What has justice got to do with it? Gender and the political economy of post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina

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While International Financial Institutions (IFIs) play an increasingly relevant role in post-war countries, the interplay between their interventions and other aspects of post-conflict transitions, such as those related to dealing with the consequences of wartime violence, has not received much attention in the literature. This paper tackles this gap and suggests that, in post-conflict contexts, gendered forms of socioeconomic violence and injustice can be perpetuated through economic reforms led by IFIs. Overlooking justice considerations in post-war economic reforms not only reflects and reinforces a limited understanding of wartime violence and justice issues, but also entrenches gendered forms of socioeconomic injustice that had their roots in the war. A feminist approach to the study of political economy encompassing both gender and socioeconomic justice is adopted here to show how complex and overlapping forms of injustice are supported by wartime and post-war political-economic power structures. To illustrate how and why justice considerations are important for post-war economic reforms, the paper looks at the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and analyses the rationale and gendered effects of economic reforms that reorganized welfare and jobs, and promoted privatisations that accelerated deindustrialisation and economic decline.

Keywords: International Financial Institutions; post-war justice; feminist IPE; Bosnia and Herzegovina

# Introduction

Post-war and post-authoritarian countries usually undergo multiple processes of transition, often from war to peace, from authoritarian to democratic political systems, and from their previous economic system (or a wartime economy) to – most commonly – a market economy. In these contexts, political and economic reforms are vitally important for post-war recovery and stability, while post-war justice processes respond to the needs of conflict-affected communities by dealing with the legacies of violence affecting the society at large, often through war crimes trials, truth and reconciliation commissions, and reparation programmes that include important socioeconomic and gender justice dimensions (Arbour, 2007; Bell, Campbell & Ní Aoláin, 2007; O’Rourke, 2009). Thus, economic reforms and transitional justice processes operate alongside one another, but the relationship between the two is rarely addressed in the literature (for exceptions see True, 2012, Chapter 7; Davies and True 2017). In fact, by overlooking the overlapping dimensions of political economy and post-war justice, we are failing to understand important aspects of the process through which societies move through ‘transitions’, and particularly from wartime conditions to peace.

This paper tackles this issue by examining the interplay between International Financial Institutions (IFIs) interventions in post-war countries and the gendered entrenchment of socioeconomic injustice and violence in the aftermath of war. In line with the special issue theme, the paper draws on feminist IPE to look at the connections between zones of war and peace through IFIs interventions in post-war contexts, but also highlights the importance of a justice perspective – responding to the need for nuanced analysis of justice claims in post-war contexts. The paper analyses the gendered dimension of post-war economic reforms through a justice lens, exploring their rationale and relating them to women’s experiences of socioeconomic violence during the war and in the post-war period. As feminist traditions in political economy emphasise the centrality of the household, this paper looks at the sphere of employment and social services within which the political economy of households operates.

To better understand why justice considerations are important for post-war economic reforms, the paper looks at the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, focusing on the socioeconomic dimension of wartime violence and its legacies to illustrate how post-war interventions can fail to redress gender injustice and even entrench it. The Bosnian case is interesting for two reasons. First, it was here that, throughout the 1990s, IFIs started assuming prominent, even ‘quasi-legislative’ functions in post-conflict economies (Boon, 2007; see also Bojičić-Dželilović and Hozić, this issue). Second, looking at Bosnia allows us to provide a much-needed analysis of the relationship between women’s wartime experiences, socioeconomic violence in war, and the economic legacies of the conflict, characterized by a complex overlapping of ethnic cleansing, destruction of property and accumulation of wealth through war profiteering, trafficking, and market fragmentation (Pugh and Cooper, 2004; Andreas, 2009). In sum, the Bosnian case provides important insights into how IFIs become entangled in post-war transitions, and how their interventions operate against the background of past violence without accounting for its legacies.

Following feminist traditions concerned with locating the analysis of violence, (in)justice and agency in lived experiences, the paper focuses on two Bosnian communities in particular, Prijedor, and Zenica, to analyse the gendered impact of IFI-sponsored policies. Despite their different experience of the war, Prijedor and Zenica were connected through the steel production value chain both before the war – when iron ore mined in Prijedor was transported to the Zenica steel mill to be processed – as well as after, once ArcelorMittal acquired part of the Prijedor mines as well as the plant in Zenica. The rationale for selecting these two cities is further explained in a separate section on methods. Evidence from these twinned cities is used to show how post-war reforms reinforced, rather than redressed, gendered socioeconomic injustice.

The key claim advanced by this paper is that overlooking justice considerations (specifically those related to redressing wartime wrongs) in post-war economic reforms not only reflects and reinforces a limited understanding of wartime violence and justice issues, but also entrenches gendered forms of socioeconomic injustice that had their roots in the war. In fact, drawing on the special issue theme, the paper argues that gendered circuits of violence can operate through IFIs interventions that connect *the wartime political economy of conflict and violence* and the *peacetime politics of privatisation, liberalisation and austerity*. It is precisely by following women among marginalized working-class communities – the ‘losers’ of the transition – that the legacies of social injustice deriving from the war become particularly acute and visible. The paper is organized as follows. Following a brief note on methods, the first section discusses the benefits of integrating transitional justice and political economy perspectives when studying socioeconomic justice. The following section articulates the theoretical tenets supporting the analysis of how gendered circuits of violence operate in post-war Bosnia. Here I highlight the disjunction between the selective ways in which past violence and the war are narrated and used politically, and the complex, interlocking forms of injustice that are supported by wartime and post-war political-economic power structures. The third section addresses the gendered political economy of post-war injustice in Bosnia, analysing reforms such as the reorganisation of welfare and jobs, and the deprivation of workers through privatisation, which span across and connect processes of production and social reproduction. Focusing on Prijedor and Zenica, this section illustrates the workings of gendered circuits of socioeconomic violence and injustice, demonstrating that giving limited consideration to wartime violence and its legacies when devising post-war economic reforms is deeply problematic, as it entrenches women’s economic subordination and marginalisation; it further demonstrates the importance of incorporating a justice perspective in IPE, and the potential for feminist approaches to take up the challenge.

# Methods

This paper analyses the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina due to its relevance for understanding subsequent post-conflict transitions and especially the role played by IFIs in these contexts. While informed by country-wide research on Bosnia, the paper focuses on two cities specifically: Prijedor, today located in the Serb-majority entity, Republika Srpska (RS); and Zenica, now part of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH).[[1]](#footnote-1) This division between the two entities stems from the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, which cemented wartime military gains. In fact, Zenica stayed under the control of Bosnian Muslim forces throughout the war, though the city was shelled and involved in the fighting, while Bosnian Serb forces took control of Prijedor in 1992, and began ethnically cleansing the area of Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) and Croats, including the elimination of non-Serb local elites (in what Gratz 2011 has called ‘elitocide’). The link between ethnic cleansing and socioeconomic violence is epitomised by the transformation of Omarska: a key mining site during socialism, it was turned into a camp where war crimes and crimes against humanity were perpetrated during the Bosnian War, and later sold to ArcelorMittal, whose promise of building a memorial on the site was never fulfilled.[[2]](#footnote-2)

The two cities developed as industrial centres during social times thanks to respectively mining and steel production. This development pattern was rather typical of Bosnian and formerly Yugoslav non-capital cities. In Bosnia, with the exception of Sarajevo and Banja Luka, urban centres with populations between 80,000 and 120,000 constituted regional points of reference for work, education, and services. In addition to Prijedor and Zenica, centres such as Mostar, Tuzla, Bijelina, Bihać developed industrially and grew significantly in size thanks to government investments during the socialist period. If Prijedor and Zenica had mining and steel, Mostar had aluminium, and Bihać a large agribusiness conglomerate. The cities were variably mixed in terms of ethnicity, but always presented at least significant minorities from the less represented groups.[[3]](#footnote-3) Industrialisation was certainly a driver of this ethnic diversity, as the factories drew workforce from the surrounding rural areas and in some cases – such as Zenica – from across the country. Because of their connection in the steel production value chain, the cities of Prijedor and Zenica are selected as particularly illustrative cases of the post-war and post-socialist transformations discussed in the paper with reference to gendered forms of socioeconomic injustice. Moreover, as further argued in the theoretical section of the paper, micro-case studies – while placed against the background of national and transnational politics and economics – are well suited for feminist approaches that trace the effects of specific policies, patterns of exclusion and discrimination, violence and inequalities among groups that are traditionally marginalised both in policy formulation and in processes of knowledge production.

Research for this paper was carried out as part of a larger project on socioeconomic violence and justice issues in post-war Bosnia. Interviews and direct observation were carried out during about nine months of fieldwork in 2014-2016, mostly in Sarajevo, Prijedor and Zenica, but also involving shorter fieldtrips to other cities. Carrying out fieldwork during this time gave me a privileged point of view from which to observe the long-term reverberations of socioeconomic injustice in post-war Bosnia – as these years were characterised by social mobilisation and confrontation with state authorities and IFIs regarding some of the conditions attached to the renewal of the IMF Stand-by arrangement, and to an international reform agenda promoted by the IFIs in collaboration with the European Union (EU).[[4]](#footnote-4)

To trace how socioeconomic injustice became entrenched in post-war Bosnia, I use a range of sources. The experiences of Bosnian women were recovered through interviews covering their life story from the period before the war, through the war and the post-war period, following a flexible semi-structured interview format. A sample of 17 in-depth interviews with women informs the analysis presented in this paper, alongside more than 30 other interviews with activists working on justice and socioeconomic issues, and direct observation at activist meetings and protests. Interviewees were selected based on their residence and working history in Prjedor and Zenica, and the interviews analysed thematically to reconstruct women's experiences before, during and after the war.[[5]](#footnote-5)

The paper’s focus is on illustrating the significance of socioeconomic violence and (in)justice for a comprehensive understanding of the gendered implications of IFIs interventions in post-conflict contexts. Therefore, when showing how IFIs-sponsored reforms contributed to the entrenchment of socioeconomic injustice in BiH, the paper also relies on statistics and reports produced by the IFIs themselves, other international organisations, Bosnian government authorities and NGOs, as well as interviews with representatives of the IMF, World Bank, EU and a number of other international actors.[[6]](#footnote-6)

# Towards a ‘justice perspective’ on the political economy of post-conflict transitions

Socioeconomic issues are increasingly recognized as a legitimate concern by transitional justice scholars. This expansion of competences has brought transitional justice closer to political economy studies, but a significant gap still separates them and prevents meaningful dialogue across the two fields. Before the paper addresses (and challenges) this separation within the international intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this section highlights the contribution that taking post-war justice seriously could make to the analysis of post-war political economies.

In its contemporary form, transitional justice attempts to address the legacy of mass human rights abuses and wartime violence in transitional countries. Although the term ‘justice’ in transitional justice is meant to take up different meanings and practical forms depending on the local context, in practice this has often had a narrow, legalistic connotation (Teitel, 2003). The dominance of legalism has come under severe criticism (McEvoy, 2007), especially in light of the limitations of individual convictions in dealing with crimes that possess a collective dimension, such as genocide or crimes against humanity (Subotić, 2011). Despite the variety of transitional justice mechanisms attempted around the globe, spanning from domestic to international trials, truth commissions, reparation programmes, and institutional reforms, scholars have commonly criticized their narrow focus on specific dimensions of violence (Wilson, 2001; Mamdani, 2002), which traditionally did not encompass, if not marginally, socioeconomic and gender violence.

A new wave of critical transitional justice scholarship has taken socioeconomic concerns more seriously as a key component of gender and feminist justice (O’Rourke, 2009; Ní Aoláin, 2012; O’Reilly, 2016), and transformative justice (Lambourne, 2009; Gready and Robins, 2014). Moving forward from the traditional focus on reparations as the key economic tool within the transitional justice framework (Torpey, 2003; de Greiff, 2006), the socioeconomic dimension of transitional justice now refers to the need for remedies to conflict-related violations of socioeconomic or ‘subsistence’ rights (Arbour, 2007; Sankey, 2014), or – more broadly – socioeconomic violence, historical inequalities, or structural violence (Laplante, 2014; McGill, 2017). Different understandings of the socioeconomic dimension of transitional justice evidently call for different remedies. While a narrow focus on socioeconomic rights might entail the use of prosecutions or commissions to ascertain violations and provide compensation (Sankey, 2014), looking at economic violence more broadly requires a systemic or transformative approach to tackling the legacy of violence (Lambourne, 2009; Gready and Robins, 2014). It also entails accounting for the role that pre-existing economic inequalities play in producing wartime gender-based violence, which call for economic interventions as an integral part of post-war remedies (Davies and True, 2017). Despite these positive developments, there is still scepticism as to whether transitional justice could legitimately deal with the socioeconomic legacies of war (Waldorf, 2012; McAuliffe, 2014), and paucity of empirical research on how wartime socioeconomic violence is experienced on the ground.

Therefore, this paper addresses the under-explored connections between wartime violence, post-war justice issues, and political economies. While debates on the nexus of transitional justice and development have touched on these connections (Addison, 2009; de Greiff, 2009), arguments for a ‘development-sensitive’ approach to transitional justice have often relied on a narrow definition of what transitional justice is (thus excluding socioeconomic justice from its purview) (Duthie, 2008), and failed to raise critical questions on the relationship between socioeconomic violence and political economy. Links between economic structures and transitional justice returned at the centre of scholarly attention in the aftermath of the financial crisis, but driven by an interest in efficient spending, economic recovery and growth (Dancy and Wiebellhaus-Brahm, 2015). From a different angle, the field of peacebuilding has addressed political economy questions related to post-conflict reconstruction, aid, and economic reforms, which are considered crucial for building a stable peace. In the 1990s, post-war economic reforms sustained by IFIs were largely inspired by neoliberal principles (see Williamson, 1990; Pugh, 2005), and more often characterized by blindness to individual countries’ histories and circumstances, than by a serious engagement with the socioeconomic legacies of the war (as noted by critical scholars; on the Bosnian case see Pugh and Cooper, 2004; Donais, 2005). Yet, while peacebuilding emphasizes the forward-looking goal of building sustainable peace (on feminist IPE and sustainable peace see also Cohn and Duncanson, this issue), transitional justice points towards the importance of the past and the justice claims deriving from it. This differentiates peacebuilding from transitional justice, and therefore the valuable contribution of studies on the political economy of peacebuilding does not erase the need for a justice perspective in IPE.

While the paper points at the potential for political economy to address the impact of past injustices and legacies of wartime violence, debates on the legacy of the past and its economic implications have been limited so far. One relevant example is the debate on reparations for slavery and other historical injustices committed against black people, which was particularly prominent in the US a few decades ago. Discussions revolved around the need to assess damages, the type of reparations potentially applicable, their impact and different ways of financing them, tapping onto larger debates about redistributive policies and the role of states and markets within capitalist economies (America, 1990; Allen, 1998; Browne, 1993; Darity and Frank, 2003). Another instance where the relevance of the past for political economy became apparent was the post-Apartheid transition of South Africa. Within a few years of the fall of the Apartheid regime, the South African government was implementing neoliberal policies that seriously jeopardized the advancement of black people who had been economically and politically marginalized for decades (Carmody, 2002; Barchiesi, 2011; Marais, 2001 and 2011), while affecting women’s economic, social and physical conditions in particular (Hunter, 2007). Similarly, studying the political economy of a post-conflict country requires an understanding of wartime injustice and its legacies, to be achieved by adopting a critical outlook on the conflict and its political economy that is sensitive towards the justice claims arising from violence and injustice, alongside political-economic ones. By analysing post-war economic reforms from a socioeconomic and gender justice perspective, this paper thus demonstrates the usefulness of bridging the divide between transitional justice and political economy. The following section discusses why a feminist approach developed across justice theories and IPE is considered particularly apt for the task.

# Socioeconomic violence between war and transition

International organisations working in post-conflict countries tend to treat justice issues and political economies as distinct areas of intervention. This is reflected in the beliefs widely held by international officials based in Bosnia, who mostly understand post-war justice in terms of ‘conventional’ efforts such as war crimes trials and rule of law promotion,[[7]](#footnote-7) and in the neat separation between justice issues and economic ones in the division of competences within international organisations,[[8]](#footnote-8) where officials are most likely trained in either one or the other field of expertise. This narrow understanding of post-war justice is problematic not only because it prevents from adequately considering socioeconomic violence in war, but also because it conceals the many ways in which the processes of transitioning from war to peace, and from a socialist to a market economy via a war economy, overlap and intersect. In this paper, it is by following women and their gendered experiences of violence and injustice that we are able to see how international interventions – and specifically those by IFIs – connect the *wartime political economy of conflict and violence* andthe *peacetime politics of privatisation, liberalisation and austerity*. They do so by shutting out justice considerations and the legacies of wartime violence from the process of post-war economic restructuring. This section presents four key theoretical tenets supporting the analysis of gendered circuits of violence operating to reinforce socioeconomic injustice. The paper does not suggest that IFIs single-handedly produced socioeconomic violence or the entrenchment of socioeconomic injustice in Bosnia (or elsewhere). Rather, it articulates how and through what kind of interventions they take part in these circuits. To do so, the following paragraphs outline the role of past systems of violence and injustice, while also paying attention to how the political economies of war and peace can reproduce them, further demonstrating how feminist IPE analysis is essential for the comprehensive understanding of post-conflict transitions. In discussing these four theoretical tenets, the paper acknowledges the importance of sites of analysis and agency that are key to feminist political economy: in addition to the individual, the household and communities (see Hozić and True, this issue; Rai, Hoskyns and Thomas 2014), while emphasising their shifting connections to the workplace and paid employment through the war and post-war times.

First, wartime violence can take various forms, including socioeconomic ones. While this may seem intuitive, it actually runs against predominant representations of wartime violence that inform internationally-sponsored transitional justice programmes. A selective view of wartime violence as physical, direct, and in the Bosnian case ethnicized, underpins the retributive approach to post-war justice adopted in the former Yugoslavia with international support, based on the judicial punishment of perpetrators. This judicial approach ends up constraining representations of violence and trauma, which become disjoined from the actual experience of war (Husanović, 2012). Overcoming these limitations, feminist approaches acknowledge the complexities of these experiences, and reveal the continuities between different forms of violence, spanning from the private to the public sphere, from the war to the post-war period, from individual conditions of destitution to structural inequalities (Tickner, 1992; True, 2012). They also theorize women’s conditions as subject to overlapping and intersecting forms of injustice (Fraser 1995, 2003), which are exacerbated in the context of conflict-related violence and lead to justice claims that go well beyond retribution (O’Reilly 2016). War also affects the shifting links between production and social reproduction that Elias and Rai (2019, see especially figure at p.8) define through the matrix of space, time and violence. Conflict and conflict-related violence disrupt space by pushing productive and reproductive activities into private spaces, for instance by forcing households into subsistence production, and removing social and public spaces for childcare or healthcare; it warps time patterns of work and leisure; and it exacerbates violence that is ordinarily part of the ‘everyday’ but also stems from the extraordinary circumstances of military efforts and social and economic collapse.[[9]](#footnote-9)

By focusing on the legacies of socioeconomic violence – that is, the socioeconomic dimension of wartime violence which is closely connected to the political economy of conflict – this paper tries to emphasize, rather than obscure, the gendered overlaps and intersections of different forms of violence in women’s lived experiences, *and* to understand what aspects of such experiences are accounted for (or not) in post-war justice efforts and economic restructuring, thus being attentive to the global political and economic power structures that shape conditions in post-conflict countries (True, 2012). Far from diminishing the importance of other forms of violence, this approach enables us to recognize and analyse socioeconomic violence while being attentive to how it might occur alongside (or as a continuation of) ethnic cleansing, genocide or war crimes, but also gender-based violence occurring in the temporal continuum between the war and post-war period.

The second element underpinning this paper’s theoretical approach has to do with acknowledging that the separation between political economy and transitional justice is also symptomatic of the international way of dealing with the country’s post-socialist status through a liberal peacebuilding approach. Political-economic reforms in Bosnia did not originate from a careful examination of the conditions of the fall of socialism through war and, in this sense, they actively ‘bracketed’ the past by excluding any alternatives to neoliberal economic restructuring that were reminiscent of ‘socialist era values, narratives, and cultural perspectives’ (Gilbert, 2008, p. 168). Crucially, this prevented adequate consideration of how the condition of women had evolved from the socialist period through the war. This selective view of the past thus further underpins the IFIs’ role in perpetuating socioeconomic injustice after the war, in this case by integrating Bosnia into global markets. Saskia Sassen (2011) has argued that globalisation has created a political-economic reality where survival is feminised, and where profits are created on the back of women’s labour and exploitation. In post-war countries, the situation is worsened due to the consequences of physical gender-based violence, and because wartime destruction can provide further opportunities for economic exploitation and deprivation. As a result of conflict, for instance, the household is not only organically undone through death, disappearance, and trauma, but also it in its ‘materiality’ (Elias and Rai 2019, p. 9), through physical destruction and displacement. A new post-war economic order, established through IFIs intervention, can also engender economic exclusion of women, for instance by redesigning post-war societies based on the (re)establishment of traditional and gendered forms of labour (at home and outside), and where ‘female subjects are depoliticized by being reduced to simplified archetypes devoid of complexity so as to reproduce dominant patriarchal regimes and norms’ (Husanović 2009, p. 106). The bracketing of the socialist past further contributed to depletion by facilitating the disappearance of social services to support social reproduction that were traditionally available in the workplace, with clear gendered effects, as outlined in the following section. In sum, this second point highlights the importance of tracing the emergence of IFIs policies back to their rejection of the socialist past, in addition to a selective view of the war that is alienated from lived experiences of wartime violence. The perpetuation of socioeconomic violence, therefore, is enabled both by a limited understanding of wartime violence, as well as a lack of consideration for how the past is brought to bear onto the formulation of post-war policies.

Drawing on feminist political economy, the third theoretical linchpin of this paper shows the centrality of intersectional divisions within transitional societies, with different groups differently affected by the legacy of war and wartime violence. True (2012, pp. 29-30) has argued that one of the advantages of a political economy approach to studying violence against women resides in its ability to investigate the connections between economic, social, and political realms, and to analyse political and economic power as part of the same, masculine, transnational authority structure. Much of this attention to the operation of power structures is directed at the intersectional nature of inequalities and vulnerabilities that put women at risk. Feminist studies on the GFC have already noted the gendered nature of ‘intersectional inequalities that are both a cause and effect of economic austerity’ (Hozić and True 2017, p. 275; Bruff and Wöhl, 2016; Smith, 2016; Tepe-Belfrage and Montgomerie, 2016). A justice-informed feminist analysis of war and post-war transitions requires articulating the intersectional nature of socioeconomic violence and injustice across different social groups. A political economy approach shows that, during war, workers’ cities and their communities become particularly vulnerable to socioeconomic violence: their factories become military targets, or they are cut off from supply chains, leaving workers physically and economically vulnerable, but making women vulnerable in specific ways: as wartime fighting largely (though not exclusively) involved men, women were also left to bear the brunt of socioeconomic violence in its many forms, as well as direct violence that targeted them as women of a specific ethnicity. Being enlisted in the army entailed physical risks in combat, but also granted steadier access to food supplies that were not available to civilian women, many of whom had lost their jobs in the factories. This illustrates the bivalence of gender injustice as being based both on misrecognition (of one’s identity) and maldistribution (Fraser, 2003), which in the Bosnian case was compounded by the ethnicization of wartime violence and the institutionalisation of ethnicity as a governing principle of the post-war order.

Interethnic and gender-based violence are crucial in order to understand the extent of socioeconomic injustice in the Bosnian context, as different forms of injustice can only be separated analytically, and temporarily, but not in lived experiences of wartime violence. Yet, redressing socioeconomic violence was not made a priority in post-war justice processes. Those suffering from multiple forms of injustice – such as working-class women living in parts of Bosnia where their ethnic group is a minority – constituted the largest group of ‘losers’ of the war, which set out to lose in the transition too, due to post-war economic reforms that reinforced, rather than alleviated, socioeconomic injustice. The following section illustrates this point empirically with reference to processes of privatisation and welfare and labour reforms.

Lastly, a feminist approach can be best placed to address the justice dimension of post-war IFIs interventions by attending to the ways in which global political-economic transformations are situated, experienced, reproduced, or challenged in local contexts. From a methodological perspective, this approach directs our inquiry towards marginalized groups and local communities, where the gendered effects of socioeconomic violence and its reproduction though IFIs interventions become most visible. The analysis of this paper is thus situated in the two Bosnian cities of Prijedor and Zenica. As the Bosnian War entailed economic clashes and destruction as much as fighting and violence among Bosnian Muslim, Serb and Croat forces, the international community intervened through sanctions that contributed to fostering trafficking and black markets that operated in ‘symbiosis’ with the international intervention (Pugh and Cooper, 2004; Andreas, 2009). The economic conduct of the war shaped its aftermath too, as economic crimes were amnestied, well-connected individuals could profit by seizing assets such as factories, to be often privatized on an ethnic basis (Donais, 2002), while entire working-class communities were displaced, fragmented, and economically marginalized. While international organisations, and indeed some transitional justice literature, would treat this context as separated from justice issues, situating the analysis in the micro-cases of Prijedor and Zenica can illustrate the connections between wartime socioeconomic violence and its legacies and the gendered reproduction of socioeconomic injustice through post-war economic reforms analysed in the following section.

The cases of Prijedor and Zenica are illustrative of the country-wide destruction or appropriation of socially-owned industries that destroyed workers’ communities while ‘ethnic’ ones were being fostered and isolated from one another. Prijedor was subject to systematic ethnic cleansing targeting the non-Serb population. The mass dismissal of non-Serb workers in the spring of 1992 was the first step, followed by several other measures aimed at limiting freedom of movement within and outside the city, social interactions and communications. Ultimately, this culminated in the transfer of civilians into mines and factories turned into camps, and killings and torture that ultimately drove away almost all of the city’s Muslim population (Grève, 1994). In Prijedor, violence perpetrated on an interethnic basis had a clear socioeconomic dimension that came to profoundly affect and define people’s experiences of the conflict, and continued to be felt in its aftermath. Even in Zenica, where interethnic violence was less prominent, civilians survived extreme deprivation, exploitation and social marginalisation. Most of the employees of the Zenica steel mill, which had around twenty thousand workers in the late 1980s, where fired or put on waiting lists during the war (UK DfID, 2002a; 2002b), often for failing to report at the factory while displaced due to the conflict. The fall of the city’s main employer, combined with food scarcity due to the war, deprived the civilian population of basic means of survival. ArcelorMittal later bought the Zenica steel mill, as well as part of the Prijedor mines, but – as Vučkovac (2016, p. 2) argues – the company’s presence legitimized the process of privatisation occurred through war and ethnic cleansing, and the ‘smooth cooperation of global capital and local nationalism’. In both cities, the closure of industries entailed the loss of working-class communities that transcended ethnic boundaries, while the post-war institutional system facilitated the entrenchment of ethno-nationalism, which feminist literature has repeatedly linked to gendered social hierarchies and to the reproduction of gender-based violence across times of war and peace (Mostov 1995; Helms 2008 and 2014), both across community lines and within the household, showing how, as argued by Hozić and True (this issue) the latter is both ‘part of the circuits of violence and shaped by them’.

A justice-informed political economy approach highlights the disjunction between the ways in which the past and wartime violence is narrated and used politically, and the more complex political-economy structure supporting interlocking forms of injustice. It breaks down injustice to its constitutive parts to show how they fit together, and denounces a selective view of wartime violence that minimizes the effects of socioeconomic violence, largely borne by women during conflict. In sum, it challenges the separation between political economy and justice issues that contributes to perpetuating social injustice after conflict, by allowing IFIs to intervene without regard for its violent legacies.

# The gendered political economy of injustice in post-war Bosnia

While it is generally accepted that the Dayton Peace Agreement was relatively silent on economic issues compared to political and military ones, the preamble of the Constitution (Annex 4 of the Agreement) does express a commitment ‘to promote the general welfare and economic growth through the protection of private property and the promotion of a market economy’, thus clearly establishing the scope of Bosnia’s post-war transformation. The Agreement also gave the IMF direct influence over the setting up of Bosnia’s new Central Bank, underpinning many fundamental economic choices that would shape the country’s transition, such as the establishment of the new currency and currency board arrangement, as documented in the writings of US Treasury and IMF consultants (Tesche 2000; Coats 2003).[[10]](#footnote-10) While IFIs such as the World Bank, IMF and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), worked in close cooperation with organisations like US Agency for International Development, UN Development Programme, European Union (EU), and the Office of the High Representative (OHR), debates around political-economic transformations were kept isolated from post-war justice strategies, thus making economic reforms blind to the gendered legacies of wartime socioeconomic violence.. This section discusses three ways in which interventions promoted by IFIs in collaboration with other international actors, and implemented by Bosnian governments (especially at entity level), contributed to entrenching injustice. Looking at the impact of these policies reveals the deeply gendered dimension of the reproduction of socioeconomic injustice in post-war Bosnia.

## Reorganising welfare and jobs

Bosnia’s transition from a socialist to a market economy went through the introduction of new labour laws and welfare reforms that – by overlooking women’s experiences of socioeconomic violence – contributed to entrenching injustice. What drove these reforms was the aim of abandoning an active role for the state in promoting employment, resolving the status of workers left on ‘waiting lists’ from the war, and liberalising the labour market, which was a concern of both the IMF and World Bank early on in the transition.[[11]](#footnote-11) Reform agendas from the early transition years, such as the OHR-sponsored ‘Jobs and Justice’ programme, clearly stated that ‘government cannot create jobs’ and that it would be necessary to transform the economy so that it becomes capable of creating jobs, by ‘allowing the free market to flourish’ (OHR, 2004, pp. 4-5). The reforms also had to deal with those workers of socially-owned companies who had been put on ‘waiting lists’ during the war, while their firms were not operating. Many of these factories had ceased production: almost half of industrial facilities had been destroyed during the war, and by 1998 the productive sector employed only 53% of the workers it did in 1991 (Jahović, 1999; World Bank, 2014). While workers on waiting lists were still entitled to receive healthcare and pension contributions, firms often did not keep up with payments (European Training Foundation, 2006, p. 38). Moreover, many Bosnians had been unjustly dismissed during the war due to ethnic discrimination or other personal and political reasons.

The legitimate claims of workers to their rights to work and social services came to be seen by the international community as a legacy of socialism in need of permanent dismantling or reform.[[12]](#footnote-12) The new Labour Laws, approved to comply with IFIs conditions in 1999 (FBiH) and 2000 (RS),[[13]](#footnote-13) set time limits for the extinguishment of waiting lists, and only provided for limited rights to compensation for those unjustly dismissed during the war, falling short of guaranteeing financial redress for lost income or redeployment.[[14]](#footnote-14) Both the 1999/2000 laws and the more recent 2015 (FBiH) and 2016 (RS) Labour Laws[[15]](#footnote-15) also facilitated part-time and temporary employment, reduced severance compensation, and established easier procedures for the dismissal of employees, following the argument that permanent contracts made it harder for businesses to hire new workforce.[[16]](#footnote-16) OHR interventions into pension laws prevented Bosnian authorities from easing the pressure on the labour market through early retirement,[[17]](#footnote-17) and social services were also increasingly privatized and decentralized, with non-governmental actors receiving funds to provide social services ‘at the expense of promoting good social welfare practice’ (Deacon and Stubbs, 1998, p. 110). As Deacon, Lendvai and Stubbs (2007) note, the ability of former Yugoslav states to develop social policies was limited (and guided) by the constrains place by IFIs conditionality on Ministries of Finance. The decentralisation of healthcare, now managed by entity- and cantonal-level health funds, resulted in great inequality of access to good-level health care within the country, and in high costs due to the funds’ weakness in negotiating pharmaceutical provisions.[[18]](#footnote-18) Shrinking social services ultimately aggravated the situation of vulnerable citizens, whose rights to pensions, maternity leave, and healthcare were not adequately protected (Vaša Prava, 2016, p. 40).

Labour and social sector reforms were planned without accounting for the legacies of socioeconomic violence stemming from the war, and contributed to entrench heavily gendered forms of socioeconomic injustice both within households and whole communities in Prijedor and Zenica. During the war, unjust dismissals from work were one dimension of socioeconomic violence largely borne by women who were not drafted in for combat. In Zenica, for instance, women put in charge of carrying children to safer cities in Croatia were fired from the steel mill for failing to report back at work after a period of leave, when travelling back to Bosnia became too dangerous.[[19]](#footnote-19) Dismissals and periods of forced leave also brought loss of income, and the inability to access food supplies, often making women dependent on army packages and humanitarian aid. During the worst phase of the conflict, the situation of one interviewee in Zenica became so dramatic that her body weight shrank to 38 kilograms. As her husband did not come home after the end of the war and she was left alone with two young children, the legacy of wartime deprivation was entrenched in its aftermath, when food reappeared in the shops, but she had no money to buy it, as she had been dismissed from her steel mill job after a light back injury.[[20]](#footnote-20) In Prijedor, the dismissal of non-Serbs was the first step towards the ethnic cleansing of the city. In some strategic sectors like healthcare, female workers were often kept at work for longer than other non-Serbs in the city, only to risk deportation to the infamous Prijedor prison camps once the authorities demanded it.[[21]](#footnote-21)After the war, post-industrial cities like Zenica and Prijedor suffered dramatically. Today less than 30% of the working age population is formally employed in Zenica (Institute for Statistics of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2015). Across BiH, access to credit, activity and employment rates for women are lower than those of men (World Bank, 2015 and 2017b, pp. 7-8). In Prijedor, where most non-Serbs became displaced during the war, very few could exercise the right to request compensation severance pay for unjust dismissal within the time limit set by the RS Labour Law, especially while still being displaced or facing the hostility of local authorities.[[22]](#footnote-22) The Labour Laws also lacked any provision for reinstating employees in their jobs, a widely shared grievance among interviewees, some of whom unsuccessfully tried to renegotiate their re-entry into their old workplace.[[23]](#footnote-23) Moreover, the lack of active employment policies made it particularly hard for returnees in Prijedor to reintegrate into the socioeconomic life of their community. In both cities, the relief for the end of the conflict was compromised by unemployment and lack of social services. While Yugoslav citizens had enjoyed a relatively good standard of life (Grandits and Taylor, 2010), especially if compared to most countries of the communist bloc, at the end of the war people struggled to make sense of the institutions’ lack of care for the widespread deprivation they faced.[[24]](#footnote-24) Looking at the micro-cases of Zenica and Prijedor, and the position of women in these communities, highlights the international organisations’ inability to understand socioeconomic violence as a constitutive part of women’s experiences of wartime violence. Because they did not engage with this gendered dimension of wartime violence, IFIs-sponsored reforms were not able to prevent injustice from becoming entrenched in Bosnian communities and contributing to forms of depletion stemming from social exclusion. Chiefly, among these, emigration has taken a toll on Bosnian households (a majority of interviewees in Prijedor and Zenica had close family members living abroad), and is a gendered phenomenon, as more women than men cancel their residence in BiH each year (55% compared to 45%; BiH Ministry of Security 2016, p. 54).

## The gendered dimension of privatisations

Privatisations were another crucial component of IFIs efforts in Bosnia, and – coupled with the support for micro-credit programmes – constituted a second element in the process of entrenching social injustice after the war. While reforms linked to IMF conditionality in the 1980s had already pushed the Yugoslav market to open up, it was after the war that most privatisations got under way under international pressure (IMF, 1998; for a comprehensive discussion of the IFIs role in Bosnian privatisations see Donais, 2005). Domestic elites also had strong incentives to stir the privatisation process so as to benefit from it, by creating strong patronage networks that would support ethnonationalist parties in power. The privatisation process, more so than labour reforms, depended on IFIs initiative combined with Bosnian elites’ need for external validation (from international actors) and ethnonationalist control over the political and economic system.

At first, similarly to other Eastern European countries, a voucher model was set up, where citizens would be eligible for titles corresponding to lost foreign currency savings, unpaid salaries for soldiers, and as compensation for nationalized property (Jahović, 1999; Tesche, 2000).[[25]](#footnote-25) In practice, Privatisation Investment Funds (PIFs) were often created to acquire privatized property, but these operations largely led to asset-stripping (OHR, 2004). This was due, at least in part, to IFIs requirement that enterprises be sold before being internally restructured, in spite of their generally poor state at the end of the war (Stojanov, 2001). On the other hand, as the international community recognized the shortcomings of this approach, IFIs increasingly sought FDI for large strategic firms yet to be sold (Donais, 2005, p. 143), while giving little financial support to the modernisation of the industrial sector in Bosnia.[[26]](#footnote-26)

Reforms of the ownership structure were carried out in a context of deindustrialisation and dispossession. While the Bosnian economy had relied heavily on industry and mining until 1991, the war destroyed a large part of these industrial facilities (Bojičić and Kaldor 1999, p. 94). It also established new internal borders, across Yugoslav republics and within Bosnia, which separated different parts of the extractive and production sites (Steblez 1998). After social property had been nationalized in 1993, voucher privatisation effectively enabled the transfer of ownership from citizens into private hands. Those who had accumulated wealth during the war, often through black markets and war profiteering, and had developed connections with ethno-nationalist elites, were often best placed to take advantage of the privatisation process. The political economy of the war effectively played a crucial role in determining the reorganisation of property ownership in post-war Bosnia.

The acquisition of the Zenica Steelworks by ArcelorMittal (and its subsequent investment in the Prijedor iron ore mines) was considered a privatisation success story. At the time, this was Bosnia’s largest foreign investment since the end of the war, supported by an EBRD contribution of €25 million in the hope of stimulating further FDI.[[27]](#footnote-27) A closer look at the post-war communities of Prijedor and Zenica, however, shows the contradictory outcomes of ‘successful’ privatisations carried out with no regard for socioeconomic justice. In Zenica, the steel mill now employs one tenth of the approximately 20,000 workers it had before the war, which is half what the privatisation contract required Mittal to keep (Slavnić et al. 2013, p. 43). This had a dramatic impact on the city, and women in particular. In addition to the frustration for not being involved in the privatisation process, the citizens of Zenica now face staggeringly high air pollution levels, which studies have shown to have gendered effects on household care responsibilities and consequently the labour market (Montt 2018).[[28]](#footnote-28) In fact, the installation of filters for the plant was envisaged by the EBRD project, but there was a subsequent lack of monitoring and engagement with the issue of air pollution, on the part of the Bank and other international organisations alike.[[29]](#footnote-29) Additionally, in both cities the fall of socialist industries deprived people of a working-class identity that entailed positive values, especially if contrasted with the exclusive ethnonational identity promoted by Bosnian politicians. Despite the shortcomings of the socialist system on gender disparities, privatisations also deprived women of a workplace where they had been guaranteed some forms of social and economic equality. This had implications not only for individual women, but also for households and whole communities, through the removal of a series of services – such as canteens, holiday resorts for workers and their children, and care services – which had previously provided support social reproductive work that traditionally fell onto women. Thus, exclusion from the workplace gave rise to a particular form of depletion stretching from the household as a site of social reproduction to the workplace as a site of socialisation and community building.

Adding to the loss of employment opportunities in the industrial sector, micro-credit programmes sponsored by international organisations in the early post-war period often contributed to the reestablishment of traditional gender roles.[[30]](#footnote-30) On the one hand, microcredit and employment projects have often focused on ‘women’s jobs’ such as handicraft and knitting. These have been criticized for promoting gender stereotypes, for being planned without taking into account the education level, skills, or aspirations of Bosnian women, and for depoliticising and atomising women’s agency (Pupavac 2005, 2010; Stavrevska 2018). On the other hand, it ultimately became apparent that the schemes had largely failed to alleviate unemployment (Bateman et al., 2012; EBRD, 2015-16),[[31]](#footnote-31) and more commonly constituted a survival mechanism used to cover current expenses, while Bosnian women often relied on informal debts to repay microcredit instalments on time (Jašarević, 2014; see also Johnston in this issue).

Through the war and the post-war economic intervention, gender roles in society were redefined: while during socialism women were expected to actively contribute to the labour market (in addition to household work), the end of the war marked the beginning of a period where the legacies of wartime socioeconomic violence became acutely felt and visible. Faced with the lack of job prospects, and with interventions that did not consider their wartime experiences and post-war expectations for justice and economic recovery, they were drawn into the financialized economy through microcredit loans and other employment projects that were unsuccessful, especially among women with lower income whose activity rates remain extremely low (World Bank, 2017b). Overall, both labour reforms and privatisations, supported and sponsored by the IFIs, failed to acknowledge the need for economic policies to play a role in redressing gendered forms of socioeconomic injustice, thus inevitably sustaining the operation of the circuits of violence discussed in this paper and special issue.

# Conclusion

The analysis of economic reform in the Bosnian transition accomplishes two goals: first, it shows how these political-economic reforms intervene onto, and are deeply intertwined with, post-war justice issues; second, it reveals the economic priorities guiding the reform effort, and illustrates how discounting justice issues aggravated a condition of socioeconomic injustice that was particularly felt among women in peripheral or marginalized Bosnian communities in the aftermath of the war. The political economy of the war partly based on destruction, dispossession, and trafficking, as well as on the dismantling of workers’ communities, turned into a peacetime intervention that responded to IFIs economic agendas while discounting the gendered consequences of wartime violence. In fact, one of the main aims of the paper has been to show that changes to labour legislation and industrial policies did not occur in a vacuum. Rather, they intervened onto this pre-existing situation of socioeconomic injustice that was not only left unaddressed, but was even aggravated by the international efforts at economic reform. Rather than intentionality on the part of IFIs and their international partners (which the paper does not attempt to prove), the discussion of reforms shows that this lack of consideration for justice issues reflects a narrow understating of post-war processes of dealing with the past, which is further reinforced by the unhelpful separation between transitional justice and political economy.

An IPE approach that is feminist and has justice considerations at its core can, instead, reveal how different forms of violence and injustice, during war, overlap and intersect. This is particularly important in a context where dominant transitional justice approaches reinforce a selective view of wartime violence that excludes the socioeconomic dimension of gender-based violence, and where international organisations narrow down political options by avoiding engagements with the legacies of socialism. In fact, the analysis of IFIs intervention shows, for instance, that the reorganisation of welfare and jobs was blind to the ways in which women had borne the brunt of socioeconomic violence in war, and were being once again excluded from a fair reintegration in social and economic life by neoliberal reforms. By not attending to the micro-context of post-industrial, post-war, post-socialist cities like Prijedor and Zenica, international actors also pushed women towards inactivity and unemployment, or towards fulfilling more ‘traditional’ professional and social roles. Jasmina Husanović (2009) suggests that the importance of adopting ‘Bosnian lenses’ when making sense of gender politics resides in the power of witnessing, which constitutes a way of continuously reshaping and questioning established identities and affiliations. Witnessing to the ‘twin crises’ of ‘(post)-war trauma’ and ‘(post)-socialist losses’ or destitution (Husanović, 2009, p. 100) represents a way, for Bosnian feminists, to escape a political order that ties post-war stability to subordination and violence. What the paper shows, ultimately, is that IFIs in Bosnia played a crucial role in supporting post-war economic stability and reform at the expense of gender justice.

In sum, giving limited consideration to wartime violence and its legacies when devising post-war economic reforms does not break the gendered circuits of violence and injustice that link war and peace, thus prolonging injustice and producing the basis for new forms of violence, and potentially of conflict. Here lies the importance of incorporating a justice perspective in IPE: considering post-war justice alongside political economy in international interventions is crucial for a comprehensive approach to post-war transitions, and feminist approaches are particularly suited to highlighting the relevance of structural injustice and inequalities in hindering meaningful economic and social reconstruction. IFIs, while affecting directly the lives of post-war communities, are still relatively impermeable to attempts at making international actors accountable for gender-just peace. In his respect, one of the implications of this paper is that making women part of peace and justice processes is necessary, but not sufficient, as many important decisions affecting post-war transitions are taken in consultations with and among IFIs. The voices of women, and especially those from disadvantaged communities that still bear the greatest costs of the war, should be more present in conversations over the socioeconomic setup of post-war countries.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments, the participants to the panel at the 11th Pan-European Conference in International Studies (Barcelona, September 2017) where the paper was first presented, and especially Aida Hozić and Jacqui True for their support and advice throughout the writing and revision process.

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1. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is composed of two entities, the FBiH and RS, and the Brčko District. The FBiH is further divided into ten cantons with majority Bosnian Muslim (or Bosniak) or Bosnian Croat population. The entities, cantons and the Brčko District each elect their own assemblies and form governments. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. On the memorial controversy, see Refik Hodžić Shadow of London ‘Orbit’ in Bosnia: Mittal Suppresses Memories of Omarska, Balkan Transitional Justice, 20/Apr/2012, available at <https://balkaninsight.com/2012/04/20/mittal-suppresses-memories-of-omarska/>, last accessed 27/Jul/2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Demographic data for these cities comes from the pre-war 1991 census, available at <http://fzs.ba/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Etnicka-obiljezja-stanovnistva-bilten-233.pdf> ; and the first post-war census carried out in 2013, available at <http://www.popis.gov.ba/popis2013/doc/RezultatiPopisa\_BS.pdf>, both accessed 15/Jul/2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. On the Stand-by arraignment see IMF (2018); on the EU-led initiative (involving the IFIs) ‘Compact for Growth and Jobs’ see the EU Delegation to BiH webpage at <https://europa.ba/?page\_id=547>, last accessed 15/Jul/2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. The broader study included interviews across genders and various other locations in BiH, which corroborate the evidence presented in this paper. A total of 80 in-depth interviews were carried out between 2014 and 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Interviews were carried out with representatives of the EU Delegation (April 2015), World Bank, IMF, Office of the High Representative, OSCE and UNDP (May 2015), and a number of local and international NGOs and activists (multiple fieldtrips between 2014 and 2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Interviews with international officials in Sarajevo, 30/Apr/2015, 27/May/2015, 4/Jun/2015, 5/Aug/2015, 13/Aug/2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Interviews with international officials in Sarajevo,6/May/2015, 30/Apr/2015. See also the separation between the sectors of Justice, Home Affairs and Public Administration Reform, Economic Development, Natural Resources, Infrastructures and Social Development, Civil Society and Cross-Border Operations in the EU Mission to BiH, at <http://europa.ba/?page\_id=468>, accessed 30/Jan/2018; see the UNDP separation between Justice and Security sector and Social Inclusion and Democratic Governance sector, <http://www.ba.undp.org/content/bosnia\_and\_herzegovina/en/home/operations/about\_undp.html>, accessed 30/Jan/2018. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. On the role of war and social breakdown in exacerbating violence see Elias and Rai 2019, p. 15; see also True 2012 and Rai, True and Tanyag (2019, forthcoming). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. This is outlined in Article VII of the DPA. The IMF and other IFIs took part in other foundational economic reform projects, such as the transformation of the payment bureaux. See Zaum (2005). [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. See for instance the World Bank Group (2000, p.2), stating the Bank’s and IMF support for labour reforms linked to, respectively, IDA adjustment lending and a Stand-by Arrangement. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. See EU Delegation to BiH, Compact for Growth and Jobs, <http://europa.ba/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/delegacijaEU\_2014090816171626eng.pdf>, last accessed 23/Jan/2018; they are referred to as ‘ghost workers’ who are ‘just clinging on to the past’. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. See World Bank (2000) and the Bosnian Government’s Letters of Intent of 23 February 2000, available at https://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2000/bih/01/ and 4 December 2000 available at https://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2000/bih/02/, both accessed 11/Jul/2019. The IMF made other welfare reforms, such as pensions and healthcare, part of its conditions for the 1998 Stand-by Arrangement, see IMF (1998). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Labour legislation in Bosnia falls within the competence of entities. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. The approval of the new 2015-16 labour laws was a condition for the renewal of the IMF Stand-by arrangement. See IMF (2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Labour Law of the Federation of BiH, Official Gazette of the Federation of BiH 26/16; Labour Law of Republika Srpska, Official Gazette of Republika Srpska 1/16. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. See OHR, Decision amending the RS Law on Pension and Disability Insurance, providing for financial feasibility and independence, 11/Dec/2000, <http://www.ohr.int/?p=68025>, accessed 30/Jan/2018. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Interview with international official, Sarajevo, 14/May/2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Interview, woman from Zenica, 4/Jun/2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Interview, woman from Zenica, 4/Jun/2015,8/Jun/2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Interview, woman from Prijedor, 19/Jul/2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. According to Vaša Prava Prijedor, many of these claims are still pending (Interview, Prijedor, 10/Jul/2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. See for instance interviews with: woman from Zenica, 8/Jun/2015; woman from Prijedor 12/Jul/2015; woman from Prijedor, 14/Jul/2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Interview, woman from Zenica, 4/Jun/2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Property in Yugoslavia was socially owned and had to be nationalized before the state could privatize it. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. See the EBRD website at <http://www.ebrd.com/bosnia-and-herzegovina-data.html> accessed 30/Jan/2018. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. See the EBRD website at <http://www.ebrd.com/work-with-us/projects/psd/arcelormittal-zenica-.html>, accessed 30/Jan/2018. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. According to data from the environmental NGO Eko Forum, levels of SO2 and PM10 in the air have been constantly above the legal limit since 2004. In 2015, the annual average concentration of PM10 in Zenica was 120 μg/m3 (the legal limit set by the EU is 40 μg/m3). [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. See supra note 28. On lack of concern with air pollution, see interview with Eko Forum, 1/Jul/2015; and author’s observations from meeting ‘Conversations with the Citizens’ in East Sarajevo, May 2015, where the issue of air pollution was raised in the Q&A. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. See the EBRD website at <http://www.ebrd.com/cs/Satellite?c=Content&cid=1395245312978&pagename=EBRD%2FContent%2FContentLayout> and <http://www.ebrd.com/work-with-us/projects/psd/usebrd-sme-procredit-bank-bosnia.html>, on loans to the Micro Enterprise Bank. See also the USAID website at <https://2012-2017.usaid.gov/bosnia/fact-sheets/usaid-assistance-bosnia-and-herzegovina>, last accessed 22 March 2018. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Bosnia is the only Western Balkan country not to have reached pre-2008 crisis employment levels by 2017 (World Bank, 2017a, p. 7) [↑](#footnote-ref-31)