *The Sun* Trevor Kavanagh who declared that "Mr Cameron has had poor reviews for his performance. But he actually scored on all the key points worrying voters" (19 April). This positivity was translated through adjectives used to describe Cameron: "statesman-like", "strong", "smart", "family man", "hope", "saviour", "best candidate" or "best potential PM". The tabloid went further by being emotionally partisan: hope, enthusiasm and admiration were almost systematically associated with Cameron, whereas fear, anger, frustration and hate were linked to other candidates or a possible hung parliament. Cameron was also seen as being unfairly attacked and discredited. An insignificant number of negative references (13 per cent negative references) were also coded. However, these were more a list of facts (losing, defensive or rich, among others) than descriptions aimed at counter-balancing the positive and victory framing of Cameron by *The Sun*.

TABLE 4.10: Percentage of negative and positive descriptions of Cameron in *The Sun* and *News of the World*

Negative descriptions	Positive descriptions
Losing (33.9) Manipulator (27.7) Not ready to be PM (23.2) Defensive (8) Desperate (4.5) Rich (2.7)	Pro-active (17.2) Victorious (16) Saviour, representing change (14.8) Aggressive (12.1) Determined and confident (8.3) Strong (7.3) Close to people (6.4) Family man (5.2) Leader (4.9) Good for substantive questions (3.9) Trustworthy (1.7) Optimistic (1.3) Patriotic (0.8)

C. Emotions

I now take a closer look at emotions displayed by journalists, candidates and sources. In the American case, emotions represented 18.2 per cent of the whole coverage of *The New York Times* and split into three groups: journalists (59.1 per cent of all emotions coded), sources (25.6 per cent) and candidates (15.2 per cent). Similarly, emotions represented 22.3 per cent of the whole coverage of the *New York Post* with 67.8 per cent of emotions coded for journalists, 20.4 per cent for sources and 11.7 per cent for candidates. As for the British case, emotions represented 23 per cent of the coverage of *The Guardian* and 26.2 per cent of that of *The Sun*. I coded 60.3 per of all emotional references for journalists, 21 per cent for candidates and 18.7 per cent for sources in *The Guardian* and *The Observer*. Similarly, 72.3 per cent of all emotional references were coded for journalists, 14.3 per cent for candidates and 13.3 per cent for sources in *The Sun* and *News of the World*. The type of newspaper article (e.g. news story, opinion piece, editorial) is noted for each example discussed here, which shows what type of articles contained emotions.

Emotions displayed by journalists

Emotions displayed by journalists was the most coded and widespread group for all newspapers analysed. In the American case, although both newspapers used a fairly broad range of emotions - from positive ones such as love or enthusiasm to negative ones such as anger or disappointment - many differences arose between the two. From Figure 4.5, it can be seen that American journalists from *The New York Times* mainly used humour (42.5 per cent of references coded) and emotions such as anger (19.7 per cent), disappointment (15.2 per cent) and frustration (9.7 per cent). Journalists also marginally used fear (4.1 per cent), love (1.2 per cent) or anxiety (1 per cent). Therefore, no specific positive or negative emotions were put forward. Along those lines, the NYT avoided more intense emotions such as admiration (0.4 per cent) or hate (0 per cent).



FIGURE 4.5: Percentage of humour and emotions displayed by journalists in *The New York Times* and *New York Post*

Anger was the most coded emotion in the coverage of the NYT. In the following example discussing the controversial past of the co-chairman of the Romney campaign, John Sununu, it can be seen that anger was translated by certain expressions and the use of short sentences (NYT, opinion piece, Charles Blow, 27 October):

> For starters, he is no stranger to racism controversies. When George H.W. Bush selected him as chief of staff in 1988, The New York Times reported:
> "Mr. Sununu's selection was shadowed by concern among some key Jewish leaders. The 49-year-old New Hampshire Governor, whose father is Lebanese and who takes pride in his Arab ancestry, was the only governor to refuse to sign a June 1987 statement denouncing a 1975 United Nations resolution that equated Zionism with racism."
> But that wasn't his undoing. It was his actions. In 1991, Sununu became enmeshed in a scandal over using government planes for personal trips.

Furthermore, anger was also used directly in relation to topics that were ignored by candidates during the debates. For example, anger was used in relation to the lack of discussion concerning gun control:

> People, have you noticed how regularly this topic fails to come up? We have been having this campaign since the dawn of the ice age. Why wasn't there a gun control moment before now? (NYT, opinion piece, Gail Collins, 20 October)

Thus, it seems that some of the *Ignored Issues* such as gun control triggered many emotions, especially anger, from American journalists.

The NYP used humour (16.3 per cent of references coded) as well as mixed emotions, especially anger (43 per cent) and admiration (21.1 per cent). Fewer references to disappointment (7.5 per cent), frustration (4.1 per cent) and enthusiasm (1.9 per cent), among others, were also identified. Unlike the NYT, the tabloid used stronger emotions such as admiration and hate. For example, Michael Goodwin was angry at Obama who:

> failed as president because he is incompetent, dishonest and not interested in the actual work of governing. His statist policies helped consign millions of Americans to a lower standard of living and his odious class warfare further divided the nation. He had no intention of uniting the country - it was his Big Lie. [...] I sure as hell don't trust him. (NYP, opinion piece, Michael Goodwin, 1 November)

Parallel to this anger towards anything relating to Obama, grew an intense admiration for Romney who was much "more substantial, more formidable" than Obama:

> He was neither sinister nor condescending. He seemed neither comically out-of-touch nor secretly hostile to the interests of ordinary people. He didn't sound like a man out to raise the taxes of the deserving

> middle class to benefit the undeserving rich, or one determined to separate America's working people from their jobs and retirees from their benefits. Rather, he came across like a well-prepared, confident, thoughtful leader with tons of plans at his fingertips, plans he's eager to use to hoist the country out of the economic ditch. (NYP, opinion piece, John Podhoretz, 5 October)

Goodwin sustained the same mood by saying that Romney "managed to touch all the conservative erogenous zones while, in the same 90 minutes, present himself to independents as a sensible, pragmatic alternative to the president" during the first debate (opinion piece, 7 October).

Similar results were identified for the coverage of the British debates. Figure 4.6 shows that both British newspapers used similar emotions with varying degrees. *The Guardian* framed its coverage with an overwhelming use of humour (37.6 per cent of references coded) as well as frustration (17 per cent), anger (15.6 per cent) and disappointment (8.1 per cent). With the exception of humour, these emotions are all negative. *The Guardian* also used, to a lesser extent, fear (5.7 per cent), admiration (5.4 per cent), hope (4.1 per cent), enthusiasm (2.5 per cent) and anxiety (1.6 per cent). All other emotions were below 0.7 per cent.

The most coded emotions, frustration and anger, therefore affected the coverage of *The Guardian*. Frustration was used by many journalists such as Marina Hyde when describing the post-debate atmosphere (opinion piece, 23 April):

> To the left, George Osborne repeating robotically: "David Cameron showed passion, leadership and commitment. David Cameron showed passion, leadership and commitment." To the right, Michael Gove simulating anguish that Nick Clegg should have referred to the dead Polish president's party as "nutters" - "the sort of comment that no one who wants to be taken seriously should utter". In the middle, Alastair Campbell failing to pull off sang froid: "It's a poll, it's a poll

> - you can take them or leave them." And unifying the picture, Sky's endlessly pant-wetting coverage of its own coverage.



FIGURE 4.6: Percentage of humour and emotions displayed by journalists in *The Guardian* and *The Sun*

This frustration was often linked to anger and was translated by specific words such as "rotten, broken electoral system", "one of the grossest acts of gerrymandering in British political history", "absurd", "his mates and sugar daddies", "bloodsuckers" or "outrage". This anger was also directed at other newspapers and politicians constantly attacking Clegg through smear stories. Nicholas Watt said that "newspapers may have started to forget how detested they are" (opinion piece, 16 April).

Despite also using admiration, hope, disappointment and hate, *The Sun* predominantly framed its coverage with humour (15.1 per cent of references coded), anger (34.1 per cent), fear (13.9 per cent) and frustration (11.2 per cent). Anger was the most coded emotion and was mainly directed at Clegg and Brown. For example, Trevor Kavanagh showed his anger at Brown for destroying the British economy: "Today it is a debt-ridden island with a debauched currency, a million unemployed school-leavers and five million on welfare. Thanks a trillion, Gordon" (opinion piece, 26 April). In another instance, Andrew Nicoll compared Clegg to a horse bug called “cleg” (news story, 20 April):

> N. CLEGG. An annoying, frantic, ugly pest which buzzes around larger beings trying to find a way to survive. Sustains its short-lived life by desperately sucking on the blood of anything it comes into contact with.
> A CLEG An insect.

Journalists of *The Sun* also defended their right to be angry as they considered anger as sound and vital in politics (“Anger at our politicians is a just and formidable force”, Trevor Kavanagh, opinion piece, 19 April).

Journalists of *The Sun* also used fear and frustration during the campaign. Fear was directed at issues and policies (“We are terrified at the parlous nature of the economy and what that will mean for our incomes, our jobs, our future”, *The Sun*, editorial, 6 May) or candidates themselves (i.e. Clegg: “The ex-MEP and former Brussels Eurocrat is eager for Britain to dump the Pound and sign up to a full-blooded European superstate”, Trevor Kavanagh, opinion piece, 19 April). Fear was closely linked to frustration as shown in the next example (opinion piece, Fraser Nelson, 18 April):

> Gordon Brown boasted in the debate that 2.5 MILLION jobs have been created. But most came straight off the boat. It’s a disgraceful situation. We put our own people on welfare, and suck up overseas workers. And call it progress. All leaders say they’d act. But the truth is that we can’t - not against Bulgarians, Romanians or anyone from the European Union.

All of these examples suggest that journalists of all newspapers manipulated emotions to fit their narrative. For example, British journalist Polly Toynbee progressively introduced fear in her article by saying that Clegg will not be elected because of the British election system (“But it won’t happen this election because the abominable voting system makes it impossible", *The Guardian*, opinion piece, 25 April). She carried on spreading fear throughout the rest of the article to finish with the only choice presented to voters: "low tactics, not high romance. Vote what best keeps the Tory out where you are. Buck that arithmetic at your peril." Similarly, *The Sun* often frightened readers and discouraged them from voting for Brown or Clegg ("increasing borrowings", "stock markets are plunging", "perilous times", editorial, 6 May).

The analysis of humour in American and British newspapers is particularly revealing as there is a difference between humour identified in transcripts (mainly jokes aimed at making voters laugh) and in newspaper articles. Firstly, humour in all newspapers analysed took the form of funny comments or jokes. For example, a journalist wrote in the NYT:

> Hello, my name is David, and I'm a pollaholic. For the past several months I have spent inordinate amounts of time poring over election polls. A couple of times a day, I check the Web sites to see what the polling averages are. I check my Twitter feed to see the latest Gallup numbers. I've read countless articles dissecting the flawed methodologies of polls I don't like. (NYT, opinion piece, David Brooks, 23 October)

Similarly in the UK, *The Guardian* journalist Leo Hickman used humour through jokes in order to show people that there is life after an election stressing that the "first asparagus are already breaking through the soil", "strawberries are not far off", "Stevie Wonder is booked to play Glastonbury" or that "The World Cup in South Africa is only 35 days away" (opinion piece, 6 May). Along those lines, Frankie Boyle used humour in *The Sun* (guest opinion piece, 30 April) to comment on the aftermath of the "Bigotgate" (Brown calling one of his supporters a "bigot" while his microphone was still on):

> BIGOTGATE. I have to confess I thought that was a shopping centre in Essex.

> It was great to see Gordon Brown's interpersonal skills visibly downloading.
> It seemed to be the first time he'd met a human being - if someone smiled at me like that I'd smash them in the forehead with a crucifix.
> Brown then went directly to Mrs Duffy's home to prove that he is only human - which is why it took almost an hour.
> It shows how exciting this election is when the highlight of the entire campaign is an hour long close-up of a closed front door.

Secondly, journalists of all newspapers also used humour to mock and attack candidates. For example, *The Guardian* mocked Brown for using his sons during the second debate: "Worst moment: that line about Clegg and Cameron reminding him of his 'two young boys squabbling at bathtime'. Ouch. Oh" (*The Guardian*, editorial, 22 April). Humour also shifted to irony or sarcasm to convey a message or question candidates' behaviours and ideas by using frustration, anger or disappointment. The following examples illustrate the use of humour and irony in American newspapers:

> Up front I'd like to make clear that I am very pleased Mitt Romney got North Mali into the foreign policy debate - twice. He also, by the way, referred to it as 'the northern part of Mali.' Americans were riveted. The Timbuktu questions had seemed in danger of getting forgotten. It would have been in good company, along with the euro zone (and its little crisis), NATO, India, Brazil, the rest of Africa, the bloody fruitless 'surge' in Afghanistan, and assorted other minor topics. (NYT, opinion piece, Roger Cohen, 26 October)

> "Honest" Joe Biden strikes again. [...]. Joe Biden's recurring accidental "honesty" is just so refreshing, who needs a vice-presidential debate, anyway? (NYP, editorial, 12 October)

Thirdly, journalists of all newspapers also wrote fictions using humour. For example, *The Sun* journalist Bill Leckie wrote a fiction using humour to show that the debates need a different format (opinion piece, 15 April). The journalist suggested having different rules for the next debates such as Treasure Island themes with candidates being dressed and talking as pirates. Similarly, in the United States, Maureen Dowd wrote an emotional and humorous fictional scene where Jed Bartlet - starring as the President in the *The West Wing* TV show - met Obama (opinion piece, 6 October). She expressed her disappointment at Obama's first dull debate performance through Jed Bartlet's anger:

> **BARTLET** *(calling out)*: Don't even get out of the car!
> **BARACK OBAMA** *(opening the door of his limo)* Five minutes, that's all I want
> **BARTLET** Were you sleepy?
> **BARACK OBAMA** Jed -
> **BARTLET** Was that the problem? Had you just taken allergy medication? General anesthesia?

These examples suggest that journalists further passed on their message (e.g. discredit or praise a candidate, focus on, or ignore, some issues) by using humour and emotions in the specific context of fiction writing.

Finally, American and British journalists recognised the power of humour when used by politicians:

> Humour is often far more persuasive than anger or didacticism, making wit something to which our politicians (or their scriptwriters) should aspire. A good joke speaks of an agility of mind, a willingness to take risks, a gift for empathy and diffusing tension, and the ability to change the game by getting people to consider something from an alternative and perhaps unexpected angle. (*The Guardian*, opinion piece, Marina Hyde, 17 April)

> [...] people usually share emails that make them laugh. The Lib Dems' witty spoof site Labservative.com, a parody of a blended Labour/

> Conservative party, got twice as many YouTube plays as Samantha Cameron's video debut simply because it's funny. (*The Observer*, news story, Gaby Hinsliff, 12 April)

Humour was therefore a powerful tool used by journalists in the coverage of the debates, allowing them to go from funny comments to irony and sarcasm.

The presence of humour in American and British newspapers is in keeping with previous literature stating that journalists have been using humour for a long time (Holton and Lewis, 2011; Feldman, 2007), especially in satirical news programmes such as *Saturday Night Live* or *The Daily Show with Jon Stewart* in America (Feldman, 2007), which can partly be explained by the fact that humour can help persuade an audience (Markiewicz, 1974; Delaney, 2015) or share political news (Beckett, 2015). For some (Beckett, 2015), humour is no longer contained to opinion pieces and so-called "soft news" but it is now reaching "hard news". More particularly, my research agrees with Meyer (2000) who argues that humour allows people to be closer to their audience by creating a bridge between them. However, my research further argues that humour is also a means for journalists to pass their opinions and push for their agenda in different ways (e.g. subtler, more accessible) than if using emotions. Indeed, and going further than Holton and Lewis (2011) who only consider humour as funny, I see humour as a way for journalists and politicians to use positive emotions as well as negative ones such as frustration, disappointment or anger.

Before closing this sub-section, it is worth noting that, although emotions were predominantly present in opinion pieces in which journalists have more freedom to express their ideas and feelings (59.2 per cent and 64.5 per cent of all emotions were coded for opinion pieces in the NYT and NYP, respectively and 73.6 per cent and 68.6 per cent of all emotions were coded in opinion pieces in *The Guardian* and *The Sun*, respectively), some were also identified in news stories, which are supposed to be purely objective (40.8 per cent and 35.5 per cent of all emotions were coded for news stories in the NYT and NYP, respectively and 26.4 per cent and 31.4 per cent of emotions were coded for news stories in *The Guardian* and *The Sun*, respectively). As far as highbrow newspapers are concerned, American journalist John Broder used frustration in an article dealing with the lack of discussion on climate change:

> For all their disputes, President Obama and Mitt Romney agree that the world is warming and that humans are at least partly to blame. It remains wholly unclear what either of them plans to do about it.
> Even after a year of record-smashing temperatures, drought and Arctic ice melt, none of the moderators of the four general-election debates asked about climate change, nor did either of the candidates broach the topic. (*The New York Times*, news story, John Broder, 26 October)

Similarly, British journalist Mark Lawson used disappointment regarding the debates being too rehearsed and controlled (*The Guardian*, news story, 16 April):

> As had been widely feared, the 76 restrictions agreed between the parties, relating to answer-lengths and other procedural issues, removed the possibility of spontaneity or conflict, especially when added to the already labyrinthine regulations imposed on television during elections.

Emotions were also identified in news stories of tabloid newspapers. *New York Post* journalist Geoff Earle used disappointment in relation to the debates: "The candidates sometimes became so focused on their attacks that they even ignored the questioners" (news story, 17 October). Journalists of *The Sun* also used emotions in news stories such as frustration at Brown's mandate (news story, Tom Newton Dunn, Clodagh Hartley and Alex West, 30 April):

> GORDON Brown last night finally confessed in front of the nation to making mistakes as PM - after three long years of bungling in No10.

Humour was identified in both opinion pieces and news stories. For example, American Michael Barbaro and Ashley Parker joked about Romney's peculiar way of speaking (NYT, news story, 21 October)

> In Romneyspeak, passengers do not get off airplanes, they 'disembark.' People do not laugh, they 'guffaw.' Criminals do not go to jail, they land in the 'big house.' Insults are not hurled, 'brickbats' are.

Thus, journalists used different emotions to pass on their message, whether in an opinion piece or a news story.

Emotions displayed by candidates

In addition to using their emotions, journalists also displayed those of candidates in their reporting of the debates. In the American case, Figure 4.7 indicates the emotions coded for American candidates in both newspapers.



Figure 4.7: Percentage of humour and emotions displayed by candidates in *The New York Times* and *New York Post*

Both American newspapers portrayed candidates as mainly using humour (39.5 per cent of references for the NYT, 46.9 per cent for the NYP) and anger (16.7 per cent for the NYT, 20.8 per cent for the NYP). For example, Richard A. Oppel Jr. used a direct quote of one of Obama's jokes after a first dull debate performance (NYT, news story, 20 October):

> As some of you may have noticed, I had a lot more energy in our second debate. I felt really well-rested after the nice long nap I had in the first debate. [...] I learned that there are worse things that can happen to you on your anniversary than forgetting to buy a gift. (NYT, news story, Richard A. Oppel Jr., 20 October)

Similarly, the Benghazi Consulate attack was reported on using paraphrase and a direct quote of Romney being angry:

> At the military school, Romney hammered Obama for saying the deadly anti-America protests and riots in the Middle East are just 'bumps in the road'. 'I don't consider the killing of our diplomat in Libya a bump in the road. And I sure as heck don't consider Iran becoming nuclear a bump in the road,' he said. (NYP, news story, S.A. Miller, 1 October)

In some cases, American journalists of both newspapers wrote about Obama and Romney being angry during the debates, almost depicting candidates fighting one another. For example, Obama was quoted following the deadly terrorist attack at the Benghazi Consulate:

> The suggestion that anybody in my team, whether the secretary of state, our U.N. ambassador, anybody on my team would play politics or mislead when we've lost four of our own, Governor, is offensive. [...] That's not what we do. That's not what I do as president. (NYT, news story, Jim Rutenberg and Jeff Zeleny, 17 October):

Ryan was quoted answering back:

> First they blame a YouTube video and a nonexistent riot. [...] Then when the country's getting upset about it, they blame Romney and Ryan for getting people upset about it. (NYT, news story, Jim Rutenberg and Jeff Zeleny, 17 October)

In another article, Ryan was quoted telling the story of Romney and the Nixons but was immediately interrupted by Biden who told the audience about the deaths of his wife and daughter in a car accident:

> Mr. Ryan made a point of praising Mr. Romney, even trying to soften his image by recounting a time when Mr. Romney gave money and attention to a couple whose children were badly injured in a car accident. It wasn't the best example to use, because it prompted Mr. Biden to describe his own tragedy, when his wife and young daughter were killed in a car crash. (NYT, news story, Alessandra Stanley, 12 October)

Anger was thus used to show disagreement as well as tensions and battles raging between candidates. All other emotions such as love, pride or anxiety were below 5.2 and 8.4 per cent for the NYT and NYP, respectively, while they were extensively used by candidates during the debates (see previous chapter).

Although my previous chapter concluded that all candidates used mixed emotions, journalists of the NYP and NYT focused on negative ones. *New York Post* journalist Rich Lowry emphasised that Obama had "run [...] a remorselessly negative campaign" (opinion piece, 22 October), which was corroborated by NYT journalist David Brooks who stated that Obama "seemed driven by the negative passion of stopping Republican extremism" (opinion piece, 5 October). Brooks urged Obama to find positive emotions ("he'll have to develop a positive passion for something he actually wants to do") as if positive emotions were vital for presidential candidates (opinion piece, 5 October). These results are in accordance with my previous chapter that argued that Obama may have been a positive candidate (hope and change) in 2008 but that image changed in the 2012 debates in which Romney was the most positive candidate. Also in accordance with my previous chapter is the fact that Biden was seen as much more emotional than Ryan by journalists. Indeed, NYT journalist David Brooks stated that the "generation war" between Biden and Ryan explains why Biden is more emotionally outspoken and Ryan emotionally shy (opinion piece, 5 October). This negativity was also highlighted by foreign news outlets, mainly from Russia, which noticed that candidates used negative emotions towards each other such as hate:

> The fashion in the last two weeks of this election season: It was decided to fill voters' hearts and minds not with love for their candidate, but with hatred for the other. (NYT, news story, Ellen Barry, 25 October)

The framing of newspapers also triggered negative emotions for candidates and their team. Following the first debate, Obama's aides were "worried that the news media, anxious for a compelling story line, would be primed to write a Romney comeback story." (NYT, news story, Mark Landler and Peter Baker, 6 October).

Similar results were identified for the coverage of the British debates. Figure 4.8 shows what emotions were used by candidates in each newspaper.



Figure 4.8: Percentage of humour and emotions displayed by candidates in *The Guardian* and *The Sun*

The Guardian put forward fear (25.1 per cent of references coded), anger (19.9 per cent) and humour (17.6 per cent) used by candidates. To a lesser extent, candidates were also depicted using anxiety (7.9 per cent), hope (6.5 per cent), enthusiasm (4.5 per cent), love (4.5 per cent), empathy (3.2 per cent) and pride (2.7 per cent). All other emotions (frustration, happiness, admiration, sadness, disappointment, hate and hopelessness) were all below 2.1 per cent. *The Sun* highlighted anger (23.3 per cent), fear (19.8 per cent) and hope (12.8 per cent) displayed by candidates. To a lesser extent, the tabloid focused on humour (9.9 per cent), love (8.7 per cent) and empathy (8.1 per cent) used by candidates. All other emotions (happiness, anxiety, enthusiasm, admiration, disappointment, pride, sadness and cynicism) were below 3.6 per cent.

Furthermore, Brown, Cameron and Clegg were depicted using the same emotions as British journalists in newspaper articles. For example, Patrick Wintour's and Polly Curtis' anger at smear stories directed at Clegg was accentuated by the Lib Dem leader himself ("let's save time and assume that every time you talk about our policy you are simply wrong" said Clegg to Cameron during the debates, *The Guardian*, news story, 30 April). In another example, Graeme Wilson and Kevin Schofield supported their favourite candidate, Cameron, by using a direct quote of the Conservative leader getting angry at Brown: "He is trying again to frighten people and actually he should be ashamed" (*The Sun*, news story, 30 April). These examples suggest that journalists were using candidates' emotions not only to fit their narrative as shown by the previous sub-section but also to reinforce their arguments.

Emotions displayed by sources

The two previous sections established that journalists used emotions in two ways: they displayed their emotions and those of candidates. Emotions displayed by sources have to be added to this list as journalists carefully chose what sources to contact, what questions to ask and what quotes to use. Before detailing what emotions were used by sources, it is worth mentioning who these sources were in the first place. In the American case, Figure 4.9 indicates what types of source *The New York Times* and *New York Post* used to cover the debates. From this figure, it can be seen that, although both newspapers used the same types of source, the NYT primarily relied on quotes from PR people, subject experts (e.g. researchers, think tanks, institutes and centres), private individuals and politicians. The NYP mainly relied on quotes from private individuals, politicians, subject experts and PR people.



Figure 4.9: Type of source used in *The New York Times* and *New York Post*

Similarly, Figure 4.10 shows the type of source used by *The Guardian* and *The Sun* during the coverage of the debates. Although *The Guardian* and *The Sun* used the same types of sources, the tabloid predominantly focused on quotes from private individuals and politicians, whereas *The Guardian* mainly relied on quotes from politicians, PR people and subject experts (e.g. researchers, institutions).

Mostly relevant for the next chapter, tweets respectively represented 1.3 and 12.7 per cent of *The New York Post*'s and *New York Times*' sources. More specifically, these tweets were posted by subject experts, journalists, politicians, PR people and private individuals as shown in Figure 4.11. From this figure, it can be seen that, although both newspapers used tweets from the same sources, the NYP used tweets from private individuals, journalists, politicians and experts and the NYT relied on tweets from private individuals, PR people and experts only.



FIGURE 4.10: Type of source used in *The Guardian* and *The Sun*

Along those lines, both *The Guardian* and *The Sun* used tweets as a subset of journalistic sources. Tweets represented 11.5 and 2.7 per cent of sources used by *The Guardian* and *The Sun*, respectively. Figure 4.12 shows that both newspapers used the same sources of tweets. However, *The Guardian* mainly focused on tweets from private individuals, journalists, politicians, PR people and experts, while *The Sun* chose tweets from politicians, private individuals and PR people only.

Figure 4.13 and Figure 4.14 indicate what emotions were coded for sources in both American and British newspapers, respectively. As far as the American coverage is concerned, sources of the NYT were depicted as mainly using negative emotions with 21.3 per cent of references coded for anger, 18.5 per cent for disappointment, 15.2 per cent for anxiety and 8.6 per cent for frustration. For example, Susan Saulny used a quote from one of her disappointed sources to finish her article on the first debate:

> Ms. Gardner, a homemaker and dog breeder, said, 'I felt that Obama lost some of his passion. This time, when he was speaking, he just didn't have that'. (NYT, news story, Susan Saulny, 4 October)



FIGURE 4.11: Type of Twitter user identified in *The New York Times* and *New York Post*



FIGURE 4.12: Type of Twitter user identified in *The Guardian* and *The Sun*

This view was echoed in Brian Stelter's article that reflected the opinions of bored sources after the last debate:

> Half an hour into the presidential debate on Monday, the foreign policy analyst Anne-Marie Slaughter could not muster up any enthusiasm. Her son evidently agreed; he was checking the baseball score a few minutes later [...]. (NYT, news story, Brian Stelter, 23 October)



Figure 4.13: Percentage of humour and emotions displayed by sources in *The New York Times* and *New York Post*

Sources were, however, also portrayed as using humour and positive emotions when Obama used humour ("we also have fewer horses and bayonets") and told an emotional personal story about a child whose father died in the 9/11 attacks in American newspapers. Leaning on these examples, I argue that the emotions displayed by candidates kept people and, in this case, sources watching the debates. This is corroborated by NYT source and former chief executive of NBC Universal Jeff Zucker who argues that:

> Television is about drama [...] and these debates have provided incredibly great drama. It just proves the adage that if you put on a good show, and both of these debates have been very good television, the audiences are going to be there. (NYT, news story, David Carr, 15 October)

Thus, emotions and personal stories can be considered as motivations for political action as candidates, through sometimes dramatic emotions and anecdotes, helped to keep viewers involved in the political process. Indeed, although sources predominantly used negative emotions, the emotions displayed by candidates triggered more enthusiasm and desire to keep watching.

The framing of sources in the NYP was less clear-cut as sources were depicted using humour (35.2 per cent of references coded) and anger (32.4 per cent) but also marginally, disappointment (8 per cent), hope (6.3 per cent), cynicism (5.1 per cent), enthusiasm (5.1 per cent) and hate (3.4 per cent), among others. For example, Obama supporters were shown as being angry after the first debate:

> At the end of the debate, the highly excitable pseudo-conservative-turned-hot-leftist Obama fancier Andrew Sullivan spoke for many on his side when he was reduced to heartbroken profanity on Twitter: 'How is Obama's closing so f–king sad, confused, lame? He choked. He lost. He may even have lost election tonight'. (NYP, opinion piece, John Podhoretz, 4 October)

Romney also triggered anger when saying that he would suppress Planned Parenthood. Waitress Marianne Reilly declared:

> "That's terrible," she fumed. "There are girls that need to go there [to Planned Parenthood] because they aren't rich like Mitt Romney, or Barack Obama for that matter". (NYP, news story, Geoff Earle and S.A. Miller, 23 October)

Some sources decided not to show their anger or frustration at Obama's failed first debate, but rather to laugh about it as Jimmy Fallon did for example:

> That's right, after months of buildup, last night was the first presidential debate at the University of Denver. Of course, a lot of big

> names didn't show up to the event - Joe Biden, Nancy Pelosi, President Obama. (NYP, news story, Todd Venezia and S.A. Miller, 5 October)

This anger was also used by the sources of the NYP to criticise other people's emotions. For example, Mayor Bloomberg was angry at the empathy displayed by candidates regarding gun control issues:

> I think it's incumbent on the candidates who want our votes to say what they would do about it and not just say, "Isn't it terrible? I feel your pain". (NYP, news story, David Seifman, 2 October)

Very similar results were identified for the British coverage of the debates. *The Guardian*'s sources were predominantly depicted using anger (26.5 per cent of references coded) and humour (17.5 per cent). For example, Lord Mandelson, Labour's election strategist, was quoted showing anger at the Conservatives using smear tactics to attack other candidates:

> It violates some basic rules of electioneering in this country. This is born of Tory panic, the Tories pushing the smear button in the hope that it will damage Clegg and they will get the benefit. It is cheap and rather squalid. If a Tory campaign is sub-contracted to someone like Andy Coulson it is no surprise that things like this are going to appear on the front pages of our newspapers. (*The Guardian*, news story, Patrick Wintour, 23 April)

Lord Mandelson was also quoted using anger in relation to these scare tactics in another article:

> And by the way, don't give us any lectures about frightening, scare-mongering advertisements. This was the advertisement that the Conservative party put up all over the country - a tombstone designed to

> frighten elderly people. That's rich coming from them; let's not hear anything more of their hypocrisy. (*The Guardian*, news story, Polly Curtis, 23 April)

To a lesser extent, sources were also shown using enthusiasm (10.6 per cent), anxiety (9.5 per cent), disappointment (7.8 per cent), fear (5.3 per cent), frustration (5 per cent), cynicism (4.2 per cent), hope (4.2 per cent) and admiration (2.8 per cent). All other emotions (pride, disgust, hate, love, sadness and shame) were below 2.6 per cent of references coded.



FIGURE 4.14: Percentage of humour and emotions displayed by sources in *The Guardian* and *The Sun*

The Sun's sources were mainly portrayed using anger (30.6 per cent of references coded) and anxiety (16.9 per cent). For example, soldier's wife Sarah Bennett Thurston was quoted using anxiety and anger regarding rising petrol prices:

> My biggest concern is petrol prices - they are ridiculous. We've got three kids and family and friends all over but now we have to think

> twice about every journey we make. I'm sick of the Government holding us to ransom for using our cars. (*The Sun*, interview, Bella Battle, 4 May)

Student Maria Gardner was also quoted showing anxiety regarding the unemployment rate:

> Unemployment does worry me. I tried to apply for a summer job as a cleaner and the firm had to take the advertisement off their website as they were so swamped with replies. (*The Sun*, interview, Rebecca Ley, 20 April)

To a lesser extent, the tabloid's sources were also quoted using fear (10.6 per cent), humour (10 per cent) and frustration (9.4 per cent) with other emotions being below 5.7 per cent.

In addition to analysing what emotions sources used, Table 4.11 and Table 4.12 indicate the percentage of emotions and humour displayed by each type of source in *The New York Times* and *New York Post.* These two tables highlight that the same types of users were featured displaying different emotions from one newspaper to another. For example, the NYT quoted experts mainly being anxious (28.3 per cent) and hopeful (17.4 per cent), politicians and PR people mainly angry (37.2 and 16.7 per cent, respectively) and using humour (25.6 and 19.4 per cent, respectively), journalists mainly disappointed (40 per cent) and using humour (28), private individuals mainly angry (26 per cent) and disappointed (22.9 per cent) and finally Twitter users mainly disappointed (37.5 per cent), angry (25 per cent) and using humour (25 per cent). However, the NYP described experts as mainly being angry (80 per cent), journalists using humour (50 per cent) and being angry (30 per cent), politicians being angry (52.2 per cent) and hopeful (34.8 per cent), PR people being equally anxious, enthusiastic, hopeful and using humour (all 25 per cent), private individuals being angry (33.3 per cent) and cynical (21.4 per cent) and, finally, Twitter users overwhelmingly using humour (74.3 per cent).

TABLE 4.11: Percentage of emotions and humour according to each type of source in *The New York Times*

	Experts	**Journalists**	**Politicians**	**PR people**	**Private individuals**	**Twitter users**
Admiration	0	4	0	5.6	2.1	0
Anger	10.9	20	37.2	16.7	26	25
Anxiety	28.3	4	2.3	8.3	13.5	0
Disappointment	17.4	40	4.7	5.6	22.9	37.5
Enthusiasm	0	0	2.3	11.1	3.1	0
Fear	13	0	14	5.6	1	0
Frustration	10.9	4	0	11.1	13.5	12.5
Gratefulness	0	0	0	2.8	0	0
Hate	0	0	0	0	1	0
Hope	17.4	0	11.6	11.1	5.2	0
Humour	2.2	28	25.6	19.4	7.3	25
Love	0	0	0	2.8	1	0
Pride	0	0	2.3	0	3.1	0

TABLE 4.12: Percentage of emotions and humour according to each type of source in the *New York Post*

	Experts	**Journalists**	**Politicians**	**PR people**	**Private individuals**	**Twitter users**
Anger	80	30	52.2	0	33.3	8.6
Anxiety	0	0	0	25	2.4	0
Cynicism	0	0	0	0	21.4	0
Disappointment	0	0	8.7	0	9.5	17.1
Empathy	0	0	4.3	0	0	0
Enthusiasm	0	10	0	25	9.5	0
Fear	0	10	0	0	0	0
Hate	0	0	0	0	7.1	0
Hope	0	0	34.8	25	0	0
Humour	20	50	0	25	11.9	74.3
Shame	0	0	0	0	4.8	0

As for the American case, the British results indicate that similar types of users were not featured using the same emotions from one newspaper to the other, as shown by Table 4.13 and Table 4.14. However, almost each type of user was described using anger in both newspapers. In *The Guardian*, experts were mainly angry (27.3 per cent) and disappointed (25 per cent), journalists used humour (29.7 per cent) and enthusiasm (16.2 per cent), politicians were angry (32.8 per cent) and enthusiastic (15.5 per cent), PR people and private users were angry (49 and 37 per cent, respectively) and, finally, Twitter users used humour (62.5 per cent) and anger (15 per cent). In *The Sun*, experts were described as being angry (66.7 per cent) and anxious (33.3 per cent), politicians as being angry (61.5 per cent) and hateful (15.4 per cent), PR people as being angry (40 per cent), anxious (20 per cent) and hopeful (20 per cent), private individuals as being anxious (25.3 per cent), angry (17.3 per cent) and frustrated (17.3 per cent) and, finally, Twitter users as using humour (75 per cent) and being anxious (16.7 per cent). As shown by Figure 4.10, journalists were not used as a type of source by *The Sun*. It is also worth noting that the maximum number of references to humour was almost always identified for Twitter users in all newspapers analysed, indicating that humour was an important aspect of expressing emotions on social media during the debates.

This section on emotions highlights that American and British journalists used their own emotions as well as those of candidates and sources to construct their reporting of the debates. Indeed, American and British journalists hijacked the emotions of sources and candidates to fit their narrative (e.g. take a serious quote and place it out of context to make readers laugh, get angry or become aware of something). Furthermore, in both case studies, candidates' manipulation of emotions and emotionality during the debates failed as journalists reacted mainly negatively to this manipulation of emotions. The emotions and emotionality displayed by candidates during the debates were only echoed positively by the newspapers that chose to endorse them in the first place (e.g. *The New York Times* and Obama, the *New York Post* and Romney, *The Sun* and Cameron, *The Guardian*

Table 4.13: Percentage of emotions and humour according to each type of source in *The Guardian*

	Experts	**Journalists**	**Politicians**	**PR people**	**Private individuals**	**Twitter users**
Admiration	0	10.8	5.2	3.9	0	0
Anger	27.3	10.8	32.8	49	37	15
Anxiety	11.4	2.7	8.6	2	13	0
Cynicism	4.5	2.7	1.7	0	7.4	0
Disappointment	25	8.1	3.4	0	7.4	0
Disgust	2.3	2.7	0	2	1.9	2.5
Enthusiasm	9.1	16.2	15.5	9.8	13	10
Fear	6.8	0	6.9	5.9	1.9	0
Frustration	0	2.7	6.9	9.8	1.9	5
Hate	0	5.4	0	0	0	0
Hope	13.6	0	1.7	3.9	0	2.5
Humour	0	29.7	10.3	9.8	11.1	62.5
Love	0	5.4	0	0	0	0
Pride	0	0	6.9	2	1.9	2.5
Sadness	0	0	0	2	1.9	0
Shame	0	2.7	0	0	1.9	0

Table 4.14: Percentage of emotions and humour according to each type of source in *The Sun*

	Experts	**Journalists**	**Politicians**	**PR people**	**Private individuals**	**Twitter users**
Admiration	0	0	0	0	1.3	0
Anger	66.7	0	61.5	40	17.3	0
Anxiety	33.3	0	7.7	20	25.3	16.7
Cynicism	0	0	0	0	5.3	0
Disappointment	0	0	0	0	9.3	0
Enthusiasm	0	0	3.8	20	2.7	0
Fear	0	0	7.7	0	10.7	0
Frustration	0	0	0	0	17.3	8.3
Hate	0	0	15.4	0	0	0
Hope	0	0	0	20	2.7	0
Humour	0	0	3.8	0	1.3	75
Pride	0	0	0	0	4	0
Sadness	0	0	0	0	2.7	0

and Clegg). Moreover, politicians were not the only ones to manipulate emotions and emotionality as journalists too manipulated emotional references to fit or reinforce their narrative.

D. Personal stories and relationships

Personal relationships and stories are composed of three elements (references to candidates' families, friends and personal stories) and give a more precise picture of the framing of the 2012 and 2010 debates as I consider personal relationships and stories as emotional. This category was less widespread in all newspapers analysed than emotions with 2.9 per cent of the whole coverage of the NYT (with 46.5 per cent of these coded for family, 11.5 per cent for friends and 42 per cent for personal stories) and 1.4 per cent of the whole coverage of the NYP (with 61.1 per cent of these coded for family, 9.3 per cent for friends and 29.6 per cent for personal stories) as indicated by Figure 4.15.



Figure 4.15: Percentage of personal relationships and stories in *The New York Times* and *New York Post*

The Guardian devoted 3.6 per cent of its coverage to personal relationships and stories, while *The Sun* devoted 2.2 per cent of its coverage to the same category. Figure 4.16 details the number of references for family, friends and personal personal for both newspapers.



Figure 4.16: Percentage of personal relationships and stories in *The Guardian* and *The Sun*

The press coverage of the American debates barely mentioned friends (11.5 per cent in the NYT and 9.3 in the NYP) in both newspapers. The only exceptions were when journalists discussed what possible friends of each candidate could take positions in the future government (NYT, Peter Baker and Ashley Parker, 20 October) or when journalists were angry at how many times Biden used the term "friend" during the debates ("It was pure bombast, as was his phony use of the phrase 'my friend' 14 times to refer to Ryan", NYP, Michael Goodwin, 12 October). Similarly, in Britain, references to candidates' friends were the least coded with only 4 per cent of references coded for *The Sun* and 14.8 per cent for *The Guardian*. These references described candidates' friends ("his friend from university", "his best friend"). *The Guardian* journalist Julian Glover emphasised the importance of friends in the communication strategy of candidates by saying that "Every party leader needs friends who tell journalists this sort of thing [compliments, praise]" (26 April). Fraser Nelson stressed the friendship that exists between journalists and candidates by saying "From what I know of Cam" or "CAM told me" (*News of the World*, 15 and 18 April).

More references were devoted to candidates' families in American and British newspapers. While NYT journalist Christine Haughney wrote about candidates' wives "waging their own campaigns in women's and celebrity magazines to show voters their spouses' softer sides" (8 October), the NYP editorial zoomed in on Romney's family ("I've got five boys. I'm used to people saying something that's not always true but just keep on repeating it, ultimately hoping I'll believe it.", 4 October). Similarly, *News of the World* journalist David Wooding talked about Cameron as a family man in his article (Cameron "revealed how he is preparing for the tough task ahead...by slipping into bed for secret daytime 'cuddles' with his wife!", 2 May). *The Sun* journalist Tom Newton Dunn associated specific emotions with Cameron's family: love was linked to Cameron's wife, children and job as an MP; admiration was linked to Cameron's supportive and working wife; and anger was linked to the expenses scandal and the failed criminal justice system (24 April). Along those lines, Allegra Stratton talked about Clegg suffering from his children's absence:

> His mood will not have been improved by being separated from his three sons, who cannot get back from Spain where they have been spending time with their grandmother. His wife, Miriam Gonzalez, has said that her husband has been more affected than she has by their children's absence. (*The Guardian*, Allegra Stratton, 20 April)

Journalists at *The Guardian* were also fascinated by the multi-cultural aspect of Clegg's family (e.g. Russian and Dutch ancestors, Spanish wife):

> Clegg's Russian great-great-aunt, Baroness Moura Budberg, has been called Moscow's answer to Mata Hari. A writer, she worked for both

> the Soviet Union and British intelligence after the Bolsheviks seized power. Her lovers allegedly included HG Wells, Maxim Gorky and Robert Bruce Lockhart, the British spy chief in Moscow who inspired James Bond. (*The Guardian*, Luke Harding, 21 April)

These examples suggest that all newspapers analysed focused on candidates' families to show the best sides of their favourite candidates. However, references to families, especially wives, also triggered anger and frustration from journalists. For example, in *The Observer*, Carole Cadwalladr argued that the "war of the wives" or "battle of the spouses" undermined women's role in politics (12 April). The journalist used anger, frustration and, to a lesser extent, cynicism, at the view of women in British political campaigns: "in Britain's democratic process in 2010, the only qualification a woman truly requires is a Level 1 NVQ in applying makeup and a short primer in how to accessorise one's handbag with one's shoes." Thus, newspapers used references to families in order to frame their favourite candidate to their very best advantage, even though this framing sometimes also triggered negative emotions.

Beyond framing each candidate at his best, American and British journalists also showed the growing importance of candidates' families in politics, which are now at the centre of the campaign ("There is a growing celebrity culture in this country [...] It is inevitable the leaders' families are much more prominent than a decade ago. The Obama election has played into that as well", *The Guardian*, Amelia Gentleman, 21 April). Furthermore, family values were paramount for voters ("I would like the next government to place more emphasis on family as I worry families aren't valued the way they used to be", *The Sun*, Bella Battle, 4 May) and were even a motivation to switch voting ("I used to vote Labour but see myself switching to Conservative - at least they have more pro-marriage, pro-family policies", *The Sun*, Bella Battle, 4 May). Along those lines, journalists also argued that candidates' families were strategic ways to get to voters ("New tactic: repeatedly mentioned his foreign-ish family (sod you Daily Mail), including 'mum' who was PoW liberated by Brits", *The Guardian*, Michael White, 23 April). For

Hadley Freeman, candidates used their family as an ultimate weapon to convince voters:

> David Cameron climbs further up his own family tree. He's shown us the kids. He's certainly shown us the wife. And now, as the winds of potential failure nip ever closer, in a move that defines the phrase "hitting the emergency supplies", has brought out his parents. (*The Guardian*, Hadley Freeman, 20 April)

The journalist also used humour to outline this family over-use: "William Hill is now offering odds of 4/1 that Cameron wheels out a second cousin twice removed in Thursday's debate". This is in accordance with Delaney (2015, p. 111) who showed the power of using candidates' families in the 1987 British general election that was fought on an "emotional basis". Indeed, it was only when Labour candidate Neil Kinnock talked about his wife, children and childhood during his party election broadcast that people began to be moved and that he got the best ratings since the start of the campaign. My results go further than Delaney's as they show that references to candidates' families were important for newspapers (e.g. used as topic in articles, to praise or discredit a candidate), voters (e.g. defending family values) and candidates (e.g. political communication).

Candidates' personal stories were more multidimensional and had a significant echo in newspapers. NYT journalist Alessandra Stanley started by criticising Obama for being very methodical (relying on numbers and studies) but was touched when he went personal and told an anecdote about the "struggles of his single mother and grandmother" (17 October). She did the same with Romney whose anecdotes, although less appreciated by the journalist, were also referred to in the article (e.g. his father was born in Mexico, Mrs Romney has family in Wales). In order to strengthen their narrative and articles, journalists also used personal stories that were not part of the debates. For example, an editorial of the NYT discussed Romney and "a close relative who died years before as result of complications from an illegal abortion to underscore his now-extinct support for Roe v. Wade" (16 October). The highbrow newspaper used that anecdote to discredit Romney who planned on suppressing the very institution that would have saved his friend's life, Planned Parenthood. Finally, personal stories were also considered by journalists as weapons of last resort to convince voters. For example, NYT journalist Trip Gabriel started by stating that Florida was vital for Romney who was losing in that state (7 October). He then stated that, to win Florida, Romney needed an ultimate weapon, personal stories, in order to "project a more compassionate side of his personality". British newspapers also mentioned personal anecdotes. For example, *The Sun* described Cameron as a normal man watching TV at night with his family:

> RELAXES by watching episodes of his favourite sitcom Friends and cop series Ashes To Ashes.
> FEARS going grey under the pressure of running the country - but has sworn never to use hair dye.
> LOVES watching Star Wars movies with his kids, dressing them up in character costumes and even speaking in 'intergalactic' languages.
> (*The Sun*, David Wooding, 2 May)

Similarly, *The Observer* described Brussels as the city of love for Clegg:

> Nick Clegg doesn't just like Europe, he loves it. Especially Belgium. He studied there (at the College of Europe in Bruges), worked there (in Brussels as an adviser to trade commissioner Leon Brittan and later as a member of the European parliament), and fell in love there (with his Spanish wife). Clegg says he could barely understand a word that Miriam Gonzalez Durantez said in their first few weeks together - but knew that he had discovered someone "magnificent". (*The Observer*, 20 April)

Many journalists underlined the importance of these personal stories. For example, American debate expert Michael Tomasky advised British candidates to "tell a human story or two. It's especially helpful if the story is attached to humans who happen to live in a crucial swing constituency" (*The Guardian*, 15 April). Consequently, more and more scrutiny was placed on the authenticity of candidates' anecdotes. For example, Oliver Burkeman showed that three of Cameron's anecdotes were misleading (*The Guardian*, 16 April). The first was about a £73,000 police Lexus car:

> Cameron claimed that he had visited a police station in Hull where they "had five different police cars, and they were just about to buy a £73,000 Lexus". [...] the Tory leader was wrong on two counts: the Lexus IS-F had been bought over a year ago and hadn't cost £73,000.

The second told the story of a black man that Cameron met in Plymouth:

> "I was in Plymouth recently and a 40-year-old black man actually made the point to me," Cameron recalled at the debate. "He said: 'I came here when I was six, I served in the Royal Navy for 30 years, I'm incredibly proud of my country, but I am so ashamed that we have had this out of control system with people abusing it so badly'." This, Cameron's critics swiftly noted, would have made the anonymous man just 10 years old when he joined the service in 1980.

And finally, Cameron also told a misleading anecdote about a burglary in Crosby:

> Cameron had been in Crosby "the other day", he said, "and I was talking to a woman there who had been burgled by someone who had just left prison and he stole everything in her house and, as he left, he set fire to the sofa and her son died from the fumes and that burglar, that murderer, could be out in four-and-a-half years." He was referring to the killing, in March 2008, of Ryan Dugdale, 21, by Liam O'Brien. The crime actually took place in Anfield, causing angry calls to the Crosby Herald yesterday from people who felt Cameron was unfairly branding Crosby - part of the new Lib Dem-Tory marginal seat of Sefton Central - as a dangerous place.

In these three examples, Burkeman depicted Cameron as a liar and manipulator. Thus, if perceived as inauthentic, anecdotes can trigger the opposite emotions that politicians were looking to elicit in the first place. In order words, anger can replace empathy, pride, admiration or support for a particular candidate.

The results presented in this section are in keeping with previous literature on the personalisation of, and intimacy in, politics. For some (Karvonen, 2009; Kinder, 1994; van Zoonen, 2004; Corner and Pels, 2003; Van Aelst et al., 2012; Manin, 1997), there is a current personalisation of politics, which focuses on individual politicians and issues rather than political parties and collective identities. In addition to this personalisation, Stanyer (2013) also highlights that there is a current "intimization" of politics, which focuses on the personal lives of politicians (e.g. their sex lives, marital problems, family lives, tastes in music, clothes or movies) in advanced industrial democracies. For researchers (Cushion, 2012; Haßler et al., 2014; Peters, 2011; Stanyer, 2013), intimacy in politics is also spread by journalists who affect the kind of information, mainly personal and emotional, that citizens receive. Indeed, journalists tend to focus on human and candidate-centred aspects of politics rather than substantive issues on television but also increasingly on social media where feelings and intimate relationships can be shared (Karvonen, 2009; Coward, 2009, 2013). My results indicate that journalists did not only use emotions in their coverage of the 2012 US and 2010 UK debates but also references to candidates' anecdotes, family and, less so, friends, in order to support or discredit a candidate, all of which showed the respective political orientation of the newspapers analysed.

E. Criticisms

The criticisms voiced by journalists have a direct link with the framing of the debates as they reveal what journalists were against: emotions, other elements, or both? In the American case, criticisms represented 8.6 per cent of the whole coverage of the NYT and 7.3 per cent of the coverage of the NYP, making criticisms the fourth most coded group of my framing analysis for both newspapers.

Figure 4.17 indicates that the NYT criticised *Candidates* (81.6 per cent of all other criticisms), *Issues and Policies* (9.7 per cent), *Politics and Campaigning* (4.2 per cent), *TV Debates* (3.1 per cent) and *America* (1.3 per cent). Similarly, the NYP criticised *Candidates* (73.1 per cent of all other criticisms), *TV Debates* (18.4 per cent), *Issues and Policies* (7.8 per cent) and *Politics and Campaigning* (0.7 per cent).

Criticisms of candidates are particularly revealing. Indeed, the NYT criticised both candidates but also Obama/ Biden and Romney/ Ryan separately. A total of 49.5 per cent of such criticisms were directed at both candidates (e.g. not enough substantive talk, too similar, too manipulative), for example:

> Both men argued that their policies would improve the lives of the middle class, but their discussion often dipped deep into the weeds, and they talked over each other without connecting their ideas to voters. (NYT, Jeff Zeleny and Jim Rutenberg, 4 October)

Moreover, 8.8 per cent of such criticisms were directed at Obama only (e.g. wealthy, passive, liar and arrogant), for example:

> Mr. Obama and his top political advisers are basically contemptuous of their opponent, according to people who have spent time with the president in private. (NYT, Albert R. Hunt, 1 October)

And finally, 41.7 per cent of candidate-directed criticisms focused on Romney only (e.g. manipulative, liar, no plan for foreign policy, dangerous for domestic policy). For example:

> He seems to consider himself, ludicrously, a leader similar to the likes of Harry Truman and George Marshall, and, at one point, he obliquely questioned Mr. Obama's patriotism. The hope seems to be that big propaganda, said loudly and often, will drown out Mr. Obama's respectable record in world affairs, make Americans believe Mr. Romney

> would be the better leader and cover up the fact that there is mostly just hot air behind his pronouncements. (NYT, editorial, 9 October)



FIGURE 4.17: Percentage of criticism in *The New York Times* and *New York Post*

Thus these results confirm earlier sub-sections (Sections A, B and C) stating that the NYT, although more balanced and objective than the NYP, nonetheless showed its support for Obama. Indeed, criticising both candidates or Romney only was another way for the NYT to support the Democrat candidate.

The NYP criticised almost exclusively Obama with 97.6 per cent of candidate-directed criticisms (e.g. manipulative, incompetent, arrogant, ignorant), for instance:

> That's it. Unemployment, the debt and deficit, the Mideast meltdown - none of it burdens him. He ducks the terrorist attack in Libya as just another day at the office and the mounting death toll in Afghanistan as not his problem. (NYP, Michael Goodwin, 3 October)

The tabloid also marginally criticised both candidates (2.4 per cent of all such criticisms). For example:

> [...] gun violence and 'mass incarceration' are issues being ignored by both candidates. (NYP, Ikimulisa Livingston, Geoff Earle and Carl Campanile, 16 October)

Romney alone was left uncriticised. These results are also in accordance with previous sections (A, B and C) showing that the NYP was more straightforward in its endorsement for Romney as the tabloid concentrated all negative references, including issues, emotions and criticisms, towards Obama, while admiring and praising Romney at all costs.

Minor criticisms were also common to both American newspapers. The NYT and NYP agreed that *TV Debates* were sometimes useless, not always objective and did definitely not contain enough political talk. Both newspapers further agreed on issues relating to *Politics and Campaigning*: polls are always confusing and cannot be trusted and American politics is generally inconsistent. Consensus was also key when criticising the handling of some *Issues and Policies* such as the situation in Syria and Libya or the state of the economy. The NYT further criticised *America* for being too racist and too self-absorbed. These minor criticisms thus show that although newspapers both framed their candidates to their advantage, they also criticised the same minor elements relating to the 2012 debates.

Similar results were identified in the British case with 4.5 per cent of the whole coverage of *The Guardian* and 4.1 per cent of *The Sun* being devoted to criticisms. As indicated by Figure 4.18, four criticisms were common to both British newspapers: *Candidates* (56 per cent of references coded for *The Guardian*, 56.7 per cent for *The Sun*), *Britain and British Politics* (27.6 per cent for *The Guardian*, 22.5 per cent for *The Sun*), *TV Debates* (7.8 per cent for *The Guardian*, 20.3 per cent for *The Sun*) and the *Economy* (3.5 per cent for *The Guardian*, 0.5 per cent for *The Sun*). *The Guardian* further criticised two other elements of the campaign: *the Media* (4.3 per cent) and *Education* (0.8 per cent).

Like for the American case, criticisms of *Candidates* were the most coded in the British press. For *The Guardian*, these criticisms were mainly directed at all candidates (60.8 per cent) and at Cameron only (20.1 per cent), Brown only (10 per cent) and Clegg only (3.8 per cent). Candidates were blamed for not addressing substantive issues enough, for being hypocrites and for diminishing Britain's reputation. While Cameron was accused of making things worse for Britain, Brown was criticised for constantly attacking his opponents and being unable to express himself. As already discussed in Section B, journalists were split regarding Brown's legacy as a PM. Indeed, journalists criticised the media for constantly attacking and discrediting Brown arguing that Labour "does not deserve to die" (*The Guardian*, Jackie Ashley, 3 May). In accordance with the findings discussed in Section B, Clegg emerged as barely criticised (3.8 per cent).



FIGURE 4.18: Percentage of criticisms in *The Guardian* and *The Sun*

Similarly, *The Sun* criticised all candidates (42.5 per cent) for being hypocrites and for not tackling Britain's main issues. *The Sun* also criticised Brown and Labour (38.7 per cent) for having failed Britain for 13 years and Clegg (18.2 per cent) for being dangerous for Britain. In accordance with Section B, Cameron, *The Sun*'s favourite candidate, was left uncriticised. Overall, my results show that criticising one candidate was another means for newspapers to show their support for another candidate.

Journalists of both newspapers also criticised *Britain and British Politics.* While *The Guardian* primarily focused on the inefficiency of the current British voting system, the need for more women in politics and the high level of racism in politics, *The Sun* stressed that British politics is corrupt and ineffective but that the voting system should remain the same fearing that the Conservatives would never access power again if it were to be changed. Much more consensus was obtained when discussing *TV Debates*, which were criticised for being fake, superficial and unrepresentative by both newspapers. TV debates were “fairly boring”, candidates resembled “second-guessing political automatons”, exchanges were “dull” (*The Guardian*). In summary, these debates were a “big political FLOP” leaving voters as “undecided as ever” (*The Sun*).

In the British case, minor criticisms included the *Economy*, *the Media* and *Education.* Indeed, both British newspapers criticised the poor handling of the economy that could lead to Greece’s situation, all of which triggered much anger and fear from journalists (“We are dumbstruck by the bankers and their bonus-led greed which brought the country to its knees”, *The Sun*, editorial, 6 May). *The Guardian* also marginally criticised education for having a “shortage of good schools” leading to “educational inequalities” and almost no “social mobility” (Catherine Bennett, 1 May). The highbrow newspaper also criticised the media for being dishonest and manipulative:

> I’ve been shocked this week by the degree to which the political classes - including the media - believe they can tell us all what to think. First there was the lunacy of journalists turning up after the “historic debate”, so that they could tell us what the party handlers told them that we saw and heard. Then there was the implication that positive reactions to Nick Clegg were the result of our ceaseless craving for “novelty” in our infantile X-Factor non-culture. Television viewers did not invent “Cleggmania”, or declare that he was “the new Obama”. These were media interpretations of the collective noise that they heard

> when millions of people said, in unison: "Actually, he'd do, at a pinch". (*The Guardian*, Deborah Orr, 22 April)

Other journalists directly attacked tabloids, including *The Sun*: "The Sun's effortful denial yesterday that anything had interfered with David Cameron's serene, Murdoch-endorsed progress to No 10 was deeply unconvincing" (*The Guardian*, editorial, 19 April).

American and British journalists also criticised candidates for using too many emotions and anecdotes during the debates. This emotional overdose was perceived and framed differently according to journalists. For example, in the United States, Obama's wedding anniversary and references to his grandmother were perceived as failures in the NYP:

> The president was so off his game that he failed even to create an "aw" moment at the very start, when he noted that last time was his 20th wedding anniversary. [...] Obama retreated into comforting soundbites from ineffective past speeches - about how his grandmother needed Medicare, and how Abraham Lincoln liked to build infrastructures just like Obama does. (NYP, John Podhoretz, 4 October)

> He [...] mentioned his dead grandmother to make a point on health care. [...]. His first mistake was to mention it was his wedding anniversary and call his wife "Sweetie", a cringe-inducing moment that felt totally contrived. (NYP, Michael Goodwin, 4 October)

Conversely, the NYT framed Obama's anniversary and references to his grandmother positively:

> 9:02 p.m. President Obama's opening lines, wishing Michelle Obama a happy 20th anniversary, earned him a few sympathetic "awwws" from the women in the room. (NYT, Susan Saulny, 4 October)

> He didn't really engage with the questioners and often lapsed into blue-book essay answers, but he found ways to make his policies personal, answering a query about women's pay by referring to the struggles of his single mother and grandmother. (NYT, Alessandra Stanley, 17 October)

Similarly, in Britain, *The Sun* used anger regarding Brown's manipulation of emotions by saying that "Labour's campaign is like a plane spiraling to the ground. But that is NO excuse for them dealing in fear, smear and lies" (editorial, 24 April). Similar emotional criticisms were identified in *The Guardian*, which mainly used anger. For example, one of the *The Guardian*'s editorials (23 April) declared that was a "first name friendliness" as well as "platitudous anecdotes about citizens they claimed to have met and a telling anxiety to stare at the camera not the audience" in the debates. Tim Adams denounced the same in *The Observer*: candidates "were incredibly sniffy about anything contrived; Brown's 'my two boys squabbling at bath time' would have pretty much immediately disqualified him from office" (1 May). All in all, American and British journalists were sceptical and critical of candidates' use of anecdotes and emotions.

Many criticisms in American and British newspapers were expressed using humour. For example, *The Guardian* journalist Marina Hyde criticised the overuse of emotions by using humour: (30 April):

> as is the fashion on these shows, they will soon be telling us that they've been on an "amazing journey", and that their dead grandparents would be so proud. Let's just hope that whatever happens in next Thursday's live final, they're not going to give up on their dreams

This emotional overdose was also identified in *The Observer* where Andrew Rawnsley used frustration and humour regarding Cameron's over-use of anecdotes (17 April):

> David Cameron was the most painfully over-reliant on the American technique of using an anecdote to make a point. “I recently bumped into a Basildon mother of three with an ingrowing toenail and that is why I love the NHS.” [...] That and a few other gaffes might suggest that the Tory leader was under-rehearsed, but I suspect his real problem was that he was over-coached. He was playing not to lose and straining too hard to seem prime-ministerial, with the result that he looked anxious and sounded constipated.

Thus, humour, which also allows journalists to use negative emotions as shown in Section C, was also a means for journalists to criticise candidates.

All in all, emotions as well as personal relationships and stories were framed positively when newspapers defended their candidate and were criticised when talking about their opponent.

F. Recommendations

Exploring what recommendations journalists made is crucial as these recommendations provide information regarding what journalists thought needed changing during the debates period. Although American and British newspapers made recommendations regarding specific topics, no recommendations regarding emotions or emotionality were made.

This category is by far the least coded of my whole framing analysis in both American and British cases. In the American press, only 1.2 per cent of the coverage of the NYT was devoted to recommendations and 0.4 per cent for the NYP. The NYT nonetheless made recommendations regarding four clusters of topics: the *Economy* (31.5 per cent), *TV Debates* (31.5 per cent), *Foreign Policy* (19.6 per cent) and *Issues and Policies* (17.4 per cent). Once again the NYP was more straightforward by making only three recommendations: creating better and more reliable polls (29.4 per cent), improving TV debates by having two moderators (5.9 per cent) and voting for Romney instead of Obama to solve all other issues (64.7 per cent).

Similarly, only 0.9 per cent of the whole coverage of *The Guardian* and 1.5 per cent of the that of *The Sun* were devoted to recommendations, which split into four clusters: *Voting* (33.3 per cent for *The Guardian*, 32 per cent for *The Sun*), *Politics* (30.7 per cent for *The Guardian*, 37.9 per cent for *The Sun*), *TV Debates* (24 per cent for *The Guardian*, 23.3 per cent for *The Sun*) and the *Economy* (9.3 per cent for *The Guardian*, 6.8 per cent for *The Sun*). In addition to these common categories, *The Guardian* also made recommendations regarding *Bets and the Election* (2.7 per cent).

II. Discussion

The results presented in this chapter can now be compared to past literature, especially regarding the emotionalisation of journalism as well as its norms and practices. Although Chapter 4 is in agreement with Richards (2004) who claims that news media content in the UK has become increasingly emotional for the last two decades, my research details that this emotionalisation has not only touched broadcast journalism as Richards theorised. Indeed, my study suggests that the print news media both in the UK and US were emotional regardless of the type of newspaper considered (highbrow and tabloid newspapers). Furthermore, although the presence of humour in newspaper articles identified in my study is in keeping with previous literature (Holton and Lewis, 2011; Feldman, 2007; Meyer, 2000) with journalists using humour to persuade an audience (Markiewicz, 1974; Delaney, 2015) or share political news (Beckett, 2015), my research went further as it concluded that journalists used humour to display different emotions and emotional attitudes ranging from jokes to frustration, disappointment or anger. Thus, journalists used humour to pass on their opinions and push for their agenda in different ways (e.g. subtler, more accessible) than if directly using emotions.

The emotionalisation of journalism also puts into question some of the most deep-rooted journalistic norms as it is the case with objectivity. Indeed, journalism relies on an emotional paradox: while journalists create dispositions for the public to emotionally react to the coverage of specific events (e.g. crime, disaster or accidents reporting), there is also an emotional barrier separating emotions from political reporting as emotions could contaminate journalistic objectivity (Richards, 2009; Richards and Rees, 2011). These claims only add to other criticisms targeting objectivity. For some, contemporary journalism confines objectivity to rituals (Tuchman, 1972). Others, such as Coward (2009, 2013), declare that objectivity does not exist as the idea of a neutral observer who transparently reports on facts without having a position on them, or affecting them, by his or her presence is highly questionable.

Among these criticisms, many authors claim that objectivity could reinvent itself through transparency. For example, Wallace (2013) claims that it is more honest and true to be a subjective reporter with his own public persona. For Coward (2009, 2013) greater transparency means greater accountability. My results seem to point in a similar direction as journalists whose articles were studied as part of my research included emotions both in content and tone in their articles. However, if more emotions are now part of journalism, this transparency does not necessarily equate to authenticity. Indeed, just like politicians' emotions were manipulated for many reasons (e.g. to fit their arguments, policies or defence tactics), journalists too manipulated emotions and emotionality for different reasons (e.g. to support or discredit a candidate). I believe that the notion of authenticity is a slippery one, particularly hard to define. For Chouliaraki and Blaagaard (2013), a "new authenticity" has emerged, highlighting how contemporary journalism deals with issues around truth, objectivity and credibility. Rather than objectivity, this new authenticity encompasses unrehearsed, unpolished and personal truth. Similarly, Wahl-Jorgensen (2016) states that audience participation in journalism is instant, unmediated and subjective, contrasting with professional, cold and procedural traditional journalism. Adding to these accounts, I believe that it is important here to distinguish between being authentic and being perceived as authentic. Indeed, the question here is why do news consumers perceive bloggers or citizens journalists, who may be lying about their identities and writing processes, as authentic, while considering professional journalists as inauthentic? Although answering this question goes beyond the aims of my research, I believe that it is vital to open the debate on authenticity in journalism and, as will be discussed in the next chapter, on authenticity and social media. Thus, my results could be a testament of the constant evolution of journalism, which may depart from traditional norms and practices such as objectivity towards more transparency, although not complete authenticity, including a more emotionalised form of journalism. Whether Twitter users positively received this type of reporting will be discussed in the next chapter, which analyses tweets relating to each debate both in the US and UK.

III. Conclusions

This chapter has analysed how the selected newspapers framed emotions and emotional references to construct their reporting of the 2012 American and 2010 British debates. This chapter has also indicated how journalists reacted to politicians' use of emotions and lays the foundation for the next chapter investigating how Twitter users reacted to the coverage of the debates. The discussion section has highlighted that newspaper journalism is becoming more and more emotional in the UK and US, especially when it comes to the use of humour by journalists. Indeed, my research suggests that humour in both countries was conveyed by jokes but also more negative emotions such as frustration, disappointment or anger allowing journalists to pass on their message and push through their agenda. This emotionality also questions journalists' objectivity and authenticity.

The results discussed in this section showed that the 2012 American and 2010 British debates were framed according to six elements: issues, descriptions of candidates, emotions, personal relationships and stories as well as criticisms and recommendations made by journalists. I now summarise the key findings for each of these elements.

Issues

Overall, *The New York Times* and *New York Post* in America and *The Guardian* and *The Sun* in Britain gave the most attention to similar style and election-related issues: *TV Debates*, *Governor Romney and his Team*, *President Obama and his Team*, *Campaigning and Election Race* and *Wars and Conflicts* (USA) and *Campaigning and Election Race* and *TV Debates* (UK). Journalists of both British newspapers also predominantly discussed party politics with references to Brown, Cameron and Clegg.

Other issues, focusing on substance (e.g. *Abortion*, *Women and the Election*, *Ignored Issues* for the American debates and *Social Media*, *Immigration*, *Candidates' Families* and *Wars and Conflicts* for the British ones), were marginally and superficially discussed by papers in both countries. Despite these similarities, highbrow newspapers in each case study differentiated themselves from tabloids as they covered more issues and weighed the pros and cons of each candidate, whereas tabloids framed issues to reflect the very best of Romney and Cameron only.

Furthermore, a comparison with Chapter 3 (debate transcripts analysis) revealed that journalists and candidates did not discuss the same issues, in the same proportions and in the same way for both case studies. American and British candidates discussed substance-related issues in an optimistic and positive way, whereas all newspapers analysed focused on style and PR without trying to be positive but rather truth-seeking. Finally, emotions played a special role in the American and British coverage of issues as journalists of all papers considered references to candidates' families as an angle for their articles alongside the *Economy* or *Immigration* for example.

Candidates

Candidates were depicted differently according to the newspaper considered. In the American case, the NYT drew a balanced picture of Romney who was described positively (family man, pro-active, a good debater, moderate) almost as many times as seen negatively (a manipulator, a liar, dangerous for foreign and domestic policy). Obama was described mainly positively by the NYT, which depicted the Democrat candidate as pro-active, determined, efficient and presidential. Despite also negatively describing Obama, the NYT used subtle ways of showing its support for the Democrat (e.g. presenting Obama as a victim, finding excuses to explain Obama's mistakes). The NYP was much more straightforward in its description of candidates: Obama was described almost exclusively in negative terms (offensive, weak and a manipulator) and his emotionality was seen as a weakness. Conversely, Romney was described as the saviour who was pro-active, presidential, knowledgeable and a good debater. Romney's emotions, unlike Obama's, were praised and described positively. Negative descriptions of Romney were also framed positively in the NYP as they did not depict Romney in a bad way. Romney was also presented as a victim who was attacked and discredited by Obama and his media army. Finally, the NYP was emotional in its partisanship: enthusiasm, admiration and pride were almost systematically associated with Romney, whereas anger, frustration and disappointment with Obama. Thus, the NYT and NYP had the same goals (support different candidates) but tried to reach these through different means (subtlety for the NYT, unconditional support for the NYP).

In the British case, differences too arose between *The Guardian* and *The Sun* regarding the portrayal of each candidate. *The Guardian* was split regarding Brown who was mainly framed as offensive, a manipulator and a bad PM making many mistakes and gaffes. Journalists also attacked his physical appearance and criticised his lack of emotions. However, Brown also attracted the pity and sympathy of journalists and was thus framed as respected, experienced, a good leader and good for substantive questions. Cameron, despite being described positively in some instances, was mainly framed negatively and considered as the major threat to *The Guardian*'s favourite candidate, Clegg. Cameron was seen as a manipulator having wrong ideas and policies and being too rich to be close to normal people. Lastly, Clegg was mostly framed positively by the highbrow newspaper as doing well thanks to the debates, a saviour representing change, aggressive and very popular. Journalists of *The Guardian* showed admiration for their candidate that they defended against outside criticisms. However, Clegg was also marginally described as having wrong ideas and policies, as being not ready for the job, pressured and controversial. *The Sun* strictly framed Brown in negative terms (bad PM, a manipulator, mistakes and gaffes, peculiar physical appearance). Despite some compassion for Clegg being attacked and discredited, the tabloid framed Clegg in the same way (a dangerous manipulator, a novice, stupid, weak, incompetent) and used many tactics to discredit the Lib Dem leader (e.g. inverted commas, rhetorical sentences or exaggeration). Cameron was exclusively framed in positive terms and presented as a saviour, a messiah who would save Britain, pro-active, aggressive as well as determined and confident. *The Sun* was also emotional in its partisanship and linked hope, enthusiasm and admiration with Cameron, and fear, anger, frustration and hate with other candidates and a hung parliament. Thus, *The Guardian* and *The Sun* endorsed their favourite candidates but differentiated themselves in the ways they did so: unconditional support for *The Sun*, a more balanced approach for *The Guardian*.

Emotions

My results also show that emotions were used by three different actors in the American and British press: journalists, candidates and sources. In the American case, although each of these actors used a wide range of emotions, they all predominantly used anger and humour in conjunction with other emotions (mainly disappointment, frustration, admiration, hope and anxiety). In the British case, journalists of *The Guardian* predominantly framed their coverage using humour and more negative emotions such as frustration or disappointment. Unlike *The Guardian*, *The Sun* framed its coverage mainly through anger, humour, fear and frustration. Furthermore, humour played a special role during the coverage of the American and British debates as it was used to show irony but also deeper and sometimes negative emotions such as frustration or disappointment. Thus, humour was both a tool and bridge for journalists to use different emotions.

The emotions displayed by candidates were reported the same way in both American papers with a main focus on humour, anger and hope. Furthermore, although candidates used mixed emotions, American journalists predominantly focused on negative ones to cover the debates. In the British case, while *The Guardian* framed the emotions displayed by candidates mainly through fear, anger and humour, *The Sun* highlighted the use of anger, fear and hope by candidates.

The emotions displayed by sources (e.g. subject experts, journalists, politicians, PR people and private individuals) were mainly framed negatively in American newspapers: anger, disappointment, anxiety and frustration were the main emotions of the NYT's sources, while the NYP's sources mainly used humour and anger. Similarly, British newspapers quoted their sources (e.g. subject experts, journalists, politicians, PR people and private individuals) as mainly using humour, anger and anxiety. To conclude, American and British journalists used emotions in a wide range of articles but also manipulated candidates' and sources' emotions to fit and reinforce their narrative.

Personal relationships and stories

Personal relationships and stories were powerful tools used by journalists and candidates in the 2012 American debates as well as in the 2010 British debates. In both case studies, journalists used references to candidates' families and anecdotes in order to frame their favourite candidate in the best possible way. Conversely, journalists used personal relationships and stories in a negative way when trying to discredit their favourite candidate's opponents. For example, the NYT used personal relationships and stories to support Obama and highlight Romney's inconsistency, whereas the NYP used these to discredit Obama and praise Romney. Similarly, *The Sun* used personal relationships and stories to support Cameron and discredit Clegg and Brown, while *The Guardian* used these to praise Clegg and discredit Cameron and Brown. These personal references were therefore framed according to each newspaper's bias.

Criticisms

Journalists of American and British newspapers criticised candidates as well as general elements of the 2012 American and 2010 British campaigns. American and British journalists (through quotes of candidates and sources) criticised, with frustration, anger and humour, candidates for using too many emotional references during the debates. Consequently, journalists were disappointed that candidates did not tackle substantive issues enough (although, ironically, journalists did not cover substance either but rather focused on style and PR).

My results also show that American and British newspapers used their power to criticise or to show their support for one candidate. Indeed, by criticising one candidate, a newspaper was supporting another. In Britain, *The Guardian* mainly criticised all candidates as well as Cameron and Brown separately, whereas *The Sun* criticised all candidates as well as Brown and Clegg separately. In America, the NYT predominantly criticised both candidates, while the NYP almost exclusively criticised Obama. Romney only was not criticised, which shows the clear and total endorsement of the NYP for the Republican challenger.

Finally, other issues (e.g. *Issues and Policies*, *Politics and Campaigning*, *TV Debates*, *Candidates* and *America*) were criticised in much the same way by both American newspapers, while British newspapers criticised other issues with varying degrees of consensus (e.g. TV debates, economy) or disagreement (e.g. Britain and British politics). Overall, newspapers therefore used humour and different emotions to voice their criticisms (e.g. anger and frustration), which were aimed at the emotions and anecdotes used by candidates and general issues.

Recommendations

No recommendations were made regarding emotions and personal relationships and stories by the American and British newspapers. However, American journalists from the NYT recommended many practical, general and even humorous solutions to issues concerning the *Economy*, the future of *Foreign Policy*, *TV Debates* along with *Issues and Policies*. The NYP mainly made an umbrella recommendation for every issue: vote Romney. British journalists made recommendations regarding a wide range of general issues, which were sometimes similar for both papers (e.g. voting issues or TV debates) or triggered much disagreement (e.g. political issues or minor issues).

All in all, the results presented in this chapter show that, although politicians tried to manipulate emotions and emotionality during the debates, this use failed as journalists reacted mainly negatively to the emotions put forth by candidates. More specifically, the use of emotions and emotionality was only welcomed for Cameron in *The Sun*, for Clegg in *The Guardian*, for Obama in *The New York Times* and for Romney in the *New York Post*. The manipulation of emotions backfired for the candidates that were not supported by specific newspapers. Moreover, journalists too manipulated emotions and emotionality through the range of issues covered in their articles, the respective portrayal of all candidates, the emotions and emotionality conveyed in articles and the criticisms voiced in each article.

Chapter 5

Emotions & Twitter: analysis of tweets

After having explored the intersection of emotions and politics through an analysis of debate transcripts, and of emotions and journalism through an analysis of newspaper articles, this chapter now puts the spotlight on Twitter users. This chapter analyses how specific members of the public, namely Twitter users, reacted not only to the debates and their content but also to the coverage of both elements. While some researchers have already linked social media to emotions (Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveira, 2012; Serrano-Puche, 2015), no literature exploring how Twitter users reacted to TV debates and their journalistic coverage has been found to date. This chapter answers the following question: how did Twitter users react to the emotions used by politicians and journalists during the 2012 American and 2010 British TV debates? What emotions did Twitter users display during the debates? For this purpose, the first section will present my results. The second section will offer a discussion of my findings, while the third section will draw the conclusions derived from this chapter. In agreement with my ethics review, usernames will only be displayed for politicians and journalists.

Chapter 5 argues that although politicians tried to manipulate emotions and emotionality during the debates, this failed as journalists and Twitter users mainly responded negatively. Similarly, although journalists tried to manipulate emotions to fit their narrative and present their favourite candidate in the best possible way, Twitter users mainly expressed negative emotions regarding the coverage of the debates. In other words, the three analyses carried out in this thesis show that emotions are not a means for politicians and journalists to interact with a specific part of the public, namely Twitter users, as both manipulations of emotions (political and journalistic) failed to convince Twitter users.

I. Findings

I now turn to the results extracted from the content analysis applied to the samples of American and British tweets relating to the 2012 and 2010 debates. Before detailing these results, it is worth noting that, in the American case, 61.37 per cent of all tweets coded contained at least one emotion or emotional reference (humour, anecdote, reference to family or friends). Furthermore, 49.2 per cent of all tweets were original tweets, 42.4 per cent were retweets (RT) and 8.4 per cent were mentions or replies (@). A total of 87.8 per cent of all of these tweets contained one or more hashtags. A majority of these American tweets were posted by private individuals (83.9 per cent), followed by journalists (7.5 per cent), experts (5.6 per cent), politicians (1.6 per cent) and PR people (1.4 per cent). A total of 11.9 per cent of tweets contained a hyperlink, especially towards news websites (36.9 per cent), political websites (14 per cent), images (11.6 per cent), other websites (10.7 per cent), expert websites (10.2 per cent) and videos (5.9 per cent). A total of 10.7 per cent of hyperlinks were broken and could not be accessed. The majority of tweets forming the American sample are therefore either original tweets or retweets containing one or more hashtags posted by private individuals.

Similarly, 44.9 per cent of all British tweets coded contained at least one emotion or emotional reference (humour, anecdote, reference to family or friends). Furthermore, a majority of British tweets were original (61 per cent), while only 18.6 per cent were retweets (RT) and 20.4 per cent were mentions or replies (@). Only

22.5 per cent of all tweets contained a hashtag. A majority of British tweets were posted by private individuals (71.8 per cent), followed by journalists (14.9 per cent), experts (5.2 per cent), PR people (4.6 per cent) and politicians (3.5 per cent). A total of 27.5 per cent of these tweets contained a hyperlink to images (1.3 per cent), videos (2.6 per cent), news websites (50.5 per cent), other websites (18 per cent), expert websites (10.9 per cent) and political websites (5 per cent). A total of 11.7 per cent of links were broken. The majority of tweets forming this British sample was therefore mostly composed of original tweets posted by private individuals.

A. Twitter & candidates

This sub-section looks at how Twitter users reacted to candidates' use of emotions and emotionality (use of anecdotes and references to family or friends).

Twitter & candidates' use of emotions

When exploring how Twitter users reacted to candidates using emotions, my data reveals two trends in both the US and UK cases: candidates were not only criticised throughout the debates, their use of emotions also predominantly triggered negative emotions from Twitter users. More specifically, all candidates were more criticised than praised. My data also allow me to break results down per type of Twitter user (see Appendix C). As far as the American case is concerned, the same elements were coded for all users: humour, anger, frustration and, to a lesser extent, admiration, disappointment and enthusiasm. Furthermore, most negative emotions as well as humour were displayed for Romney. Thus, my results show that more negative emotions were coded for Romney than Obama, which indicates that the types of users contained in my American sample were all slightly more in favour of the Democrat candidate. In Britain, all users, with the exception of experts, associated negative emotions mostly with Cameron, less so with Brown and in almost no cases with Clegg. Conversely, all users, with the exception of experts, linked positive emotions to Clegg, less so with Brown and almost never with Cameron.

In the American case, Obama was the most praised on Twitter with 34.8 per cent of positive references (against 65.2 per cent of negative ones) and Romney the most criticised with 78.8 per cent of negative references (against 21.2 per cent of positive ones). Not surprisingly, presidential candidates Obama (39.8 per cent) and Romney (51.1 per cent) were more referred to than vice-presidential candidates Biden (4.8 per cent) and Ryan (4.3 per cent) on Twitter. Like Obama, Biden was the most praised vice presidential candidate with 44.1 per cent of positive references (against 55.9 per cent of negative ones) and like Romney, Ryan was the most criticised vice presidential candidate with 68.2 per cent of negative references (against 31.8 per cent of positive ones).

American candidates' use of emotions also mainly triggered negative emotions from Twitter users as seen in Table 5.1. From Table 5.1, it can be seen that the most coded emotions are anger with 22.4 per cent of references in total (8.5 per cent for Obama, 0.9 per cent for Biden, 12 per cent for Romney and 1.1 per cent for Ryan) and frustration with 14.8 per cent of references in total (4.9 per cent for Obama, 0.4 per cent for Biden, 9.1 per cent for Romney and 0.4 per cent for Ryan). References to anger and frustration can particularly be seen in the following tweets reacting to Romney displaying love:

> I feel like Romney just desperately yells "I LOVE ..." hoping to get a few votes. #Debates (private user)
>
> "I love teachers" says #Romney. You also say you love Big Bird[1], but you want to cut support for him too. #debates (expert in political affairs)
>
> It is official; he loves teachers and big bird; yet he wants to fire both. #debates (private user)

---

[1] Big Bird is a character from the children TV show *Sesame Street* broadcast on the Public Broadcasting Service, which Romney vowed to privatise in the 2012 campaign.

Table 5.1: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed in American tweets regarding candidates' use of emotions

	Biden	Obama	Romney	Ryan	Total
Admiration	0.2	2.6	2.5	0.1	5.4
Empathy	0	0.1	0.1	0	0.2
Enthusiasm	0.6	3.9	3.5	0.3	8.3
Happiness	0	0.2	0.2	0	0.4
Hope	0	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.7
Love	0.2	0.4	0.6	0	1.2
Pride	0	0.3	0.2	0	0.6
Hate	0.1	0.6	0.7	0.1	1.5
Fear	0.1	0.4	0.7	0	1.2
Frustration	0.4	4.9	9.1	0.4	14.8
Sadness	0	0.2	0.3	0	0.5
Shame	0.1	0	0	0	0.1
Anger	0.9	8.5	12	1.1	22.4
Anxiety	0	0	0.1	0	0.1
Disappointment	0.1	2.8	2.2	0.1	5.3
Humour	1.8	10.1	23.7	1.6	37.2
Total	4.3	35.6	56.1	4	100

Humour was the most coded element of Table 5.1 with 37.2 per cent of references in total (10.1 per cent for Obama, 1.8 per cent for Biden, 23.7 per cent for Romney and 1.6 per cent for Ryan). Although humour cannot be associated with positive or negative emotions as such, humorous references were mainly negative as 80.5 per cent of humour related to candidates Biden, Obama, Romney and Ryan was associated with criticisms or negative emotions such as anger, disappointment or frustration. For example, the two following tweets contain humour to criticise Romney's education stance and VP Ryan's attractive physical appearance:

> “I love great schools” - Mitt Romney FINALLY taking a stand against shitty schools. #debates (private user)

> “Look Martha, I’m a numbers guy, and math is for nerds. Don’t you want to see my biceps?” #debates #toosexyforaccounting (private user)

The two following tweets contain humour to express negative emotions, in this case frustration and disappointment:

> Two Party Presidential Debates: Where vomiting is not solely induced due to the drinking games. (PR person)

> I love the presidential debates because I love people saying what they think I want to hear. It’s super cute! (private user)

Negative emotions and criticisms are particularly visible in tweets, which denounce the manipulation of emotions by candidates. For example:

> So true! @ktenkely: Being reminded tonight that data can be used/ manipulated to tell any story we want. #Debates (private user)

> RT @CaterpillarJive: #NObama is after your emotions #Debates (private user)

Many of these tweets expressed anger:

> Move the fuck on. Stop using scare tactics. #debates shut up Congressman Ryan (private user)

> Obamaplaybook: interrupt, lie, deceive, mock, sidestep, talk in platitudes, emotionally manipulate and stumble. #debates #fail (private user)

> It's sick watching @MittRomney harness fear and ignorance to sway voters on issues in the Middle East. #Debates (private user)

And some Twitter users urged candidates to express their real emotions:

> Stop the fake smiles! You're pissed off, irritated, or offended... be pissed off, irritated, or offended! #Debates (private user)

Along those lines, my British results indicate that, with the exception of candidate Clegg, all other candidates were mainly criticised on Twitter. Cameron was the most criticised (83.9 per cent of negative references) and less praised (16.1 per cent of positive references), followed by Brown with 58.1 per cent of negative references and 41.9 per cent of positive ones. However, Clegg was mainly praised on Twitter with 69.9 per cent of positive references against only 30.1 per cent of negative ones.

The criticisms directed towards Cameron and Brown and praise surrounding Clegg correlate with the emotions Twitter users displayed regarding these candidates. From Table 5.2, it can be seen that the most coded elements are humour (20.6 per cent of references), frustration (17.5 per cent), enthusiasm (15.4 per cent) and, to a lesser extent, disappointment (9.2 per cent) as well as admiration and anger (8.6 per cent of references each). Thus, although some references were coded for positive emotions (enthusiasm and admiration), the overall emotional tone of the tweets coded was negative especially so considering that an overwhelming majority of references coded for humour (82.1 per cent) were linked to Twitter users criticising candidates or their statements. For example, a private user displayed humour to mock and criticise Brown:

> I think i'm gonna watch the next set of debates in HD to prove Gordon Brown's smile is made from dead children. #leadersdebate (private user)

Table 5.2: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed in British tweets regarding candidates' use of emotions

	Brown	Cameron	Clegg	Total
Admiration	2.2	1.2	5.2	8.6
Anger	2.2	4.9	1.5	8.6
Anxiety	0.3	0.9	0.6	1.8
Disappointment	1.8	4.6	2.8	9.2
Enthusiasm	3.7	2.8	8.9	15.4
Fear	0.9	1.2	1.8	4
Frustration	5.2	6.5	5.8	17.5
Happiness	0.6	0.3	2.5	3.4
Hate	0.9	0.9	0.3	2.2
Hope	0.9	1.2	1.8	4
Love	0.6	1.2	1.2	3.1
Pride	0	0	0.9	0.9
Sadness	0	0	0.3	0.3
Shame	0	0.3	0	0.3
Humour	8.3	8.6	3.7	20.6
Total	27.7	34.8	37.5	100

More specifically, these references to humour were identified to mainly criticise Cameron (8.6 per cent of references) and Brown (8.3 per cent) and less so Clegg (3.7 per cent). Twitter users displayed frustration for all three candidates (6.5 per cent of references for Cameron, 5.8 per cent for Clegg and 5.2 per cent for Brown). For example, a private user expressed frustration at Cameron being first in the polls:

> Seriously, how is Cameron coming first in these polls? Have I been watching different debates? (private user)

Furthermore, Cameron elicited the most disappointment (4.6 per cent) and anger (4.9 per cent) online as illustrated by the two following examples:

> DC is losing these debates in a most undignified manner. He just sounds angry and ranty, smarmy and hollow. #leadersdebate (private user)

> How could anyone think Cameron won any of the debates. He said nothing in any of them. Just hollow bullshit. If you vote Tory you're a twat. (private user)

Consistent with previous results, Clegg was almost systematically associated with positive emotions such as enthusiasm (8.9 per cent for Clegg, only 2.8 per cent for Cameron and 3.7 per cent for Brown) and admiration (5.2 per cent for Clegg and only 1.2 per cent for Cameron and 2.2 per cent for Brown) and marginally so with negative emotions such as disappointment (only 2.8 per cent for Clegg) or anger (only 1.5 per cent for Clegg). The following two tweets show enthusiasm and admiration linked to Clegg:

> RT @willswanson1980: Seen all three live debates, I'm voting LIB DEM. Nick clegg believes what he's saying!, #iagreewithnick #livedebate (private user)

> @jonnoallan he's addressing everybody that asks a question, and isn't lowering himself to brown and cameron's debates. n'aww! he's lovely. (private user)

Brown systematically occupied the middle ground with more negative emotions coded than for Clegg but fewer than for Cameron. Similarly, Brown was more associated with positive emotions than Cameron but less so than for Clegg.

Twitter & candidates' use of emotionality

In addition to showing that Twitter users reacted mainly negatively to candidates using emotions, my data also shows that Twitter users in both case studies reacted negatively when candidates referred to anecdotes, family or friends. Results broken down per type of user indicate that, in America, although a marginal number of references were coded for experts, politicians and PR people, all users expressed the same emotions regarding American candidates' use of anecdotes and references to family and friends: humour and negative emotions. Interestingly, in the British case, only journalists and private users displayed emotions in relation to candidates' use of emotionality (see Appendix C for full results). Indeed, no emotional references to anecdotes, family or friends were coded for experts, politicians or PR people. Journalists only displayed anger, frustration and humour regarding anecdotes. Private users focused on anecdotes and family with frustration, humour and disappointment.

In the American case, a majority of tweets criticised references to anecdotes, friends and family especially when it comes to Romney with 43.3 per cent of negative references in total (20.6 per cent for anecdotes, 20.4 per cent for family and 2.4 per cent for friends) and Obama with 29.6 per cent of negative references in total (13.3 per cent for anecdotes, 14.7 per cent for family and 1.6 per cent for friends) as indicated by Table 5.3. From this table, it can also be seen that Biden's and Ryan's references to anecdotes, family and friends were marginally coded: 2.4 per cent of negative references and 2.9 per cent of positive references for Biden and 9 per cent of negative references and 0.4 per cent of positive references for Ryan. Marginal also is the number of positive references relating to anecdotes, family or friends of Obama (only 6.1 per cent) and Romney (only 6.3 per cent).

Not only did Twitter users criticise candidates' use of anecdotes, friends and family, they also felt strongly negatively about it. From Table 5.4, it can be seen that the two most coded emotions are frustration with 19.7 per cent of references in total (12.3 per cent for anecdotes, 6.6 per cent for family and 0.9 per cent for friends) and anger with 17 per cent of references in total (10.6 per cent for anecdotes, 5.5 per cent for family and 0.9 per cent for friends).

Table 5.3: American Twitter users' assessment of candidates' references to anecdotes, family and friends (in percentages)

	References to anecdotes	References to family	References to friends	Total
Biden - criticisms	0.2	0	2.2	2.4
Biden - praises	1.8	0.2	1	2.9
Obama - criticisms	13.3	14.7	1.6	29.6
Obama - praises	2.2	3.7	0.2	6.1
Romney - criticisms	20.6	20.4	2.4	43.3
Romney - praises	2	4.1	0.2	6.3
Ryan - criticisms	6.3	1.8	1	9
Ryan - praises	0.2	0	0.2	0.4
Total	46.5	44.9	8.6	100

Humour is the most coded element of this table with 51.6 per cent of references coded in total (18.7 per cent for anecdotes, 29.1 per cent for family and 3.7 for friends). Although humour cannot be linked to either positive or negative emotions, its use was mainly negative as 82.8 per cent of references coded for humour were also coded for other negative emotions such as anger, disappointment, frustration or fear. Twitter users referred to humour and negative emotions mainly to mock candidates. For example:

> Obama's talking about his Gramma. I'd type more, but it's really fucking hard to type and clean up stoic tears at the same time. #debates (private user)

> "I came and sat by his family when he'd been shot in the head, and 2 months later he was healed" Obama #yourenotJesus #debates (private user)

> How many times do I have to hear about Obama's poor mother and grandmother. I'm just heartbroken. #debates (private user)

TABLE 5.4: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed in American tweets regarding candidates' references to anecdotes, family and friends

	References to anecdotes	References to family	References to friends	Total
Admiration	0.7	1.3	0.1	2.2
Anger	10.6	5.5	0.9	17
Disappointment	1.6	1	0	2.7
Enthusiasm	0.6	0.9	0.3	1.8
Fear	0	0.1	0	0.1
Frustration	12.3	6.6	0.9	19.7
Happiness	0.1	0.3	0	0.4
Hate	0.3	0.4	0.3	1
Hope	0.1	0.3	0	0.4
Love	0.7	1	0.1	1.9
Pride	0.1	0.1	0	0.3
Sadness	0	0.1	0	0.1
Shame	0.1	0.3	0	0.4
Humour	18.7	29.1	3.7	51.6
Total	46.2	47.4	6.4	100

Beyond critiquing a candidate or issue, humour was also used to express negative emotions such as frustration for example:

> "I was raised by a single mom," Obama says for those one or two people who didn't know that. #debates (@politicoroger, journalist)

> Romney talked to a family that wasn't in a swing state? Thats a big surprise #debates (private user)

All of these negative emotions and criticisms translated into different, yet all negative, outcomes for candidates. Indeed, politicians' use of anecdotes and references to friends and family backfired and triggered negative emotions. For example, anecdotes and references to family and friends triggered anger on Twitter:

> Wtf was that @BarackObama we don't give a Hoover damn about your relationship. #Debates (@JustenCharters, journalist)
>
> I'm tired of Obama bringing his daughters into this. He wants to keep family out - until he doesn't. #Debates (@BernardGoldberg, journalist)
>
> Hey, Romney, no one cares what your "friend" thinks. #debates (private user)

But also frustration:

> first real person story. Well done for waiting a whole 20 minutes. #debates (private user)
>
> And now the pretend people he met are here. Isn't that the same person who's husband had four part time jobs #debates (private user)

And even hate, sadness and shame:

> Portland hates the Paul Ryan fetal heartbeat story. HATES IT. #debates (@theriaultpdx, journalist)
>
> So sad that Romneys team trying to use his family on stage and kissing babies #debates shame on you (private user)

Twitter users also reacted to candidates referring to so-called “friends” who are closer to political enemies. Many tweets relating to friends used humour to denounce this hypocrisy:

> LOL RT @Refinery29: “My friend” = new code word for someone you really can’t stand. #debates (private user)

> “My friend never answers the question, and honestly I’m considering not inviting him to by birthday party.” #debates (private user)

Twitter users also felt that candidates were using emotions and emotionality to avoid addressing questions or facts during the debates, which triggered more negative emotions. For example:

> Personal story personal story personal story Obama let’s here some facts!! #debates (private user)

> This is not personal story time! Answer the questions being asked! #debates (private user)

> Why do I have the feeling we are going to hear an unending stream of personal anecdotes with no actual answers to questions. #debates (private user)

Similarly, in the British case, Table 5.5 indicates that Twitter users assessed candidates’ use of emotionality in an overwhelming negative way. Indeed, Cameron’s, Brown’s and Clegg’s references to family and anecdotes were all coded negatively (50 per cent for Cameron, 30 per cent for Brown and 20 per cent for Clegg). No references to friends were coded and only 10 per cent of references to family were coded for Cameron. For example, a private user expressed anger at Cameron using the death of his son to make a political point:

> RT @NicholasPegg: That's the 3rd time in the debates that Cameron has looked straight into camera and exploited the death of his child. (private user)

Table 5.5: British Twitter users' assessment of candidates' references to anecdotes, family and friends (in percentages)

	References to anecdotes	References to family	References to friends	Total
Brown criticisms	30	0	0	30
Brown praises	0	0	0	0
Cameron criticisms	40	10	0	50
Cameron praises	0	0	0	0
Clegg criticisms	20	0	0	20
Clegg praises	0	0	0	0
Total	90	10	0	100

In addition to criticising candidates using their families, friends and anecdotes for political matters, Twitter users also displayed an overwhelming majority of negative emotions regarding this use. Table 5.6 indicates that the most coded elements are humour (36.8 per cent) directed exclusively at anecdotes, frustration (26.3 per cent for anecdotes, 10.5 per cent for family) and disappointment (5.3 per cent for anecdotes, 5.3 per cent for family). Furthermore, 57.1 per cent of humour was also coded for anger and frustration, which indicates that humour was mainly used negatively in relation to candidates' references to anecdotes and family. The following tweets illustrate the main negative emotions used in conjunction with humour coded for anecdotes:

> @rozicollier yeah, they joked about that tonight. i got bored of the debates, has davey met any more black people yet? (private user)

> RT @allpointsnorth: So I guess Brown's not going to be using his "I was with a woman in Rochdale" anecdote in the debates then. (private user)

> Is the man in the middle a Sheffield MP? One never knew. He has only mentioned it 50 times over the last few debates. (journalist, @julietunney)

> @stewchambers i dont really care who kissed a baby or who was mean to an old lady. Dont have time to watch a trillion debates. All done :) (private user)

In Britain, humour was also expressed through the sharing of links like www.slapometer.com or fridgetmagnet.org.uk as shown by Figures 5.1 and 5.2. Slapometer allowed web users to manually slap Brown, Cameron or Clegg regarding what they said during the debates. Statistics about who was the most slapped could then be seen. Fridgetmagnet is a so-called "anecdote generator" and provided fakes quotes of David Cameron and his "I have met" stories. Web users could reload the Internet page to find out about another anecdote, mocked and criticised.


SLAPOMETER
VOTE WITH THE BACK OF YOUR HAND
SLAP ALONG TO THE LIVE DEBATES. WATCH THE GRAPH TO SEE WHO EVERYONE ELSE IS SLAPPING.
Block...
LIVE SLAPPING
LIVE SLAPS PER SECOND
BROWN
47 %
CAMERON
38 %
CLEGG
15 %
CLICK HERE TO TRY NEW HIGHLY EXPERIMENTAL HAND GESTURE SLAP CONTROL
(WEBCAM NEEDED)

FIGURE 5.1: Print screen of slapometer.com (accessed on the 20th of April 2016)



"Last week, I met a Somali policeman, who told me that communists in the BBC should be stopped before things get any worse."

Click or reload to find out who he met next.

fridgemagnet 2010-04-16
election debate video, if you're not sure what this is referring to

FIGURE 5.2: Print screen of fridgemagnet.org.uk (accessed on the 20th of April 2016)

Only 5.3 per cent were coded for anger, enthusiasm and happiness regarding candidates' anecdotes and none for other emotions. For example, a private user expressed anger at Cameron telling anecdotes during the debates:

> I'd love for Cameron to've had a mic on after visiting that drug addict he talked about in the debates. Sure he had splendid things to say. (private user)

Several consequences derived from the negativity linked to candidates referring to their families and anecdotes during the debates in both cases. Indeed, more negative emotions were expressed regarding what was considered as a manipulation of emotions by candidates. Consequently, Twitter users increasingly scrutinised anecdotes as illustrated by the following British tweet:

> I think at the next two Leaders' Debates, it would be wise not to use the phrase "the other day" unless it actually was. (journalist, @c4marcus)

The manipulation of emotions by candidates also triggered support for opposing candidates who were seen as more concerned about policies and facts in both cases as illustrated by the following British tweet:

> Catching up on PM debates. Cameron and Clegg look P.R savvy; anecdotes, flattering questioners. Brown going straight for facts/policy. (private user)

Table 5.6: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed in British tweets regarding candidates' references to anecdotes, family and friends

	References to anecdotes	References to family	References to friends	Total
Admiration	0	0	0	0
Anger	5.3	0	0	5.3
Anxiety	0	0	0	0
Disappointment	5.3	5.3	0	10.5
Enthusiasm	5.3	0	0	5.3
Fear	0	0	0	0
Frustration	26.3	10.5	0	36.8
Guilt	0	0	0	0
Happiness	5.3	0	0	5.3
Hate	0	0	0	0
Hope	0	0	0	0
Love	0	0	0	0
Pride	0	0	0	0
Sadness	0	0	0	0
Shame	0	0	0	0
Humour	36.8	0	0	36.8
Total	84.2	15.8	0	100

Similarly, in the American sample, journalist Billy Hallowell praised Romney's reaction following Obama wishing his wife a happy 20th wedding anniversary:

> Romney cracks romance joke. Ha. #Debates (@BillyHallowell, journalist)

The manipulation of emotions by candidates also triggered increasing scrutiny and scepticism from Twitter users regarding candidates' anecdotes as illustrated by these American tweets:

> Obama just described his fiercely independent grandmother as someone highly dependent on Medicare and Social Security #confused #debates (private user)

> RT @DrJamesPeterson I want to find these people that Mitt's talking about and ask them if they really told him that. #debates (expert in American Studies and African American Studies)

> Obama is lying he was raised by his adopted step-dad with his Mom. He is making crap up as usual #debates (private user)

Several conclusions can be drawn from this sub-section. In the American case, Twitter users criticised candidates' use of emotions and references to family, friends and anecdotes, especially when it comes to Romney and Obama and marginally so for Biden and Ryan. Furthermore, Twitter users expressed negative emotions (especially anger and frustration) regarding American candidates' use of emotions and emotionality. However, in Britain, while only Brown's and Cameron's use of emotions was mainly criticised on Twitter, the use of anecdotes and references to family was criticised for all three prime ministerial candidates. More specifically, negative emotions were consistently associated to Cameron and positive ones to Clegg. Brown occupied the middle ground throughout all the debates eliciting both positive and negative emotions. However, only negative emotions were associated to anecdotes and to a lesser extent, references to family, for all three candidates. In both US and UK cases, humour was the most coded element and was rather negative as it was used to either mock or criticise a candidate or issue or to express negative emotions regarding a candidate or issue. More negative emotions were triggered by candidates manipulating voters' emotions and answering substantial questions with anecdotes or references to friends or family during the debates. Consequently, Twitter users in both case studies felt that political candidates were trying to manipulate their emotions, which, in some cases, triggered negative emotions, mockery, support for opposing or independent candidates and an increasing scepticism and scrutiny on Twitter. Lastly, in the American sample, experts, journalists, politicians, PR people and private users all mainly used humour, anger and frustration regarding candidates', especially Romney's, use of emotions. However, only journalists and private users displayed humour and negative emotions towards anecdotes and references to family. The other users and references to friends were marginal regarding this aspect. In the British sample and in the case of emotions, while journalists displayed slightly more negative emotions for Cameron and mixed emotions for Brown and Clegg, politicians, PR people and private users almost only associated positive emotions to Clegg and negative ones to Cameron with Brown being in between. However, when it comes to references to anecdotes and family, only journalists and private users displayed emotions with experts, PR people and politicians remaining silent. Journalists and private users mainly used negative emotions directed towards anecdotes. Thus, Twitter users predominantly reacted negatively regarding candidates using emotions as well as references to their families, friends or anecdotes in both US and UK cases.

B. Twitter & TV debates

In addition to expressing their feelings and opinions regarding candidates, Twitter users also reacted to two specific aspects of the debates: the debates as political and media events but also as discussions of substantive issues. This sub-section investigates both of these in turn.

TV debates as political and media events

I now explore how Twitter users reacted regarding TV debates as political and media events. A further analysis of the data indicated that, in the American case, there was no difference in the emotions used by each type of Twitter user as all users (experts, journalists, politicians, PR people and private users) consistently displayed humour, frustration, anger, disappointment and enthusiasm (see Appendix C for full results) regarding TV debates. My British analysis revealed that experts and politicians marginally shared their feelings regarding the debates, whereas private users were the most active during the debates. All British users predominantly shared their frustration (with the exception of PR people), enthusiasm, disappointment displayed in conjunction with humour. Private users and PR people also shared their anger at the debates. Thus, in Britain, most emotions coded in relation to the debates were heavily posted by private users who, along with other users, focused on negative emotions (frustration, disappointment, anger) more so than positive ones (enthusiasm).

In the American case, Table 5.7 links all nodes coded regarding TV debates (e.g. positive references to the debates, negative references to the debates, general references to the debates and moderators, among others) to the corresponding emotions. From this table, it can been seen that Twitter users mainly expressed negative emotions regarding the American debates. Indeed, four emotions were more coded than others, namely frustration (16 per cent), anger (12.7 per cent), enthusiasm (12.6 per cent) and disappointment (11.6 per cent). Although enthusiasm was the third most coded emotion in this table, this result has to be compared to an overwhelming majority of negative emotions and to the context of the debates itself. Indeed, most of the references coded under "enthusiasm" were coded before the debates, or in the first few minutes of the debates, translating Twitter users' enthusiasm at the debates kicking off. A typical example of these tweets is the following (posted in the afternoon preceding the first debate):

> actually realllly excited to watch the presidential debates tonight (private user)

Table 5.7 also indicates that humour was the most coded element of my analysis with 38.7 per cent of references coded in total. Humour had different uses and purposes when commenting on the debates ranging from jokes:

> This is like Book 6 of Harry Potter where Voldemort and Dumbledore finally go at it. #lovinit #debates (private user)

To irony:

> I really liked the part where the third-party presidential candidates got to present their sides. #debates (private user)

And bridging negative emotions such as frustration and disappointment:

> What was that sound behind the two of them? Did the Constitution just came crashing to the ground? #debates (private user)

> I think someone just shot themselves in the background #debates (private user)

Thus, humour predominantly helped express negative emotions. All other references were comprised between 2.4 and 0.1 per cent of references and therefore considered marginal.

This overwhelming presence of negativity was also accompanied by an overall negative assessment of the American debates. Indeed, 84 per cent of references coded in relation to the debates were negative (against 16 per cent of positive references). For example, some users felt uncomfortable while watching the debates:

> Presidential debates make me uncomfortable. #debate #awkward (private user)

The following example contains an interesting use of "lol" (abbreviation of "laughing out loud"), which could have helped the following private user to diffuse awkwardness and embarrassment for not understanding the debates:

> Watching the #debates and I'm so confused I don't know what they talking about lol , such a newbie to voting lol (private user)

Table 5.7: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by American Twitter users regarding TV debates

	TV debates
Admiration	2.4
Empathy	0.4
Enthusiasm	12.6
Happiness	0.9
Hope	0.9
Love	1.1
Pride	0.2
Anger	12.7
Anxiety	0.2
Disappointment	11.6
Fear	0.4
Frustration	16
Guilt	0.1
Hate	0.8
Nostalgia	0.2
Sadness	0.6
Shame	0.2
Humour	38.7

In the British case, Table 5.8 indicates that most of the elements coded are negative. Indeed, TV debates mainly triggered frustration (22.9 per cent), disappointment (17 per cent) and anger (9.8 per cent). A total of 18.4 per cent of references to a positive emotion, enthusiasm, was also coded. Lastly, 19.7 per cent of references were coded for humour, which was used in different ways throughout the debates: to make jokes or express other emotions such as frustration through irony. Thus, humour predominantly helped express negative emotions. This majority of negative emotions correlate with the overall negative assessment that Twitter users gave of the debates. Indeed, 68.9 per cent of references coded in relation to the debates were negative (against 31.1 per cent positive). For example, the following private user displayed frustration in conjunction with humour to criticise the debates:

> Still think the leader debates would have been better if they had nailed all three of them to a tree. (private user)

Others chose to share their anger at the UK for copying the American debates:

> I am getting so fed up with the American style "debates" if you can call that in civil terms! No wonder we go down the dogs, disgrace! (private user)

And some Twitter users compared the debates to PR exercises or reality TV shows:

> Is anyone else fed up of the election? I really don't trust anyone. These debates are tiresome, just PR exercises. (private user)

> Honest to God, what does it say about the psyche of a nation that we decide who to govern on the strength of 3 live debates? X factor crap (private user)

> @RMBer I think it was a spoof. The whole election thing - debates etc - is an enormous reality TV show with actors playing the candidates. (private user)

In addition to expressing negative emotions towards the debates, users also criticised the organisation and format of the debates. For some, there should not have been any debates at all as they do not fit the UK electoral system:

> Here folks drooling over debates - you will not find those 3 names on your ballot paper. Who are yr local candidates? What do they stand for (private user)

> @SkyJacquie why are we having these debates? Only the people in the leaders constituencys vote for them, we are not voting for a president (private user)

> didn't watch any of the leadership debates, as she will be voting for her MP and not the Prime Minister. That's how it works in the UK. (private user)

Table 5.8: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by British Twitter users regarding TV debates

	TV debates
Admiration	1.6
Enthusiasm	18.4
Happiness	2.1
Hope	1.8
Love	1.8
Pride	1.2
Anger	9.8
Anxiety	0.6
Disappointment	17
Fear	0.8
Frustration	22.9
Guilt	0.4
Hate	0.8
Sadness	0.7
Shame	0.3
Humour	19.7

Much enthusiasm and excitement was also communicated in relation to the British debates. My data reveals that Twitter users were enthusiastic about the idea of debates being held (i.e. good for democracy, policy discussion and decision-making, among others) for the first time in the United Kingdom. For example, some users thought that the debates had deeply changed British politics:

> These debates have been brilliant. Opening up politics & the campaign process to the public & making it accessible & exciting- amazing. (private user)

> I enjoyed the final Leaders Debate. Whatever your politics, the three debates have forever changed the way future General Elections are run. (private user)

However, a few minutes after the debates started, this enthusiasm gave way to negative emotions such as disappointment, frustration or anger. Indeed, much enthusiasm was linked to expectations before the debates but rapidly turned into negative emotions once the debates started. The following examples are typical tweets posted before the start of the debates:

> plesantly surprised at how much i'm looking forward to the debates tonight. Go politics! (private user)

> RT @PaulPambakian: @HenCorner just said on the phone, "I've never been this excited before" when talking about the leaders debates! (private user)

While the following example, expressing disappointment, was posted by a politician only five minutes after the first debate started:

> The process of the debate I think is getting in the way of a proper debate. I can't see this keeping interest over 3 debates #leadersdebate (politician, @waynechadburn)

Beyond positive or negative emotions, Twitter users asked or answered many questions about the British debates (what channel, what format...). Users were trying to help each other understand the events and their implications creating a feeling of connection and cooperation surrounding the debates. These conversations revealed two elements. Firstly, the debates left many users confused regarding who to vote for or how to handle the debates:

> Anyone know where I can watch the debates online tonight? For everyone in the UK they will be debating domestic affairs on ITV 1 at 2030. (private user)

> RT @iaindale: Are the debates actually live, or shown recorded as live? anyone know? (private user)

> does anyone believe the polls? anyone interested in how the live tv debates will change them tonight? geeky i know! (private user)

Secondly, the debates divided Twitter users: some were very opinionated about the debates and expressed strong emotions (anger or admiration mainly), while others were either lost or uninterested at the debates taking place:

> Waiting for the debates to start whilst the wifey shows her apathy for politics by reading Twilight and listening to music (private user)

> I would watch the Prime Ministerial Debates but my daughter's insisting on Peppa Pig and somehow I don't think theres much in the difference (private user)

TV debates as discussions of substance

My analysis now investigates how Twitter users reacted regarding what was discussed during the debates. Table 5.9 links emotions and humour to substantive issues discussed during the American debates. From this table, it can be seen that Twitter users mainly expressed negative emotions, predominantly anger (26.5 per cent) and frustration (18.3 per cent), regarding what and how issues were discussed during the American debates. For example, most users were angered and frustrated at the lack of depth regarding some issues, at some issues being ignored altogether or at how issues were handled by candidates:

> The answer to the first question always takes a few seconds to focus on frivolity. Sorry jobs. #debates (private user)

> Can we talk about immigration or foreign policy or something? #debates (private user)

> RT @nicholemagoon: Why should the government have its hands in my uterus when it can't even get its head out of its own ass? #debates (private user)

As for debates as events, many references to humour (35.6 per cent) were identified and had similar uses and purposes: to make jokes or express other emotions such as frustration, anger or disappointment through to irony. Thus, humour in this case predominantly helped express negative emotions. Furthermore, while experts, journalists, PR people and private users all displayed humour, anger and frustration, politicians tweeting about the debates used anger, frustration and humour the most (see Appendix C for full results).

Similar trends were identified in the UK where, while the promise of hosting live TV debates for the first time drew prompted enthusiasm, the content of these debates triggered almost only negative emotions, as indicated by Table 5.10. Indeed, the most coded elements of this analysis are frustration (34.6 per cent), anger (22.1 per cent), disappointment (19.2 per cent) and humour (13.5). Positive emotions (e.g. admiration, enthusiasm, happiness, hope, love and pride) are comprised between 0 and 1.9 per cent. These emotions were predominantly shared by private users and, to a much lesser extent, by journalists (see Appendix C for full results). Experts, politicians and PR people very marginally shared their emotions regarding the content of the debates.

Table 5.9: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by American Twitter users regarding substantive issues

	Substantive issues
Admiration	3.3
Empathy	0.2
Enthusiasm	6.2
Happiness	0.5
Hope	0.5
Love	0.7
Pride	0.4
Anger	26.5
Anxiety	0.1
Disappointment	4.4
Fear	1.7
Frustration	18.3
Guilt	0.1
Hate	0.6
Nostalgia	0.1
Sadness	0.6
Shame	0.1
Humour	35.6
Total	100

Negative emotions arose predominantly because the British debates were perceived to focus too much on candidates' personalities, not enough on facts and did not provide in-depth analyses and discussions of issues. The following tweets indicate that the debates focused on personalities rather than facts:

> Debates, sorties and what-nots should be about ISSUES not personalities. Sigh. (private user)

> The debates are championing the personalities. Which policies will you vote for? http://voteforpolicies.org.uk/ (private user)

Other users found the format selected for the debates not appropriate for the exchange and discussion of policy:

> RT @jonsnowC4 Not the best of the 3 debates: all three assaulting us with gobets of policy delivered so fast they become uninteligable¡agreed (private user)

> RT @EvanHD: These debates don't allow enough focus or follow-up on individual points..this one has been..quite hard to follow #leadersdebate (private user)

More negative emotions were expressed when it comes to the narrow range of issues covered in the British debates:

> Immigration yet again. Will health be raised for the first time in these debates? (journalist, @James_Macintyre)

> RT @chasbooth: Immigration question in all 3 debates. Why? Climate change & peak oil are far more important: let's talk about what matte ... (expert, Britain's largest student network campaigning on world poverty, human rights and the environment)

> Hold on, the economy again? What the hell were the other two debates meant to be about then?!?!? #leadersdebate (private user)

Table 5.10: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by British Twitter users regarding substantive issues

	Substantive issues
Admiration	0
Enthusiasm	1.9
Happiness	0
Hope	1.9
Love	1
Pride	0
Anger	22.1
Anxiety	1.9
Disappointment	19.2
Fear	1
Frustration	34.6
Guilt	0
Hate	2.9
Sadness	0
Shame	0
Humour	13.5
Total	100

Interestingly, these last three tweets were posted in the same 6-minute time period, exactly 19 minutes after the start of the second debate.

Many references to humour were also identified in this British analysis. In this case, humour was intrinsically linked to frustration. Many Twitter users displayed frustration in a humorous tone when talking about immigration being overly discussed by candidates compared to other issues that were ignored:

> @TimMontgomerie Immigration has been raised as an issue in all three debates #leadersdebate - must be important to us members of the public! (private user)

> RT @nextleft: We NEVER talk about immigration in this country. For example, making it the only topic asked in all 3 debates is just a front (private user)

All in all, Twitter users in both case studies expressed mainly negative emotions regarding not only the debates as media and political events but also regarding the issues discussed during the debates. These negative emotions were mostly translated by many references to frustration, anger and disappointment in the US and UK. In both cases, many tweets featured humour, the uses of which, although many and diverse, were mostly intended to express negative feelings about the debates and their content. Furthermore, in addition to expressing negative emotions regarding the debates, Twitter users also negatively assessed the debates as well as the lack of depth, format, organisation and the selection and handling of issues. In Britain, enthusiasm was however coded a significant amount of times (e.g. excitement at debates of this kind being held for the first time in the UK) but as soon as the debates started, positive emotions faded and turned into negative ones. Still in Britain, a feeling of connection and cooperation was also identified on Twitter and corresponded to users helping each other understand these first live debates. Lastly, these results were consistent for all types of users who all mainly expressed humour, frustration, anger, disappointment and enthusiasm regarding TV debates as events but also as discussions of substance in the American case. Most emotions coded in relation to debates were heavily posted by private users who, along with other users, focused on negative emotions (frustration, disappointment, anger) more so than positive ones (enthusiasm) in the British case.

C. Twitter & the news media

To understand the emotional interactions that took place during and around the 2012 American and 2010 British debates, it is also vital to investigate how Twitter users reacted to the news media coverage of the debates. Regarding the American case, Table 5.11 indicates the emotions displayed by Twitter users regarding the news coverage of the debates. It is worth noting that the coverage of the American debates was mostly mentioned on Twitter before and after each debate and less so during the debates. From this table, it can be seen that three emotions dominated all others: frustration with 23 per cent, anger with 16.6 per cent and enthusiasm with 16.3 per cent. Twitter users also chose to mock, criticise and express more negative emotions regarding the media coverage of the debates by massively using humour in their tweets (30.6 per cent). More specifically, many Twitter users displayed both humour and enthusiasm to share their excitement about the upcoming coverage of satirical shows such as *The Daily Show with Jon Stewart* or *Saturday Night Live* (28.6 per cent). Furthermore, users also displayed enthusiasm towards new reporting techniques such as news media publishing GIFs mocking the debates (3.6 per cent), specific news commentators giving their opinions about the debates (8.9 per cent) or simply enthusiastically telling what channel or medium they were following journalists on (14.3 per cent). In total, only 42.6 per cent of references were identified to enthusiastically congratulate journalists on their coverage of the debates, making this emotion marginal compared to frustration or anger. These results are consistent for all types of users coded separately (see Appendix C). However, most of the references coded in this sub-section were from private users and journalists, as experts, politicians and PR people remained almost silent regarding the news coverage of the debates.

Negative emotions translated Twitter users' feelings regarding what they perceived as a biased, unfair and manipulated media coverage of the debates. For example, much anger derived from the perceived bias of the news media:

> The nightly News is going to tell me who won the #debates. Smirk. What, I can't figure that out for myself? (private user)

> CNN & MSNBC spin showing true colors by grasping for Obama win. Once again irresponsible "journalism" rears its ugly head. #debates (private user)

> If all these "journalists" want so badly to insert their views into the Presidential debates, they should run for office. Otherwise, STFU. (private user)

TABLE 5.11: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by American Twitter users regarding the news coverage of the debates

	News coverage
Admiration	0.6
Enthusiasm	16.3
Happiness	0.3
Hope	0.9
Love	0.9
Pride	0.6
Anger	16.6
Disappointment	7.6
Fear	0.6
Frustration	23
Hate	0.9
Nostalgia	0.3
Sadness	0.6
Shame	0.3
Humour	30.6
Total	100

Furthermore, many Twitter users expressed their frustration and powerlessness at the media spin:

> Their guy is down & bleeding. CNN, msnbc pulling out all stops to prop up their guy & declare victory. Going to be ugly. Fight back #debates (private user)

> MSNBC is talking about Romney's right flank and "racial hatred" instead of trumpeting an Obama win. Maybe Romney did beat him. (@mkhammer, journalist)

In addition to expressing negative emotions regarding the tone of the media, Twitter users were also disappointed, frustrated and angered by what journalists chose to cover, namely trivia, emotions and emotionality. For example:

> media will largely ignore any substantial points made and focus on big bird and happy anniversary comments... #debates @sadbuttrue (private user)

> Love how all the media cares about in the #debates are the marketing aspect of the candidates. Let's talk policy for once. (private user)

Similarly, more negative emotions than positive ones were coded regarding the coverage of the British debates as indicated by Table 5.12. The most coded emotions are frustration (24 per cent, mostly used in conjunction with humour, 22.9 per cent), for example:

> After three debates, my mind is made up. ITV shouldn't be allowed to do things. (journalist, @mattkmoore)

Disappointment (15.6 per cent):

> Three Debates, thousands of column inches and not a single punch thrown. Very disappointing. (private user)

And anger (11.5 per cent):

> the sun and the mirror should be banned from writing about these debates. Do they not think any of their readers actually watched it? !!!!!! (private user)

TABLE 5.12: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by British Twitter users regarding the news coverage of the debates

	News coverage
Admiration	2.1
Enthusiasm	16.7
Happiness	1
Hope	1
Love	3.1
Pride	0
Anger	11.5
Anxiety	2.1
Disappointment	15.6
Fear	0
Frustration	24
Guilt	0
Hate	0
Sadness	0
Shame	0
Humour	22.9
Total	100

Enthusiasm was also identified in 16.7 per cent of references and corresponded to Twitter users either looking forward to some journalists' analysis or congratulating some journalists or news programmes. For example, the following users shared their excitement at the coverage of the debates:

> Looking forward to the next two debates now. The analysis on question time should be excellent (PR person)

> Looking forward to seeing round two of the great leaders' debates tonight...wonder who will be gracing the front pages tomorrow?! (PR

> person)

While others congratulated specific journalists or news programmes:

> RT @richardpbacon: Michael Cockerill's "How To Win The TV Debate" (the story of leaders' TV debates) was a propa TV gem last night. (private user)

> Two nights ago "The Daily Show" did a brilliantly funny review of the British election, including its debates and television coverage. (private user)

All of these emotions were mostly identified for private users and, to a lesser extent, for journalists themselves (see Appendix C for full results). Experts, politicians and PR people remained almost silent regarding the news media coverage of the debates.

These negative emotions are linked to the fact that Twitter users perceived the coverage of the debates as biased, manipulated or superficial. The following tweets display anger, frustration and disappointment at the news media being biased towards Cameron or Brown and framing Clegg negatively:

> RT @ThePollPot: Could anybody be convinced by the Murdoch presses attempt to spin the debates in favour of Cameron?!? I hope not (private user)

> I hate these televised debates. It is such propaganda platform for the Tory press. GB was miles ahead, will that be shown in the press? NO!! (private user)

> Some papers desperately trying to find a negative angle on Nick Clegg. He had some notes before the debates the Sun says. Oooh how bad!!!! (private user)

Others believed that the press could go as far as manipulating polls to frame their candidate in the best possible way:

> Waiting for Mail headline extrapolating from past two debates to suggest that Cameron will have 103.7% of the vote next week. #leadersdebate (private user)

Other Twitter users criticised the coverage of the debates and said it resembled a "soap opera" focusing on the wrong things:

> Nick Robinson on #bbcnews at 10 says he hopes party leaders' debates aren't just "soap opera". How about this: don't report it like one then (PR person)

> Given the media circus about the debates and the wives , they really should have organised a debate between the wives. (private user)

Lastly, some users urged others not to follow the news media to make up their minds but rather to decide for themselves:

> I'm getting a bit pissed off with the purveyors of dead tree based news sheets telling me who WON the debates. Thats for me to decide (private user)

> Great thing about debates: YOU the people saw & heard them & will not be told what to think by polls, spinning politicians or the newspapers (private user)

> Ne news reporting bout UK Leaders Debates will b edited, filtered n biased in sum form, 1 way or another by media. Watch, make own decisions (private user)

To conclude, Twitter users in both case studies, predominantly private users and journalists, displayed mainly negative emotions regarding the media coverage of the debates, especially frustration, disappointment and anger. Overall, the coverage was perceived as biased, manipulated and unfair and triggered powerlessness in social media users. Many references to humour and enthusiasm were also coded, however, these mocked or expressed excitement towards upcoming satirical news programmes, the analysis of some pundits or alternative reporting techniques. Lastly, Twitter users not only felt strongly against the tone of the media, they also expressed negative emotions regarding what journalists chose to cover; mainly trivia, emotions and emotionality according to Twitter users.

D. Twitter & other social media

In addition to displaying emotions towards candidates, the debates and the news media, Twitter users also expressed themselves regarding Twitter and other social media. Table 5.13 indicates what emotions Twitter users expressed regarding social media in the American case study. This table indicates that three emotions were coded more than others in the American case: enthusiasm (16.6 per cent), frustration (15.4 per cent) and anger (12.6 per cent). Furthermore, many Twitter users chose to mock the platform on which they were writing by using humour (39.4 per cent). These users were predominantly journalists and private users as experts, PR people and politicians almost did not tweet about social media during the debates (see Appendix C for full results).

Humour is the most coded element of Table 5.13 and was mostly used to make an overwhelming amount of jokes:

> RT @hereinid: Biden means Ryan is his friend in the strictly Facebook sense of the word. #debates (private user)

> What causes more twitter-rage than a presidential debate? TWO presidential debates! (private user)

Table 5.13: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by American Twitter users regarding social media platforms

	Social media
Admiration	1.2
Enthusiasm	16.6
Happiness	0.9
Hope	6.7
Love	2.4
Pride	0.5
Anger	12.6
Anxiety	0.2
Disappointment	2.4
Fear	0.6
Frustration	15.4
Guilt	0.1
Hate	0.5
Sadness	0.3
Shame	0.1
Humour	39.4
Total	100

These jokes were in some cases translated by the creation of fake Twitter accounts, such as @RomneyZinger:

> Lesson learned from McCain: when I wander around stage, I shall look determined and have a 1000 yard stare for maximum intimidation #debates (@RomneyZinger)

"Internet memes[2]" mocking candidates' ideas or statements were also created.

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[2] An Internet meme is often an image, video or even email depicting a person or situation sometimes with a funny caption. These memes spread virally on the Internet, especially on social media.

Picture 5.3 was posted by @YahooNews during the last debate and mocked Romney for not realising how much the Navy had changed over the years since it now possesses fewer horses and bayonets than it used too, as stated by Obama in the final debate ("Well, Governor, we also have fewer horses and bayonets because the nature of our military has changed").



Yahoo News
@YahooNews

#HorsesandBayonets courtesy of @nickciesiulka #Debates bit.ly/X5dl3e

RETWEETS 66
LIKES 13

8:04 PM - 22 Oct 2012

Figure 5.3: Meme posted by @YahooNews during the last debate (22nd of October 2012)

Twitter users also displayed much enthusiasm for social media in different instances. Indeed, Twitter users perceived social media as a means to enhance the debates. For example, many users said that social media were much more entertaining than the debates:

> #debates on Twitter is so much better than #debates on tv. (private user)

> Twitter and presidential debates, definitely a great match! #Debate2012 #twitter (private user)

> Twitter was really invented to help people survive the Oscars, Superbowl & Presidential debates. (private user)

In this particular case, social media triggered positive emotions:

> This commentary on Twitter is making my day so much brighter. I am so happy right now. #debates (private user)

> Twitter is really popping right about now #debates I'm proud lol (private user)

This enthusiasm and other positive emotions can be linked to a greater feeling of connection and cooperation between social media users who posted guides on how to use social media during the debates, for example:

> 5 ways to use social media to join in the live presidential debate tonight (#debates) http://t.co/XFYMZ1I2 #sarahsfaves (PR person)

> How to follow the #debates on social media: http://t.co/pmMnXjSm. Am super excited about @tumblr's live GIF'fing #GIFjournalism #itsanart (private user)

> 100 people you must follow on Twitter if you're watching the #debates: http://t.co/DsIDJ60v (PR person)

Others asked questions about whom to follow during the debates:

> Recommendations wanted: best Twitter source to follow the Presidential debates... (private user)

> What's the "must-follow" list of snarky/smart/comical tweeters for presidential debates? (Asking for a friend.) (expert in economy)

Although the number of references coded for positive emotions is significant, even more negative emotions were coded regarding social media and the debates. Indeed, for many users social media undermined the debates:

> Is it sad that I'm reading more tweets about the debate than actually watching it? #debates (private user)

While others expressed negative emotions regarding social media being used too much during the debates:

> I really hate this nonstop twitter feed playing underneath the #debates (private user)

> candidates talking about tax, and everybody twitting about the ties #debates (private user)

> I can't stress enough how annoying, hypocritical, uneducated, and judgmental people are on Twitter during the presidential debates (private user)

More negative emotions arose from the inclusion versus exclusion phenomenon that took place on Twitter during the debates:

> Just want to be apart of all this tweeting. #Debates #RomneyRyan2012 (private user)

Indeed, while some users felt happy to be part of the live feed of the debates by contributing to arguments, others felt left out because they were not watching or understanding the debates. For example, the following private user felt excluded from Twitter as he was not interested in the debates:

> Everyones tweeting about politics and I'm like hey what's a president?
> I don't really care to know what's going on in the world #debates

These mixed feelings were also identified in the British case study as shown by Table 5.14. Indeed, much humour (41.2 per cent) and enthusiasm (32.4 per cent) and, to a lesser extent, frustration (11.8 per cent), disappointment (5.9 per cent), anger (2.9 per cent), hope (2.9 per cent) and sadness (2.9 per cent) were coded in the British case. These emotions were mainly tweeted by private users as almost no references were coded for experts, journalists and PR people (see Appendix C for full results). No references at all were coded for politicians.

Table 5.14: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by British Twitter users regarding social media platforms

	Social media
Admiration	0
Enthusiasm	32.4
Happiness	0
Hope	2.9
Love	0
Pride	0
Anger	2.9
Anxiety	0
Disappointment	5.9
Fear	0
Frustration	11.8
Guilt	0
Hate	0
Sadness	2.9
Shame	0
Humour	41.2
Total	100

Half of all references to humour correspond to users making jokes regarding www.slapometer.com (see Sub-section A, Figure 5.1 for a print screen), while others were making fun of drunk Twitter users or commented on funny tweets. For example, the following two tweets acknowledge the enthusiasm and humour linked to slapometer.com:

> http://slapometer.com/ a great way to respond to tonight's Party Leader debates! Follow @slapometer (private user)

> British ad agency pioneers website where you can slap politicians during their live debates. http://bit.ly/9N2xfj (expert in adverts)

All references to enthusiasm correspond to Twitter users feeling enthusiastic at the possibility to live tweet the debates, for example:

> The Leaders' debates will kick off tonight. What excitement! Tweetage will be had. (private user)

It is also worth noting that many users thought that the 2010 British election was not a social media election as predicted but rather a traditionally led election relying heavily on newspapers and television. The following Twitter users shared their views regarding this traditional election:

> Hands up who thought this was going to be the new media election? It all comes down to trad newspaper battles and 3 televised debates. (private user)

> People are on a drunken new media binge but the TV debates showed TV is still top dog. #GE2010 (private user)

> @ewanmcintosh. Im afraid after the debates there's no way this is an "internet election." See https://twitter.com/mtrainey/status/12908241975 (private user)

> this election has only one week to be the social media campaign it has not been. it's all tv debates, tv microphones, next newspaper scoops (private user)

Several conclusions can be drawn from this sub-section. Twitter users in both cases, predominantly private users, displayed mixed emotions in relation to social media and the debates, especially enthusiasm, frustration, disappointment, anger, hope and sadness. Much enthusiasm and other positive emotions (e.g. happiness, pride, hope or love) derived from the fact that social media were perceived as entertaining during the debates thus improving the overall watching experience. More positive emotions were linked to Twitter users connecting and cooperating with each other online by asking and answering questions relating to the debates. Although these positive emotions were significant in both samples, even more negative emotions, especially frustration and anger, were coded regarding social media and the debates. From this viewpoint, social media were seen as a distraction, which undermined the viewing experience and substantive discussions. More negative emotions were linked to people feeling excluded when not following the debates and their coverage. Lastly, the most references were coded for humour, which took the form of many jokes but also the creation of fake social media accounts and Internet memes that mocked candidates or their statements. In Britain, while enthusiasm corresponded to users' excitement at live tweeting the debates, some users were also disappointed that the 2010 British election was not the social media election they expected.

II. Discussion

The key results presented in this chapter can now be compared to past literature, especially regarding the emotionalisation of society. This chapter, supported by Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, challenges the concept of "emotional governance" formulated by Richards (2007). For Richards (2007), the public's "emotional deficit" - a lack of careful and continuous focus on the emotional needs of the public - is linked to a “democratic deficit” - a growing lack of interest and distaste in politics. To answer these emotional and democratic gaps, Richards (2007) theorises the concept of “emotional governance”, which relies on mass media communications to emotionally touch the public. For Richards (2007), the governed public is at the centre of society and politics and has the ability to change politics. For example, if the governed express a need for a more emotionalised society, as Richards thinks is the case, then governments should become more emotional in their leadership. This chapter has highlighted two key findings, which seem to contradict this hypothesis. Firstly, although politicians tried to manipulate emotions and emotionality during the debates, this manipulation failed as Twitter users mainly displayed negative emotions in relation to politicians’ emotions. Indeed, my results show that Twitter users (private users, journalists, politicians, experts and PR people) perceived the emotions and emotionality used by politicians as inauthentic. Consequently, many tweets posted both in the UK and US expressed frustration, anger or disappointment at candidates trying to manipulate them through the telling of stories of people they have allegedly met or through an exaggerated display of empathy.

Secondly, journalists’ manipulation of different forms of emotionality failed too as Twitter users mainly expressed negative emotions regarding the coverage of the debates. Indeed, while journalists tried to manipulate emotions to fit their narrative and present their favourite candidate in the best possible way, Twitter users criticised journalists for focusing on emotions both in tone and content, rather than presenting issues and policies discussed during the debates. Furthermore, Twitter users also displayed emotions, mainly negative, regarding TV debates as events and discussions of substance and mixed emotions regarding social media.

I believe it is important here to mention that although Twitter users denounced the inauthenticity of politicians’ and journalists’ emotions, it does not necessarily mean that the emotions displayed on Twitter were authentic. Just like politicians and journalists, Twitter users too had reasons to manipulate emotions such as to gain followers, attract attention or establish their online presence, among others. Thus, going back to the debate opened in the discussion of the previous chapter, I can say that although Twitter users may not have been authentic, they may be perceived as such because their posts were immediate, unmediated and they appeared to be “people like us”. The results presented in this thesis, although not analysing authenticity *per se*, therefore reveal that politicians, journalists and Twitter users all may have manipulated emotions during the debates and their news and social media coverage. Furthermore, while politicians’ and journalists’ use of emotions was perceived as inauthentic, further research should look into how authentic Twitter users are in relation to media and political events. Thus, if emotions can deepen and strengthen democracy as stated by Richards (2007), my results show that emotions and emotional references have not become new means for politicians to convince voters who have lost interest, and gained distrust, in politics.

III. Conclusions

Chapter 5 has analysed how Twitter users reacted to the emotions and emotionality used by politicians during the 2012 American and 2010 British debates and by journalists covering these debates. This chapter has also investigated what emotions Twitter users themselves displayed on Twitter. The discussion section and my three results chapters have highlighted that, although journalists and politicians can directly affect the public’s emotions and emotionality (Richards, 2007), emotional governance or other related concepts may not be the solution to overcome potential deficits in politics.

I now summarise the key findings presented in this chapter regarding candidates, TV debates, the news media and social media.

Candidates, debates & the news media

Overall, it can be said that Twitter users displayed emotions in more than half of American tweets (61.37 per cent of all tweets coded contained at least one emotion or emotional reference) and less than half of British tweets (44.9 per cent) relating to candidates, the debates, the news coverage of the debates and social media platforms. More particularly, my results show that the overall reactions and emotions used in relation to candidates, the debates and their news coverage were mainly negative in both case studies.

In the American case, Twitter users criticised and expressed negative emotions regarding candidates' use of emotions and emotionality (mainly directed towards Romney and, to a lesser extent, Obama), the debates as events and discussions of substance along with the news coverage of the debates. In all three cases (candidates, debates and news coverage), humour was the most coded element and was rather negative in its use as Twitter users displayed humour mainly to mock, criticise, and/or to express negative emotions regarding a candidate, the debates or their coverage.

Similar results were obtained for the British case study. Firstly, while Twitter users criticised and displayed negative emotions towards candidates Brown and Cameron only, the use of anecdotes and references to family was criticised and elicited mainly negative emotions for all three prime ministerial candidates (mainly frustration and disappointment used in conjunction with humour). More specifically, negative emotions were consistently associated to Cameron and positive ones to Clegg. Brown occupied the middle ground throughout all the debates eliciting both positive and negative emotions. Secondly, Twitter users not only negatively assessed but also felt strongly against (frustration, disappointment and anger, sometimes used in conjunction with humour) the 2010 debates both as events and discussions of substance. Moreover, even though much enthusiasm was also coded (e.g. excitement at debates of this kind being held for the first time in the UK), it turned into negative emotions once the debates started. Thirdly, Twitter users mainly expressed negative emotions (frustration, disappointment and anger) regarding the coverage of the debates. To a lesser extent, some enthusiasm and excitement was coded regarding upcoming news programmes or congratulating post-debate news programmes. In all of these three analyses, humour was mostly negative as it was used to mock or criticise candidates or their statements but also to help express negative emotions such as frustration.

Chapter 5 also looked at the type of Twitter users behind these results. Regarding the American sample, these results were consistent for all types of users (experts, journalists, politicians, PR people and private users) who all mainly displayed humour, anger and frustration regarding candidates' use of emotions. However, only journalists and private users displayed humour and negative emotions mainly towards candidates using anecdotes and references to family. References to friends and reactions from experts, politicians and PR people were marginal regarding this aspect. The differences between types of users are mainly due to the fact that almost all tweets contained in my sample were posted by private individuals (83.9 per cent), followed by journalists (7.5 per cent), experts (5.6 per cent), politicians (1.6 per cent) and PR people (1.4 per cent).

In Britain, journalists displayed slightly more negative emotions for Cameron and mixed emotions for Brown and Clegg, while politicians, PR people and private users almost only associated positive emotions to Clegg and negative ones to Cameron with Brown being in between regarding candidates using emotions. However, only journalists and private users displayed negative emotions with experts, PR people and politicians remaining silent regarding references to family, friends and anecdotes. Regarding the debates and their coverage, most tweets were posted by private users and marginally so by experts, journalists, politicians and PR people. However, all users focused on negative emotions (frustration, disappointment and anger) more so than positive ones (enthusiasm). As all users broadly displayed the same emotions, the differences between user types can be allocated to the fact that a majority of the tweets contained in my sample were posted by private individuals (71.8 per cent), followed by journalists (14.9 per cent), experts (5.2 per cent), PR people (4.6 per cent) and politicians (3.5 per cent).

The results developed in Chapter 5 revealed that most tweets were posted by private users, to a lesser extent by journalists and marginally so by experts, politicians and PR people. My research therefore begs the question of how representative Twitter users contained in my samples are compared to the overall public watching the debates and following their coverage. Although it would be interesting for future research to select more tweets posted by politicians, experts and PR people in order to explore how other members of the public reacted to the debates and their coverage, my research provides details regarding what Twitter users in general posted during the British and American debates.

Similar consequences were derived from this negativity in both case studies. Firstly, American and British candidates' use of emotions and emotionality backfired, which mainly triggered negative emotions, mockery, support for opposing candidates and an increasing scepticism and scrutiny on Twitter. Secondly, Twitter users criticised and strongly reacted against the debates as events but also regretted the lack of depth, the selection and handling of issues during the American debates. These results are consistent for all types of users who all mainly expressed humour, frustration, anger, disappointment and enthusiasm regarding TV debates as events but also as discussions of substance in relation to the American debates. In the British case, Twitter users thought that the debates were a simple PR exercise or TV reality show and were too much like the American debates. Both the organisation and format of the debates were also criticised and deemed not fit for the United Kingdom polling system. Moreover, the debates were seen as superficial, lacking issues and discussions and focusing too much on candidates' personalities. From this confusion emerged a feeling of connection and cooperation, which corresponded to users helping each other understand these first live debates. Lastly, Twitter users mainly displayed humour and negative emotions regarding the journalistic coverage of the debates, which was perceived as biased, manipulated and unfair and triggered powerlessness in social media users in both case studies. Users did not only criticise the tone of American and British media but also displayed negative emotions in relation to what journalists chose to cover, namely trivia, emotions and emotionality according to Twitter users.

Social media

The last analysis carried out in this chapter investigated what emotions Twitter users displayed in relation to social media. In the American case, mixed emotions were used, predominantly enthusiasm, frustration and anger displayed by private users and journalists, in relation to social media and the debates. Enthusiasm and other positive emotions can be linked to the entertaining function of social media during the debates as well as to discussions in which social media users helped each other by answering and asking questions about the debates and their content. However, even more negative emotions than positive ones were coded regarding social media, which were perceived as a distraction from the debates and their content. Furthermore, many users who did not watch the debates felt excluded from social media platforms. Lastly, as for references to candidates, debates and their coverage, humour was the most coded element and consisted in many jokes and the creation of fake social media accounts and Internet memes that mocked candidates or their statements.

In the British case, Twitter users displayed mixed emotions such enthusiasm and, to a lesser extent, frustration, disappointment, anger, hope and sadness, in relation to the social media platforms they were sharing their thoughts and feelings on. Humour was also identified and was mostly conveyed by jokes. More specifically, users were mostly enthusiastic at live tweeting the debates or disappointed that the 2010 British debates were not more led by social media. Lastly, all tweets analysed in this sub-section were mostly coded for private users, very marginally for experts, journalists and PR people and not at all for politicians.

Conclusions

I. Summary

After exploring the interactions between emotions and society, journalism, politics and social media in the Literature review; my data sets, samples and methods of analysis in the Methodology; and the results of my analyses in three analytical chapters, this conclusion brings all of these chapters together. For this purpose, I now summarise my thesis and its content (I), detail the gaps in knowledge relating to my research (II) and discuss my findings (III) and recommendations for future work (IV).

This thesis has explored the emotions and emotional references used in and around TV debates. More specifically, I carried out a content analysis of the three 2010 British and four 2012 American televised leader debates looking at what emotions and emotional references British candidates Brown, Cameron, Clegg as well as American candidates Biden, Obama, Romney and Ryan used in each debate. This analysis also investigated in what proportions candidates used these emotions and emotional references. Following on from this, I carried out a framing analysis of newspaper articles covering the debates in each country. In the American case, I analysed 104 articles from the *New York Post* and 223 articles from *The New York Times.* In the British case, I analysed 93 articles from *The Sun* and its Sunday sister at the time, the *News of the World* as well as 238 articles from *The Guardian* and its Sunday sister, *The Observer.* This analysis was aimed at building on my debate transcripts analysis by investigating how *The Guardian,* *The Sun, The New York Times* and the *New York Post* framed the emotions and emotional references used by politicians to construct their reporting of the debates. Finally, after investigating the emotions and emotionality surrounding politicians and journalists, I focused on how a specific part of the public, namely Twitter users, reacted to the debates and their coverage. I performed a content analysis of a sample of American (30 000 tweets) and British tweets (3 000 tweets) posted during the debates period. In addition to exploring how Twitter users reacted to the emotions used by politicians and journalists during the 2012 American and 2010 British TV debates, this final analysis also shed more light regarding what emotions Twitter users themselves displayed online during the debates.

II. Novel contributions to knowledge

This thesis has addressed several gaps in knowledge. As the importance of emotions has only recently been rediscovered, the emotional field is worth investigating further academically. If they ever were, emotions are no longer understood as confined to irrational behaviours but seen to be central to so-called rational fields such as politics and journalism. As stated in the Introduction, I have included in this thesis emotions such as love or hate but also states or behaviours that can elicit an emotion such as humour or anecdotes (Bollow, 2004; Richards and Brown, 2002; Freud, 1927). Thus, my research has identified more emotions and emotionality used in political TV debates by politicians, journalists and Twitter users than other studies researching emotions and politics (Brader, 2005; Tiedens, 2001; Marcus et al., 2000). As my research has identified the specific emotions and emotionality used by politicians, journalists and Twitter users, my research has improved the understanding of emotions in politics, journalism and social media.

My research has also explored the emotions and emotionality used by different actors (politicians, journalists and Twitter users) in the 2012 American and 2010 British TV debates. By analysing (a) what emotions were used across candidates, topics and debates and in what proportions, and (b) how these emotions were used by these actors, my research has gone further than previous studies (Marcus, 2002, 1988; Lyons and Sokhey, 2014; Masters and Sullivan, 1993), which analyse emotions in politics and the news media. Indeed, to date, the literature analysing debate transcripts to identify what emotions politicians used remains very limited.

I have also carried out a framing analysis of different types of newspapers paying particular attention to emotions. While many researchers have carried out framing analyses of newspaper articles in the past, no literature was identified to carry out a framing analysis of newspaper articles in order to study the potential emotional framing of journalists, especially when considering the broad definition and understanding of emotions that I have applied throughout this thesis. Furthermore, as discussed in my Methodology chapter, framing analysis, although an increasingly used method, still draws disagreements amongst researchers. By considering this research method (its limitations, disagreements and valuable benefits when it comes to analysing emotions) and developing my own understanding of framing analysis and how to operationalise it, my research has contributed to the growing body of literature exploring framing analysis. Lastly, my framing analysis was not an isolated piece of research like many in the field of journalism but rather part of a bigger project, which aimed at analysing the whole spectrum of emotions linked to TV debates going from politicians during the debates to journalists covering the debates and Twitter users reacting to the debates and their coverage, a spectrum that has not been analysed to date.

Although many studies have focused on social media recently (Bruns, 2012; Bruns and Burgess, 2012; Papacharissi, 2009; Mourao et al., 2015), social media research is still in its infancy. By acquiring historical social media data, adapting research methods to analyse this data and considering any ethical implications linked to this type of data, my research has provided a new contribution to this growing field of research. Furthermore, by using a definition of emotions that is broader than previous studies (Brader, 2005; Tiedens, 2001; Marcus et al., 2000) and by including states and behaviours that can elicit an emotion such as humour, references to family, friends and anecdotes, my research has identified more emotions tweeted during the 2012 American and 2010 British debates than previous studies (Lasorsa et al., 2012; Holton and Lewis, 2011; Mourao et al., 2015). Moreover, due to the significant size of the samples analysed (33000 tweets in total), my research has analysed (without resorting to automated computer searches) more tweets than other studies (Lasorsa et al., 2012; Holton and Lewis, 2011) therefore improving the representativeness of samples and the validity of results. Lastly, as I coded each tweet according to its user (experts, journalists, politicians, PR people and private users), my results are more detailed and accurate than previous studies, which either do not define what users tweets corresponded to (Bruns and Burgess, 2011a, 2012) or which only focus on journalists' tweets (Lasorsa et al., 2012; Holton and Lewis, 2011). In summary, this research is novel in its methodology design, case studies and fields of interest.

III. Findings

I am now presenting the findings corresponding to my three analytical chapters.

A. Content analysis of debate transcripts

Chapter 3 aimed at answering my first subsidiary research question, which asked whether debates were emotional, in what proportions and composed of what emotions. This chapter concluded that the 2012 American and 2010 British debates were conducted in emotional terms.

Chapter 3 showed that American candidates, especially Romney who used emotions and emotional references the most, all used mixed emotions (especially empathy, anger, pride, happiness, frustration, anxiety, disappointment, fear, hope and love), humour and references to their families, friends and anecdotes. In the British debates, candidates used both negative and positive emotions as well as references to their families, friends and anecdotes, however, some emotions were specifically used by some candidates more than others. Cameron, who was the most emotional candidate of these debates, used mixed emotions (especially care, empathy, gratefulness, love, anger and shame), whereas Brown predominantly used negative emotions (especially anxiety, apology, fear, hate and shame) and Clegg less risky ones (especially disappointment, humour and pride).

My analyses further revealed that these emotions (especially empathy, pride and anger in the American case study and empathy, anger, fear and hope for the British one) and humour were predominantly used in conjunction with specific topics such as economy and finance, wars and conflicts, health and social care as well as education and training for both countries. In addition to these, American candidates particularly used emotions in relation to America and American values and British ones regarding police and national security affairs as well as possible changes and alternatives. Furthermore, in both case studies, candidates focused on specific features of these topics, mostly those which were rather optimistic, positive or non-controversial.

My results also show that American and British candidates manipulated emotions to illustrate examples, support arguments, persuade voters and defend or criticise another candidate. More specifically, as candidates were well-trained before the debates, the emotions displayed were not necessarily authentic but were manipulated for many reasons: to show optimism through positive emotions, to pressure an opponent using anger or to create solidarity through empathy. In addition to this manipulation of emotions, my results also indicate that candidates themselves felt that too many emotions and emotional references were used during the debates, which lacked substantive discussions. Consequently, politicians expressed negative emotions, especially anger, regarding the emotional “overdose” that was taking place during the debates.

B. Framing analysis of newspaper articles

Chapter 4 aimed at answering my second subsidiary research question exploring how newspapers framed the emotions and emotional references used by politicians during the debates. This chapter concluded that the press coverage of the 2012

American and 2010 British debates was emotionally framed according to six elements: issues, descriptions of candidates, emotions, personal relationships and stories as well as criticisms and recommendations made by journalists.

Results for my two case studies have shown that journalists of *The New York Times*, *New York Post*, *The Guardian* and *The Sun* emotionally framed the 2012 American and 2010 British debates. Although differences arose between tabloid and highbrow newspapers (tabloids were systematically more straightforward in their partisanship and emotions), articles were emotionally framed across all newspapers analysed. Firstly, this framing was made possible by a manipulation of emotions at different levels: journalists used their emotions but also those of candidates and sources, through the display of carefully selected quotes, to fit and reinforce their narrative. Secondly, this emotional framing occurred in the content of journalists' articles. Indeed, while journalists of all newspapers selected mainly wrote about style and election-related issues with a particular focus on candidates' families, friends and anecdotes, they undermined policy discussions in their articles. Thus, while candidates gave substantive answers to debate questions trying to avoid controversial angles, journalists focused on style and PR and tried to spark debates. In addition to manipulating emotions and humour, journalists of all selected newspapers also manipulated candidates' references to family, friends and anecdotes, in conjunction with their power to criticise, describe a candidate or discuss an issue. This manipulation was aimed at praising the candidate that each newspaper chose to endorse or to discredit his opponents.

All in all, Chapter 4 showed that, although politicians tried to manipulate emotions and emotionality during the debates, this use failed its purpose as journalists reacted mainly negatively to this manipulation of emotions. Candidates' use of emotions and emotionality only worked on the newspapers that chose to endorse them in the first place (e.g. *The Sun* and Cameron, *The New York Times* and Obama). For the candidates that were not supported by specific newspapers, this manipulation of emotions backfired. However, journalists too tried to manipulate emotions and emotionality in different ways: through the range of issues covered, the respective portrayal of all candidates, the emotions and emotionality conveyed and the criticisms voiced in each article.

C. Content analysis of Twitter feeds

Chapter 5 built upon Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 by looking at how Twitter users reacted to the 2012 American and 2010 British debates, candidates, the coverage of the debates and social media. This chapter concluded that Twitter users in American and Britain mainly displayed humour and negative emotions regarding candidates, the debates and their coverage and mixed emotions regarding social media platforms.

Chapter 5 concluded that Twitter users displayed mainly negative emotions (frustration, anger, disappointment used in conjunction with humour) regarding candidates using emotions and references to family, friends and anecdotes as well as regarding TV debates and their journalistic coverage both in the UK and US. In all three cases (candidates, debates, news coverage), humour was the most coded element and was rather negative in its use as Twitter users displayed humour mainly to mock, criticise and/or to express negative emotions regarding a candidate, the debates or their coverage.

Furthermore, Twitter users in both countries used mixed emotions to share their feelings and views about social media. In the American case study, Twitter users displayed mixed emotions (predominantly enthusiasm, frustration and anger) in relation to social media and the debates. Enthusiasm and other positive emotions can be linked to the entertaining function of social media during the debates as well as to discussions in which social media users helped each other by asking and answering questions about the debates and their content. Despite this positivity, even more negative emotions were coded regarding social media, which were perceived as a distraction from the debates and their content. Furthermore, many users who did not watch the debates felt excluded from social media platforms. In the British case study, Twitter users displayed mixed emotions such as enthusiasm and, to a lesser extent, frustration, disappointment, anger, hope and sadness, in relation to social media. More specifically, users were mostly enthusiastic at live tweeting the debates or disappointed that the 2010 British was not more led by social media. Finally, humour was the most coded element regarding social media in both case studies and conveyed many jokes, the creation of fake social media accounts and Internet memes that aimed at mocking candidates or their statements.

The consequences of these negative emotions were similar for both case studies. Firstly, the use of emotions and references to family, friends and anecdotes by candidates during debates backfired and prompted mockery, support for opposing candidates and an increasing scepticism and scrutiny on Twitter. Secondly, Twitter users criticised, and strongly reacted against, the debates as events but also regretted the lack of depth as well as the selection and handling of issues during the debates. From this confusion emerged a feeling of connection and cooperation, which corresponded to users helping each other understand the debates. Lastly, the coverage of the debates in both countries was perceived as biased, manipulated and unfair and triggered powerlessness in social media users who urged others not to follow the news media to make up their minds. Users not only criticised the tone of the media, they also displayed negative emotions in relation to what journalists chose to cover (trivia, emotions and emotionality).

All in all, this thesis shows how emotions were used in and around the 2012 American and 2010 British TV debates by politicians during debates, by newspaper journalists in their coverage of debates and by Twitter users following debates and reacting to their coverage. The conclusions presented in this thesis are twofold. Firstly, my analyses highlight that, although politicians tried to manipulate emotions and emotionality during the debates, this failed as journalists and Twitter users mainly reacted negatively. Secondly, this thesis shows that, although journalists tried to manipulate emotions to fit their narrative and present their favourite candidate in the best possible way, Twitter users mainly expressed negative emotions regarding the coverage of the debates. Thus, the three analyses carried out in this thesis show that emotions are not a straightforward means for politicians and journalists to interact with a specific part of the public, namely Twitter users, as both manipulations of emotions (political and journalistic) failed to convince Twitter users. My thesis therefore challenges the argument that "emotional governance" (Richards, 2007) is the answer to the journalistic and political deficits society is facing.

IV. Recommendations for future research

This thesis extracted results from various data sets: debate transcripts, newspaper articles and tweets. While these have been rich in information and allowed me to answer my research question, future work should build upon these results using other methods and data sets. For example, interviews with senior politicians and aides could help us to understand in more detail why politicians used emotions and emotional references in the context of the 2012 American and 2010 British debates. Along those lines, interviews with journalists who covered the 2012 American and 2010 British debates could help us to understand more precisely why journalists used emotions both in tone and content in the coverage of the debates.

Future work should also aim at examining a larger sample of tweets than I have, which would improve even more the representativeness and validity of results. For example, future analyses should particularly include tweets by politicians, PR people and experts, all of whom were marginal in my analysis. This type of big data analysis should also be coupled with interviews of non-Twitter users in order to have a more comprehensive view of the public and how it reacted to the debates and their coverage. Furthermore, future work on tweets relating to TV debates should also include a time analysis, which would give more detail about when Twitter users posted each tweet.

Finally, future research should expand my understanding of emotions even more. For example, applying my understanding of emotions to visuals would be particularly relevant as my definition could also cover emotional music, body language analysis or the use of family, friends and anecdotes embodied by people on stage. In addition to studying the emotionality linked to visuals, interviews or focus groups could also be carried out in order to examine how the public reacted to these emotions.

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Appendix A

Dictionary of topics

I. 2012 American TV debates

Here are the final forms composed of the name, definitions and a few examples of the fourteen topics identified in the 2012 American debate transcripts:

- **Ecology and Green Energy**

Definition

This topic comprises all references to the two presidential candidates' proposals on green energy and ecology, and to the current state of the American energy resources.

Dictionary of sub-nodes

- **Energy independence**: energy independent; energy dependent; full-efficiency;
- **Energy of the future**: new sources of energy; green energy; energy sources of the future; wind; wind power; solar; biofuels; energy-efficient cars; cleaner; electricity; electric battery cars; renewables; ethanol; natural gas production; oil production; oil from offshore in Alaska; clean coal;
- **General talks about energy**: coal industry; coal employment; coal plant; coal facility; drill; drilled; pipeline; pipelines; Canada; pump; gallon; gasoline prices; gasoline; public lands; Federal lands; Federal waters; resources;

resource; birds; Migratory Bird Act; Department of energy; American energy production; energy-mix; environment; environmentally; oil companies; oil man; oil imports; coal;

- **Economy and Finance**

Definition

This topic comprises all references to the state of the economy, national finances, the employment rate and the crisis that hit many developed countries in 2008.

Dictionary of sub-nodes

- **Banks**: banks; Central Bank; lenders;
- **Companies and businesses**: small businesses; business; companies; corporations; small enterprise; AEI (American Enterprise Institute); auto industry; industries; manufacturers; manufacturing; entrepreneurs; General Motors; GM; Chrysler; Apple; Tesla; Fisker; Solyndra;
- **Economy**: finance; financed; financing; refinance; financial; economy; economic; top-down; reduce; reduced; reducing; money; regulate; regulated; regulating; regulation; middle-class; market; budget; balance; balanced; balancing; costs, cost, costing; Dodd-Frank (Wall Street reform and consumer protection act); Wall Street; Main Street; Bowles-Simpson (National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform); Grover Norquist; profits; profitable; dollars; trillion dollars; Detroit; export; exported; exporting; exportations; import; importing; imported; importations; surplus; spend; spent; spending; borrow; borrowed; borrowing; deductions; loopholes; exemptions; gain; gained; gaining; gains; pay; paid; paying; price; pricing; prices; payment; buy; bought; buying; Big Bird; protectionist; protectionism; food stamps; compete; competed; competing; competitive; competitiveness; currency; intellectual property; designs; patents; counterfeit; Latin America; Greece; China; Chinese; Chinese tires; binge; sequestration cuts; sequester; cheat; cheated; cheating; cheater; farms; owe; owed; owning; IOUs (I owe you statements); checks; innovate; innovated; innovating; innovators; overseas; stimulus; interest groups; Moody's; share; shares; lower; less; hedge funds; increase; increased; increasing; wealthy; millionaires; billionaires; wealthiest; rich people; interests; rates; credits; fund; funds; funding; dividends; savings; credit card; loans; mortgages; lost; lose; losing; deficit; bankrupt; bankruptcy; foreclosures; debt; income; incomes; wages; wage; take-home pay; earners; revenue; middle-income; high-income; bailout; rescue; rescued; rescuing; recover; recovered; recovering; recovery; thrive; thrived; thriving;
- **Financial crisis**: brink of collapse; recession; financial crisis;

- **Investments**: invests; investing; invested; investments;
- **Jobs and employment**: jobs; hire; hired; hiring; create; created; creating; work; worked; working; out of work; employment; unemployment; unemployed; employed; workforce; taskforce; workers; worker;
- **Recovery**: growth; grow; recovery;
- **Taxes**: raise; raises; raised; raising; tax code; tax plan; tax cuts; cut taxes; corporate taxes; cut; taxpayer; tax relief; tax; taxed; taxing; tax break; taxation;
- **Trade**: middlemen; trade; traded; trading; tariffs; goods;

- **Education and Training**

Definition

This topic gathers all references to the American educational system, its organisation, its students and classes.

Dictionary of sub-nodes

- **Classes**: class; class size; classroom;
- **Education**: education; education system; high education; higher learning; student loan; tuition; scholarship; grant; tuition-free ride; exams; exam; tests; tested; graduation exam; school degree; Race to the Top; top-quarter; think tanks;
- **Fields and disciplines**: basic science; research; maths; English;
- **Pupils and students**: students; kids; graduate; fourth-graders; eight-graders; drop out;
- **Schools, colleges and universities**: schools; colleges; toughest-to-deal-with schools; public institution; high school; community colleges;
- **Skills**: skills; skilled; qualifications; qualified; equipped;
- **Teachers**: teachers;
- **Training**: training; trained; training programs; retrained;

- **Emotions, Humour and Personal Relationships and Stories**

Definition

This topic gathers all the references to emotions (e.g. love, pride, or empathy), personal relationships and stories (references to families, friends and personal stories) and humour displayed by candidates. For this topic only (as the other topics are self-explanatory), I have defined each emotion in order to shed some light on my coding process and help readers grasp what I understand for each specific emotion and emotional reference. All definitions (except for family and personal stories) are derived from definitions provided by Oxford Dictionaries (2014).

Dictionary of sub-nodes

- **Anger**: a strong feeling of annoyance, displeasure, or hostility.
  Examples of terms coded: anger; angry; offensive; it's about time they take some responsibility; this is unconscionable; stop talking about how you care about people. Show me something. Show me a policy. Show me a policy where you take responsibility.

- **Anxiety**: a feeling of worry, nervousness, or unease about something with an uncertain outcome.
  Examples of terms coded: I'm concerned that the path that we're on has just been unsuccessful; people become concerned; families who were worried; we're going to have to have employers in the new economy [...] that are going to be so anxious to get good workers, they're going to be anxious to hire women.

- **Apology**: a regretful acknowledgement of an offence or failure.
  Examples of terms coded: I'm sorry, Jim, I'm going to stop the subsidy to PBS; I'm sorry; I apologize.

- **Care**: feeling of affection or liking; look after and provide for the needs of someone.
  Examples of terms coded: he cares about 100 percent of Americans; my faith informs me about how to take care of the vulnerable; that's to equip those we send into harm's way and care for those who come home.

- **Disappointment**: sadness or displeasure caused by the non-fulfilment of one's hopes or expectations.
  Examples of terms coded: for me, I look at what's happened in the last four years and say this has been a disappointment; we don't have to live like this; the president has tried, but his policies haven't worked.

- **Empathy**: the ability to understand and share the feelings of another.
  Examples of terms coded: we've been through tough times but we always

bounce back because of our character; because we pull together; terrible tragedy; disaster; massacre; we think of their families and care for them deeply; grieving with the families; comfort families who have lost somebody; I want to fight for them; buried; crushed; burden; struggling; suffering; hardship; hurt; stuck; at the mercy; I know; my folks; feel like we're under attack; our hearts and minds.

- **Family**: feeling related to one's family including spouse, children, parents and grand-parents.
  Examples of terms coded: I became the luckiest man on Earth because Michelle Obama agreed to marry me; happy anniversary; most romantic place; I've got five boys; I was raised by a single mom; I've got two daughters; my dad was born in Mexico of American parents, Ann's dad was born in Wales and is a first-generation American; I'm a son of Detroit, I was born in Detroit. My dad was head of a car company. I like American cars; my wife was in an accident, killed my daughter and my wife, and my two sons survived.

- **Fear**: an unpleasant emotion caused by the threat of danger, pain, or harm.
  Examples of terms coded: scare; someone you should run from; afraid of; frightening.

- **Friendship**: the emotions or conduct of friends; the state of being friends.
  Examples of terms coded: our friends; friend; friendly; true friend; best friend; friendship.

- **Frustration**: the feeling of being upset or annoyed as a result of being unable to change or achieve something.
  Examples of terms coded: frustrated; frustration.

- **Happiness**: feeling or showing pleasure or contentment.
  Examples of terms coded: I'm happy; I am pleased; I am glad.

- **Hope**: a feeling of expectation and desire for a particular thing to happen.
  Examples of terms coded: I hope; the hopes.

- **Humour**: the quality of being amusing or comic.
  Examples of terms coded: and congratulations to you, Mr. President, on your anniversary. I'm sure this was the most romantic place you could imagine, here with me; But under Governor Romney's definition, there are a whole bunch of millionaires and billionaires who are small businesses. Donald Trump is a small business. Now, I know Donald Trump doesn't like to think of himself as small anything, but that's how you define small businesses if you're getting business income; Well, Governor, we also have fewer horses and bayonets, because the nature of our military's changed. We have these things called aircraft carriers, where planes land on them. We have these ships that go underwater, nuclear submarines.

- **Love**: a strong feeling of affection towards someone or something.
  Examples of terms coded: the most important one is that 20 years ago I

became the luckiest man on Earth because Michelle Obama agreed to marry me. And so I just want to wish, Sweetie, you happy anniversary and let you know that a year from now we will not be celebrating it in front of 40 million people; love.

- **Personal stories**: feeling related to someone telling a story about his or her past experiences.
  Examples of terms coded: a woman grabbed my arm; Can you help us?; I talked to a guy; that I met; a wonderful young lady; a woman came to me; I met; I was in Pennsylvania with someone; People grab my arms and say, please save my job; I talked to a young woman; I've met some of those people. I met a young woman; This is a guy who I was talking to a family in Northborough, Massachusetts the other day, Sheryl and Mark Nixon. Their kids were hit in a car crash, four of them. Two of them, Rob and Reed, were paralyzed; because these are my folks; I'm a guy who wants to help; I served as a missionary, as a pastor.
- **Pride**: a feeling of deep pleasure or satisfaction derived from one's own achievements, the achievements of one's close associates, or from qualities or possessions that are widely admired.
  Examples of terms coded: pride; proud; one of the magnificent things about this country; the brilliance of our people and states; I was astonished at the creativity and innovation that exists in the American people; All those things are designed to make sure that the American people, their genius, their grit, their determination, is channeled and they have an opportunity to succeed.

- **Former Presidents and Politicians**

Definition

This topic gathers all references to previous Presidents and politicians such as Senators, Congressmen, as well as party and candidates aides, among others.

Dictionary of sub-nodes

- Bush tax cuts; George Bush; the Bush administration
- John McCain
- Secretary Clinton
- Bill Clinton
- All the prior Presidents combined
- Dwight Eisenhower

- Ronald Reagan; Tip ONeill
- Abraham Lincoln
- The previous administration; the previous President;
- John F. Kenney; Jack Kennedy
- Dick Cheney
- FDR (Franklin Delano Roosevelt)
- Sarah Palin

- **Gender Issues**

Definition

This topic consists of all the references to gender issues and inequalities such as women being paid less than men all qualifications being equal, but also to contraception, children, and current regulations to defend women's rights.

Dictionary of sub-nodes

- **Inequalities between men and women**: same job as a man; paid less; discrimination; gender equality; qualifications; qualified; contraceptive; contraception; mammographs; cervical cancer screenings; Planned Parenthood; Lilly Ledbetter;
- **References to women**: breadwinners; women; amazing women; womens groups; binders full of women; rights of women; treating women with the kind of respect and dignity;

- **Governor Romney and the Republican Party**

Definition

This topic comprises all the references to the Republican presidential team that is to Mitt Romney, and his running mate, Paul Ryan.

Dictionary of sub-nodes

- Governor Romney; Governor; Mitt; Mitt Romney; Massachusetts; Governor of Massachusetts; successful investor; businessman; opponent

- Republicans; Republican candidate; Republican primary; members of the Republican Congress
- Congressman Ryan; running mate; Paul Ryan; congressman
- Presidential candidate
- Romney-Ryan ticket
- Bipartisan

- **Gun Control**

Definition

This topic consists of the references to gun control, the Second Amendment and the consequences of the use of weapons in the United States.

Dictionary of sub-nodes

- **Anti-gun**: violence; violent impulses; violent acts; criminals; drug lords; mentally-ill; mentally disturbed;
- **Law and regulation**: second amendment; ban;
- **Pro-gun**: hunting; sportsmen; protect; protection;
- **Weapons**: guns; weapons; assault weapons; AK-47; handguns; automatic weapons;

- **Health and Social Care**

Definition

This topic tackles the health issues raised during the four televised debates and that range from patients to diseases, Medicare and Medicaid.

Dictionary of sub-nodes

- **Carers, doctors and staff**: check-ups; doctors; patients; medical training; board; wellness visits; nursing homes; hospitals; clinic;
- **Diseases, conditions and general health**: healthier; prescriptions; drugs; drug costs; treatments; benefits; disabilities; preexisting condition; sick; diabetes; preventive care; care; health care; childcare;

- **Health care system**: Medicare; Medicaid; Obamacare; Social Security; health insurance; coverage; uninsured; insured; premiums; AMA (American Medical Association; AARP (American Association of Retired Person); privatization; voucher;
- **Patients and pensioners**: seniors; poors; retirees; near-retirees; retirement; beneficiaries; autistic kid;

- **Immigration**

Definition

This topic consists of all the references to the immigration topic that is legal and illegal immigration, immigrants and current regulations, among others.

Dictionary of sub-nodes

- **Immigration and immigration issues**: immigration; illegal immigration; legal immigration; legally; illegally; Ellis Island; Arizona law; border; Border Patrol; deportation; self-deportation; green card; visa; papers; citizenship;
- **Migrants**: Hispanics; permanent residents; immigrants; legal immigrants; undocumented workers;

- **President Obama and the Democrat Party**

Definition

This topic gathers all the references to the Democratic presidential team that is to Barack Obama and his running mate, Joe Biden.

Dictionary of sub-nodes

- The President; President of the United States; Commander in Chief; presidency
- The administration
- The government; the Federal government
- Democrats; Democrat; Hillary Clinton
- Running mate; Vice President; Joe Biden; Joe; Vice Presidency

  - Hometown of Chicago; Chicago
  - Bipartisan

- **Pro-life/Abortion**

Definition

This topic gathers the main arguments around abortion, pro-life arguments and religious consideration of life.

Dictionary of sub-nodes

  - **Pro-abortion**: but I refuse to impose it on equally devout Christians and Muslims and Jews, and I just refuse to impose that on others; I do not believe that we have a right to tell other people that - women - they can't control their body. It's a decision between them and their doctor; contraception; abortion; Court; Justice;
  - **Pro-life**: pro-life; first-born; heartbeat; baby; ultrasound; child; conception; freedom of religion; religion;
  - **Rape, incest and danger for the life of the mother**: rape; forcible rape; the exceptions for rape, incest and life of the mother;

- **United States and American Values**

Definition

This topic gathers all the references to America as a land, as a nation but also to its people, its values and its international mission.

Dictionary of sub-nodes

  - **American land**: America; American; Americans; United States; United States of America; States; North America; North American; US; this country; the Nation; the land of promise; at home;
  - **America's mission**: the hope of Earth; torch; responsibility; fulfill our role in the world; America must lead; the one indispensable nation; we have freed other nations from dictators; greatest nation on Earth;
  - **American people**: American people; our people; our citizens; their genius, their grit, their determination; our values; magnificent; free; prosperous;

- **American values**: resilience; determination; patriotism; patriotic; freedom; first freedom; free enterprise; happiness; pursuit; dreams; liberty; hope; opportunity; principles; human rights; human dignity; freedom of expression; elections; freedom of religion; pacific power; Constitution; Declaration of Independence; pledge allegiance to the flag;
- **Religion**: God; creator; religion; religious; blessed; religious liberties;

- **Wars and Conflicts**

Definition

This topic gathers all references to wars (countries and lands involved), conflicts, but also to soldiers, equipment, weapons, treaties and to the consequences of war.

Dictionary of sub-nodes

- **American Consulate attack in Benghazi**: diplomats; Benghazi; consulate; embassy; Libya; Ambassador; diplomatic; Chris Stevens; YouTube video; embassy security;
- **Casualties and health consequences of war**: coffins; assassination; kill; killed; killing; die; dead; dying; assassinate; assassinated; assassinating; murder; murdered; murdering; crush; crushed; crushing; murderous activities; corpses; slaughter; slaughtered; slaughtering; post-traumatic stress disorder; traumatic brain injury;
- **Countries, peoples, leaders, and political/ religious organisations involved with war or conflict**: Middle East; Iraq; Afghanistan; Syria; Egypt; Israel; Iran; Mali; Russia; Turkey; Lebanon; Poland; Tehran; Asia; Europe; Africa; volatile region; Herzliya conference; Saudi Arabia; North Korea; Pakistan; Yemen; Somalia; Afghans; Libyans; Syrians; Saudis; Qataris; Turks; Russians; Iranians; Egyptians; Israelis; Jordanians; Ah Gandah; Kandahar; Monamanee; Helmand; Kunar; Kabul; Bagdad; Quetta Shura; hotspots; Zabul; Islam; Muslim; Muslim Brotherhood President; Arab; Arabic; Sunni-Shia; Hamas; Assad; Vladimir Putin; Muammar Qaddafi; Ahmadinejad; Chavez; Castro, Kim Jong II; Mubarak; Bibi Netanyahu; Bibi; Mullahs; Ayatollah; Pashtun; Arab Spring; Tahrir Square;
- **Equipment and weapons**: weapons of mass destruction; ships; aircraft carriers; submarines; drones; drone strikers; UAVs; cargo planes; M1 tanks; aircraft; airspace; nuclear bomb; nuclear weapon; nuclear treaties; treaty; uranium; centrifuge; nuclear proliferation; blow up; fissile material; enriched; nuclear-armed; arms; heavy weapons; armed; bombs; bombers; bombed; bombing; chemical weapons; Nunn-Lugar;

- **International agreements and allies**: alliances; international coalition; ally; allies; international community; partners; international law; partnerships; cooperate; cooperated; cooperating; cooperation; UN; United Nations; Kofi Annan; council; NATO; Israel;
- **Soldier, fighters and staff**: soldiers; troops on the ground; forces; Navy; Air Force; fighters; security forces; joining forces; Joint Chiefs of staff; private; General Petraeus; Admiral Mullen; joint patrols; reservist; forward-operating base; General Allen; General Scaparrotti; commander; special forces; decorated soldier; veterans; Tom Pickering;
- **Terrorism**: Al Qaida; Bin Laden; 9/11; terrorist attack; act of terror; Al Qaida-type individuals; bad guys; terrorism; Hezbollah; genocide; Ground Zero; memorial; Twin Towers; warheads; Haqqani network; counterterrorism; jihadists; Taliban; extremism; extreme; radical; counterinsurgency;
- **War issues**: wars; two wars; Cold War; conflict; tension; World War I; World War II; Army; military; militarily; missile defense program; defense needs; veto; vetoed; peace; peaceful; overflight; fight; fought; fighting; Joint Strike Fighter; national security; security; cybersecurity; homeland; safety; foreign policy; civilians; civil society; reject; rejected; rejecting; hearts and minds; violent; violence; dangerous; civilized people; humanitarian aid; humanitarian assistance; combat; battleship; harm; chaos; tumult; confusion; hurt; hurting; folly; strategy; strategic; geopolitical; anti-Americans; anti-America; justice; liberate; liberated; liberating; defend; defended; defending; defense; help; support; supported; supporting; responsible; mission; democracy; democratically elected; nation-building; intelligence sources; ISI (Pakistani Intelligence Organisation); CIA; cease-fire; transition; negotiations; withdrawal; challenges; Holocaust; Yod Vashem; enemies; enemy; foe; adversaries; sanctions; pressure; crippled; crippling; embargoes; isolate; isolated; isolating; isolation; pariah; evil; Great Satan; despot; dictatorship; dictator; revolution; Green revolution;

II. 2010 British TV debates

Here are the final forms composed of the name, definitions and a few examples of the fifteen topics identified in the 2010 British TV debates:

- **Change and Alternative**

Definition

This topic gathers all references to the wind of change, hope and innovations offered by the three debating parties, but also to what they call "old politics" and their broken promises.

Dictionary of sub-nodes

- **Alternative and change**: alternative; fantastic opportunity; differently; fair; change; changes; something new; something different; Liberal Democrats; Conservatives; Labour; no ordinary times; no ordinary election; defining year; fairness; debates; hope; restore; faith; trust; badly need; big choice; major innovation; public confidence; do something different; new; new start; way forward; alternative to the two old parties; say no to the old parties and yes to something new and something different; give real change a chance; trust your instincts; support fairness; Britain's future; better future; future; new team; responsibility; responsible; televised leaders' debates; they're beginning to hope, they're beginning to think that we can do something different this time; one of the most exciting elections we have had in a very long time; change the country and make it a better place; real change; genuine change; real action, sensible action; new leadership; take the country forward; fresh, new leadership from a new team on May 7th; clean break; new direction; build a better, fairer Britain; we can change Britain for good;
- **Old politics**: two old parties; running things for years; the only choice; old politics; old party politics; going wrong for so long; both major parties running governments over the last 20 years; much tough talk from different governments of different parties for so long; same old remedies; the more they attack each other, the more they sound exactly the same; all politicians are just the same; the only choice is between two old parties who have been playing pass the parcel with your government for 65 years now; same promises; same old mistakes; judgment; and you won't be stuck with what you've got now; exactly in the same old way; very old electoral system; big lie; old choices of the past; repeat the mistakes of the past; same old Tory party; nothing really changes at all;

- **David Cameron and the Conservative Party**

Definition

This topic comprises all the references to the Conservative party including candidate David Cameron and the Conservative team.

Dictionary of sub-nodes

- Conservative; Conservatives; Conservative MP; Boris Johnson, Conservative Mayor of London; Tory;

- David Cameron; David;

- **Ecology and Green Energy**

Definition

This topic comprises all references to the three candidates' proposals on green energy and ecology, and to the current state of British energy resources.

Dictionary of sub-nodes

- **Ecology and climate change talks**: climate change; weather; Climate Change Act; reduce; emissions; CO2 emissions; addiction; dependence; energy plan; energy supply; carbon dioxide emissions; reduction plans;
- **Energy of the future**: cliffs of Dover; wind; Scotland; wind turbine; sun; solar panel; energy; heat our water; renewables; offshore wind power; wind power; onshore wind; The Green Deal; sustainable future; electric car; hybrid cars; greener; environmentally friendly; insulation; environmentally sustainable; low-carbon industries; London Array Project; off the coast; energy ministers; energy strategists; green-field sites;
- **International agreements**: Copenhagen; global; British-only solution; China; America; anti-Americanism;
- **Pollution**: trains; plane; roads: high-speed rail network; domestic air flights; North Queensferry; energy bill; third runaway; Heathrow; hub; flights; aeroplanes; fly; volcanic ash; freight; pollution; aviation; energy balance; oil; nuclear; gas; fuel; expensive; nuclear plants; oil prices; power cuts; see the lights go out;

- **Economy and Finance**

Definition

This topic comprises all references to the state of the economy, national finances, the employment rate and the crisis that hit many developed countries in 2008.

Dictionary of sub-nodes

- **Banks**: greedy bankers; banks; banking; bankers; lend; lent; lending; Bank of England; banking crisis; ownership of the banks; banking system; greed; Northern Rock; small bank; big bank; bank levy; retail banks; casinos; wild bets; Royal Bank of Scotland; RBS; Halifax; Lloyd's TSB; free-wheeling casino investment banking; conservative sober retail high street banking; investment banking; high street banking; HSBC;

- **Companies and businesses**: companies; business; small business; large business; business people; Sainsbury's; Marks & Spencer; Mothercare; Corus; Logica; Next; the steelmakers; Trident; British company; manufacturing company; manufacture; manufactures; manufactured; manufacturing; British business; sell; sells; sold; selling; leading businessmen and women; industrial heritage; digital industries; firms; biotechnology; new technologies; factories; Kraft; American multinational; Cadbury; small and medium-sized enterprises; new manufacturing industries; Siemens;

- **Economy**: economy; economic; economically; money; money is tight; pay; payments; spend; spending; fund; funding; save; saving; savings; waste; wasting; cost; costing; cut; cutting; undercut; penny; pence; pound; six billion; 6 billion; support; supporting; child trust fund; afford; credit cards; profits; Financial Services Authority; City of London; rates; rate; interest rates; capital gains; wages; financial decisions; finances; financially huge; benefit; benefits; loopholes; subsiding; for free; Council for Financial Stability; Governor of the Bank of England; Business Council for Britain; tripartite committee for financial stability; Chancellor of the Exchequer; Alistair Darling; reduce; reducing; reduction; national economic benefit; public spending; Whitehall; quangos; public finances; viable; draconian; emergency budget; global financial supervision system; high street; risk; at risk; high-risk; 1930s; 1980s; 1990s; United States; Depression; big summit; welfare; fix; regulate; regulating; China; Chinese; made in China; buy; buying; goods; placing bets on money markets; public sector pay restraint; balance the books; people's pockets; petrol prices; weekly shopping bills; income scale; Institute of Fiscal Studies; poorest people; bonuses; bonus incentive; nationalise; restructure; cash flow; recapitalise; remuneration; global financial levy; Fred Goddwin; "Fred the Shred"; pre-budget report; shares; overdraft limit; clients; demand; regional development agencies; purchase; purchases; purchased; purchasing; purchaser; goods and services; contracts; substantial sums; expand; create; assets; capital; stake; VAT; penalty; deficit; debt; repossessions; excess; bail out;

- **Financial crisis**: biggest global financial crisis; recession; double-dip recession; biggest budget deficit of any developed country in the world; terrible financial recession; global financial recession; black hole; big hole; structural deficit; stop crisis becoming calamity; stop a recession becoming a depression;

- **Housing**: property; properties; empty; houses; homes; build; built; building; home owners; first time buyers; owner-occupied majority; home ownership; rent; housing association; council homes; flats; private property developers; shared equity; part-rent; part-buy; housing benefit;
- **Investments**: invest; investments; invested; investing;
- **Jobs and employment**: jobs; ministers' pay; paymaster; jobs killer; pay increase; civil servants; pay rise; unemployed; unemployment; employ; employs; employed; employment; redundant; earners; earn; earns; earned; earning; earnings; work; works; worked; working; full-time; part-time; out-of-work;
- **Recovery**: recovery; prosperity; secure; better off; grow; grows; growing; growth; thrive; thrives; thrived; thriving; move; moves; moved; moving; boost;
- **Taxes**: tax system; tax; taxes; taxed; taxing; taxpayer; capital gains tax; offshore haven; Belize; Lord Ashcroft; tax credits; tax breaks; inheritance tax system; income tax; tax subsidy; tax relief; child tax credit; tax reform; global financial tax; tax man; tax switch; big tax give-away promises; stamp duty;
- **Trade**: trade; export; exports; exported; exporting; import; imports; imported; importing; trade deals;

- **Education and Training**

Definition

This topic gathers all references to the British educational system, its organisation, students and classes.

Dictionary of sub-nodes

- **Classes**: classroom; small class sizes; average class size; one-to-one tuition; Saturday morning classes; evening classes; catch-up classes;
- **Education**: education; aspiration to succeed; nursery education; part-time; full-time; grades; highest of standards; exams; educational quangos; external marking; vocation; national curriculum; instructions; Education Freedom Act; federations; academy; academies; discipline; overruled; order; creativity; freedom; additional resources; Department of Children, Schools and Families; Department of Curtains and Soft Furnishings; contemplation suite; massage room; tested; educational reform; educational authorities; future; SureStart Children's Centres; personal tuition; crazy rules; diversity; excellence; educational failure; special needs education; mainstream education; aspiration; talent; under performance; individual care;

- **Fields and disciplines**: science; scientists; entrepreneurs; read and write; old fashioned synthetic phonics methods;
- **Pupils and students**: pupils; students; difficult pupils; infants; brightest children; university students; bright; fall; fell; falling behind; pupil premium;
- **Schools, colleges and universities**: protect your schools; schools; under performing secondary schools; primary school; secondary school; FE (further education) colleges; children's state schools; great universities; college; fee-paying schools; special schools;
- **Skills**: skills; skill; skilled; highly skilled; qualifications; aptitude; abilities;
- **Teachers**: teachers; teach; taught; teaching; head teacher; teaching assistants;
- **Training**: training; retrained; train; trained; apprenticeships;

- **Emotions, Humour and Personal Relationships and Stories**

Definition

This topic gathers all the references to emotions (e.g. love, pride or disappointment) as well as to personal relationships and stories (references to families, friends and personal stories) displayed by candidates. As for the American dictionary, I have defined each emotion contained below based on definitions (except for families and personal stories) provided by Oxford Dictionaries (2014).

Dictionary of sub-nodes

- **Anger**: a strong feeling of annoyance, displeasure, or hostility.
  Examples of terms coded: angry; extremely torn apart; it is simmering and bubbling below the surface; anger; it's a scandal; outrage.
- **Anxiety**: a feeling of worry, nervousness, or unease about something with an uncertain outcome.
  Examples of terms coded: concerns; I am worried; I worry; the anxiety; I am anxious.
- **Apology**: a regretful acknowledgement of an offence or failure.
  Examples of terms coded: I am sorry; I sincerely apologise; apology; I regret.
- **Care**: feeling of affection or liking; look after and provide for the needs of someone.
  Examples of terms coded: what I care about most in education; care; caring.

- **Disappointment**: sadness or displeasure caused by the non-fulfilment of one's hopes or expectations.
  Examples of terms coded: I was shocked and sickened; what's gone wrong; need to come clean; they don't deserve your trust; horrendous episode; I am dismayed; sad truth; galling.

- **Empathy**: the ability to understand and share the feelings of another.
  Examples of terms coded: hurt and pain; suffering; suffer; tragedies; I've heard; I've been listening to people; I know people feel; complete chaos; the public has lost confidence; feels unsafe; feels insecure; desperate; over and over again; important to us; terrible suffering; immeasurable scars; heartening; heartbreak; heart; it's been tough; struggling; people in tears.

- **Family**: feeling related to one's family including spouse, children, parents and grand-parents.
  Examples of terms coded: when I was young, my father ran a youth club with my brother; my mother was a magistrate in Newbury for 30 years; I've been brought up to believe by my parents; as someone who has two children [...] and hopefully another child to come; my own children; as a parent of children; I know from my two sons; what it did for my family and for my son; where my third son was born; how it helps me and my family when we're ill, sick and in need of NHS care.

- **Fear**: an unpleasant emotion caused by the threat of danger, pain, or harm.
  Examples of terms coded: I fear for the economy; I am afraid of his policies; putting jobs and the economy at risk.

- **Friendship**: the emotions or conduct of friends; the state of being friends.
  Examples of terms coded: friends of mine; friends; neighbours; people I grew up with and the people I went to school with.

- **Gratefulness**: the quality of being thankful; feeling or showing an appreciation for something done or received.
  Examples of terms coded: thanks; I thank; I want to thank you; I am grateful for.

- **Happiness**: feeling or showing pleasure or contentment.
  Examples of terms coded: I'm happy; I am pleased; I am glad.

- **Hate**: intense dislike.
  Examples of terms coded: I hate.

- **Hope**: a feeling of expectation and desire for a particular thing to happen.
  Examples of terms coded: I hope; the hopes; hopeful; hopeless.

- **Humour**: the quality of being amusing or comic.
  Examples of terms coded: I know we're not up against The X Factor or Britain's Got Talent and I hope people have been able to stay with us; You know who these two guys remind me? They remind me of my two young boys squabbling at bath time; That's a good line in rehearsal; I did actually

once get a letter from someone couldn't really agree with this and said, Mr Cameron, if you're so concerned about carbon emissions why don't you just stop breathing? That was the moment I realised I still have some persuasion to do.

- **Love**: a strong feeling of affection towards someone or something.
  Examples of terms coded: I dearly love; our loved ones; lovely.

- **Personal stories**: feeling related to someone telling a story about his or her past experiences.
  Examples of terms coded: I was in Plymouth recently; I was in a hospital [...] treating very sick premature young babies; I went to Crosby the other day and I was talking to a woman there who had been burgled [...] her son died from the fumes; I went to a drug rehab [...] and met a young man; I met a young man in London [...] burgled five times [...] his father's funeral; I've been to Afghanistan [...] the bravery and the incredible courage; I went from hospitals to hospitals [...] the dedication, and the vocation and the love [...] incredibly proud; I have a man in my constituency [...] Tragically, two of them died because they couldn't get the drug.

- **Pride**: a feeling of deep pleasure or satisfaction derived from one's own achievements, the achievements of one's close associates, or from qualities or possessions that are widely admired.
  Examples of terms coded: we've done great things; brave; most astonishing job in the most extraordinarily difficult circumstances; pride and admiration; bravery; incredible courage; determination; brilliant diplomats; incredible athletes; brilliant people; proud; pride; wonderful thing; Britain's unsung heroes; heroines; amazing country; incredible things; blown away; professionalism; courageous.

- **Shame**: a painful feeling of humiliation or distress caused by the consciousness of wrong or foolish behaviour.
  Examples of terms coded: brought great shame; I was ashamed; it's a shame.

- **European Union and Euro-scepticism**

Definition

This topic comprises all the references to Europe, new entrants, the European currency and to pros and cons of being part of the European Union.

Dictionary of sub-nodes

- **Anti-EU**: Westminster; Brussels; power; powers; Euro; Pound; currency; British rebate; bureaucracy; rules; regulations; isolation; Margaret Thatcher; chocolate; chocolate directive; club; isolated; margins; mainstream; terrible, terrible mistake; weaker; empty chair; referendum; Lisbon Treaty; do we stay in or do we go out?; interests; in-out referendum; treaty; con; daft rules; daft things;

- **Europe and the EU**: Europe; European Union; European leaders; France; President Sarkozy; Germany, Angela Merkel; G20; America; European Council; European People's Party; European Party; anti-European; anti-American; United Nation Security Council; chairman of the G20; anti-Europeanism; Polish President;
- **Pro-EU**: trading nation; allies; alliances; model of democratic efficiency; membership; stronger; trade; trading; European Constitution; European Police Authorities; paedophile ring; 100 sex offenders; 20 young women from unimaginable abuse and servitude; operation Koala; repatriate; repatriating; Britain-only solution; largest single market in the world of 475 million consumers; superpowers;

- **Expenses Scandal**

Definition

This topic gathers all references to the MP expenses scandal and the subsequent reforms of the House of Commons and House of Lords proposed by the three candidates.

Dictionary of sub-nodes

- **Formal apologies**: apologise; apology; apologies; extremely sorry;
- **Broken trust**: restore some of the faith and some of the trust into our politics; trust; credibility; honest; honesty; honestly;
- **Consequences and reforms**: reform; reformed; House of Lords; House of Commons; referendum; elect; hereditary; unaccountable; accountable; peers; voting system; size; chamber; democratic; direct elections; vote; fundamental reform; proportional representation list system; total transparency; transparent; hung parliament(s); open; independent standards authority; political reform; open politics; restructuring of government;
- **Expenses scandal**: expenses saga; great shame; Parliament; let you down; trust; credibility; deserve; deserves; deserved; deserving; clear; expenses rules; abuse; abuses; abused; abusing; MPs; responsibility; property; properties; personal profit; scot-free; duck houses; profiting; honest; Members of Parliament; guilty; offences; recall; constituents; corrupt; petition; horrendous episode; official reviews; sack; murky business; blocked; block; betrayal; betrayed; con: constituency; representation; mess; dreadful expenses problems; court; rotten system; Westminster; safe seats; jobs for life; public trust;

serving the public; break the rules; throw out of Parliament; cleaned Parliament; expenses fiasco; unacceptable; punishment; culture of jobs for life in politics; trouble with expenses; jobs for life; safe seats for life; no questions asked; cutting corners; suspended; account; pedestal; clean up; terrible scandal;

- **Gordon Brown and the Labour Party**

Definition

This topic comprises all the references to the Labour party including candidate Gordon Brown and the Labour team.

Dictionary of sub-nodes

- Labour governments; Labour; Labour MPs
- Gordon Brown; Gordon
- Prime Minister; actual administration;
- 13 years; 13 years of failure;

- **Health and Social Care**

Definition

This topic tackles health and social care issues ranging from patients to diseases, pensions and the entire health care system.

Dictionary of sub-nodes

- **Carers, doctors and staff**: home helps; health visitors; managers; hospitals; nurses; doctors; consultant; carers; support; social care groups; caring; Britain's unsung heroes; unsung army of heroines and heroes; holiday; break; breather; respite; take a week off; care; penalised; punished;
- **Diseases, conditions and general health**: living longer; cancer specialist; diagnostic test; operation; GP services; health check-up; cancer drugs; expensive treatments; cancer outcomes; death rate from cancer; detection; screening; diseases; good health;

- **NHS and healthcare system**: National Health Service; health; national insurance contributions; health authority; NHS; NHS constitution; Britain's biggest employer; strategic health authorities; bureaucracy; urgent care; PCT (Primary Care Trust); institutional care; nursing homes; old people's home; maternity services; wards; A&E departments; personal and medical care; equipment;
- **Patients**: winter fuel allowance; free concessionary travel; free television licenses; retirement; retire; retired; dignity; security; old age; promise, an important promise; elderly; fuel; heat; heating; cold Winter; energy; energy companies; pension reforms; occupational pension; comfort; free prescriptions; free eye tests; free bus pass; pass your home on to your children; pay for your care; Alzheimer's; cleaning; washing; getting dressed; getting fed; housing; housing authorities; individual patients; people's needs; older people; worked hard all their lives; elderly people; disabled children; ill; old; terminally ill; disabled; cancer patients; older people;
- **Pensions**: pensioners; pension; pension credit; full state pension; occupational pension; pensions tax relief; public sector pensions;

- **Immigration**

Definition

This topic consists of all the references to the immigration topic that is legal and illegal immigration, immigrants and current regulations.

Dictionary of sub-nodes

- **Immigration issues**: concerns; pressures; immigration; come to Britain; outside the European Union; jobs; Job centres; skills; shortages; abroad; migration; too high; too much; housing; overseas; coming here; coming in; going out; bring immigration down; new countries; join the European Union; chaos; leave; borders; sponsor; sponsoring; arrival; needs; needed; coped; net inward migration; legal; illegal; employer; employers; good; bad immigration; public services; out of control; break the law; occupations; British people; net migration levels; restrict; benefited from immigration; integrated country; shambolic; chaos; chaotically; chaotic; counted in; counted out; false asylum claims; denial; living in the shadows; Refugee Action; recruit; legalised;
- **Migrants**: skilled workers; unskilled workers; immigrants; foreign nationals; immigrant communities; work hard; make a contribution; semi-skilled;
- **Proposed solutions**: control; manage; points system; training; chef; cooks; care assistants; nurses; course teachers; integrate; tolerant; diverse country;

controls; right policy; limit; transitional controls; workable immigration system; exit controls; regions; ID cards; tighten; tightening; visa controls; cap; border police force; customs; security; police; policeable borders; regional approach; identity cards; fines; welfare reform; M62; border post; work permit; vouch for; amnesty; legalise; biometric visas; identification; deport; deported; remove; removing;

- **Nick Clegg and the Liberal Democrat Party**

Definition

This topic comprises all the references to the Liberal Democrat party including candidate Nick Clegg and the Liberal Democrat team.

Dictionary of sub-nodes

- Liberal Democrats; Lib Dem; Liberal; Liberals; Liberal Democrat MP; Liberals; Shirley Williams;
- Nick Clegg; Nick
- MP; in my city of Sheffield; Sheffield;

- **Police and National Security**

Definition

This topic gathers all references to police forces, crimes, criminals and proposed regulations to cut down criminal activities.

Dictionary of sub-nodes

- **Crimes and criminals**: burglar; burglars; convict; convicts; convicted; convicting; burgled; steal; steals; stole; stealing; home; house; murderer; rob; burglary; young offenders; law-level nuisance; anti-social behaviour; hardened criminals; crime; violent crime; car crime; addicted to drugs; drug addicts; drug-free lives; committed; commit; youngsters; yobs; re-offend; re-offending; experienced criminals; on the run; criminal; criminal gangs;
- **Policing and police forces**: police; on the streets; officers; police force; police cars; Metropolitan Police; uninformed officers; crime fighters; form-fillers; magistrate; sat on the bench; fight; fights; fought; fighting;

- **Proposed solutions**: ID card system; piece of plastic card; parent; parents: responsibility for their children; order; teenager; treatment; substitute drug; drug rehab; residential rehab centre; residential rehab;
- **Punishment**: sentences; prison; punishment; judge; short-term prison sentences;

- **Religion**

Definition

This topic consists of all references to religion, faith and the abuse scandal of the Catholic Church, all of which were triggered by the Pope's visit to Britain in September 2010.

Dictionary of sub-nodes

- **Abuse scandal**: repentance; sin; terrible, terrible suffering; abusive relationships; immeasurable scars; tragedies; abuse; abused; cruelly abused; trust; church; open and clean confession;
- **Faith and beliefs**: Catholic Church; people of faith; faith; faith-based; Christian; Jewish; Muslim; Hindu; Catholic(s); openness; religion; faiths; Presbyterian religion; religious faiths; respect people for their different faiths; theology; doctrine;
- **Pope and Pope's visit**: Pope; visit; Pope's Catholic faith;
- **Religious and societal issues**: contraception; homosexuality; science; abortion; civil partnerships; gay; straight; human embryology; treat a disease; embryos;

- **Wars and Conflicts**

Definition

This topic gathers all references to wars and conflicts (countries and lands involved) as well as to soldiers, equipment, weapons, treaties and consequences of war.

Dictionary of sub-nodes

- **Casualties and health consequences of war**: those who lost their lives;

- **Countries and political/ religious organisations involved with war**: Afghanistan; Afghan-Pakistani border; American Army; British Army; Iraq; Taliban; St Petersburg; Moscow; Iran; China; North Korea; Al Qaeda; Somalia; Yemen; Pashtun; Afghan National Army; Afghan Government; Helmand; President Obama; Afghan;

- **Equipment**: under-equipped; warships; body armours; helicopters; vehicles; equipment; equipped; rollers; mine; Mastiffs; Ridgebacks; nuclear weapons; expenditure; nuclear deterrent; ultimate protection; Chinooks; Merlins; Lynx; full defence review; Eurofighter Typhoon; Eurofighter Typhoon project; plane; mechanics; convoy; explosive devices; metal detectors; submarines;

- **International agreements and allies**: Cold War nuclear Trident missile system; allies; negotiations; Non-Proliferation Treaty; international coordination; unilaterally; multi-lateral; multilateral partners; National Security Council; multinational disarmament;

- **Soldier, fighters and staff**: underpaid; Ministry of Defence; admirals; brigadiers; brigade; servicemen; servicewomen; pay; army; armed forces; Territorial Army; troops; forces; brave fighters; brilliant diplomats; incredible athletes; brilliant, brilliant people; fight; fights; fought; fighting; fighter(s); soldiers; armed services; Navy; our force; on the ground; Chief of Defence Staff; security staff; explosive experts; intelligence; Generals; military experts; General Mike Jackson;

- **Terrorism**: terror threat; terrorism; chain of terror; terrorist plots; 9/11; 7/7; extremism;

- **War issues**: difficult circumstances; battle; war; paying tribute; difficult situations; deployed; overseas; blow up; destroy; save lives; frontline; operational requirement; protection; defence; wars; defend our country; protect; conflicts; military; serve our nation; one-to-one confrontation; win; armed battle; tactics; terrain; safe; safety; safer; safely; allegations of complicity in torture; invaded; invade; invasion; international crime; mission; parachute democracy; harm's way; strategy; national interests; security policy; foreign policy; Home Office policy; national security; future operations; Christmas Eve; bombs; bombed; bombing; bomber; orders; protect; political; sands; face-to-face; person-to-person; barracks; opponents; alternatives; danger; dangerous; war cabinet; peace;

Appendix B

Details on framing analysis

My Methodology chapter (Chapter 2) details the procedure applied to my framing analysis. This appendix provides more detail regarding each category of my framing analysis, examples and justification.

Issues

Inspired by Entman's "problem definition" or "diagnosis on issue" (1993), this category contains references to the issues raised in each article. For example, recurrent issues were the TV debates being too controlled and rehearsed or a candidate losing or winning the election. Every reference to an issue was therefore coded in a sub-category (e.g. negative aspects of the debates, campaigning and horse race) in order to highlight a potential emphasis towards one specific issue.

This category is particularly relevant as it allows to see the range of issues addressed in the coverage of the debates, compare the topics addressed by candidates with those covered by journalists, see whether emotions were incorporated in a wide range of issues and, finally, gauge in what proportions each issue was addressed.

Candidates

This category draws a comprehensive picture of how each candidate was described by the press. Thus, every time that a candidate was described in a particular way (e.g. as winning, losing, family man, honest person, manipulative), I created a subnode to quantify these occurrences. For example, Clegg was regularly described as more honest and less affected by spin than his opponents, Brown was often described as desperate and Romney as a chief executive.

Candidates' descriptions help understand how candidates were perceived by the press after the debates and see whether candidates were depicted in emotional terms. Finally, the depiction of each candidate gives information regarding the partisanship of each newspaper, which affects how they each framed emotions.

Emotions

All definitions of emotions are the same as those that can be found in Appendix A. I coded every reference to emotions displayed by three different actors: journalists, sources and candidates. For example, a journalist expressing enthusiasm at a candidate's anger was coded in enthusiasm (for the journalist) and anger (for the candidate).

This category is the centrepiece of my framing analysis as it allows me to know what emotions were used, in what proportions and by whom.

Personal stories and relationships

This category is defined the same way as in Appendix A. I coded every reference to either family (wife, kids, grandmother), friends or personal stories. For example, Obama wishing his wife a happy anniversary was coded in family while Romney telling a personal story about his dad selling cars was coded in both family and personal story.

This category is paramount as I consider personal relationships and stories to be an extension of emotions. Consequently, the more data about this section I acquire, the more accurate the picture of the emotional framing of newspapers I can draw.

Criticisms

This category was inspired by Hammond's "criticisms" section on evaluating the framing of post-Cold war conflicts (2007). In this category, I coded every criticism voiced by journalists. For example, many British journalists complained about the British voting system not being representative or about candidates not discussing substantive issues enough.

This category has a direct link with the framing of emotions: were journalists in favour or against emotions? What else did they criticise? In what proportions?

Recommendations

This final category is derived from Entman's "remedy prescription" (1993) and Hammond's "prescriptions" (2007). I coded items in this category every time that a journalist made a recommendation. For example, following the historical debates that took place in Britain in 2010, many journalists recommended to change the format of the debates for something less strict.

This category further answers my research questions by seeing whether journalists made recommendations for general issues, emotions or both.

Appendix C

Twitter data - User type

This appendix provides all results from Chapter 5 broken down per user type, namely experts, journalists, politicians, PR people and private users.

I. Twitter & candidates

Twitter & American candidates' use of emotions

Table C.1: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by experts regarding candidates' use of emotions

	Biden	Obama	Romney	Ryan	Total
Admiration	0.3	4.2	8.1	0.4	13
Anger	0.1	8.8	7.8	0.6	17.4
Anxiety	0	0	0	0	0
Disappointment	0	2.3	1.7	0.1	4.2
Empathy	0	0	0	0	0
Enthusiasm	0.3	2.2	3	0.7	6.2
Fear	0	0.1	0.7	0.1	1
Frustration	0	3	11.7	0.3	15.1
Guilt	0	0	0	0	0
Happiness	0	0.1	0.3	0	0.4
Hate	0	0.3	0.1	0	0.4
Hope	0	0.1	0	0	0.1
Humour	0.9	9.7	29.4	0.7	40.7
Love	0	0	0	0	0
Nostalgia	0	0	0	0	0
Pride	0	0.3	0.3	0	0.6
Sadness	0	0.1	0.6	0	0.7
Shame	0	0	0	0	0
Total	1.6	31.4	63.9	3	100

Table C.2: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by journalists regarding candidates' use of emotions

	Biden	Obama	Romney	Ryan	Total
Admiration	0	1.9	1.1	0	3
Anger	0.3	6	4.1	0.8	11.1
Anxiety	0	0	0	0	0
Disappointment	0.1	3.8	3.6	0.1	7.6
Empathy	0	0.6	0.6	0	1.3
Enthusiasm	0.5	1.6	1.9	0.1	4.1
Fear	0	0.1	0.6	0	0.8
Frustration	0.1	6.6	9.5	0.3	16.5
Guilt	0	0	0	0	0
Happiness	0	0.1	0.1	0	0.3
Hate	0	0.5	0.5	0	1
Hope	0	0.1	0.1	0	0.3
Humour	1.4	24.2	25.7	1.4	52.6
Love	0.1	0.1	0.3	0	0.5
Nostalgia	0	0	0	0	0
Pride	0	0.3	0.3	0	0.5
Sadness	0	0	0.5	0	0.5
Shame	0	0	0	0	0
Total	2.5	45.9	48.9	2.6	100

Table C.3: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by politicians regarding candidates' use of emotions

	Biden	Obama	Romney	Ryan	Total
Admiration	0.8	3.9	6.3	0	11
Anger	0.8	12.6	11	1.6	26
Anxiety	0	0	0	0	0
Disappointment	0	4.7	4.7	1.6	11
Empathy	0	0	0	0	0
Enthusiasm	0.8	4.7	3.9	0	9.4
Fear	0	0.8	0	0	0.8
Frustration	0	6.3	6.3	0	12.6
Guilt	0	0	0	0	0
Happiness	0	0	0.8	0	0.8
Hate	0	0.8	0.8	0	1.6
Hope	0	0.8	0.8	0	1.6
Humour	0	3.9	10.2	0.8	15
Love	0	0	0.8	0	0.8
Nostalgia	0	0	0	0	0
Pride	0	0	1.6	0	1.6
Sadness	0	3.9	3.9	0	7.9
Shame	0	0	0	0	0
Total	2.4	42.5	51.2	3.9	100

Table C.4: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by PR people regarding candidates' use of emotions

	Biden	Obama	Romney	Ryan	Total
Admiration	0	3.6	3.6	0	7.2
Anger	1	5.2	12.4	2.1	20.6
Anxiety	0	0	0	0	0
Disappointment	0.5	3.1	2.6	0.5	6.7
Empathy	0	0	0	0	0
Enthusiasm	1	5.7	5.2	0	11.9
Fear	0	0	1	0	1
Frustration	1.5	3.1	7.7	0.5	12.9
Guilt	0	0	0	0	0
Happiness	0	0	0	0	0
Hate	0	0	0.5	0	0.5
Hope	0	0.5	1	0.5	2.1
Humour	3.1	4.6	23.7	2.6	34
Love	1.5	0	0	0.5	2.1
Nostalgia	0	0	0	0	0
Pride	0	0	0	0	0
Sadness	0.5	0	0	0.5	1
Shame	0	0	0	0	0
Total	9.3	25.8	57.7	7.2	100

Table C.5: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by private users regarding candidates' use of emotions

	Biden	Obama	Romney	Ryan	Total
Admiration	0.2	2.6	2.2	0.1	5.1
Anger	1.0	8.6	12.6	1.1	23.3
Anxiety	0	0	0.1	0	0.1
Disappointment	0.1	2.7	2.1	0.1	5.1
Empathy	0	0.1	0.1	0	0.2
Enthusiasm	0.6	4.1	3.6	0.3	8.6
Fear	0.1	0.4	0.7	0	1.3
Frustration	0.4	5	9	0.5	14.8
Guilt	0	0	0	0	0
Happiness	0	0.3	0.1	0	0.4
Hate	0.1	0.7	0.7	0.1	1.6
Hope	0	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.8
Humour	1.8	9.5	23.4	1.6	36.4
Love	0.2	0.5	0.7	0	1.3
Nostalgia	0	0	0	0	0
Pride	0	0.3	0.2	0	0.6
Sadness	0	0.2	0.3	0	0.5
Shame	0	0	0	0	0.1
Total	4.5	35.3	56.2	4	100

Twitter & British candidates' use of emotions

Table C.6: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by experts regarding candidates' use of emotions

	Brown	Cameron	Clegg	Total
Admiration	0	0	0	0
Anger	0	0	0	0
Anxiety	0	0	0	0
Disappointment	0	0	0	0
Enthusiasm	0	0	0	0
Fear	0	0	0	0
Frustration	0	0	0	0
Guilt	0	0	0	0
Happiness	0	0	0	0
Hate	0	0	0	0
Hope	0	50	0	50
Humour	50	0	0	50
Love	0	0	0	0
Pride	0	0	0	0
Sadness	0	0	0	0
Shame	0	0	0	0
Total	50	50	0	100

Table C.7: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by journalists regarding candidates' use of emotions

	Brown	Cameron	Clegg	Total
Admiration	0	0	2.4	2.4
Anger	2.4	4.9	0	7.3
Anxiety	2.4	4.9	0	7.3
Disappointment	2.4	7.3	0	9.8
Enthusiasm	0	0	2.4	2.4
Fear	2.4	4.9	4.9	12.2
Frustration	9.8	4.9	7.3	22
Guilt	0	0	0	0
Happiness	0	0	0	0
Hate	0	0	0	0
Hope	0	0	0	0
Humour	9.8	19.5	2.4	31.7
Love	0	2.4	0	2.4
Pride	0	0	2.4	2.4
Sadness	0	0	0	0
Shame	0	0	0	0
Total	29.3	48.8	22	100

Table C.8: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by politicians regarding candidates' use of emotions

	Brown	Cameron	Clegg	Total
Admiration	5	0	15	20
Anger	0	0	0	0
Anxiety	0	0	0	0
Disappointment	5	0	0	5
Enthusiasm	5	0	20	25
Fear	0	0	0	0
Frustration	5	0	0	5
Guilt	0	0	0	0
Happiness	0	0	20	20
Hate	0	0	0	0
Hope	5	0	5	10
Humour	5	0	0	5
Love	0	0	0	0
Pride	0	0	10	10
Sadness	0	0	0	0
Shame	0	0	0	0
Total	30	0	70	100

Table C.9: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by PR people regarding candidates' use of emotions

	Brown	Cameron	Clegg	Total
Admiration	4.5	0	9.1	13.6
Anger	4.5	0	0	4.5
Anxiety	0	0	0	0
Disappointment	4.5	4.5	0	9.1
Enthusiasm	4.5	9.1	13.6	27.3
Fear	0	0	0	0
Frustration	4.5	4.5	0	9.1
Guilt	0	0	0	0
Happiness	0	0	9.1	9.1
Hate	0	0	0	0
Hope	0	4.5	0	4.5
Humour	0	9.1	0	9.1
Love	0	4.5	0	4.5
Pride	0	0	9.1	9.1
Sadness	0	0	0	0
Shame	0	0	0	0
Total	22.7	36.4	40.9	100

Table C.10: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by private users regarding candidates' use of emotions

	Brown	Cameron	Clegg	Total
Admiration	2.4	1.6	5.2	9.3
Anger	2	5.6	2	9.7
Anxiety	0	0.4	0.8	1.2
Disappointment	1.2	4.4	3.6	9.3
Enthusiasm	4	2.8	9.3	16.1
Fear	0.8	0.8	1.6	3.2
Frustration	4.4	7.3	6	17.7
Guilt	0	0	0	0
Happiness	0.8	0.4	1.6	2.8
Hate	1.2	1.2	0.4	2.8
Hope	0.8	0.8	2	3.6
Humour	8.5	7.3	4.4	20.2
Love	0.8	0.8	1.6	3.2
Pride	0	0	0	0
Sadness	0	0	0.4	0.4
Shame	0	0.4	0	0.4
Total	27	33.9	39.1	100

Twitter & American candidates' use of emotionality

Table C.11: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by experts regarding candidates' references to anecdotes, family and friends

	Anecdotes	Family	Friends	Total
Admiration	0	0	0	0
Anger	0	0	0	0
Anxiety	0	0	0	0
Disappointment	0	0	0	0
Empathy	0	0	0	0
Enthusiasm	0	0	0	0
Fear	0	0	0	0
Frustration	40	10	10	60
Guilt	0	0	0	0
Happiness	0	0	0	0
Hate	0	0	0	0
Hope	0	0	0	0
Humour	0	30	10	40
Love	0	0	0	0
Nostalgia	0	0	0	0
Pride	0	0	0	0
Sadness	0	0	0	0
Shame	0	0	0	0
Total	40	40	20	100

Table C.12: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by journalists regarding candidates' references to anecdotes, family and friends

	Anecdotes	Family	Friends	Total
Admiration	1.9	1.9	0	3.8
Anger	5.8	5.8	1.9	13.5
Anxiety	0	0	0	0
Disappointment	1.9	3.8	0	5.8
Empathy	0	0	0	0
Enthusiasm	0	0	0	0
Fear	0	0	0	0
Frustration	9.6	5.8	0	15.4
Guilt	0	0	0	0
Happiness	0	0	0	0
Hate	0	0	0	0
Hope	0	0	0	0
Humour	25	30.8	1.9	57.7
Love	0	0	0	0
Nostalgia	0	0	0	0
Pride	1.9	1.9	0	3.8
Sadness	0	0	0	0
Shame	0	0	0	0
Total	46.2	50	3.8	100

Table C.13: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by politicians regarding candidates' references to anecdotes, family and friends

	Anecdotes	Family	Friends	Total
Admiration	0	0	0	0
Anger	50	25	0	75
Anxiety	0	0	0	0
Disappointment	0	0	0	0
Empathy	0	0	0	0
Enthusiasm	0	0	0	0
Fear	0	0	0	0
Frustration	0	0	0	0
Guilt	0	0	0	0
Happiness	0	0	0	0
Hate	0	0	0	0
Hope	0	0	0	0
Humour	0	25	0	25
Love	0	0	0	0
Nostalgia	0	0	0	0
Pride	0	0	0	0
Sadness	0	0	0	0
Shame	0	0	0	0
Total	50	50	0	100

Table C.14: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by PR people regarding candidates' references to anecdotes, family and friends

	Anecdotes	Family	Friends	Total
Admiration	11.1	11.1	0	22.2
Anger	0	0	0	0
Anxiety	0	0	0	0
Disappointment	11.1	11.1	0	22.2
Empathy	0	0	0	0
Enthusiasm	0	0	0	0
Fear	0	0	0	0
Frustration	0	22.2	0	22.2
Guilt	0	0	0	0
Happiness	0	0	0	0
Hate	0	0	0	0
Hope	0	0	0	0
Humour	11.1	22.2	0	33.3
Love	0	0	0	0
Nostalgia	0	0	0	0
Pride	0	0	0	0
Sadness	0	0	0	0
Shame	0	0	0	0
Total	33.3	66.7	0	100

Table C.15: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by private users regarding candidates' references to anecdotes, family and friends

	Anecdotes	Family	Friends	Total
Admiration	0.5	1.2	0.2	1.9
Anger	11.1	5.6	0.8	17.6
Anxiety	0	0	0	0
Disappointment	1.5	0.7	0	2.2
Empathy	0	0	0	0
Enthusiasm	0.7	1	0.3	2
Fear	0	0.2	0	0.2
Frustration	12.2	6.4	0.8	19.4
Guilt	0	0	0	0
Happiness	0.2	0.3	0	0.5
Hate	0.3	0.5	0.3	1.2
Hope	0.2	0.3	0	0.5
Humour	18.6	29.2	3.9	51.7
Love	0.8	1.2	0.2	2.2
Nostalgia	0	0	0	0
Pride	0	0	0	0
Sadness	0	0.2	0	0.2
Shame	0.2	0.3	0	0.5
Total	46.3	47.1	6.6	100

Twitter & British candidates' use of emotionality

TABLE C.16: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by journalists regarding candidates' references to anecdotes, family and friends

	Anecdotes	Family	Friends	Total
Admiration	0	0	0	0
Anger	20	0	0	20
Anxiety	0	0	0	0
Disappointment	0	0	0	0
Enthusiasm	0	0	0	0
Fear	0	0	0	0
Frustration	20	0	0	20
Guilt	0	0	0	0
Happiness	0	0	0	0
Hate	0	0	0	0
Hope	0	0	0	0
Humour	60	0	0	60
Love	0	0	0	0
Pride	0	0	0	0
Sadness	0	0	0	0
Shame	0	0	0	0
Total	100	0	0	100

Table C.17: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by private users regarding candidates' references to anecdotes, family and friends

	Anecdotes	Family	Friends	Total
Admiration	0	0	0	0
Anger	0	0	0	0
Anxiety	0	0	0	0
Disappointment	7.1	7.1	0	14.3
Enthusiasm	7.1	0	0	7.1
Fear	0	0	0	0
Frustration	28.6	14.3	0	42.9
Guilt	0	0	0	0
Happiness	7.1	0	0	7.1
Hate	0	0	0	0
Hope	0	0	0	0
Humour	28.6	0	0	28.6
Love	0	0	0	0
Pride	0	0	0	0
Sadness	0	0	0	0
Shame	0	0	0	0
Total	78.6	21.4	0	100

II. Twitter & TV debates

American TV debates as political and media events

Table C.18: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by experts regarding TV debates

	TV debates
Admiration	4.7
Anger	13.7
Anxiety	0
Disappointment	18.4
Empathy	0.5
Enthusiasm	13.2
Fear	0.9
Frustration	14.2
Guilt	0
Happiness	0.5
Hate	0
Hope	0.5
Humour	32.5
Love	0.9
Nostalgia	0
Pride	0
Sadness	0
Shame	0
Total	100

Table C.19: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by journalists regarding TV debates

	TV debates
Admiration	3.3
Anger	6.5
Anxiety	0.2
Disappointment	14.5
Empathy	0
Enthusiasm	10.3
Fear	0
Frustration	17.1
Guilt	0
Happiness	0.5
Hate	0.2
Hope	0.7
Humour	43.9
Love	1.2
Nostalgia	0.2
Pride	0.5
Sadness	0.7
Shame	0.2
Total	100

Table C.20: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by politicians regarding TV debates

	TV debates
Admiration	3.3
Anger	16.7
Anxiety	0
Disappointment	13.3
Empathy	0
Enthusiasm	3.3
Fear	0
Frustration	30
Guilt	0
Happiness	0
Hate	0
Hope	0
Humour	33.3
Love	0
Nostalgia	0
Pride	0
Sadness	0
Shame	0
Total	100

Table C.21: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by PR people regarding TV debates

	TV debates
Admiration	4.3
Anger	4.3
Anxiety	0.9
Disappointment	8.5
Empathy	0.9
Enthusiasm	8.5
Fear	0.9
Frustration	16.2
Guilt	0
Happiness	0.9
Hate	0
Hope	1.7
Humour	45.3
Love	1.7
Nostalgia	0.9
Pride	0
Sadness	5.1
Shame	0
Total	100

Table C.22: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by private users regarding TV debates

	TV debates
Admiration	2.2
Anger	13.1
Anxiety	0.2
Disappointment	11.3
Empathy	0.4
Enthusiasm	12.7
Fear	0.5
Frustration	16
Guilt	0.1
Happiness	1
Hate	0.9
Hope	0.9
Humour	38.5
Love	1.1
Nostalgia	0.2
Pride	0.2
Sadness	0.6
Shame	0.3
Total	100

British TV debates as political and media events

Table C.23: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by experts regarding TV debates

	TV debates
Admiration	6.9
Anger	3.4
Anxiety	0
Disappointment	20.7
Enthusiasm	20.7
Fear	0
Frustration	27.6
Guilt	0
Happiness	0
Hate	0
Hope	6.9
Humour	6.9
Love	0
Pride	0
Sadness	6.9
Shame	0
Total	100

Table C.24: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by journalists regarding TV debates

	TV debates
Admiration	0
Anger	8.4
Anxiety	2.1
Disappointment	25.3
Enthusiasm	22.1
Fear	3.2
Frustration	16.8
Guilt	0
Happiness	2.1
Hate	0
Hope	1.1
Humour	16.8
Love	1.1
Pride	1.1
Sadness	0
Shame	0
Total	100

Table C.25: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by politicians regarding TV debates

	TV debates
Admiration	5.3
Anger	5.3
Anxiety	0
Disappointment	15.8
Enthusiasm	21.1
Fear	2.6
Frustration	18.4
Guilt	0
Happiness	5.3
Hate	0
Hope	0
Humour	21.1
Love	0
Pride	5.3
Sadness	0
Shame	0
Total	100

Table C.26: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by PR people regarding TV debates

	TV debates
Admiration	3.8
Anger	9.4
Anxiety	0
Disappointment	24.5
Enthusiasm	32.1
Fear	0
Frustration	5.7
Guilt	0
Happiness	5.7
Hate	0
Hope	0
Humour	13.2
Love	1.9
Pride	3.8
Sadness	0
Shame	0
Total	100

Table C.27: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by private users regarding TV debates

	TV debates
Admiration	1.5
Anger	10.2
Anxiety	0.6
Disappointment	15.7
Enthusiasm	17.3
Fear	0.6
Frustration	24.2
Guilt	0.5
Happiness	2
Hate	1
Hope	1.9
Humour	20.5
Love	2
Pride	1.1
Sadness	0.7
Shame	0.3
Total	100

American TV debates as discussions of substance

Table C.28: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by experts regarding substantive issues

	Substantive issues
Admiration	3.7
Anger	21.3
Anxiety	0
Disappointment	6.5
Empathy	0
Enthusiasm	6.7
Fear	1.7
Frustration	17.6
Guilt	0
Happiness	0.6
Hate	0.2
Hope	0.6
Humour	40.2
Love	0.2
Nostalgia	0
Pride	0
Sadness	0.6
Shame	0
Total	100

Table C.29: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by journalists regarding substantive issues

	Substantive issues
Admiration	1.4
Anger	14.4
Anxiety	0
Disappointment	8.4
Empathy	0.8
Enthusiasm	4.3
Fear	0.6
Frustration	19.1
Guilt	0
Happiness	0.4
Hate	0.6
Hope	0.2
Humour	48
Love	0.4
Nostalgia	0
Pride	0
Sadness	1.0
Shame	0.2
Total	100

Table C.30: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by politicians regarding substantive issues

	Substantive issues
Admiration	7.7
Anger	26.2
Anxiety	0
Disappointment	6.2
Empathy	0
Enthusiasm	12.3
Fear	1.5
Frustration	16.9
Guilt	0
Happiness	1.5
Hate	0
Hope	3.1
Humour	16.9
Love	1.5
Nostalgia	0
Pride	1.5
Sadness	4.6
Shame	0
Total	100

Table C.31: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by PR people regarding substantive issues

	Substantive issues
Admiration	4.2
Anger	26
Anxiety	0
Disappointment	5.2
Empathy	0
Enthusiasm	8.3
Fear	1
Frustration	18.8
Guilt	0
Happiness	1
Hate	0
Hope	0
Humour	33.3
Nostalgia	0
Pride	0
Sadness	2.1
Shame	0
Total	100

Table C.32: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by private users regarding substantive issues

	Substantive issues
Admiration	3.4
Anger	27.7
Anxiety	0.2
Disappointment	4
Empathy	0.1
Enthusiasm	6.2
Fear	1.8
Frustration	18.3
Guilt	0
Happiness	0.4
Hate	0.8
Hope	0.5
Humour	34.7
Love	0.7
Nostalgia	0
Pride	0.5
Sadness	0.6
Shame	0.1
Total	100

British TV debates as discussions of substance

Table C.33: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by experts regarding substantive issues

	Substantive issues
Admiration	0
Anger	14.3
Anxiety	0
Disappointment	42.9
Enthusiasm	14.3
Fear	0
Frustration	28.6
Guilt	0
Happiness	0
Hate	0
Hope	0
Humour	0
Love	0
Pride	0
Sadness	0
Shame	0
Total	100

Table C.34: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by journalists regarding substantive issues

	Substantive issues
Admiration	0
Anger	13.3
Anxiety	0
Disappointment	26.7
Enthusiasm	0
Fear	0
Frustration	40
Guilt	0
Happiness	0
Hate	0
Hope	0
Humour	20
Love	0
Pride	0
Sadness	0
Shame	0
Total	100

Table C.35: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by politicians regarding substantive issues

	Substantive issues
Admiration	0
Anger	20
Anxiety	0
Disappointment	20
Enthusiasm	0
Fear	0
Frustration	60
Guilt	0
Happiness	0
Hate	0
Hope	0
Humour	0
Love	0
Pride	0
Sadness	0
Shame	0
Total	100

Table C.36: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by PR people regarding substantive issues

	Substantive issues
Admiration	0
Anger	33.3
Anxiety	0
Disappointment	33.3
Enthusiasm	0
Fear	0
Frustration	33.3
Guilt	0
Happiness	0
Hate	0
Hope	0
Humour	0
Love	0
Pride	0
Sadness	0
Shame	0
Total	100

Table C.37: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by private users regarding substantive issues

	Substantive issues
Admiration	0
Anger	24.3
Anxiety	2.7
Disappointment	14.9
Enthusiasm	1.4
Fear	1.4
Frustration	32.4
Guilt	0
Happiness	0
Hate	4.1
Hope	2.7
Humour	14.9
Love	1.4
Pride	0
Sadness	0
Shame	0
Total	100

III. Twitter & the news media

News coverage of the American debates

Table C.38: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by experts regarding the news coverage of the debates

	News coverage
Admiration	0
Anger	15.8
Anxiety	0
Disappointment	5.3
Empathy	0
Enthusiasm	15.8
Fear	0
Frustration	10.5
Guilt	0
Happiness	0
Hate	0
Hope	0
Humour	52.6
Love	0
Nostalgia	0
Pride	0
Sadness	0
Shame	0
Total	100

Table C.39: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by journalists regarding the news coverage of the debates

	News coverage
Admiration	0
Anger	20
Anxiety	0
Disappointment	8.6
Empathy	0
Enthusiasm	20
Fear	0
Frustration	17.1
Guilt	0
Happiness	0
Hate	2.9
Hope	0
Humour	25.7
Love	0
Nostalgia	0
Pride	5.7
Sadness	0
Shame	0
Total	100

Table C.40: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by politicians regarding the news coverage of the debates

	News coverage
Admiration	0
Anger	100
Anxiety	0
Disappointment	0
Empathy	0
Enthusiasm	0
Fear	0
Frustration	0
Guilt	0
Happiness	0
Hate	0
Hope	0
Humour	0
Love	0
Nostalgia	0
Pride	0
Sadness	0
Shame	0
Total	100

Table C.41: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by PR people regarding the news coverage of the debates

	News coverage
Admiration	0
Anger	10
Anxiety	0
Disappointment	10
Empathy	0
Enthusiasm	30
Fear	0
Frustration	20
Guilt	0
Happiness	0
Hate	0
Hope	0
Humour	20
Love	0
Nostalgia	0
Pride	0
Sadness	10
Shame	0
Total	100

Table C.42: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by private users regarding the news coverage of the debates

	News coverage
Admiration	0.7
Anger	15.9
Anxiety	0
Disappointment	7.6
Empathy	0
Enthusiasm	15.5
Fear	0.7
Frustration	24.9
Guilt	0
Happiness	0.4
Hate	0.7
Hope	1.1
Humour	30.3
Love	1.1
Nostalgia	0.4
Pride	0
Sadness	0.4
Shame	0.4
Total	100

News coverage of the British debates

Table C.43: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by experts regarding the news coverage of the debates

	News coverage
Admiration	25
Anger	0
Anxiety	0
Disappointment	0
Enthusiasm	0
Fear	0
Frustration	50
Guilt	0
Happiness	0
Hate	0
Hope	0
Humour	25
Love	0
Pride	0
Sadness	0
Shame	0
Total	100

Table C.44: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by journalists regarding the news coverage of the debates

	News coverage
Admiration	0
Anger	10
Anxiety	5
Disappointment	25
Enthusiasm	10
Fear	0
Frustration	25
Guilt	0
Happiness	0
Hate	0
Hope	0
Humour	25
Love	0
Pride	0
Sadness	0
Shame	0
Total	100

Table C.45: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by politicians regarding the news coverage of the debates

	News coverage
Admiration	50
Anger	50
Anxiety	0
Disappointment	0
Enthusiasm	0
Fear	0
Frustration	0
Guilt	0
Happiness	0
Hate	0
Hope	0
Humour	0
Love	0
Pride	0
Sadness	0
Shame	0
Total	100

Table C.46: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by PR people regarding the news coverage of the debates

	News coverage
Admiration	20
Anger	0
Anxiety	0
Disappointment	0
Enthusiasm	60
Fear	0
Frustration	0
Guilt	0
Happiness	0
Hate	0
Hope	0
Humour	20
Love	0
Pride	0
Sadness	0
Shame	0
Total	100

Table C.47: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by private users regarding the news coverage of the debates

	News coverage
Admiration	0
Anger	12.1
Anxiety	1.5
Disappointment	15.2
Enthusiasm	16.7
Fear	0
Frustration	24.2
Guilt	0
Happiness	1.5
Hate	0
Hope	1.5
Humour	22.7
Love	4.5
Pride	0
Sadness	0
Shame	0
Total	100

IV. Twitter & other social media

Social media & the American debates

TABLE C.48: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by experts regarding social media platforms

	Social media
Admiration	5
Anger	0
Anxiety	0
Disappointment	0
Empathy	0
Enthusiasm	35
Fear	0
Frustration	0
Guilt	0
Happiness	0
Hate	0
Hope	0
Humour	60
Love	0
Nostalgia	0
Pride	0
Sadness	0
Shame	0
Total	100

Table C.49: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by journalists regarding social media platforms

	Social media
Admiration	0
Anger	0
Anxiety	0
Disappointment	2.8
Empathy	0
Enthusiasm	30.6
Fear	0
Frustration	13.9
Guilt	0
Happiness	5.6
Hate	0
Hope	0
Humour	44.4
Love	2.8
Nostalgia	0
Pride	0
Sadness	0
Shame	0
Total	100

Table C.50: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by politicians regarding social media platforms

	Social media
Admiration	0
Anger	50
Anxiety	0
Disappointment	0
Empathy	0
Enthusiasm	50
Fear	0
Frustration	0
Guilt	0
Happiness	0
Hate	0
Hope	0
Humour	0
Love	0
Nostalgia	0
Pride	0
Sadness	0
Shame	0
Total	100

Table C.51: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by PR people regarding social media platforms

	Social media
Admiration	0
Anger	0
Anxiety	0
Disappointment	0
Empathy	0
Enthusiasm	25
Fear	0
Frustration	25
Guilt	0
Happiness	0
Hate	0
Hope	0
Humour	50
Love	0
Nostalgia	0
Pride	0
Sadness	0
Shame	0
Total	100

Table C.52: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by private users regarding social media platforms

	Social media
Admiration	1.1
Anger	13.6
Anxiety	0.3
Disappointment	2.5
Empathy	0
Enthusiasm	15.3
Fear	0.6
Frustration	15.8
Guilt	0.1
Happiness	0.8
Hate	0.5
Hope	7.3
Humour	38.6
Love	2.4
Nostalgia	0
Pride	0.5
Sadness	0.4
Shame	0.1
Total	100

Social media & the British debates

Table C.53: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by experts regarding social media platforms

	Social media
Admiration	0
Anger	0
Anxiety	0
Disappointment	0
Enthusiasm	0
Fear	0
Frustration	0
Guilt	0
Happiness	0
Hate	0
Hope	0
Humour	100
Love	0
Pride	0
Sadness	0
Shame	0
Total	100

Table C.54: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by journalists regarding social media platforms

	Social media
Admiration	0
Anger	0
Anxiety	0
Disappointment	0
Enthusiasm	33.3
Fear	0
Frustration	33.3
Guilt	0
Happiness	0
Hate	0
Hope	33.3
Humour	0
Love	0
Pride	0
Sadness	0
Shame	0
Total	100

Table C.55: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by PR people regarding social media platforms

	Social media
Admiration	0
Anger	0
Anxiety	0
Disappointment	50
Enthusiasm	0
Fear	0
Frustration	0
Guilt	0
Happiness	0
Hate	0
Hope	0
Humour	50
Love	0
Pride	0
Sadness	0
Shame	0
Total	100

TABLE C.56: Percentage of emotions and humour displayed by private users regarding social media platforms

	Social media
Admiration	0
Anger	3.6
Anxiety	0
Disappointment	3.6
Enthusiasm	35.7
Fear	0
Frustration	10.7
Guilt	0
Happiness	0
Hate	0
Hope	0
Humour	42.9
Love	0
Pride	0
Sadness	3.6
Shame	0
Total	100